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PREFACE 
The f o s t e r i n g  of increased awareness and u s e  of a v a i l a b l e  resources  by 
a i rc rews  under high workload cond i t ions  is becoming a m a t t e r  of g r e a t e r  
concern t o  t h e  a i r l i n e s .  New r e sea rch  and t r a i n i n g  programs t o  enhance 
aircrew c a p a b i l i t i e s  are being developed , l a r g e l y  independently,  by t h e  
va r ious  o rgan iza t ions  involved. The t iming appeared appropr i a t e  f o r  an  
exchange of i deas  and information t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and, 
accord ingly ,  a NASA-Industry Workshop devoted t o  Resource Management on t h e  
F l i g h t  Deck w a s  organized by G. E. Cooper Assoc ia tes  f o r  t h e  Aviat ion Safe ty  
Research Of f i ce  of Ames Research Center.  The Workshop w a s  held a t  t h e  Jack  
Tar Hotel  i n  San Franc isco ,  Ca l i fo rn ia ,  June 26-28, 1979. P a r t i c i p a n t s  
included sen io r  o f f i c e r s  of major a i r l i n e s  who are re spons ib l e  f o r  aircrew 
t r a i n i n g ;  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of cognizant  government agencies ;  and special is ts  
i n  human f a c t o r s  work as i t  a p p l i e s  t o  aircrew opera t ions .  
This  r e p o r t  p re sen t s  t h e  proceedings of t h e  Workshop. I n  some cases 
t h e  papers  are taken from a verbat im t r a n s c r i p t  of t h e  proceedings; i n  o the r  
cases, they  r ep resen t  formal submi t t a l s .  John K. Lauber, Ames Research 
Center,  NASA, and Capt. A. A. Fr ink ,  Pan American World A i r l i n e s ,  w e r e  
cochairmen of t h e  Workshop. 
The Workshop comprised four  se s s ions :  
Session 1. Formal p re sen ta t ions  by nonindustry r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  on t h e  
background and human f a c t o r s  a s p e c t s  of t h e  problem. 
Session 2 .  Formal p re sen ta t ions  by a i r l i n e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  desc r ib ing  
cu r ren t  i ndus t ry  approaches t o  t r a i n i n g  f o r  r e source  management. 
Sess ion  3 .  Small-group d i scuss ions  and ana lyses  by p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  aimed 
a t  developing conclusions and recommendations f o r  e f f e c t i v e  r e source  
management t r a i n i n g .  Resul t s  w e r e  r epor t ed  t o  assembled p a r t i c i p a n t s  by 
chairmen of t h e  ind iv idua l  groups. A gene ra l  d i scuss ion  of working group 
r e p o r t s  is included. 
Sess ion  4 .  Summary of t h e  Workshop. 
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RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ON THE FLIGHT DECK: 
BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
* 
John K. Lauber 
INTRODUCTION 
The t h e s i s  presented i n  t h i s  paper is  s t ra ight forward:  one of t h e  
p r i n c i p a l  causes  of i n c i d e n t s  and acc iden t s  i n  c i v i l  j e t  t r a n s p o r t  ope ra t ions  
is  t h e  l a c k  of e f f e c t i v e  management of a v a i l a b l e  resources  by t h e  f l igh t -deck  
crew. It is f u r t h e r  argued t h a t  p re sen t  aircrew t r a i n i n g  programs could be 
augmented t o  improve f l igh t -deck  management. The purpose of t h i s  paper i s  t o  
d i s c u s s  previous r e sea rch  and o the r  d a t a  t h a t  l ead  t o  t h e s e  conclus ions ,  and 
t o  present  some concepts  t h a t  he lp  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  problem and t o  suggest  some 
poss ib l e  approaches toward i ts  s o l u t i o n .  
THE PILOT INTERVIEW STUDY 
The present  human-factors-in-aviation-safety r e sea rch  program a t  A m e s  
Research Center w a s  begun i n  1973. I n  an  e f f o r t  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  most 
r e l e v a n t  and p res s ing  r e s e a r c h  i s s u e s ,  and t o  l e a r n  more about t h e  human 
f a c t o r s  problems encountered dur ing  r o u t i n e  l i n e  ope ra t ions ,  NASA conducted 
s t r u c t u r e d ,  c o n f i d e n t i a l  in te rv iews  wi th  a i r l i n e  crewmembers. This  i n t e r -  
view problem, which w a s  conducted wi th  t h e  f u l l  cooperat ion of management and 
union r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  a number of i n t e r e s t i n g  i s s u e s  being 
brought t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  of t h e  NASA resea rch  team. O f  most d i r e c t  i n t e r e s t  
he re  w e r e  i s s u e s  r e l a t e d  t o  c r e w  t r a i n i n g  and, s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t r a i n i n g  f o r  new 
capta ins .  General ly ,  t hose  p i l o t s  who mentioned t r a i n i n g  dur ing  the  i n t e r -  
views expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n  wi th  t h e  t r a i n i n g  they  receive i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  
a s p e c t s  of f l y i n g  and i n  f l y i n g  s k i l l s .  The d i f f i c u l t y  r e l a t e d  more t o  
i s s u e s  such as how t o  be  a more e f f e c t i v e  l e a d e r ,  and how t o  achieve  more 
e f f e c t i v e  crew coord ina t ion  and improved communication wi th in  t h e  cockpi t .  
One new c a p t a i n  s t a t e d  t h e  problem as fol lows:  "My company t r a i n s  p i l o t s  
very  w e l l ,  bu t  no t  c a p t a i n s  - command t r a i n i n g  is  needed." A f l i g h t  
engineer  f e l t  s t rong ly  t h a t  " P i l o t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c a p t a i n s ,  ought t o  be given 
s p e c i f i c  t r a i n i n g  i n  human behavior and human r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  . . t h e r e  is too  
much emphasis on t h e  t e c h n i c a l  s i d e  of f l y i n g ,  and too  l i t t l e  upon t h e s e  
' s o f t e r '  i s sues . "  
genera l  f e e l i n g  among f l i g h t  crewmembers t h a t  t h e r e  is  a need f o r  t r a i n i n g  
i n  areas o the r  than manual c o n t r o l  and systems opera t ions .  
Many o t h e r  comments w e r e  rece ived  t h a t  pointed t o  a 
"Ames Research Center, NASA, Mof f et t F ie ld  , Cal i fo rn ia  . 
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FULL-MISSION SIMULATION STUDY 
The next major s t imu lus  f o r  conducting t h e  resource  management t r a i n i n g  
research came from a fu l l -miss ion  s imula t ion  study conducted by R u f f e l l  Smith 
and co l leagues  ( r e f .  1 ) .  That s tudy ,  which made use  of a B-747 t r a i n i n g  
s imula to r ,  analyzed t h e  frequency and kinds of e r r o r s  committed by q u a l i f i e d  
l i n e  crews dur ing  a simulated r o u t i n e  l i n e  t r i p  segment, and du r ing  a segment 
i n  which a mechanical problem w a s  introduced t h a t  necess i t a t ed  an  engine 
shutdown and a d i v e r s i o n  from t h e  o r i g i n a l  f l i g h t  p l an .  A l l  normal communica- 
t i o n s  were s imula ted ,  as w e l l  as o t h e r  f a c t o r s  t h a t  are known t o  be d i s -  
t r a c t i n g ,  bu t  no t  i nhe ren t ly  dangerous. For example, dur ing  the  more 
d i f f i c u l t  second segment, a cab in  a t t e n d a n t  f r equen t ly  c a l l e d  t h e  cockpi t  
v i a  t h e  crew interphone t o  make va r ious  r eques t s  o r  a s k  ques t ions  of t he  
f l i g h t  c r e w .  Other elements of t h e  s imula t ion  included ATC s e r v i c e s ,  weather, 
closed runways a t  t h e  d i v e r s i o n  a i r p o r t ,  and an inope ra t ive  a u t o p i l o t ,  which 
f u r t h e r  increased  p i l o t  workload. The scena r ios  were cons t ruc ted  i n  such a 
way t h a t  good crew coord ina t ion ,  cockpi t  communications, decisionmaking, 
and planning s k i l l s  w e r e  r equ i r ed ,  but no t  so complex as t o  preclude an 
e n t i r e l y  s a f e  ope ra t ion  provided t h e s e  s t e p s  were taken. 
Twenty volunteer  l i n e  crews f lew t h e s e  simulated t r i p s .  The v a r i e t y  of 
behavior observed w a s  most i l l umina t ing .  Problems were observed i n  com- 
munication, decisionmaking, crew i n t e r a c t i o n  and i n t e g r a t i o n ,  and i n  an a r e a  
subsequently c a l l e d  "resource management." 
R u f f e l l  Smith and h i s  co l leagues  t h a t  one of t h e  major v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  
influenced how e f f e c t i v e l y  and s a f e l y  a crew handled t h e  problem s i t u a t i o n s  
presented them w a s  their  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  and u t i l i z i n g  t h e  
va r ious  material and human re sources  a v a i l a b l e  t o  them. The e f f e c t s  of 
s t rong  l eade r sh ip ,  o r  t h e  l a c k  t h e r e o f ,  were r e a d i l y  apparent ,  and g r e a t l y  
influenced t h e  frequency and s e v e r i t y  of t h e  e r r o r s  observed. 
S p e c i f i c a l l y  i t  appeared t o  
Events surrounding one p a r t i c u l a r  s e c t i o n  of t h e  high workload 
scena r io  w e r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i l l umina t ing  w i t h  regard  t o  t h e  r e source  manage- 
ment i s s u e .  Because of t h e  forced  d i v e r s i o n ,  i t  was necessary t o  dump f u e l  
i n  o rde r  t o  reduce t h e  a i r c r a f t  g ros s  weight t o  an accep tab le  va lue  f o r  
landing. During t h e  f u e l  dump procedure, which p l a c e s  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  heavy 
load on t h e  f l i g h t  engineer ,  t h e  cab in  a t t endan t  c a l l e d  t h e  f l i g h t  engineer 
w i th  a r eques t  t o  c a l l  i n  a l ist  of passenger names s o  t h a t  s u i t a b l e  con- 
n e c t i o n s  t o  t h e i r  d e s t i n a t i o n s  could be made. Many of t h e  f l i g h t  engineers  
attempted t o  comply w i t h  t h i s  r eques t ,  and t h e  subsequent d i v e r s i o n  of 
a t t e n t i o n  from t h e  f u e l  dumping procedure l e d  t o  some i n t e r e s t i n g  e r r o r s ,  
inc luding  one in s t ance  of a 100,000 lb e r r o r  i n  c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
g ros s  weight. Of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  here ,  however, were t h e  va r ious  ways 
d i f f e r e n t  c a p t a i n s  managed t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  and t h e  e f f e c t  of t h i s  on t h e  k inds  
and f requencies  of e r r o r s  committed. I n  some ins t ances ,  t h e  c a p t a i n  played 
a ve ry  active management r o l e  by s e t t i n g  p r i o r i t i e s  and d i r e c t i n g  t h e  f l i g h t  
engineer t o  postpone the c a l l  t o  the company u n t i l  a f t e r  t h e  f u e l  dump and 
o t h e r  more important o p e r a t i o n a l  requirements were m e t .  I n  t h e s e  in s t ances ,  
r e l a t i v e l y  few e r r o r s  were observed. In o t h e r  cases, however, t h e  c a p t a i n  
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e i t h e r  f a i l e d  t o  no te  t h e  r eques t  from t h e  cabin  a t t e n d a n t ,  o r  d id  nothing 
t o  in te rvene  i n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  Many e r r o r s  w e r e  noted i n  t h e s e  circum- 
s t ances ,  and i t  w a s  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  series of observa t ions  t h a t  l ed  most 
d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of resource  management behavior as being a 
most important v a r i a b l e  i n  f l igh t -deck  ope ra t ions  and t o  t h e  subsequent 
e f f o r t  t o  s t i m u l a t e  t h e  development of improved t r a i n i n g  f o r  resource  
management s k i l l s .  
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA 
I n  order  t o  gain more i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  resource  management problem and 
t o  ob ta in  resource  material t h a t  might be used i n  a resource  management 
t r a i n i n g  program, NASA p r o j e c t  personnel  undertook a review and a n a l y s i s  of 
j e t  t r a n s p o r t  acc iden t s .  On t h e  b a s i s  of t h i s  review, more than 60 acc iden t s  
i n  t h e  per iod 1968-1976 w e r e  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  which resource  management problems 
played a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  (see t a b l e  1 f o r  a complete l i s t ) .  Some examples 
follow. 
I n  December 1972, a wide-body t r a n s p o r t  a i r c r a f t  crashed i n  t h e  
Everglades near  Miamiwhile  t h e  f l i g h t  crew w a s  a t tempt ing  t o  r e p l a c e  a 
f a u l t y  nose gear  l i g h t .  The subsequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n  revealed t h e  fol lowing 
sequence of events  as repor ted  i n  t h e  o f f i c i a l  acc iden t  r e p o r t :  
A t  2336:04 t h e  c a p t a i n  i n s t r u c t e d  t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r ,  who was f2yin.g the 
a i r c r a f t  [ i t a l i c s  added],  t o  engage t h e  a u t o p i l o t .  
A minute later:  
The f i r s t  o f f i c e r  success fu l ly  removed t h e  nose gear  l i g h t  l e n s  
assembly, bu t  i t  jammed when he  attempted t o  r e p l a c e  i t .  
A t  2338:34, t h e  c a p t a i n  aga in  d i r e c t e d  t h e  second o f f i c e r  t o  
descend i n t o  t h e  forward e l e c t r o n i c s  bay and check t h e  a l ign -  
ment of t h e  nose gear  i nd ices .  
From 2338:56 t o  2341:05, t h e  c a p t a i n  and t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  
discussed t h e  f a u l t y  nose gear  p o s i t i o n  l i g h t  l ens  assembly 
and how it  might have been i n s e r t e d  i n c o r r e c t l y .  
A t  2340:38, a half-second C-Chord which ind ica t ed  a dev ia t ion  
of +/-250 f t  from t h e  s e l e c t e d  a l t i t u d e  sounded i n  t h e  cockpi t .  
No crew member commented on t h e  C-chord. No p i t c h  change t o  
c o r r e c t  f o r  t h e  loss  of a l t i t u d e  w a s  recorded. 
A t  2342:12...the a i r c r a f t  crashed i n t o  t h e  Everglades.  
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The NTSB r e p o r t  co 
r o u t i n e  of f l  c t i o n s  usua l ly  do no 
t h e  o the r  f l i  cause of t h e i r  shor 
o r  t h e i r  r o u t i n e  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  f l y i n g  task .  However, 
t h e  fol lowing took p l ace  i n  t h i s  acc ident :  
1. The approach and landing r o u t i n e  w a s  i n t e r rup ted  by 
an  abnormal gear  i nd ica t ion .  
2 .  The a i r c r a f t  was flown t o  a s a f e  a l t i t u d e ,  and t h e  
a u t o p i l o t  w a s  engaged t o  reduce workload, but posit ive 
deZegation of aircraf t  controZ was not accompZished [ i t a l i c s  
added]. 
3 .  The nose gear  p o s i t i o n  l i g h t  l e n s  assembly w a s  removed 
and i n c o r r e c t l y  r e i n s t a l l e d .  
4 .  The f i r s t  o f f i c e r  became preoccupied [ i t a l i c s  added] 
wi th  h i s  a t t e m p t s  t o  remove t h e  jammed l i g h t  assembly. 
5. The c a p t a i n  divided his  attention [ i t a l i c s  added] 
between a t tempts  t o  he lp  t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  and o rde r s  t o  t h e  
o the r  crewmembers t o  t r y  o the r  approaches t o  t h e  problem. 
6. 
d i s t r a c t i o n ,  wi th  minimal regard f o r  o the r  f l i g h t  requirements.  
The f l i g h t  crew devoted approximately 4 min t o  t h e  
And f i n a l l y :  
The c a p t a i n  f a i l e d  t o  a s s u r e  that a p i l o t  w a s  monitoring t h e  
progress  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  a t  a l l  times. 
I n  t h e  same month as t h a t  i n  which t h e  previous acc ident  occurred,  a 
B-737 crashed s h o r t  of t h e  runway a t  Midway a i r p o r t  i n  Chicago. A s  i n  t h e  
previous acc iden t ,  a minor mechanical malfunct ion d i s t r a c t e d  t h e  f l i g h t  
crew s u f f i c i e n t l y  so  t h a t  p o s i t i o n  awareness w a s  apparent ly  l o s t .  
c r a f t  crossed t h e  F ina l  Approach F ix  700 f t  above t h e  published minimum 
cross ing  a l t i t u d e ,  wi th  t h e  a i r c r a f t  no t  configured f o r  t h e  landing. 
The air- 
The o f f i c i a l  a c  
The preponderanc tes t h a t  t h e  rush  of cockpi t  
a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i  descent  caused a breakdown of t h e  
safeguards inhe  ask-sharing of a crew. The e r ro r -  
provoking env ir o m  e s t a g e  f o r  t h e  crew's f a i l u r e  t o  
n o t i c e  t h a t  t h e  s p o i l e r s  w e r e  s t i l l  extended a t  level-off  and 
t o  arrest t h e  r ap id  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of a i r speed  t h a t  followed. 
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Although a g r e a t e r  p o r t i o n  of t h i s  a n a l y s i s  d e a l s  w i th  t h e  
events  surrounding t h e  l eve l -o f f ,  t h e  board wishes t o  
emphasize t h a t  t h e  acc ident  sequence w a s  t r i gge red  by the 
captain's fai lure t o  exercise posit ive f l i g h t  management 
earlier during the approach [ i ta l ics  added]. 
I n  s t i l l  another  j e t  t r a n s p o r t  acc iden t ,  t h e  NTSB wrote:  
Cont r ibu t ing  c a u s a l  f a c t o r s  were. . . the c a p t a i n ' s  f a i l u r e  
t o  d e l e g a t e  any meaningful r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t o  t h e  c o p i l o t  
which r e s u l t e d  i n  a l a c k  of e f f e c t i v e  t a s k  sha r ing  dur ing  
t h e  emergency. 
Af te r  a more r ecen t  acc iden t  i n  which a cargo l i n e r  crashed i n t o  h igh  t e r r a i n  
whi le  t h e  f l i g h t  c r e w  w a s  a t tempt ing  t o  r e s o l v e  a mechanical problem, t h e  
NTSB wrote:  
Since t h i s  type  of s i t u a t i o n  is dynamic because t h e  a i r c r a f t  
must be flown whi le  t h e  malfunct ion is reso lved ,  i t  fo l lows  
t h a t  t h e  cap ta in  must manage the f l i g h t  crew [ i ta l ics  added] 
i n  a manner which w i l l  i n s u r e  a b s o l u t e  s a f e  ope ra t ion  of t h e  
a i r c r a f t  dur ing  t h e  i n t e r i m . . . I t  remains t h a t  t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  
f i r s t  and foremost r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  t o  i n s u r e  s a f e  ope ra t ion  
of the a i r c r a f t .  To achieve  t h i s  ob jec t ive ,  he must r e l e g a t e  
o the r  ac t iv i t i e s  accordingly.  
These acc iden t s  s h a r e  some common f a c t o r s ,  each of which is an  element of 
t h e  r e source  management problem. 
observed problems i n  t h e s e  acc iden t s .  
L i s t ed  below are t h e  most f r equen t ly  
-Preoccupat ion wi th  minor mechanical problems 
*Inadequate  l eade r sh ip  
* F a i l u r e  t o  d e l e g a t e  t a s k s  and a s s i g n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
' F a i l u r e  t o  set p r i o r i t i e s  
Inadequate monitor ing 
* F a i l u r e  t o  u t i l i z e  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  
* F a i l u r e  t o  communicate i n t e n t  and p l ans  
Co l l ec t ive ly ,  t h e  i t e m s  l i s t e d  above suggest  a d e f i n i t i o n  of "resource 
management" and a l s o  suggest  some p o s s i b l e  t r a i n i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  t h a t  should be 
addressed by any r e source  management t r a i n i n g  program. 
no te  t h a t  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  were a l s o  observed i n  t h e  R u f f e l l  Smith s tudy,  and 
are a l s o  common f e a t u r e s  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  i nc iden t  d a t a  d iscussed  below. 
It is i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  
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AIRCRAFT INCIDENT DATA 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  reviewing t h e  t r a n s p o r t  acc ident  record ,  a search  of t h e  
Aviat ion Safe ty  Reporting System d a t a  base  w a s  conducted. The o b j e c t i v e s  of 
t h i s  s ea rch  were similar t o  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  acc iden t  a n a l y s i s ,  namely, 
t o  o b t a i n  a d d i t i o n a l  d a t a  t h a t  f u r t h e r  r e f i n e  our understanding of resource  
management as it  a p p l i e s  t o  f l igh t -deck  ope ra t ions ,  and t o  f i n d  material 
t h a t  may have educa t iona l  value.  A t  t h e  t i m e  t h e  search  w a s  conducted, t h e  
ASRS d a t a  base  contained nea r ly  7,000 r e p o r t s .  
t r a n s p o r t  opera t ions  only,  recovered 670 inc iden t  r e p d r t s  t h a t  were r e l evan t  
t o  t h e  i s s u e  of resource  management. Some t y p i c a l  examples of ASRS inc iden t  
r e p o r t s  fol low.  
The search ,  which covered j e t  
During t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  PA t a l k  t o  t h e  passengers ,  w e  received a 
change of heading and a l t i t u d e  from 9,000 up t o  14,000. The 
c a p t a i n  s t a r t e d  t h e  climb and changed power whi le  t a l k i n g .  
When he f i n i s h e d  t a l k i n g ,  t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  s a i d  t o  t u r n  l e f t  
t o  160". The c a p t a i n  turned t h e  a i r c r a f t  and kept  climbing-- 
16,000 f t  w a s  i n  t h e  a l t i t u d e  reminder window. W e  l eve led  
of f  a t  16,000 and c a l l e d  depa r tu re  c o n t r o l  and requested higher .  
We w e r e  advised t h a t  w e  should be on Center frequency. W e  
c a l l e d  Center ,  and he  asked i f  t h i s  w a s  our f i r s t  c a l l .  W e  s a i d  
yes ,  and Center asked f o r  our a l t i t u d e .  W e  r e p l i e d  16,000, and 
Center s a i d  w e  should be a t  14,000, bu t  t o  climb ins t ead  t o  
FL230. W e  don ' t  know who put  16,000 i n  t h e  window of 
of t h e  a l t i t u d e  reminder; w e  could not  recall any conversa t ion  
about changing t o  Center.  I f e e l  that it is p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  
c a p t a i n  misunderstood t h e  160 as a n  a l t i t u d e  in s t ead  of a heading 
and put  160 i n  t h e  a l t i t u d e  reminder. 
wi th  something else and d i d n ' t  see t h e  wrong a l t i t u d e  i n  t h e  
window. Nei ther  t h e  c a p t a i n  nor t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  remember p u t t i n g  
160 i n  t h e  window. 
We did .  
F i r s t  o f f i c e r  w a s  busy 
Another r e p o r t  which i l l u s t r a t e s  another  a spec t  of t h e  problem w a s  
received from a n  a i r l i n e  capta in :  
Our a i r c r a f t  a r r i v e d  i n  Omaha. I went i n t o  t h e  ope ra t ions  
o f f i c e  t o  check t h e  weather. On, r e t u r n i n g  t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
I asked t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  i f  w e  had a n  ATC c learance .  H e  
r e p l i e d  t h a t  w e  d i d .  I asked him what it w a s .  H e  s a i d ,  
"Cleared as f i l e d ,  maintain 5,000, expect 11,000 10 min a f t e r  
departure ."  Our f l i g h t  p l ans  are a l l  Center-stored and I 
asked him how w e  w e r e  f i l e d  so t h a t  I could v e r i f y  t h e  
rou t ing  I had on my Center-stored f l i g h t  plan.  The f i r s t  
o f f i c e r ' s  "as f i l e d "  w a s  t h e  same as mine, namely, V159 STJ 
d i r e c t  M C I .  The depa r tu re  went normally. W e  were handed 
of f  t o  Center (Minneapolis) as I f l ew t h e  a i r c r a f t  on t h e  
previous rou t ing  t o  11,000 f t .  
proceeded on course  V159. Approximately 25 m i l e s  from OMA 
We c r o  sed OMA VOR and 
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VOR, Center asked i f  w e  w e r e  f l y i n g  t h e  Omaha 1 Arrival. I 
answered t h a t  w e  weren ' t ,  that it  w a s  my understanding w e  
were c l ea red  V159. H e  s a id  t h a t  w e  weren ' t ,  bu t  t h a t  w e  
could work it out  w i th  Kansas Ci ty .  Handoff w a s  e f f e c t e d ,  
and Kansas C i ty  turned u s  t o  165" and vectored u s  t o  t h e  
approach g a t e  a t  MCI .  I aga in  asked t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  f o r  t h e  
c l ea rance  t h a t  he copied. 
t h a t  he d id  no t  know what an  "Omaha 1 Arrival" meant, t h a t  
he checked my approach p l a t e s  and h i s ,  and t h a t  n e i t h e r  of 
u s  had an  Omaha SID by t h a t  name, so he ignored i t  but  read 
t h e  c learance  back without  mentioning t h e  SID and t h a t  
c learance  d e l i v e r y  accepted t h e  read-back. Furthermore, he 
s a i d  t h a t  he d id  not  t h i n k  t o  a s k  m e  about t h e  Omaha 1 
ar r iva l  when I re turned  t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  I f e l t  l i k e  I had 
been so ld  down t h e  river by an otherwise very  t rus twor thy ,  
competent f i r s t  o f f i c e r .  C lea r ly ,  he made a s e r i o u s  mistake,  
as I suppose I d id  i n  not  checking t h e  c l ea rance  wi th  
c l ea rance  de l ive ry .  To do so,  however, would s u r e l y  l eave  your 
f i r s t  o f f i c e r  wi th  t h e  f e e l i n g  t h a t  "This guy doesn ' t  t r u s t  me,"  
which is  now t h e  case. But on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t r u s t  and co- 
o rd ina t ion  are d e f i n i t e l y  necessary f o r  a s a f e  opera t ion .  
While cross-check is a hea l thy  worthwhile cockpi t  a c t i v i t y ,  i t  
becomes counter-productive when one crewmember f e e l s  t h a t  
" I ' m  g e t t i n g  a check r ide"  from t h e  o the r  crewmembers. For 
t h i s  reason ,  I probably won't quest ion t h e  next  c l ea rance  I 
g e t  from t h i s  o r  any o the r  f i r s t  o f f i c e r ,  but  I'll be uneasy. 
The nagging f e a r  t h a t  he may have miscopied o r  misunderstood 
w i l l  be  i n  t h e  back of my mind. Many of our days r e q u i r e  14  h r  
i n  t h e  cockpi t ,  and t h e  phys io logica l  needs of crewmembers 
n e c e s s i t a t e  t h a t  a l l  are not  going t o  be present  i n  t h e  cockpi t  
a t  a l l  t i m e s .  
H e  s a i d  t h a t  i t  w a s  h i s  mistake,  
One o the r  element of t h e  problem w a s  observed i n  both t h e  fu l l -miss ion  
s imula t ion  s tudy  and i n  t h e  acc ident  d a t a .  The fol lowing r e p o r t  i l l u s t r a t e s  
problems t h a t  can s t e m  from pe r sona l i ty  c l a s h e s  i n  t h e  cockpi t :  
The c e i l i n g  w a s  below minimums, repor ted  as 200 f t , , 3 / 4  m i l e s  
v i s i b i l i t y .  Winds w e r e  v a r i a b l e  from a crosswind t o  a ta i lwind  
(poss ib l e  wind s h e a r ) ,  and t h e r e  were thunderstorms, r a i n ,  and 
turbulence.  W e  were holding about 20 m i l e s  ou t  of Boston. 
Because the v i s i b i l i t y  w a s  l e g a l ,  approach c o n t r o l  w a s  c l e a r i n g  
a i r p l a n e s  f o r  approaches.  A couple  d id  g e t  i n ,  bu t  wi th  a l l  
th ings  considered,  I decided no t  t o  make a n  approach. Now, my 
c o p i l o t  is a very experienced p i l o t  (which most of them are 
nowadays) - he became a cockpi t  lawyer. H e  wanted t o  g e t  home, 
he questioned a l l  my dec i s ions ,  a c t u a l l y  t r y i n g  t o  in t imida te  
m e ,  demanding explana t ions  of everything I s a i d .  W e  were very  
busy changing holding p o i n t s ,  a l t i t u d e s ,  changing a l t e r n a t e s ,  
r e f i g u r i n g  f u e l ,  etc.  H e  w a s  making t h e  whole j o b  harder .  I 
decided a n  approach w a s  not  t h e  b e s t  t h ing ,  and went t o  t h e  
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a l t e r n a t e .  There seem t o  be a l o t  of c o p i l o t s  tak ing  over t h e  
cockpi t .  Now t h e r e  must be c a p t a i n s  a l lowing t h i s ,  because I 
see a l o t  of my c o p i l o t s  t r y i n g  t o  run  my cockpi t  l a t e l y .  
do t h i n k  t h a t  t h e r e  are c a p t a i n s  who a l low t h e  c o p i l o t  t o  in- 
t imida t e them. 
I 
Miles Murphy, one of t h e  NASA p r o j e c t  personnel ,  undertook a d e t a i l e d  
a n a l y s i s  of a sample of 250 of t h e  670 r e p o r t s .  On t h e  b a s i s  of t h e s e  d a t a ,  
Murphy developed t h e  a n a l y s i s  of s k i l l s ,  o rgan iza t ion  and process  
v a r i a b l e s ,  and resources  summarized i n  t a b l e  2. It can be seen t h a t  t h e s e  
c a t e g o r i e s  could be appl ied  t o  t h e  j e t  t r a n s p o r t  acc iden t  d a t a  discussed 
above o r  t o  t h e  d a t a  obtained by R u f f e l l  Smith. It is a l s o  apparent  t h a t  t h e  
information i n  t h e  t a b l e  might provide t h e  foundat ion f o r  an  approach t o  
developing e f f e c t i v e  resource  management behavior - t h e s e  are t h e  s k i l l s  
t h a t  should be t r a i n e d .  
APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 
Tra in ing ,  which is t h e  focus of t h i s  workshop, i s  only one of s e v e r a l  
poss ib l e  approaches t o  t h e  problem. Others ,  which could be undertaken 
sepa ra t e ly  o r  i n  tandem wi th  t h e  t r a i n i n g  approach, inc lude  s a f e t y  awareness 
pub l i ca t ions  and programs, and t h e  adopt ion of some ope ra t iona l  procedures 
t h a t  might he lp  t o  avoid s i t u a t i o n s  such as those  seen i n  i n c i d e n t s  and 
acc iden t s .  Some of t hese  a l t e r n a t i v e s  are b r i e f l y  d iscussed  below. 
It i s  poss ib l e  t h a t  a major s t e p  forward may be taken by programs t h a t  
c r e a t e  an  awareness of t h e  problem by f l igh t -deck  crewmembers. 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  used "hangar f ly ing"  as a n  informal but  important source of 
ope ra t iona l  and s a f e t y  r e l a t e d  information.  F l i g h t  ope ra t ions  news le t t e r s ,  
f l i g h t  s a f e t y  b u l l e t i n s ,  and similar material may be very  e f f e c t i v e  i n  
c r e a t i n g  more understanding of t h e  problem and developing e f f e c t i v e  s o l u t i o n s .  
Much of t h i s  material could be developed from inc iden t  d a t a  repor ted  t o  t h e  
ASRS and from a i r c r a f t  acc ident  da t a .  It is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  assess t h e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o r  completeness of t h i s  approach because of i t s  voluntary  
n a t u r e  (on t h e  p a r t  of i nd iv idua l  p i l o t s ) .  However, t h e s e  programs are 
r e l a t i v e l y  inexpensive and probably c o s t  e f f e c t i v e .  
Aviat ion has 
Another approach t h a t  might be used i s  t h e  adopt ion  of some ope ra t iona l  
gu ide l ines  o r  r u l e s  t h a t  if appl ied  proper ly  by crewmembers might assist 
t h e  crew i n  exe rc i s ing  proper f l igh t -deck  resource  management L i s t ed  below 
are some examples of ope ra t ing  r u l e s  that could be appl ied  t o  f l i g h t  
opera t ions .  These are presented as examples only,  and i t  must be  understood 
t h a t  they  have not  been reviewed o r  evaluated.  They are intended t o  provoke 
d i scuss ion  and t o  s t i m u l a t e  t h e  development of new ideas  and approaches.  
1. I n  any abnormal s i t u a t i o n ,  p o s i t i v e  de l ega t ion  of f l y i n g  and 
monitoring r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  must be  t h e  top  p r i o r i t y  a c t i o n  i t e m .  
10 
2. P o s i t i v e  de l ega t ion  of monitoring r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i s  as important 
as p o s i t i v e  de l ega t ion  of f l y i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  
3 .  The p i l o t  f l y i n g  must no t  a t tempt  t o  perform secondary t a s k s  (e.g. ,  
PA announcements) dur ing  dynamic f l i g h t  s i t u a t i o n s  (e .g . ,  cl imbing, descending, 
t u rn ing ) .  
4 .  Whenever t h e r e  are c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of f a c t ,  f o r  
example, c learances ,  e x t e r n a l  sources  of information must be used t o  r e so lve  
t h e  c o n f l i c t .  
member t o  r e s o l v e  ambigui t ies  o r  c o n f l i c t s .  
Never r e l y  on t h e  "confidence" of yourself  o r  a f e l low c r e w -  
5. Whenever t h e r e  is c o n f l i c t i n g  information from two sources ,  o r  in- 
formation of ques t ionable  v a l i d i t y  from one source,  cross-checking from an 
independent source is a n e c e s s i t y .  
6 .  I f  any crewmember has  a doubt about a c learance ,  procedure,  o r  
s i t u a t i o n ,  he o r  she must make t h a t  doubt known t o  t h e  o the r  crewmembers. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This  paper has attempted t o  d e f i n e  a s p e c i f i c  problem, namely, t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  a demonstrated requirement t o  improve t h e  a b i l i t i e s  of f l igh t -deck  
crewmembers t o  i d e n t i f y  and u t i l i z e  o r  manage t h e  resources  t h a t  are 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  them. Furthermore, t h e  paper has  attempted t o  i d e n t i f y  some of 
t h e  s p e c i f i c  s k i l l s  requi red ,  and t o  sugges t ,  i n  gene ra l  terms, t h e  
d i r e c t i o n s  which might be taken t o  address  t h e  problem. A l l  of t h i s  material 
is intended t o  se rve  as background, t o  set t h e  s t a g e  f o r  t h e  remainder of 
t h i s  conference.  Much remains t o  be done t o  develop s p e c i f i c  recommenda- 
t i o n s  f o r  what s k i l l s  need t o  be t r a i n e d  and how such t r a i n i n g  should be 
conducted; t h e s e  are t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of t h i s  workshop, and each of you w i l l  
p lay a major r o l e  i n  achieving those  o b j e c t i v e s .  To assist you, w e  have 
arranged f o r  t h e  fol lowing p resen ta t ions  - two conceptual  papers  from t h e  
academic world,  and a series of p r e s e n t a t i o n s  from your indus t ry ,  desc r ib ing  
va r ious  approaches c u r r e n t l i  being taken t o  develop l eade r sh ip  and management 
s k i l l s  i n  l i n e  p i l o t s .  The material presented i n  these  papers  i s  intended t o  
serve as a d d i t i o n a l  f u e l  - t o  s t i m u l a t e  t h e  flow of i deas  and concepts  t h a t  
might be appl ied  t o  t h e  problems descr ibed  i n  t h i s  paper.  W e  have thus  f a r  
only def ined  a problem - t h e  s o l u t i o n s  must come from you. 
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TABLE 1. - AIRLINE ACCIDENTS 
Date 
U.S. a i r l i n e  a c c i d e n t s  
1. 06/22/68 
2. 01/20/70 
3. 02/01/70 
4 .  07/27/70 
5.  09/08/70 
6. 09/08/70 
7 .  09/29/70 
8. 12/28/70 
9. 01/11/71 
10. 02/17/71 
11. 03/19/71 
12. 06/06/71 
13. 06/07/71 
14. 07/19/71 
15. 07/23/71 
16. 07/30/71 
17 .  08/04/71 
18. 09/04/71 
19. 12/21/71 
20. 03/03/72 
21. 05/18/72 
22. 06/14/72 
23. 09/01/72 
24. 12/08/72 
25. 12/12/72 
26. 12/19/72 
27. 12/20/72 
28. 01/12/73 
29. 04/10/73 
30. 07/31/73 
31. 09/08/73 
32. 12/17/73 
33. 01/16/74 
34. 01/17/74 
35. 01/30/74 
36. 07/03/74 
37. 09/11/74 
38. 12/01/74 
39. * 12/01/74 
40. 03/31/75 
41. 06/24/75 
42. 12/12/75 
43. 04/27/76 
44. 12/12/76 
Operat i on  
J L  
T I  
NC 
FT 
DL 
TV 
BN 
TQ 
DL 
so 
UA 
RW 
AL 
UA 
UA 
PA 
co 
wc 
EA 
MO 
EA 
so 
Tw 
UA 
Tw 
EA 
DC-8 
DC-9 
CV-580 
DC-8 
DC-9 
DC-8 
B-720 
B-727 
DC-9 
DC-9 
B-727 
DC-9 
CV-500 
B-737 
B-747 
B-747 
B-707/CNA 
B-727 
B-727 
FH-2 2 7 B 
DC-9 
DC-9 
B-747 
B-737 
B-707 
L-1011 
NC DC-9/DL CV-880 
EA 
EA 
DL 
wo 
EA 
Tw 
Tw 
PA 
DL 
EA 
Tw 
Nw 
WA 
EA 
EA 
AA 
wc 
L-1011 
B-727 
DC-9 
DC-8 
DC-9 
B-707 
B-707 
B-707 
L-1011 
DC-9 
B-727 
B-727 
B-737 
B-7 27 
B-727 
B-727 
B-727 
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S i t e  
San Francisco,  CA 
Harlingen, TX 
D e t r o i t ,  M I  
Okinawa 
L o u i s v i l l e ,  KY 
Jamaica, NY 
Dallas, TX 
S t .  Thomas, V . I .  
Jackson, MS 
Gulfport ,  MS 
Denver, CO 
Duarte,  CA 
New Haven, CT 
Phi lade lphia ,  PA 
Chicago, I L  
San Francisco,  CA 
Compton, CA 
Juneau, AK 
Atlanta, GA 
Albany, NY 
F t .  Lauderdale, FL 
Chicago, I L  
Jamaica, NY 
Chicago, I L  
Jamaica, NY 
M i a m i ,  FL 
Chicago, I L  
M i a m i ,  FL 
Toledo, OH 
Boston, MA 
King Cove, AK 
Greensboro, NC 
Los Angeles, CA 
Indianapol i s ,  I N  
Pago Pago, Samoa 
Atlanta, GA 
Char lo t te ,  NC 
Berryville, VA 
T h i e l l s ,  NY 
Casper, WY 
Jamaica, NY 
Raleigh, NC 
S t .  Thomas, V . I .  
Ketchikan, AK 
TABLE 1. - Concluded 
Date 
Foreign a i r l i n e  a c c i d e n t s  
Operat i on  
1. 01/05/70 
2 .  09/15/71 
3. 01/22/72 
4. 01/29/71 
5. 06/14/72 
6. 06/18/72 
7 .  11/28/72 
8. 03/12/73 
9. 03/05/73 
10.  06/23/73 
11. 07/11/73 
1 2 .  08/13/73 
13.  06/17/73 
14.  06/06/74 
15. 06/21/74 
16 .  09/05/74 
1 7 .  12/04/74 
18. 05/11/76 
Spantax CV-990 
AZ DC-8 
PK B-720B 
CP/TN DC-8/B-727 
J L  DC-8 
BE Tr iden t  
J L  DC-8 
WO/SN DC-8/CRV 
I B  DC-g/Spantax CV-990 
LL DC-8 
RG 3-707 
A0 CRY 
I B  DC-10 
B r i t .  A i r  Tours B-707 
DX B-727 
BA B-747 
Mart i n a  i r  , DC- 8 
BA B-747 
I 
S i t e  
Stockholm, Sweden 
Jamaica, NY 
Ankara, Turkey 
Sydney, A u s t r a l i a  
Delhi ,  I n d i a  
P a r i s  , France 
Moscow, USSR 
Land's End, England 
Nantes , France 
Jamaica, NY 
P a r i s ,  France 
Coruna , Spain 
Boston, MA 
Crete 
Luton, England 
Nairobi, Kenya 
S r i  Lanka 
Kuala Lumpur 
1 3  
TABLE 2. - CLASSIFICATION OF IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS 
I. Socia l  and communication s k i l l s  
S t ra ined  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  
Assert ivenes s 
Nonver i f ica t ion  of communications 
Unnecessary communications 
Withhold ing communica t ions  
Assumptions about o the r  understanding 
Assumptions about meaning 
Assumptions about message 
11. Leadership and management s k i l l s  
Delegation of a u t h o r i t y  
Erosion of a u t h o r i t y  
Captain 's  t rust-doubt  dilemma 
Lack of d e c i s i v e  command 
Disc ip l ine  and l eade r sh ip  i n  applying r egu la t ions  
Casualness i n  cockpi t  
C r e w  coord ina t ion  
T i m e  s t r u c t u r i n g ,  p r i o r i t i e s  
111. Planning, problem so lv ing ,  and dec i s ion  s k i l l s  
Inadequate planning 
Information r e t r i e v a l ,  
Qual i ty  and t ime l ines s  of information 
C r e d i b i l i t y  of information 
Problem so lv ing  s t r a t e g i e s  
Staying ahead of t h e  problem ( c r i s e s  prevent ion)  
Decision under stress 
Group t h i n k  
I V .  Role 
Def i n i t  ion/unders  tanding (p i l o  t -cop i l o  t ) 
Command r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of c a p t a i n  when f i r s t  o f f i c e r  f l y i n g  
Respons ib i l i t y  of 1st o f f i c e r  when c a p t a i n  d e v i a t e s  from s a f e  
o r  l e g a l  practices 
Reduced command opt  ions  
Workload 
Task a l l o c a t i o n  
Monitoring 
Backup 
Gal lou t s 
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TABLE 2 .  - Concluded 
I .  Resources 
Human Material 
Indiv idua l  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  F a c i l i t i e s  
knowledge, prof ic iency  , A v a i l a b i l i t y  
experience,  motivat ion,  Adequacy 
stress r e a c t i o n  Human engineer ing 
Fa t igue  Equipment 
A v a i l a b i l i t y  
Access 
Ad e qua c y 
Human engineer ing 
Automatics v s  manual 
Textual  information 
A v a i l a b i l i t y  
Access 
Adequacy 
Human engineer ing 
A v a i l a b i l i t y  
Adequacy 
Environmental information 
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S o c i a l  Psyc eck 
Robert L . Helmreich * 
Abstract 
S o c i a l  psychologica l  and p e r s o n a l i t y  f a c t o r s  t h a t  can 
i n f l u e n c e  r e source  management on the  f l i g h t  deck a r e  
d iscussed .  It is  argued t h a t  p e r s o n a l i t y  and s i t u a t i o n a l  
f a c t o r s  i n t e r s e c t  t o  determine crew responses  and t h a t  
assessment of  performance under f u l l  crew and mission 
c o n d i t i o n s  can provide t h e  most va luab le  informat ion  about 
r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r s .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  of  t r a i n i n g  procedures t o  
improve performance on these dimensions is d iscussed .  
NASA resea rch  has developed a s t r o n g  case f o r  t h e  need t o  
understand and improve r e source  management on the f l i g h t  deck. 
Examination of  data from f u l l  miss ion  s imula t ions ,  as well as from 
t r a n s c r i p t s  of  acc iden t  r e p o r t s  and ASRS i n c i d e n t  r e p o r t s ,  convincingly 
documents how less than  opt imal  management and u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  human 
re sources  i n  t h e  cockp i t  can lead t o  d i s a s t r o u s  outcomes. Considering 
f l i g h t  crews as small groups,  a number of s o c i a l  psychologica 
can be i s o l a t e d  t h a t  are r e l e v a n t  t o  crew performance. These would 
ers group r e l a t i o n s ,  and communications 
ay t o  look  a t  e f l i g h t  deck from e r s p e c t i v e  
* 
University of Texas a t  Austin. 
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of  a p e r s o n a l i t y  and s o c i a l  psychologis t  
Much o f  my own research over  t he  p a s t  15 y e a r s  has  d e a l t  w i t h  
s i t u a t i o n a l  and p e r s o n a l i t y  de te rminants  o f  crew performance under 
cond i t ions  of high stress. My research a c t i v i t i e s  have dea l t  l a r g e l y  
w i t h  t h e  Navy and NASA's space  program rather than  commercial a v i a t i o n ,  
but  I hope t o  argue convincingly t h a t  t h e  psychological  f a c t o r s  involved 
are h ighly  similar. 
By way of  p re face ,  I would l i k e  t o  say  a few words about  
psychology's c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  understanding crew performance. Everyone, 
of course ,  is  aware of  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  human f a c t o r s  research h a s  made 
t o  t e c h n i c a l  performance. P e r s o n a l i t y  psychology has  concent ra ted  on 
the  development o f  psychometric ins t ruments  f o r  personnel  s e l e c t i o n  and 
f o r  t he  p r e d i c t i o n  of  performance and/or  adjustment .  S o c i a l  psychology 
has  focused on group processes  r e l e v a n t  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  and crew 
performance. Before a t tempt ing  t o  argue t h a t  s o c i a l  and p e r s o n a l i t y  
psychology c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h i s  area, it might be worthwhile t o  
explore  some o f  t h e  reasons  why i t  has n o t  been heav i ly  u t i l i z e d .  
One problem wi th  p e r s o n a l i t y  assessment has  been a s t r o n g  emphasis 
on screening  out  u n l i k e l y  or psychopathological  cand ida te s  rather than  
s e l e e t i n q  prospec ts  with opt imal  psychological  characteristics. Part 
of  t h e  problem comes from a l a c k  o f  consensus regard ing  j u s t  what an 
optimum psychological  p r o f i l e  c o n s i s t s  of .  Fu r the r ,  one must decide 
what the  cr i ter ia  f o r  v a l i d a t i o n  o f  s e l e c t i o n  procedures should be. 
Should one look a t  success fu l  l i n e  ope ra t ion  over  an extended per iod o r  
a t  performance i n  emergency s i t u a t i o n s ,  or a t  some weighted combination 
o f  these and o t h e r  measures? I w i l l  r e t u r n  30 the ques t ion  o f  r e a c t i o n s  
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i n  d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  later. 
S o c i a l  p sycho log i s t s ,  on the  o t h e r  hand, have tended t o  ignore  
p e r s o n a l i t y  v a r i a b l e s  and t o  concen t r a t e  on t i g h t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  
l a b o r a t o r y  experiments.  Such s t u d i e s  may have great s c i e n t i f i c  rigor, 
b u t  
such research t o  t h e  complexi t ies  of real world problems such as 
t h e  consumers of  research have r i g h t l y  quest ioned the  g e n e r a l i t y  of 
combat 
o r  a v i a t i o n .  
But perhaps the  most s e r i o u s  f a i l i n g  i n  our approach t o  complex 
problems of crew performance comes from ignor ing  the  f a c t  t h a t  behavior  
is  a func t ion  of  t h e  m r a c  tian of  p e r s o n a l i t y  and s i t u a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s .  
What mean i s  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  behavior  i n  any g iven  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
J o i n t l y  determined by an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p e r s o n a l i t y  and by the  o f  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  The p e r s o n a l i t y  type  a s soc ia t ed  w i t h  t h e  b e s t  
performance i n  one s e t t i n g  could be a s s o c i a t e d  with failure i n  another .  
As I have noted ,  p e r s o n a l i t y  psycho log i s t s  have concent ra ted  on 
p e r s o n a l i t y  typo log ie s  rather than  the impl i ca t ions  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  types  
i n  a range of  s i t u a t i o n s  while s o c i a l  p sycho log i s t s  have been equa l ly  
c a v a l i e r  i n  ignor ing  t h e  impact of p e r s o n a l i t y  i n  s i t u a t i o n s ,  focusing 
I 
n a t u r e  
almost 
a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  behaviora l  outcomes. 
completely on spec i fy ing  the  aspects of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  
Examination of the f i e l d  suggests t h a t  a hea l thy  awareness of these 
problems has developed along with much more sophisticated methodologies, 
t h a t  enable  the examination of complex s i t u a t i o n s  i n  a r igo rous  manner. 
Unfor tuna te ly ,  we have on ly  begun t o  demonstrate what we can do wi th  ou r  
newly-gained e x p e r t i s e .  I n  t h e  remainder of my p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  I w i l l  
d i s c u s s  some of the  p e r s o n a l i t y  and s i t u a t i a n a l  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  I see as 
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c r u c i a l  f o r  r e source  management i n  a v i a t i o n .  As an aside,  l e t  me no te  
t h a t  I am aware o f  t h e  seve re  c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  o p e r a t e  on any l a r g e  
o rgan iza t ion  involved wi th  s e l e c t i o n  and maintenance o f  high l e v e l  
personnel .  The person with t h e  b e s t  psychologica l  p r o f i l e  may be 
d e f i c i e n t  p h y s i c a l l y  o r  may lack t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e  on any combination 
of t h e  above. Once selected,  a r i g i d  s e n i o r i t y  sys t em can over - r ide  
o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n  crew composition, The cha l lenge  i s  t o  o b t a i n  
the  optimal outcome wi th in  these c o n s t r a i n t s .  
A large number of  p e r s o n a l i t y  dimensions have been s p e c i f i e d  
through research, many wi th  cons ide rab le  ove r l ap .  Obviously,  one must 
choose by some means the  subse t  of characterist ics deemed r e l e v a n t  t o  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a t  hand. I n  our research, w e  have begun wi th  performance 
and group adjustment  and have worked toward t h e  i s o l a t i o n  o f  r e l e v a n t  
t ra i t  c l u s t e r s .  L e t  me describe t h e  p o s s i b l e  imp l i ca t ions  o f  two t r a i t  
dimensions a c r o s s  s e v e r a l  hypo the t i ca l  s i t u a t i o n s .  We have found two 
dimensions t o  b e  s t r o n g l y  and widely related t o  group and i n d i v i d u a l  
r e a c t i o n s .  The first c l u s t e r  can be  called ins t rumen ta l  i t y  o r  g o a l  
o r i e n t a t i o n .  The second c l u s t e r  can be called e x m e s s  i v i t v  o r  group 
o r i e n t a t i o n .  Persons high on t h i s  dimension tend t o  be s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  
f e e l i n g s  of  o t h e r s  and i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y  warm. 
How t h e o r e t i c a l l y  should these dimensions relate t o  f l ight-deck 
performance? I n  r o u t i n e  f l y i n g  one would expec t  a moderate r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between performance and goal o r i e n t a t i o n  and a minimal r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between performance and group o r i e n t a t i o n .  One could p r e d i c t ,  however, 
t h a t  t hose  high i n  group o r i e n t a t i o n  would es tab l i sh  warmer and more 
e f f e c t i v e  working and personal  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  a l l  co-workers. 
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I n  t h e  case o f  4 J l d i v i d W  performance i n  emergencies,  I would 
expect  t h e  h ighly  g o a l  o r i e n t e d  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  exce l .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  would seem a good candida te  as a s e l e c t i o n  measure and 
e x p r e s s i v i t y  a n i c e ,  but  non-essent ia l  f a c t o r .  Va l ida t ion  using l i n e  
performance and s imula tor  performance i n  emergencies should v e r i f y  t h e  
re levance  o f  goa l  o r i e n t a t i o n  and t h e  lesser importance o f  group 
o r i e n t a t i o n .  
However, from t h e  pe r spec t ive  of  r e source  management and the  
conten t ion  t ha t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  propor t ion  of a c c i d e n t s  i nvo lves  a f a i l u r e  
t o  work op t ima l ly  as a team, a d i f f e r e n t  approach i s  suggested.  
Val ida t ion  o f  p r e d i c t o r s  o f  crew performance, t o  t h e  b e s t  o f  my 
knowledge, t y p i c a l l y  involve  a s ses s ing  t h e  r e a c t i o n s  o f  a 
complete crew dur ing  cond i t ions  o f  work overload o r  o t h e r  i n - f l i g h t  
crises. It is my t h e s i s  t h a t  v a l i d a t i o n  under these cond i t ions  might 
sugges t  a d i f f e r e n t  c o n s t e l l a t i o n  o f  opt imal  personal  characteristics. 
I would argue t h a t  when t o t a l  crew response t o  crisis is  the  
b e s t  outcome ( o p e r a t i o n a l l y  def ined  as opt imal  responses  t o  t he  
s i t u a t i o n  by a l l  crew members) might be  i n  crews where t h e  c a p t a i n  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  was high i n  both g o a l  and group o r i e n t a t i o n .  Such 
i n d i v i d u a l s  might be  expected t o  be both competent i n  dealing with the  
t echn ica l  a s p e c t s  of t h e  problem a t tuned  t o  t h e  r e a c t i o n s  and 
performance o f  o t h e r s .  
examined, 
My i n t e r e s t  here is no t  t o  develop a n  argument f o r  t h e  adopt ion  of 
a new set  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  measures, Rather, I am t r y i n g  t o  stress t h a t  
i f  t he  premise tha t  resource  management and a s s o c i a t e d  group performance 
are impor tan t  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s  t o  e f f i c i e n t  l i n e  ope ra t ion ,  then t h e  
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e v a l u a t i o n  o f  U d i v i d u  performance may f a i l  t o  cap tu re  t h e  c r u c i a l  
dimensions o f  crew behavior  i n  s t r e s s f u l  s i t u a t i o n s .  
I cannot  resist an  aside on t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  i s s u e ,  however. I n  
d i scuss ing  r e source  management and f l i g h t  crew performance w i t h  a number 
o f  e x p e r t s ,  one o f  t h e  major p o i n t s  which emerged spontaneously was t h e  
"problem o f  t he  macho pi lot . I1  T h i s  has  a l s o  been an i s s u e  o f  some 
importance w i t h  a s t r o n a u t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  r e luc t ance  t o  accept 
females and t o  s h i f t  t o  a d i f f e r e n t  mode o f  ope ra t ion  w i t h  t h e  space 
s h u t t l e .  I won't get  i n t o  t r y i n g  t o  d e f i n e  "macho" because I t h i n k  
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  t h i s  type  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  are widely shared .  We have been 
concerned w i t h  t h i s  p e r s o n a l i t y  type  i n  our  research, e x p e c i a l l y  i n  
eva lua t ing  r e l a t i o n s  between the  sexes and t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  t o  
performance. S u f f i c e  i t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  c o n s t e l l a t i o n  which 
most closely approximates t he  macho image i s  the  h ighly  instrumental- low 
express ive  one. 
Turning t o  more g e n e r a l  s o c i a l  psychological  f a c t o r s  which may 
i n f l u e n c e  crew performance, l e t  me first d e f i n e  t h e  s o c i a l  epvironment 
o f  t h e  f l i g h t  deck. Although the primary group o f  i n t e r e s t  c o n s i s t s  o f  
t h e  Capta in ,  F i r s t  Officer and F l i g h t  Engineer ,  t he  c r i t i ca l  s o c i a l  
network is  larger and more complex. I n  th ink ing  about s o c i a l  
i n t e r a c t i o n  i t  is  e s s e n t i a l  t o  inc lude  those  i n  vo ice  communication and 
i n t e r m i t t e n t  direct  con tac t .  Thus the  system should inc lude  A i r  Traffic 
C o n t r o l l e r s ,  Company Operat ions,  the  Cabin C r e w  and i n d i r e c t l y ,  t h e  
passengers .  
The A i r  Traffic C o n t r o l l e r  i s  a c e n t r a l  f i g u r e  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  
network and h i s  r o l e  i n  f l i g h t  deck ope ra t ion  should be considered.  For 
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example, take t h e  r e c e n t  s tudy  o f  p o t e n t i a l  a c c i d e n t s  by NASA around 
which there has  been cont roversy  (as w r i t t e n  up, for example, r e c e n t l y  
i n  &jsug 1. One i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h e  data i s  t h a t  there may be a 
greater r i s k  o f  c o l l i s i o n ,  as measured by i n c i d e n t  r e p o r t s ,  when under 
d i rec t  c o n t r o l .  Without becoming embroilpd i n  arguments about t h e  need 
f o r  c o n t r o l  and d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  r i s k  a t  va r ious  l o c a t i o n s ,  it seems worth 
not ing  t h a t  a l i n e  of s o c i a l  psychological  research would p r e d i c t  
decreased v i g i l e n c e  under p o s i t i v e  c o n t r o l .  Th i s  research has  t o  do 
w i t h  d i f f u s  i O r l  ef r e s D o n s i b i l i t e  . T h i s  series o f  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  was 
s t imula ted  by t h e  observed phenomenon o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  failinn t o  take 
a c t i o n  i n  emergencies o r  r ede f in ing  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a s  non-threatening 
when o t h e r s  are p resen t  and capable  of t ak ing  a c t i o n .  The most widely 
cited example is t h e  murder o f  K i t t y  Genovese o u t s i d e  her apartment.  
She was s tabbed r epea ted ly  over  a 30 minute per iod while  38 people 
watched and called the  p o l i c e ,  I n d i v i d u a l s  i n  such s i t u a t i o n s  may 
have a diminished sense  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  f e e l i n g ,  perhaps 
unconsciously,  t h a t  o t h e r s  w i l l  handle  t he  i n c i d e n t .  It is poss ib l e  
t h a t  being under p o s i t i v e  c o n t r o l  leads t o  reduced v i g i l a n c e  on the p a r t  
o f  crews, even though they  are f u l l y  aware of t he i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
the  aircraft . 
Indeed, t h e  inc reas ing  automation o f  aircraft func t ions  may s e r v e  
the  undesired func t ion  o f  reducing t h e  crew's sense  o f  autonomy and 
personal  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I n  a r e c e n t  i n t e rv i ew,  a s e n i o r  Captain made 
the  fo l lowing  comments: "We are t h e  best t r a i n e d  instrument  p i l o t s  i n  
t he  world, bu t  we're n o t  t r a i n i n g  t o  look o u t  t h e  window any more. It 's 
easy  t o  go cross-country on radar, and have somebody else do every th ing  
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f o r  you. 
f l y  the  p lane  as w e l l  as we do!" 
Sometimes we s a y  to  each o t h e r  up there t h a t  t h e  j a n i t o r  could 
I n  a similar v e i n ,  cons ide r  t h e  social psychologica l  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  
of  data from t h e  f u l l  miss ion  s imula t ion  s tudy  conducted by R u f f e l l  
Smi th .  The da t a  suggest a higher  error ra te  when a p a r t i c u l a r  
crewmember i s  i n  a s ta te  of  work overload.  I n  many cont inuing  abnormal 
s i t u a t i o n s  o r  emergencies, such as  engine  f a i l u r e ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  
dea l ing  w i t h  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t he  a i rcraf t ,  i t  is necessary  t o  
coord ina te  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  cab in  crew and t o  communicate w i t h  t he  
passengers .  I n  s e v e r a l  i n s t a n c e s ,  for example, t h e  assumption of 
c o n t r o l  of t h e  a i rc raf t  by t h e  Captain w h i l e  a t tempt ing  t o  make 
important  o v e r a l l  d e c i s i o n s  concerning t h e  f l i g h t  was associated w i t h  
s e r i o u s  e r r o r s .  
I f i n d  no reason  t o  ques t ion  t h e  a u t h e n t i c i t y  o f  these f i n d i n g s .  
Indeed, I would expect  such outcomes to  be more f r equen t  i n  emergencies 
du r ing  l i n e  o p e r a t i o n s  than  du r ing  s imula t ions  because of  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
danger. 
What are some of t h e  imp l i ca t ions  of over load  on p i l o t s  dur ing  
non-routine f l y i n g  cond i t ions?  From a psychologica l  viewpoint ,  t he  
leader, decisionmaker i s  t h e  least a p p r o p r i a t e  person t o  be 
overburdened. Given tha t  research shows a narrowing of  pe rcep tua l  
a t t e n t i o n  under stress, one can argue t h a t  i t  is  probably n o t  op t imal  t o  
involve  t h e  Captain i n  mult i -processing a v a r i e t y  of tasks--such as 
f l y i n g  the  p lane ,  coord ina t ing  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  f l i g h t  and cab in  
crew, and making the  u l t i m a t e  d e c i s i o n s  regard ing  a c t i o n s  t o  be taken .  
It is l i k e l y  t ha t  t he  q u a l i t y  of each of these a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  be 
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degraded i f  a l l  are undertaken simultaneously.  
Another psychological  f a c t o r  can add t o  t h e  burden on t h e  Captain.  
T h i s  is inc reased  dependency of crew members on t h e  Captain under 
stress. I n  ou r  research on groups under stress and i n  a number o f  o t h e r  
s t u d i e s ,  group members are seen  t o  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  dependent on t h e  
leader mder high stress cond i t ions .  Thus, t he  Captain is l i k e l y  t o  
bear a d d i t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  monitoring and d i r e c t i n g  t h e  
performance o f  t h e  crew. Conversely, by f a i l i n g  t o  monitor t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  o t h e r  crew members du r ing  the  c r i t i ca l  pe r iod ,  t he  
Captain may s e r i o u s l y  overload o t h e r  crew members. An example of t h e  
n e g a t i v e  effects o f  overload on t h e  f l i g h t  eng inee r  was n i c e l y  shown i n  
the  R u f f e l l  Smith s tudy.  
Along w i t h  i nc reased  dependency under stress, crew members may also 
experience a diminished sense  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  an emergency, p l ac ing  
more of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  t h e  Captain.  T h i s  could 
be i n t e n s i f i e d  i f  t h e  Captain r e l i e v e s  the  F i r s t  Officer o f  f l y i n g  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Indeed, t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  l e a d e r s h i p  by the  Captain i n  
cr i t ical  s i t u a t i o n s  probably r e p r e s e n t s  a clear example o f  a p e r s o n a l i t y  
by s i t u a t i o n  i n t e r a c t i o n .  As an  hypothesized example, t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
type  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  may be g e n e r a l l y  d i s l i k e d  as a Captain i n  normal 
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opera t ions .  Such a n  i n d i v i d u a l  may, on the o t h e r  hand, t a k e  charge ve ry  
e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  emergencies and be well s u i t e d  t o  coping with t h e  
dependency of crew members. The d e m o c r a t i c , # s o c i a l l y  concerned leader 
might be h igh ly  valued du r ing  r o u t i n e  o p e r a t i o n s ,  b u t  f i n d  it more 
d i f f i c u l t  to  assume a s t r o n g  l e a d e r s h i p  r o l e  when t h e  s i t u a t i o n  demands 
it. It is p o s s i b l e  t h a t  s p e c i f i c  t r a i n i n g  i n  r o l e  performance conducted 
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with  groups under simula 
'ng and a h igh  d e n s i t y  o f  n 
t h a t  breakdowns i n  t h e  processing of  important  communications could p l a y  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  crew e r r o r s .  An important  t a s k  o f  t h e  Captain 
would appea r  t o  be  maintaining c l o s e  supe rv i s ion  o f  a l l  communications, 
e l imina t ing  unnecessary communications and ensur ing  t h a t  a l l  c r i t i ca l  
data are understood. T h i s  i s  obviously an i m p l i c i t  p a r t  o f  t h e  
Cap ta in ' s  r o l e ,  bu t  I would b e t  a tank  o f  gas t h a t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  number 
of communication breakdowns can be  observed under h igh  workload and 
emergency s i t u a t i o n s .  . 
Another type  o f  pe r son- s i tua t ion  i n t e r a c t i o n  t h a t  I t h i n k  is  l i k e l y  
t o  emerge concerns s i t u a t i o n s  involv ing  crews with a female member. 
From my own research assessing t h e  performance o f  women i n  demanding 
r o l e s  under high stress, 1 have every reason  to b e l i e v e  t h a t  t he  
ind iv idua l  performance o f  female f l i g h t  crew members w i l l  be equal  t o  
e competence o f  females, 
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f u r t h e r  work overloads.  I n  t h e  case o f  a female Captain,  t he  j u n i o r  
male crew may a t tempt  t o  usurp  t h e  Capta in ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  If t h i s  
sounds far-fetched, i t  can be pointed o u t  t h a t  such occurrences  were 
noted among s e v e r a l  all-male crews i n  t h e  R u f f e l l  Smith s tudy .  A 
similar complaint about  a t  tempted take-over o f  Cap ta in ' s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  by a very  s e n i o r  F i r s t  Officer can be found i n  t h e  ASRS 
r e p o r t s .  I n  any even t ,  I would a rgue  t h a t  as women become more widely 
i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  crews, t h e  ques t ion  o f  crew coord ina t ion  under s t r e s s f u l  
cond i t ions  should be i n v e s t i g a t e d  w i t h  high p r i o r i t y .  Our f r i e n d  the  
"macho p i l o t "  is l i k e l y  t o  p lay  t h e  p i v o t a l  ro le  i n  such scena r ios .  The 
fol lowing r e l e v a n t  views were a t t r i b u t e d  t o  a p i l o t  i n  a r e c e n t  s t o r y  i n  
t h e  Washington Post. "He d i d  say  t h a t  even though t h e  men p i l o t s  don ' t  
s l ande r  t h e i r  female co-workers when f l y i n g ,  most would rather n o t  f l y  
w i t h  a woman. He added t h a t  being a p i l o t  c a l l s  f o r  and a t t racts  a very  
powerful,  i f  no t  'macho' , per sona l i ty . "  
On a more nega t ive  n o t e ,  I would l i k e  t o  mention a l i n e  o f  research 
t h a t  has been q u i t e  i n f l u e n t i a l  i n  o rgan iza t ions .  T h i s  i s  t h e  
examination o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between group cohes iveness  (de f ined  as 
the  mutual a t t r a c t i o n  of group members and the i r  sense  of group 
membership) and performance. I n  g e n e r a l ,  it has been noted t h a t  h igh ly  
cohes ive  crews also show s u p e r i o r  performance. Th i s  has  l e d  t o  a number 
o f  a t t empt s  i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  settings t o  i n s t i t u t e  t r a i n i n g  programs t o  
improve group climate and cohesiveness  w i t h  the  assumption tha t  improved 
group r e l a t i o n s  w i l l  lead t o  improved performance. The r e s u l t s  have 
been d i s t i n c t l y  mixed. Our research wi th  well-motivated p ro fes s iona l  
crews ( i n  t h i s  case wi th  Aquanauts working underwater i n  a ve ry  
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s t r u c t u r e d  environment dur ing  P r o j e c t  T e k t i t e )  sugges t s  a rather 
d i f f e r e n t  sequence o f  courses .  I n  looking a t  performance and group 
climate over extended pe r iods  o f  time we found t h a t  p o s i t i v e  changes i n  
crew performance l e d  t o  more group cohesiveness  while  p o s i t i v e  changes 
i n  cohesiveness  had 1 1 ~  i n f luence  on performance. T h i s  sugges t s  t h a t  
many t r a i n i n g  programs have been dea l ing  w i t h  effects  rather than  
causes .  I n  o t h e r  words, t r a i n i n g  e f f o r t s  could more p r o f i t a b l y  be 
directed toward f a c i l i t a t i n g  group performance, 'in which case group 
r e l a t i o n s  should be  q u i t e  good. A part  of such t r a i n i n g  might i nc lude  
emphas is  on how p e r s o n a l i t y  types  in f luence  group performance i n  
d i f f e r e n t  t ypes  of  s i t u a t i o n s .  
I have only  touched on a few i n s t a n c e s  where I feel  s o c i a l  
psychological  f a c t o r s  may have a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on f l i g h t  deck 
performance. I fee l  s t r o n g l y ,  though, t h a t  a case i s  developing f o r  t h e  
importance o f  human re source  management f o r  s a f e t y  i n  f l i g h t  ope ra t ions .  
I would sugges t  t h a t  a two-t iered approach t o  t h e  i s s u e  might b e  
op t imal ,  
F i r s t ,  I feel t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  data on the  in f luence  o f  s o c i a l  
f a c t o r s  on performance dur ing  work overload and emergency s i t u a t i o n s  are 
needed. Cont ro l led  data o f  t h i s  s o r t  can b e s t  be obta ined  during f u l l  
mission s imula t ions .  However, an important  a d d i t i o n a l  sou rce  o f  data 
would be t h e  s o c i a l  psychological  a n a l y s i s  of cockp i t  and f l i g h t  
recorder data from a c c i d e n t s  where NTSB i n v e s t i g a t i o n  has  concluded t h a t  
crew e r r o r  has played a s i g n i f i c a n t  part.. 
Assuming t h a t  unequivocal evidence can be amassed showing 
decrements i n  performance and less than  opt imal  r e a c t i o n s  t o  abnormal 
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s i t u a t i o n s  as a func t ion  o f  s o c i a l  psychological  f a c t o r s ,  i t  should be 
q u i t e  feasible t o  develop t r a i n i n g  procedures  t o  h e l p  crews cope wi th  
such  s i t u a t i o n s  more e f f e c t i v e l y  and even t o  improve pe r son / s i tua t ion  
f i t .  I n  my opin ion ,  mission s imula t ions  w i t h  ex tens ive  c r i t i q u e s  o f  
group as w e l l  as i n d i v i d u a l  performance would be t h e  most impact fu l  
means o f  implementing t h i s .  I a l s o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  h ighly  e f f e c t i v e  
t r a i n i n g  tapes could b e  developed h i g h l i g h t i n g  t h e  types  of: d e l e t e r i o u s  
r e source  management i s o l a t e d  i n  such research. 
A s  a f i n a l  no te ,  I would stress t h a t  from a s o c i a l  p sycho log i s t ' s  
viewpoint ,  a program i n  r e source  management w i l l  on ly  be success fu l  i f  
i t  is apparent  t o  l i n e  personnel  t h a t  i t  has t h e  complete and 
unequivocal suppor t  of  management. The implementation o f  such a s h i f t  
i n  t r a i n i n g  mus t  a l s o  b e  done wi th  some d e l i c a c y  regard ing  the  
self- images .of  crew members. I t h i n k  an example from t h e  merchant 
marine is h igh ly  i n s t r u c t i v e .  One o f  t h e  major o i l  companies which 
o p e r a t e s  a large t anke r  f leet  d i d  a c a r e f u l  a n a l y s i s  o f  Capta in ' s  d u t i e s  
and concluded t h a t  t h e  Capta in ' s  j ob  d e f i n i t i o n  r e a l l y  c o n s i s t s  
p r imar i ly  o f  t h e  management of complex resources ;  both human and 
material. It was t h e r e f o r e  decided t h a t  t h e  job  d e s c r i p t i o n  should 
ref lect  t h i s .  Accordingly,  a l l  of t h e  f leet  c a p t a i n s  were informed 
t h a t ,  e f f e c t i v e  immediately,  t hey  were no longe r  Capta ins  o f  t h e i r  
v e s s e l s  bu t  i n s t e a d  were Shipboard Managers. Somewhat t o  management's 
s u r p r i s e ,  the  r e a c t i o n s  o f  these managers was d i s t i n c t l y  h o s t i l e .  Their  
t i t l e  somehow failed t o  c a p t u r e  t he  image o f  s a l t - sp ray  and r o l l i n g  seas 
which they  had s p e n t  yea r s  acqu i r ing .  
I doubt i f  t he  t i t l e  Aircraft Manager would f i n d  much acceptance 
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among your Capta ins  even though it may re f lec t  t h e  r e a l i t y  of  today ' s  
ope ra t ions .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, I feel  t h a t  conc re t e  demonstrat ions o f  
t h e  need f o r  crew coord ina t ion  and c a r e f u l  management of  resources  w i l l  
lead t o  r a p i d  acceptance o f  t h e  concept .  The R u f f e l l  Smith s tudy  
provides  a good s t a r t i n g  poin t .  The very f avorab le  r e a c t i o n s  of  t he  
crews involved sugges t  t h a t  awareness o f  a problem area can come r a p i d l y  
under t h e  proper cond i t ions .  
Our case is n o t  proven, but  I hope t h a t  time w i l l  bear out  t h e  
importance of d e a l i n g  w i t h  s o c i a l  psychological  f a c t o r s  on t h e  f l i g h t  
deck. I fee l  t h a t  we can demonstrate q u i t e  conclus ive ly  t h a t  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  can be made t o  your ope ra t ions .  If we convince 
you o f  t h i s ,  s o c i a l  psychology can assume a p lace  as a s i g n i f i c a n t  
resource  i n  commeroial a v i a t i o n .  
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ABSTMCT 
F l i g h t  crews can never be e n t i r e l y  cer 
the s i t u a t i o n  o f  t h o i r  f l i g  
set of 
cohe ren t  picture of what is happ 
many r o u t i n e  si tuations,  those theories accord  so c l o s e l y  wi th  r e a l i t y ,  
t h a t  t h e r e  is l i t t l e  sti 
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  of t h e  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n s ,  
t h e  chances of error i n  t h e  theory  become much higher .  
o u t  the . v a l i d i t y  and 
The s k i l l s  and 
w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  a f l i g h t  crew to be  alert to  possible errors i n  t h e  theo ry  
become critical to t h e i r  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to ensu re  a safe 
f l i g h t .  
The paper i d e n t i f i e s  s e v e r a l  major factors t h a t  determine the  l ikelihood 
t h a t  a f a u l t y  theo ry  w i l l  be detected and r e v i s e d :  
1. The 'theories of practice' t h a t  pilots have developed through 
t r a i n i n g  and experience-and p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  degree  to  which 
t h o s e  t h e o r i e s  b u i l d  i n  inqu i ry  and t e s t i n g  i n  s i t ua t ions  of 
confus ion ,  anomaly, and crisis. 
2. The abilities of crew members t o  combine s k i l l s  i n  advocacy 
and inqui ry .  
3.. The management s k i l l s  and s t y l e  of t h e  cap ta in .  
4. The degree  to  which t h e  role system i n  t h e  c o c k p i t  is w e l l  
understood, and procedures  for role-modificati 
shared.  
l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  t r a i n i n g  of p 
t they  r e c e i v e  training i n  a l l  o 
lane .  But it is e q u a l l y  cri t ical  tha t  they  
i z e  t h e i r  own h i s t o r i c  p a t t e r n s  for l e a r n i n g ,  for r e l a t i n g  
They need to understand how to combine 
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authority with learning, fast response t 
and c l a r i t y  with wil l ingnass 
dynamics o f  role systems, how to create an e f f e c t i v e  and mutually under- 
stood set of role relat ionships,  and how to modify those relat ionships 
quickly without creating confusion, overlaps and gaps. 
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---The crew of a 1011 d i scove r s  dur ing  an approach t h a t  t h e  l i g h t  
and begin to  circle while  
The crew apparent ly  assume 
on their nose gear is n o t  on, 
a t tempt ing  t o  correct t h e  problem. 
that a l t i t u d e  is  being monitored, b u t  f a i l  to d e t e c t  an unintended 
descent .  
k i l l e d ,  and 77 ottiers are in jured .  
"lie plane  crashes on a clear n ight ,  99 people  are 
In each case, the c a p t a i n  (or the e n t i r e  crew) was, operac ing  on the 
b 
basis of a ' theory  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n '  -0 a s e t  of b e l i e f s  about what w a s  
happening and what; a c t i o n s  it w a s  appropriate to take. 
was data a v a i l a b l e  to i n d i c a t e  that  t h e  theory  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was i n  
error. In t h e  f i r s t  case, t h e  con t r ad ic to ry  data was assumed away. In the 
second case, t h e  crew d i d  n o t  seek d a t a  t h a t  might have alerted them to  
their error. 
I n  each case, t h e r e  
I n  t h e  third, the  c r e w  focused so heav i ly  on  one element 
of the s i t u a t i o n  ( t h e  nose gear l i g h t ) ,  that they ina t t ended  to e a s i l y  
available data that would have a l e r t e d  them to a serious problem. f n  each 
2. taint  n ro  the factor:; i n  fnckqrouncl and exjx?riencc. which in f luence  
t h e  TOS t h a t  a p i l o t  is l i k e l y  to use? 
3. How can educa t ion  and t ra in i i iq  a c t i v i t i e s  reduce tho p r o b a b i l i t y  
of errors i n  a TOS? 
4.  What are t h e  s i t u a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  
that pilots w i l l  recoqnize errors i n  t h e i r  TOS? 
A. What de te rmines  t h e  theory  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n ?  
The TOS is a short-term theory  used by a n  i n d i v i d u a l  to ana lyze  and 
make d e c i s i o n s  about  t h e  immediate environment. 
d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e i r  TOS's change c o n t i n u a l l y .  Thc TOS "I am is? 
As i n d i v i d u a l s  move through 
t h e  sllpermarket buying food' is  very d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  TOS 'b a m  landing  
a 727 under very d i f f i c u l t  weather cond i t ions ' .  Iiuman e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
ddpends heav i ly  on the degree  of correspondence between a TOS and t h e  
environment. Error occurs when a TQS and t h e  environmont are mismatshcd. 
An example is t h e  case i n  which t h e  crew assumed t h a t  t h e  a l t i t u d e  must be 
'h 
s a f e  because they had a l r e a d y  rece ived  approach c l e a r a n c e  from ground 
c o n t r o l .  
The TOS t h a t  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  u ses  i n  any g iven  s i t u a t i o n  is determined 
by long-term c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  person, short- term c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  and by t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  two. 
W e  can divide t h e  long-term c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the person  i n t o  two 
m a j o r . c a t e g o r i e s r  (1) fundamental c o g n i t i v e  and behav io ra l  parameters  i n  
humanst (2) t h e  ' theory of practice' t h a t  informs t h e  behavior  of a 
particular ind iv idua l .  The latter may be viewed as a long-term theory  
(i.e., a theory  which is r e l a t i v e l y  stable, and evo lves  on ly  through 
r e l a t i v e l y  s l o w ,  developmental  p rocesses) .  The ' t heory  o f  practice' is 
used by the individual to des ign ,  test and implement ' t h e o r i e s  of t h e  
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situation'. Without a theory  o f  practice, t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  could not 
have any cohe ren t  understanding o f  a s i t u a t i o n .  
1. 
There are very impor tan t  l i m i t s  ' 
a t t e n d  to o n l y  a very l i m i t e d  number of discrete phenomena a t  any one 
t i m e ,  and have very s e v e r e  limits on short-term memory. Wfaa 
a ' d i s c r e t e  phenomenon' is heav i ly  dependent on prior Pcarning. f 
n o t  a pi lot ,  and when I look a t  t h e  c o n t r o l s  on  an  a i r p l a n e  (even a very 
s m a l l ,  p r o p e l l o r  p l a n e ) ,  I f i n d  t h e  e n t i r e  t h i n g  confusing.  I have never 
learned a set  of ' p a t t e r n s '  t h a t  would enable  
:-LA.nber of discrete b i t s  o f  in format ion  i n t o  a 
A t r a i n e d  pi lot  could look a t  t h e  ins t ruments  
m e  t o  o rgan ize  a large 
s i n g l e ,  organized concept. 
f o r  a few seconds, and would 
i 
know a g r e a t  deal about t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of t h e  p lane .  Y could look a t  the 
same ins t rumen t s  f o r  s e v e r a l  hours,  and s t i l l  know almost nothing.  
P a t t e r n s  or concepts  are stored i n  long- t em memory, add require time 
and e f f o r t  to l ea rn .  Once learned ,  however, they  can  be used with  
enormous speed and accuracy. The pi lot  who 'seems to hawe a s i x t h  sense  
f o r  knowing j u s t  what 's  happening at any g iven  mment' is a p i l o t  who 
has a c q u i r e d  o v e r  t i m e  a n  unusual ly  powerful set of c o g n i t i v e  p a t t e r n s .  
While a p a t t e r n  is be ing  l ea rned ,  t h e  pilot needs to  spend a cons ide rab le  
amount of time consc ious ly  and e x p l i c i t l y  a t t e n d i n g  to t h e  information 
subsumed by t h e  pattern. It  is a slow, se l f -consc ious  p r o c e s s  of 
t t e r n ,  and s t o r i n g  the p a t t e r n  
i n  long- te r  Once t h e  p a t t e r n  is well- learned,  howevero it can 
be used quickly and with no cons u s  a t t e n t i o n  a t  all. The i 
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c-m use t h o  p a t t e r n  wi thout  th inking  about  it, and may no t  be a b l e  to 
i d e n t i f y  what p a t t e r n  lie is usinq.  
The behavioral equivalr?nt: to a patt.arn is a ' !3kll ls .  Ju:%t as a 
p a t t e r n  is b u i l t  up throuqh thc o r g a n i z a t i o n  of a number of discrete b i t s  
of informat ion ,  a s k i l l  i s  b u i l t  up through t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of a number 
of discfcete, molecular behaviors  i n t o  a molar p a t t e r n .  Learning a s k i l l  
r e q u i r e s  time, effort, practice, and thought.  
it can  be used i n  t h e  same way as a well- learned p a t t e r n  - qu ick ly ,  
e f f o r t l e s s l y ,  and t a c i t l y .  
t h a t  it become tacit  -- t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  is no longer  consc ious  of t h e  
But once  t h e  s k i l l  is l ea rned ,  
I t  is i n  fact e s s e n t i a l  to s k i l l e d  performance 
i n d i v i d u a l  components of t h e  s k i l l .  Consciousness of t h o s e  components 
would r e t a r d  or even d i s r u p t  t h e  execut ion  of t h e  s k i l l .  
i s  typ ing  s k i l l .  
A simple example 
I can  type much more r a p i d l y  than  I c h  w r i t e  %Onghand, 
b u t  my t yp ing  rate s l o w s  down by about  90% i f  I t r y  t o  t h i n k  about  which 
f i n g e r  I w i l l  u se  to type  each letter. My speed w i l l  also d e c l i n e  (and 
I w i l l  make more errors) i f  I t r y  to type  a t e x t  c o n s i s t i n g  of nonsense 
s y l l a b l e s  or w r i t t e n  i n  an  un fami l i a r  f o r e i g n  language. 
c o n d i t i o n s  is o u t s i d e  of my s k i l l  range. 
E i t h e r  of t hose  
With practice, I could  l e a r n  
to  type  nonsense s y l l a b l e s  o r  Swedish t ex t s  wi th  h igh  e f f i c i e n c y ,  but as 
y e t  I have fe l t  no need t o  develop e i t h e r  s k i l l .  
The major i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e s e  parameters for pi lot ing an  a i r p l a n e  
are : 
1. The c a p a c i t y  of a p i lo t  to  cope wi th  i n c r e a s i n g  complex 
a i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  depend on t h e  patterns and s k i l l s  that the 
pilot has developed. 
2. When s i t u a t i o n s  occur  which go outside of l e a r n e d  p a t t e r n s  
and s k i l l s ,  t h e  pi lot ' s  performance w i l l  s l o w  markodiy, and 
the r i s k  of c o g n i t i v e  or behav io ra l  overload w i l l  i n c r e a s e  
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markedly. 
z , 
2 ,  Theor ies  of P r a c t i c e  
Earlier, I introduced tho  no t ion  o f  a TOS, which is short- term and 
(This  is supported by the  work of Ruffell Smith, 1979.) 
: 
s i t u a t i o n a l ,  and a theory  o f  p r a c t i c e  (TOP), which is more g e n e r a l  and 
longer-term. A pilot 's  TOS changes c o n t i n u a l l y  d u r i n g  a s i n g l e  f l i g h t ;  
t h e  pi lot ' s  TOP (i-e. ,  concepts  and s k i l l s  f o r  f l y i n q  a n  a i r p l a n e )  
changes very l i t t l e  dur ing  a t y p i c a l  f l i q h t .  
The TOS and TOP are fmth examples of ' t h e o r i e s  f o r  a c t i o n '  (Argyris 
and Schon, 1974; Bolman, 1974). Humans always operate i n  environments 
that are so complex t h a t  it is d i f f i c u l t  or imposs ib le  to  a t t e n d  to 
every th ing .  The q u e s t i o n  arises: h o w  do they  select? The a c t i o n -  
t h e o r e t i c  proposa l  is t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  develop theories f o r  action; 
c o g n i t i v e  and behav io ra l  frameworks t h a t  gu ide  them i n  dccit l inq what 
i 
variables to a t t e n d  to, w h a t  in format ion  t o  seek, w h a t  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
to expec t ,  and what a c t i o n s  to  take.  The p i t t e r n  and r e g u l a r i t y  i n  any 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  behavior  is seen  as s t o m i n g  from a learned program that 
informs t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  cho ices  and, i f  a c c u r a t e l y  described, can  be 
used to predict the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  behavior. 
T h a t  program, or t heo ry  for action, can be viewed as c o n t a i n i n g  f o u r  
major components: 
1. C o r e  values:  basic criteria for making choices. 
2. Beliefs: b e l i e f s  or hypotheses about  the experienced world, 
i n c l u d i n g  beliefs a b u t  o n e s e l f ,  about o n e ' s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  role, 
about  people, about  s i t u a t i o n a l  con t ingenc ie s ,  etc. 
3 . S k i l l s i  l ea rned  behavior  p a t t e r n s .  
4. Outcomes: consequences of behavior ,  which feed back to i n f l u e n c e  
8 mdify, disconf i rm)  e x i s t i n g  core va lues ,  assumptions, 
and s k i l l s .  
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Argyr is  and Schon (1374) d i s t i n g u i s h  t w o  ve r s ions  of t h e  theory  t h a t  
The espoused theory  r e p r e s e n t s  an  informs an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  behavior.  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  own explana t ion  or  account of h i s  or her  behavior;  it is t h e  
consc ious ,  c o g n i t i v e  map t h a t  an ind iv idua l  uses  to e x p l a i n  and to p r e d i c t  
h i s  or h e r  own behavior.  The theory-in-use is  the thcory  that v a l i d l y  
predicts w h a t  a n  ind iv idua l  w i l l  do; it is  t h e  implici t  program that 
guides  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  clioicos. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between espoused theory and theory-in-use is v i t a l  
The espaused theory  because t h e  t w o  are o f t e n  d i f f e r e n t  or d i sc repan t .  
is n e c e s s a r i l y  incomplete for one reason a l r eady  d iscussed:  
to ski l led behavior  t h a t  cons ide ra t ion  of d e t a i l s  become t ac i t  and subsumed 
under a c o g n i t i v e  p a t t e r n  o r  behaviora l  s k i l l .  tlore troublesome than 
incompleteness of t h e  espoused theory  is i r r e l e v a n c e  o rh i r ec t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  
between espoused theory  and theory-in-use. 
i n d i v i d u a l s  are unaware of important  elements of t h e i r  behavior ,  and a r e  
u n r e l i a b l e  i n  desc r ib ing  and p r e d i c t i n g  the i r  behavior.  
A b a s i c  reason t h e  t w o  t h e o r i e s  are o f t e n  d i s c r e p a n t  i s  t h a t  they 
it is e s s e n t i a l  
Under those  circumstances,  
were l ea rned  i n  response to  somewhat d i f f e r e n t  environmental  cont inqencies .  
Espoused theory  is o f t e n  shaped as much or more by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of 
p o s i t i v e  s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n  as by accuracy of se l f -p re sen ta t ion .  
in-use is shaped by environmental  responses  to s p e c i f i c  behavior.  
as a child t o  espouse honesty as a g e n e r a l  value, and was n o t  t a u g h t  to 
say  about  myself ,  " S o m e t i m e s  I lie." But I was also t augh t  t h a t  t h e r e  
were. c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which I was expected to l ie .  I was f u r t h e r  
t augh t  not: to t a l k  about the possible discrepancy between t h c  gene ra l  
Theory- 
1 l earned  
va lue  of honesty and t h e  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s  in which I w a s  expected to 
39 
bi: dishones t .  Under those  cond i t ions ,  it is r e l a t i v e l y  easy  for m e  to  
develop an espoused view of myself as honest ,  and a theory-in-use t h a t  is 
only  p a r t l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  espoused theory.  
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between espoused theory  and theory-in-use implies 
an  epistemological d i s t i n c t i o n  among three d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of knowing. 
Knowledge is  ' i n t e l l e c t u a l '  when it ex i s t s  i n  t h e  espoused theory  b u t  no t  
i n  t h e  theory-in-use: 
b u t  cannot  do it. Knowledge is ' tacit '  when it e x i s t s  i n  the theory-in- 
use b u t  n o t  t h e  espoused theory:  the person can do it, b u t  cannot  exp la in  
how it is  done. Knowledge is ' i n t e g r a t e d '  when t h e r e  is  synchrony between 
espoused theory  and theory-in-use: 
' 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  can  th ink  about  it and t a l k  about  it, 
t h e  person can both th ink  it and do it. 
D i f f e r e n t  forms o f  educat ion are l i k e l y  to produce d i f f e r e n t  forms of 
knowledge. 'Academic educat ion '  -- i n  which l e a r n e r s  t h i n k  about  and 
d i s c u s s  t h e  practice environment, bu t  do n o t  perform wi th in  it 0- is l i k e l y  
to produce changes i n  espoused theory,  b u t  no corresponding changes i n  
theory-in-use. The r e s u l t  is i n t e l l e c t u a l  knowledge, b u t  t h e  knowledge 
may bo useless or even harmful if t h e  knowledge is abstracted a t  a l e v e l  
too f a r  removed from practice, i f  a p p l i c a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  s k i l l s  t h a t  t h e  
, l ea rne r s  have no t  developed, or if s u c c e s s f u l  a p p l i c a t i o n  is blocked 
by t h e  l e a r n e r ' s  l a c k  o f  self-awareness.  
may h e l p  t h e  l e a r n e r  to become more i n c o n s i s t e n t  and se l f - con t r ad ic to ry ,  
I n  t h e  extreme, t h e  educa t ion  
r a t h e r  t han  more e f f e c t i v e .  
' F i e l d  educat ion '  places 
environment, and requires t h e  
t h e  l e a r n e r  d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  practice 
l e a r n e r  to  perform w i t h i n  it, But the 
f i e l d  may n o t  r equ i r e ,  and may prevent ,  t h e  l e a r n e r ' s  
performance. Thus, t h e  f i e l d  is an ideal s e t t i n g  f o r  
r e f l e c t i o n  o n  t h e i r  
t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of 
' t a c i t '  knowledge. 
i n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  environment, b u t  may no t  be f u l l y  aware of t h e  s k i l l s  they 
have developcd, a id  of  p o s s i b l e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  t h e i r  s k i l l  repertoire. 
The l e a r n e r s  develop s k i l l s  which enable  them to cope 
It is cons ide ra t ions  l i k e  t h e s e  t h a t  have led many t r a i n i n g  o rgan iza t ions  
to attempt t o  i n t e g r a t e  academic, f i e l d ,  and ' s imu la to r '  t r a i n i n g  so as to 
d e v e l o p ' p r a c t i t i o n e r s  who are se l f -consc ious  and s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e  about  
t h e i r  practice, and who also have t h e  s k i l l s  needed f o r  e f f e c t i v e  performance. 
But such programs do n o t  always pay adequate  a t t e n t i o n  to  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between espoused theory  and theory-in-use, t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
incons is tency  between t h e  t w o ,  and the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  problems which may 
res\zlt. 
aspects o f  their theory-in-use, any o f  s e v e r a l  processes are o f t e n  a t  work: 
1. The i nd iv idua l  is unable to  acknowledge the dihcrepancy ' 
(because of t h e  anx ie ty  t h a t  t h e  discrepancy creates), 
and w i l l  defend a g a i n s t  any information sugges t ing  t h a t  
a discrepancy exis ts ,  
When i n d i v i d u a l s  are unable  to desc r ibe  a c c u r a t e l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
2 .  The gaps between espoused theory  and theory-in-use m y  
gene ra t e  l e a r n i n g  errors, p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g  
and s e l f - s e a l i n g  processes. ( I f ,  f o r  example, I believe 
I a m  being p l e a s a n t  and f r i e n d l y  when o t h e r s  pe rce ive  m e  
as cool and aggress ive ,  t h e r e  is a good p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
I w i l l  m i s i n t e r p r e t  t h e i r  responses  to m e  as evidence 
of t h e i r  personal d e f i c i e n c i e s ,  r a t h e r  than as a p p r o p r i a t e  
responses  to  my behavior.) 
3. There may be c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  i n  t h e  theory-in-use t h a t  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  does' n o t  recognize,  b u t  which create confusion 
f o r  o t h e r s .  
same person t h e  fol lowing t w o  messages: (1) you should get 
o u t  and t a k e  more i n i t i a t i v e s  i n  l ife;  (2) you are too weak 
and incompetent to  get anywhere. I f  I f a i l  to  recognize  t h e  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  (because I feel t h e r e  is a c o n s i s t e n t  message 
t h a t  says 'get o u t  and do more to  overcome your weaknesses ') ,  
I may create double-binds f o r  t h e  o t h e r  person, y e t  blame 
the other person for n o t  responding i n  a more positive way 
to my e f f o r t s  to  help.) 
(Suppose t h a t  I a m  c o n t i n u a l l y  sendinq to t h e  
The impl i ca t ion  is t h a t  any educa t iona l  program which aspires to  
41 
c e s s f u l  practice must help l e a r n e r s  to  understand t h e i r  
espoused t h e o r i e s  and t h e i r  theories- in-use,  and 
between t h e  two. 
An i n d i v i d u a l ' s  theo  in-use is t h e  o v e r a l l  program f o r  t h e  des' 
o f  behavior ,  from which a l l  o t h e r  t h e o r i e s  ( inc luding  t h e  espoused theory)  
are derived.  
deve lop  a t  b i r t h ,  and g radua l ly  evolves  through t h e  i n d i v i d u a l e s  l i f e .  A 
program l ea rned  over so long a per iod  of t i m e  is heav i ly  over learned ,  and 
The theory-in-use is a long-term program, which begins  to  
can be altered only through l e a r n i n g  exper iences  which extend over cons ide rab le  
periods of time. I n  any short- term l e a r n i n g  exper ience  (e.g., an experience 
of a f e w  hours), t h e  theory-in-use is  j u s t  short of una l t e rab le .  
I have d i scussed  t h e o r i e s  f o r  a c t i o n  a t  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  l eve l s :  
the theory-in-use, t h e  theory  of practice, and t h e  theoky of t h e  
s i t u a t i o n .  The relationship among t h e  t h r e e  is  h i e r a r c h i c a l ,  and can be 
i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  f i g u r e  below: 
TH EO RY-I N-USE 
TOPA 
A 
ToSAl T0SA2 
sists o f  t h e  
which provide d 
TOPS 
A 
ToSBl T0SB2 
core values ,  beliefs, and strategies 
uniqueness to  eve i n g  t h a t  I do. 
The theory-in-use a r of 
TOPS for di f f e  e arenas.  For examp f o r  d r i v i n g  
an automobil es. My TOP for automobile 
driving incorporates a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  TOS's (e.g,, ' I  am park ing  my 
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c a r ' ,  'I a m  d r i v i n g  5 m i l e s  above t h e  speed l i m i t ' ) .  
S ince  a TOP is u s u a l l y  learned  after an  i n d i v i d u d ' s  theory-in-use 
is wal l -es tab l i shed ,  t h e  theory  o f  practice w i l l  be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  inf luenced  
by t h e  prev ious  theory-in-use. 
to  be d i f f e r e n t  for d i f f e r e n t  e lements  o f  t h e  practice environment. ,Some 
areas of t h e  practice environment--par t icular ly  t h e  h ighly  t e c h n i c a l  areas-- 
The na tu re  o f  t h a t  influence i s  bikehy 
are l i k e l y  to  be r e l a t i v e l y  unfami l ia r  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  
problems f o r  which t h e  theory-in-use has  n o t  dcvelopcd. established rou t ines .  
Learning i n  such areas is nore a ques t ion  of adding new ct2ements t o  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  theory  than o f  a l t c r i n q  elements  which are aE.rcady p r e s e n t ,  
Other areas of the practice environment -- p a r t i c u l a r l y  those d,oaling wi th  
communications, i n t e r p e r s o n a l  in f luence ,  and managcnent of'' l:.man resources  -- 
r e p r e s e n t  areas i n  which ove r l ea rn ing  has a l r eady  oecurkad, and the e x i s t i n g  
theory-in-use is r e l a t i v e l y  d i f f i c u l t  to alter. This can lead to misleading 
They r e p r e s e n t  
assumptions l i k e ,  "You can t each  a man t o  f l y ,  b u t  you $can never teach  him 
to  lead. H e ' s  e i t h e r  got it, or he doesn ' t ."  
i n d i v i d u a l  cannot  l e a r n  about  leadersh ip ;  it is j u s t  that new l eade r sh ip  
skills are d i f f i c u l t  to  acqu i re  because they  r e q u i r e  extexaaiwe r e v i s i o n s  
i n  a theory  which is a l r eady  overlearned.  
The problem As not t h a t  t h e  
The q u e s t i o n  then  becomes under what c o n d i t i o n s  w i l l  an i n d i v i d u a l  
r e v i s e  a theory.  
a dilemma t h a t  is always present .  
developed is always c o s t l y - i t  r e q u i r e s  t im, energy, effort and, o f t e n ,  
emotional stress. 
Marris (1975) calls t h e  tendency to hold  on to  our e x i s t i n g  t h e o r i e s  
To understand t h i s  i s s u e ,  it is important  ta recognize  
Revision of a theory  that i o  a l r e a d y  
the 'conserva t ive  impulse ' ,  and argues  t h a t  it is i n t r i n s i c  to t h e  human 
capac i ty  to su rv ive  and l e a r n  from experience:  
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(The conse rva t ive  iinlnilse) i s  a cond i t ion  of siirlij ~ ~ a l .  i n  any 
s i t u a t i o n ,  w t m  for t l w  i w o t l  rdcl iwl  iirnovalor. \$t? t ~ r ~ i ~ i ~ ~ > t -  a c t  
without some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of what is going on about u s ,  and t o  
i n t e r p r e t  i t ,  w e  f i r s t  match i t  with somethi 
di!;covcry is lie I W X ~ ,  i l l  a HC 
p r c t a t i o n s  which g radua l ly  consol ida te .  . . i n t o  an  under~tandhq  
o f  l i f e .  Hence, thcrc is a deap-seated impulse i n  aXR uf us to 
defend t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  w h a t  w e  have l earned ,  for wit!iL_”v:i: i ~ .  w e  
would be he lp le s s .  (Marris, p. 10) 
’ (T)he  experience of psychoanalyt ic  t rea tment  sucrgcjests that it 
is  s l o w ,  p a i n f u l  and d i f f i c u l t  for an  a d u l t  to r c c o n s t x w t  a 
r a d i c a l l y  d i f  f c r e n t  way of sec ing  l i f e ,  however needle 
h i s  preconcept ions makc h i m .  In t h i s  sense ,  w e  are al l r  pxoSoundPy 
conse rva t ive ,  and f e e l  immediately th rea t ened  i f  oux bn-;;.c assumptions 
aiid emotional a t tachments  are threa tened .  (Marris, p. 1%) 
So w e  f i n d  innumerable examples o f  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which an Lndividual,  
a group, or a na t ion  c l i n g s  d e s p e r a t e l y  to  a theory  which 6% sm Longer 
working, r a t h e r  t han  to r i s k  t h e  unce r t a in ty ,  ambiguity asad h s s  of meaning 
t h a t  would come from abandoning a f a m i l i a r  way of interpxatd,ng the world. 
A teacher who has  been t each ing  t h e  same grade i n  t h e  same way for many 
.b 
yea r s  is asked by h i s  s u p e r i o r s  t o  adopt a new pedagogy. 
of himself  and h i s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  as a t e a c h s r  i s  attached to h i s  old ways, 
t h e  change is profoundly threat.ening. It would take great effort and time 
for him t o  l e a r n  a new approach, and he is n o t  a t  a l l  s u r e  %laat. he  w i l l  
feel comfortable  and e f f e c t i v e  even i f  he can l e a r n  it. 
If his sense 
The example i l lustrates  a pervas ive  dilemma - it is o f t e n  d i f f i c u l t  
to know i n  advance whether it is u s e f u l  i n  a given  s i t u a t i o n  t o  con t inue  
t o  use t h e  theo ry  I have (and save t h e  costs associated wi th  re-design), 
or to re-design (and save 
theory) .  Taking account  o h i s  dilemma, we can  assert several propositions 
about  
costs associated wi th  error i n  my p r e s e n t  
an  ind iv idua l ’ s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  engage i n  theory- 
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rdv i s ion r  
I, The more c e n t r a l  a theory  is to t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  se l f -concept  
and self-esteem, the  less l i k c l y  t h a t  t h e  ind iv idua l  w i l l  r ev i se .  
(Returning to  an earlier example, viewing myself as 'honest '  has  
become so c e n t r a l  to my va lu ing  of  myself, t h a t  I find it d i f f i c u l t  
even to cons ider  modifying t h a t  p a r t  o f  my theory  ahout  myself.) 
2 .  The mre a t h e o r y  is  'overlearned '  (i.e., t h e  more t h a t  I have 
' e x p e r i e n c e s ) ,  t h e  less l i k e l y  is t he  theory  t o  be xevised. 
l ea rned  the same t h i n g  through i t e r a t i o n s  o f  the same or similar 
3. Thc mre t h a t  i nqu i ry  and l e a r n i n g  are b u i l t  i n t o  khe t t x i s t i ng  
theory ,  t h e  more l i k e l y  i s  r ev i s ion .  (For example, many of t h e  
t h e o r i e s  of p r a c t i c e  used by s c i e n t i s t s  i nco rpora t e  inqu i ry  as a 
c e n t r a l  va lue ,  and inc rease  the l i k e l i h o o d  of theory  r e v i s i o n .  1 
4 .  The mre t h e  s i t u a t i o n  makes disconf i rming  evidence avai l .able ,  
t h e  more l i k e l y  is  r e v i s i o n  of the  theory.  
i f  my theory  is  inaccura t e ,  b u t  I get no feedback Prom the 
environment to  a ler t  m e  to  t h e  problem, I may int-erp-oxat the 
exper ience  as f u r t h e r  conf i rmat ion  o f  t h e  theo ry ' s  validity.) 
(In other w~rdsP 
5. The greater t h e  arnount of ambiguity,  confusion,  infamat:ion 
overload and stress t h a t  an ind iv idua l  is experlewcinq, the 
less l i k e l y  i s  r e v i s i o n  of the  ope ra t inq  theory.  
over load  an  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  c o g n i t i v e  a id  performance capabilities 
i n c r e a s e s  tho  i n c e n t i v e  t o  s o l v e  problems i n  t h e  simplest possible 
way-usually by r e l y i n g  on a theory  t h a t  is welJ:-learned, rather 
than  searching  f o r  new ones. 1 
Omything t h a t  
To aumnarizer 
1. Ind iv idua l s  develop over  t h e  course  o f  t h e i r  l i v e s  t h e o r i e s  
f o r  a c t i o n ,  i nc lud ing  a theory-in-use which informs a l l  o f  
t h e i r  behavior ,  and an espoused theory,  which guides  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  pe rcep t ion  o f  s e l f .  
2. An i nd iv idua l ' s  t h e o r i e s  f o r  a c t i o n  may c o n t a i n  errors and 
gaps, b u t  be designed i n  such a way as to  prevent  t h e  person 
from recogniz ing  t h e  problems. 
3. m e n  i f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  does recognize  problems i n  the theory- 
in-use,  s/he can alter t h e  theory  only  wi th  cons ide rab le  e f f o r t  
and t i m e .  
4.  In order to perform i n  s p e c i f i e d  practice domains, i n d i v i d u a l s  
davelop ' t h e o r i e s  o f  practice'. I n  some areas--usual ly  areas 
t h a t  are highly  t e c h n i c a l  or unique to t h e  practice domain- 
those t h e o r i e s  r e p r e s e n t  additions to r a t h e r  than r e v i s i o n s  in 
the pre-existing theory-in-use. 
i s s u e s  of how an i n d i v i d u a l  relates to  and works wi th  o the r s -  
l e a r n i n g  is l i k e l y  to  be much more d i f f i c u l t  because it r e q u i r e s  
In o t h e r  a reas -pa r t i cu la r ly  
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E. 
r e v i s i o n s  to  p re -ex i s t ing  p a t t e r n s .  I n  t h e  former areas, t h e  
theory  of p r a c t i c e  is more l i k e l y  to bc dominated by t h e  
theory  o f  p r a  
produce a ' t heo ry  of t h e  s i t ua t ion ' - - a  shor t - te rm set: af goals, 
assumptions, s k i l l s  and outcomes for use i n  a s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n .  
6.. There is  always a dilemma a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  d e c i s i o n  to r e v i s e  
a theory  {at any o f  t h e  t h r e e  l e v e l s ) :  is it more P . , C Q W ~ ~ C  and 
e f f i c i e n t  to cont inue  to  implement t h e  p r e s e n t  theory ,  BP is it 
more e f f i c i e n t  t o  r e v i s e  t h e  theo ry  i n  order to carreb=t i t s  
errors and d e f i c i e n c i e s .  
7. Revis ion is mre l i k e l y  under c o n d i t i o n s  of (a) Xow stress and 
overload,  (b) a c c e s s i b i l i t y  o f  r e l e v a n t  feedback, fc$ i n q u i r y  
s k i l l s  built i n t o  the  e x i s t i n g  theory.  
8 .  Theory-revision is less l i k e l y  when a theory  i s  csxaQra.7. kcj a n  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  self-esteem, when it is over learned ,  and i~ crisis 
s i t u a t i o n s  which overwhelm t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  cogmit lve and 
performance c a p a c i t i e s .  
The Problems o f  On-Line Theory Revis ion 
The a i r  a c c i d e n t  cases cited above--like many o t h e r  cases in which 
crew errors occur-al l  occur red  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  where t h e  c a p t a i n  (or t h e  
e n t i r e  crew) was o p e r a t i n g  on  a f a u l t y  theo ry  of the s i t u a t i o n ,  and was 
over looking  data t h a t  raised q u e s t i o n s  about  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  that theory.  
I have a l r e a d y  suggested t h a t  t h e  TOS arises from t h e  i n t e r p l a y  between 
t h e  pilot 's theory of practice (TOP) and s i t u a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s ,  
TOS is i n  error, w e  can argue  t h a t  t h e  a n s  
When the 
s to  t w o  basic q u e s t i o n s  
TOS error a v a i l a b l e  bn t h e  environment? 
ror@ is t h e s e  o t h e r  
s informat ion?  
t i o n  t h a t  they  do n o t  have, i s  it 
le in format ion  
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The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of information to  d o t o c t  error is necessary ,  but 
not sufficient. Many questions about availability of information go t o  
des ign  i s s u e s  - t h e  des ign  o f  a i r c r a f t  and a i r c r a f t  i n s t rumen ta t ion ,  t h e  
des ign  o f  a i r  c o n t r o l l e r  systems, t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  a c c u r a t e  and useab le  
manuals and c h e c k - l i s t s ,  etc. 
ment a n d . i n t e r p e r s o n a 1  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
which occurred  i n  a DC-8 s h o r t l y  be fo re  it crashed i n t o  a mountains 
But some q u e s t i o n s  go to  i s s u e s  ~b manage- 
Take t h e  fo l lowing  conversa t ion ,  
F i r s t  o f f i c e r :  
Captain:  No, 40 DME, you ' re  a l l  r i g h t .  
We should be a l i t t l e  h ighe r  here ,  s h o u l d n ' t  we? 
The f i r s t  o f f i c e r  w a s  correct; t he  c a p t a i n  w a s  wrong. Both were k i l l e d  
because t h e  c a p t a i n  cont inued t o  r e l y  on h i s  f a u l t y  TOS. The c a p t a i n ' s  
TOP d i d  n o t  lead him t o  test t h e  p o s s i b l e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r ' s  
suggest ion.  The c a p t a i n  was fo l lowing  a time-honored precedent2 leaders 
i n  a l l  sorts of  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  reject subord ina te  ques t ion ing  of  t h e i r  
b e l i e f s  day i n  and day ou t .  It enables them t o  g e t  on wi th  implementing 
t h e i r  c u r r e n t  TOS, r a t h e r  t han  having to d e l a y  and test  its v a l i d i t y .  
A cons ide rab le  body o f  r e s e a r c h  on t h e  theor ies - in-use  he ld  by  managers 
and p r o f e s s i o n a l s  sugges t s  t h a t  it is normative f o r  them to  respond to  
ques t ion ing  or c o n f r o n t a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  TOS by defending  it r a t h e r  t han  
i n q u i r i n g  i n to  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  error. Even i n  s i tua t ions  where t h e  
s t a k e s  are not so high  nor so irrevocable as i n  a i r  t r a f f i c  s a f e t y ,  t h e  
costs can be se r ious .  
unacceptable. 
In  t h e  c o c k p i t  of a n  air carrier, t h e  costs are 
That sugges t s  t w o  impor tan t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  TOPS that 
t r a i n i n g  programs should seek to produce i n  f l i g h t  crews: 
1. Whenever a member of a f l i g h t  crew senses t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  t h e  crew's o p e r a t i n g  TOS may lead to s i g n i f i c a n t  error, 
t h a t  member has  a p o s i t i v e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  raise t h e  issue and 
request t h a t  t h e  TOS be tested. 
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2. Whenever a member of  a f l i g h t  crew is challenged by another 
about t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  h i s h e r  operat ing 
t o  s i g n i f i c a n t  error, t h a t  member has a pos i t i ve  
to  seek infornat ion to t h e  v a l i  
Those pro may seem reasonable enough, bu t  they are 
to  implement, for t w o  reasons: 
1. The proposi t ions are much easier to adopt a t  the  level of  
espoused theory than theory-in-use, because they requi re  
wil l ingness  and s k i l l  i n  confrontation, inquiry,  and 
conflict-management t h a t  crew members may not  have. 
There is a problem of how to design a management system 
which i n s i s t s  t h a t  t he  capta in  has  a pos i t i ve  obl iga t ion  
to inqui re  when challenged, bu t  also has t h e  au thor i ty  
to make binding decisions.  
2. 
The problems are re l a t ed ,  because both requi re  t h a t  f l i g h t  crew 
menbers have a set of management and in te rpersonal  s k i l l s  which are 
r a r e l y  observed i n  any organizat ional  s e t t i ng .  Basically,  they requi re  
t h e  a b i l i t y  to combine advocacy (behavior which advocates one's b e l i e f s ,  
i 
values and opinions) with inquiry (behavior which seeks to test t h e  
v a l i d i t y  of one 's  beliefs, behavior, and values) . 
are o f t e n  perceived as polar opposites--with the  implicat ion t h a t  it 
Advocacy and inquiry 
is impossible to do both a t  the  same time. 
managers is cons is ten t  with t h e  po la r  opposi te  theory-it is rare to f ind  
managers who a good a t  both. But there  are some. And both s k i l l s  are 
essential i n  a cockpit. 
Empirical observation of 
It is e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  a l l  members of a f l i g h t  
efs and advocate t h e i r  view of t h e  
i n  very weak advmcacy 
captain' s response 
48 
make himself appear foolish by questioning the judgment of an experienced 
pilot who was familiar with the area). Supose that each had an operating 
TOP which led them to combine advocacy and inquiry. 
conversation might have been: 
An alternative 
First officer: I'm really concerned about whether our altitude 
is safe. What leads you to think we're o.k.? 
Captain: 
Theories of practice, pilot skills and cockpit norms that favor high 
I think we're 0.k. at 40 DME, but what's your concern? 
levels of advocacy and inquiry can help to ensure that crewmembers 
communicate effectively whenever someone in the crew senses error. An 
additional step is to train crewmembers to develop TOP'S which call for 
testing and inquiry whenever there is ambiguity or anomaly in their current 
TOS. That is, whenever the crew recognizes that something is happening 
that does not completely fit their theory of the situation, they need to begin 
asking questions like, 'Could we be mistaken?' 'Is there some other 
explanation for what's happening?' 'Is there any information we have (or 
can obtain) to help us understand the situation?' 
For example, consider the case of a 727 which crashed because the 
flight crew did not recognize the nature of their problem. 
inadvertantly failed to turn on the pitot heaters. When the pitot heads 
became blocked by atmospheric icing, they gave erroneously high airspeed 
readings. The crew was very surprised by the high airspeeds, but 
attributed them to unusual weather conditions and the fact that the plane 
They had 
was flying light. 
indicators were erroneous, although the plane's altitude should have 
alerted them that such high airspeeds were improbable or impossible. 
They did not consider the possibility that the airspeed 
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The sounds of a stall warning were mistaken for a Mach buffet (partly 
because the crew had just heard an erron 
situation, a disaster might have 
question the puzzling result by askin 
be wrong?" 
C. 
Anomalous or confusing situations tend to overload flight crews. 
Theory-revision and Management of Human Resources 
Over- 
load increases the likelihood of error. 
resources becomes a critical factor in aviation safety. It is precisely 
in crisis situations that the demands on both information-processing and 
performance skills are highest. 
to ensure that each member of the crew is performing effectively and 
The optimal use of available human 
In those situations, a flight crew needs 
working on the right set of tasks for the situation. 
tasks are defined and allocated constitutes a set of role definitions for 
a given moment (and those role definitions are one aspect--often implicit-- 
of the crew's theory of the situation). 
The way in which 
The flight situation makes very high demands on the role system-- 
simultaneously demanding high levels of role clarity (so that everyone 
is clear about their tasks) and role flexibility (so that tasks may be 
shifted or re-allocated as changes in the situation warrant). 
A role is a set of activities or performances that are defined by 
the expectations of 'role-senders'--persons who have expectations about 
how a role-occupant will pe rm in the role. Role-senders for an airline 
captain include the captain himself, other members of the flight crew, the 
passengers, airline management, air controllers, other airline pilots, etc. 
der has expectations for how a captain is to behave (although 
those expectations vary greatly in breadth, specificity and clarity among 
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different role-senders) and has the potential to exert influence on the 
captain (the amount varying greatly among different role-senders: the 
captain usually pays much closer attention to air controllers than to ~ 
passengers). Role clarity exists when the expectations are well-defined 
and there is agreement among those role-senders who are significant for 
a particular situation. 
exists. 
conflict. 
of the flight crew need to have mutual role expectations that are clear 
If the expectations are vague, then role ambiguity 
If the expectations conflict with one another, there is role 
To avoid role ambiguity and conflict in the cockpit, the members 
and mutually understood. 
problems can lead to serious errors. Those problems include excessive 
role restriction, inappropriate role differentiation, errors in managing 
interdependence, and problems in managing role boundaries. 
When this does not occur, a variety of role 
1. Role restriction 
Excessive role-restriction is the common result of over-controlling 
management styles. Many individuals have great difficulty'making the 
transition from 'doing it themselves' to 'getting it done through managing 
others'. 
as they. In others, they are fearful that subordinates will make errors 
unless closely controlled. 
which creates a very restrictive role for subordinates. 
to succeed through over-control often fail, because thehr subordinates 
are unable to accomplish very much. Warwick (1975) describes in vivid, if 
depressing detail how such a management style pervades the U.S .  State 
Department and helps to produce enormously slow and cumbersome performance. 
The subordinates are 'disempowered' and prevented from making optimal use 
In many cases, they doubt that anyone else can do it as well 
The result is a controlling style of management 
Managers who try 
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of their skills and capacities. The manager's primary task is not to do 
it himself/herself, but to make the best possible use of available human 
resources. 
Ruffell Smith's (1979) simulator study of crew response to overload found 
that one source of errors in many crews was the captain's tendency to do 
too much by himself, and to overcontrol his crewmembers. For example, 
some captains attempted to fly the plane and command during a difficult, 
emergency condition. They became overloaded, while other members of the 
crew were underloaded. In other cases, the captain gave so many discrete 
orders that other crewmembers never finished important tasks because of 
constant interruptions. 
2. 
Role differentiation refers to the degree to which different roles 
Role differentiation and management of interdependence 
are clearly distinct from one another. 
or over-differentiate. 
It is possible to under-differentiate 
Under-differentiation leads to excessive overlap 
(too many people doing the same thing), which often coincides with sig- 
nificant gaps (some activities that no one is doing). 
I )  
A clear example i s  
the crew which permitted their 1011 to crash because everyone was worrying 
about the nose gear light, but no one was monitoring the plane's flight 
performance. The under-differentiation (too many people focusing on one 
problem) led easily to gaps (significant problems that no one focused on). 
Under-differentiation often leads to conflict--as people trip over each 
other, or resent one another's intrusions into their turf. 
which crashed into the mountain, the captain had apparently taken over the 
In the DC-8 
navigational role by developing his o m  personal approach plan, which he 
with anyone else. rtly before the accident, the first 
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officer asked the captain if he was planning to make a procedure turn. 
The captain replied, "No, I ... I wasn't going to." But the captain did not 
say what he was planning to do. The,first officer asked about the terrain, 
and the captain said, "Mountains everywhere." The first officer then asked, 
"We should be a little higher, shouldn't we?", but he did not have enough 
information about the captains plan to be sure. 
Overlap can have one advantage--redundancy can reduce the likelihood 
of error. 
into the roles of air pilots. 
about the areas in which redundancy is expected and needed, and the areas 
in which overlap is wasteful and hazardous. 
A number of such redundancies are planned into aircraft and 
What is important is that crews be clear 
Over-differentiation occurs when different roles are so completely 
distinct, that different individuals have great difficulty knowing what 
one another is doing. The risk is that they make erroneous assumptions 
about one another, and fail to communicate enough to test those assumptions. 
In the airline setting, that risk is particularly high between pilots 
and flight controllers, whose roles are highly differentiated. 
the interdependencies between the roles have been worked out over time and 
Many of 
have achieved high levels of precision and reliability. But some areas 
are not completely resolved (e.g., the responsibilities of pilots and 
controllers with respect to detecting and communicating possible conflicts 
among aircraft). An example of pilot-controller misunderstanding occurred 
in the case (discussed earlier) of the 727 which crashed on an approach. 
The captain believed that the controller had cleared him to an elevation 
of 1800 feet. 
the captain relied on the assumption that it was the controller's responsibility 
Even though his approach chart suggested a possible problem, 
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t o  be s u r e  t h a t  an  approach is nok given un le s s  it is aaf'e. The c r e w  had 
p l e n t y  of t i m e  to  re-check t h e  charts or t o  check a y a h  wi th  ground c o n t r o l ,  
b u t  d i d  no t  do SO. The plane  crashed,  k i l l i n g  everyom aboard. 
3. Boundary Management 
A ro le  is a set o f  t a s k s  de f ined  by t h e  expec ta t ions  of role-senders .  
Those expec ta t ions  can be seen  as d e f i n i n g  a 'Ix3undaryG maund t h e  role. 
Tasks i n s i d e  t h e  boundary are p a r t  of the  role: tasks cxtside of t h e  boundary 
are no t  part of t h e  role. 
and r o l e - f l e x i b i l i t y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  and iv idca l s  be able t o  re -def ine  
boundaries.  
bor:n:Xaries are i l l - d e f i n e d ,  or  because there is l i t t l e  agreement on t h e  
p..;'ocess for re -def in ing  boundaries.  Undax-d iPferen t ie~ion ,  for example, 
Role boundaries  axe never completely precise, 
Many of the role problems discussed above occur because t h e  
.is very  l i k e l y  to  occur when roles are ambiguous an6 hx ihda r i e s  are ill- 
defined.  
For a f l i g h t  crew to be e f f e c t i v e  uncficr anomalous or crisis cond i t ions ,  
they  need to be conscious of t h e  need for hoiindary c l a r i k y ,  and clear about 
t h e  legitimate ways i n  which role boundaries  may be redefined. 
is critical, because emergencies w i l l  o f t e n  r e q u i r e  very rapid role s h i f t s ;  
The latter 
t h e  crew needs a way t o  accomplish t h i s  without  producing confusion,  role 
r e s t r i c t i o n ,  or innappropr ia te  gaps and over laps .  
t o  t h e  problem--'role boundaries are whatever t h e  c a p t a i n  s a y s  they  are'--- 
i s  e f f e c t i v e  in producing r a p i d  s h i f t s ,  b u t  does no t  always guarantee  
correct s h i f t s .  On the o t h e r  hand, a system i n  which anyone has  t h e  r i g h t  
ae any time to resist or appeal the c a p t a i n ' s  d e c i s i o n s  would make rapid 
s h i f t  very d i f f i c u l t  to achieve.  It might lead to  good d e c i s i o n s  i n  t h e  
long-run, b u t  that is no 
One obvious approach 
i f  t h e  p l ane  c ra shes  i n  t h e  s h o r t  run. 
What is needed is a system t h a t  preserves t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  a u t h o r i t y  to  
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make binding  d e c i s i o n s ,  bu t  places a p o s i t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  an  o t h e r  crew 
members t o  raise ques t ions  o r  suggest  a l t e r n a t i v e s  when they perceive 
t h a t  t h e  c a p t a i n ' e  s t r a t en  might  lead to  sfqnificant error. 
i n  t u r n ,  need to va lue  such i n p u t  as part o f  t h e  help they expec t  from 
3 
Captains ,  
t he i r  f l i g h t  crew, r a t h e r  than r e j e c t i n g  it 
threat to t h e  command s t r u c t u r e .  
D. Train ing  i n  KLU-IE-.~~ Resource Mdnagement 
e. 
o u t  of hand or see ing  it as a 
The arguments i n  this paper imply a need to devote  more a t t e n t i o n  to 
topics t h a t  have been largely neglected i n  p i lo t  t r a i n i n g .  P i l o t s  need 
to u8:derstand t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  hcta een slituationv and t h e i r  own t h e o r i e s  
To.; p r a c t i c e ,   the^ need to approc iate t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between espoused 
theory  and theory-in-use, and Le able to  explore t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of 
discrepancy i n  t h e i r  own theories. 
of s k i l l  i n  i nqu i ry  and on- l ine  l ca rn ing ,  and they need to  l e a r n  t h e o r i e s  
of p i l o t i n g  t h a t  emphasize those :jkil.lS. They need a conceptual  understanding 
of t h e  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  processes and role i s s u e s  t h a t  aze cri t ical  to the 
They need to u ~ - I ~ w s & A J ~  t h e  importance 
flight deck s i t u a t i o n ,  and they need practice and skill i n  implementing 
those  concepts.  
W e  have begun to develop educa t iona l  approaches to  accomplish similar 
goals i n  working wi th  o t h e r  p ro fes s iona l s ,  i nc lud ing  managers (Argyris ,  
1976, B o h a n ,  19761, lawyers (Bolman, 19781, educational.  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  
(Bolman, 1976),  and m i n i s t e r s  (Bolman and Gallos, 19791, All of the 
methods emphasize the importance of i n t e g r a t i n g  theory, s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n ,  
and practice. The d e s i g n  of such t r a i n i n g  v a r i e s  w i th  t h e  l e a r n i n g  
con tex t  , 
1. 
b u t  always inc ludes  some ve r s ion  of the fol lowing elementas 
P resen ta t ion  of r e l e v a n t  theory  (e .g . ,  theory  about i nqu i ry  
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and learning, interpersonal skills, role dynamics, 
communication in small groups, etc.) 
2.  Discussion of case examples from the learner's experience 
(e.g., discussion by pilots of particularly challenging ' 
situations that they have faced), as a way to apply the 
theory and to encourage learners to reflect on their 
own practice. 
3. Simulation of practice problems, with the chance for 
discussion, feedback, and repeated practice. (As  an 
example, a crew could work through a crisis situation in 
a full-mission simulation. 
experience with assistance from faculty. 
practice the same situation again.) 
They would then discuss the 
Next they would 
The design of such training is a challenging but exciting task. 
Part of the challenge is creating effective training experiences. Another 
part of the challenge is integrating new experiences with existing training. 
A significant part of the challenge is that the training must begin to 
question traditional assumptions about management and superior-subordinate 
communications. Those questions go beyond the flight deck--the same 
questions can be raised about the entire training activity, and about the 
management of the airline. If the management patterns that lead to pilot 
error are the same patterns used at every level of management in an air- 
line (where they presumably also lead to error), then the question of 
training pilots in effective management of human resources is closely 
tied to the larger questions of organizational climate and human resource 
management for the entire system. 
Those are large and difficult questions, and many of the answers 
remain to be discovered. But I believe that the air transport industry 
has little choice--sooner or later those questions will have to be con- 
fronted. 
sooner. 
Personally, I would prefer to fly with the-airlines that do it 
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NOTES 
1. This  i s  a working paper red  t h e  
9 Fr an Management on the  F l i g h t  I t  
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FLIGHT CREW SELECTION AT UNITED AIRLINES 
Capt. W i l l i a m  Traub* 
Poor dec i s ions  i n  p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n  can be very  expensive and i n  today 's  
environment of soph i s t i ca t ed  equipment and increased  competi t ion,  dec i s ions  
do have a s i g n i f i c a n t  bear ing on an a i r l i n e ' s  success  o r  f a i l u r e .  
Looking only a t  t r a i n i n g  expense, w e  a t  United Airlines estimate a 
mistake i n  p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n  could c o s t  upwards of $250,000 over a 30-year 
p i l o t  career. 
On t h e  o the r  hand, good d e c i s i o n s  i n  p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n  pay o f f  
handsomely i n  t e r m s  of t r a i n i n g  requirements ,  whether w e  are  d i scuss ing  
resource  management s k i l l s ,  f l y i n g  s k i l l s ,  o r  a composite of a l l  of those  
t a l e n t s  t h a t  go i n t o  t h e  makeup of a n  outs tanding  employee and u l t i m a t e l y  i n  
an  outs tanding  cap ta in .  
In  t h e  p a s t  25 yea r s ,  United A i r l i n e s  has  h i r ed  more than  6,000 p i l o t s .  
To do t h i s  i t  has been necessary t o  process  over 90,000 app l i can t s .  A s  a 
r e s u l t ,  i n  those  25 yea r s  w e  b e l i e v e  w e  have developed some s k i l l s  i n  p i l o t  
s e l e c t  ion.  
A s  shown i n  f i g u r e  1, our q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  p i l o t  employment have 
va r i ed  over t h e  years  from 1954, when w e  requi red  a high school  diploma and 
165 hours of f l i gh t - t ime  experience,  t o  1970, when w e  requi red  a c o l l e g e  
degree and 500 hours of f l i g h t  t i m e .  
There w a s  a l s o  a per iod i n  t h e  l a te  1960's dur ing  which w e  processed 
a p p l i c a n t s  w i th  a p r i v a t e  p i l o t  l i c e n s e ;  i f  t h e  a p p l i c a n t  passed a l l  of our 
tests w e  guaranteed him a job  i f  he w a s  a b l e  t o  o b t a i n  a commercial license 
wi th in  1 y r .  
The c u r r e n t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  shown i n  f i g u r e  1 came about as a r e s u l t  of 
a cour t  decree .  
chal lenged by t h e  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission f o r  d i scr imina tory  
h i r i n g  p r a c t i c e s  i n  p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n .  
For those  of you who don ' t  know, United A i r l i n e s  w a s  
This  r e s u l t e d  i n  a cour t  case and t h e  s ign ing  of a cour t  decree.  
Included i n  that  dec ree  were these  minimum employment q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  
With t h e  except ion of t h e  c u r r e n t  h i r i n g  program, t h e  changes w e  made 
i n  minimum employment q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  were motivated p r imar i ly  by a p p l i c a n t  
supply r a t h e r  than  any d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  wi th  t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e  p i l o t s  
prev ious ly  h i r ed .  
This  i s  not  t o  say  w e  d i d n ' t  make some mistakes.  However, t h e  e f f e c t s  
of t h e  mistakes were minimized l a r g e l y  due to  t h e  q u a l i t y  of a p p l i c a n t s  
r a t h e r  than  any r e a l l y  s c i e n t i f i c  s e l e c t i o n  procedure. 
"F l ight  Tra in ing  Manager , United A i r l i n e s .  
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I n  1975, United A i r l i n e s  d i d  something it  had n o t  attempted t o  do before ,  
Looking ahead t o  t h e  later 1970's and e a r l y  a t  least i n  any important d e t a i l .  
1980s, w e  could f o r e s e e  a per iod of s i g n i f i c a n t  h i r i n g .  W e  would recal l  
approximately 500 furloughed p i l o t s  and h i r e  more than  1,000 new p i l o t s .  
To be s u r e  w e  would pursue t h e  proper h i r i n g  philosophy, United 
The f i r s t  management formed w h a t  w e  c a l l  a p i l o t  new-hire committee. 
cha l lenge  of t h e  committee ( f i g .  2)  w a s  t o  eva lua te  p a s t  s e l e c t i o n  processes  
used a t  United A i r l i n e s .  Fur ther ,  w e  would expand our e x p e r t i s e  i n  t h e  
methods of p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n  by s tudying t h e  state of t h e  art  and t h e  h i r i n g  
processes  used by o t h e r  a i r l i n e s  throughout t h e  world. And f i n a l l y ,  w e  would 
develop recommendations f o r  f u t u r e  new-hire p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n ,  new-hire 
t r a i n i n g ,  and t h e  probat ionary  year  eva lua t ion .  
The committee pursued t h e s e  matters f o r  some 18 months and developed a 
philosophy of p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n .  This  philosophy forms t h e  b a s i s  of United 's  
p resent  h i r i n g  and t r a i n i n g  program which is  t o  d a t e  proving t o  be the  most 
success fu l  i n  our h i s to ry .  
Before reviewing our  c u r r e n t  philosophy, a l low m e  t o  sha re  wi th  you 
seve ra l  cons ide ra t ions  t h a t  shaped t h e  committee's development of philosophy 
and i t s  recommendations ( f i g .  3 ) .  
F i r s t  w a s  t h e  s ign ing  of t h e  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
versus  United A i r l i n e s  Consent Decree, which reduced some of our previous 
h i r i n g  s t anda rds  and set g o a l s  f o r  employment of m i n o r i t i e s  and females as 
a i r l i n e  p i l o t s .  
A s  a r e s u l t  of t h e  cour t  decree ,  formal educa t ion  and f l i g h t  time could 
no longer  be used as primary Se lec t ion  cri teria i n  our h i r i n g  program. 
Second, t h e  committee w a s  inf luenced by t h e  heavy a t t a c k  our previous 
s tandards  were subjec ted  t o  dur ing  t h e  Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission-United A i r l i n e s  case, and our  l a c k  of proof t h a t  t h e s e  s tandards  
r e l a t e d  to  any c r i t e r i o n  of j ob  performance. 
requi red  t o  v a l i d a t e  each s t e p  of t h e  s e l e c t i o n  process  w e  intended t o  use.  
I n  t h e  f u t u r e  w e  would be 
Third,  and very  important ly ,  a thorough s tudy  w a s  undertaken of t h e  
psychological  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of our  most success fu l  and least success fu l  
p i l o t s .  This  l e d  t o  t h e  development of what w e  cal l  a criteria p r o f i l e  
i d e n t i f y i n g  those  a t t i t u d e s  and p e r s o n a l i t y  t ra i ts  possessed by our  most 
success fu l  p i l o t s .  
This  p r o f i l e  w a s  compared w i t h  a h igh  degree  of c o r r e l a t i o n  t o  
pe r sona l i ty  i n v e n t o r i e s  developed by o t h e r  a i r l i n e s  throughout t h e  world. 
Our s tudy  showed t h a t  a l though,  a t  t h e  t i m e  of h i r e ,  t h e r e  were s ig -  
n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  p e r s o n a l i t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  between our  most 
success fu l  and least success fu l  p i l o t s ,  t h e r e  were e s s e n t i a l l y  no d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  educat ion o r  f l i g h t  t i m e .  
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A l a r g e  b a t t e r y  of psychological  tests w a s  adminis tered t o  a sample 
group of p i l o t s .  The r e s u l t  of t h e s e  tes ts  w a s  compared t o  f l i g h t  management 
r a t i n g s  of p i l o t ' s  performance and t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r e p o r t  of j ob  satis- 
f a c t i o n .  Again t h e r e  w a s  a h igh  c o r r e l a t i o n  between c e r t a i n  psychological  
t ra i t s  and job  performance of our most success fu l  employees. 
The committee a l s o  i d e n t i f i e d  p i l o t s  who without  s i g n i f i c a n t  a d d i t i o n a l  
per iods  of t r a i n i n g  apparent ly  d i d  no t  possess  t h e  necessary  psychomotor 
s k i l l s  t o  perform c o n s i s t e n t l y  a t  t h e  high s tandards  expected of a United 
A i r l i n e s  p i l o t .  I n  most cases they  w e r e  no t  requi red  t o  complete a 
thorough p i l o t  t r a i n i n g  and eva lua t ion  program as p a r t  of- new-hire t r a i n i n g .  
And f i n a l l y ,  t h e  committee i d e n t i f i e d  p i l o t s  who were h ighly  qua l i f i ed  
a t  t h e  t i m e  of h i r e ,  bu t  who appeared t o  be psychologica l ly  unsui ted  f o r  a 
ca ree r  as an a i r l i n e  p i l o t .  These men do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  have prof ic iency  
problems, but  do have pe r sona l i ty  and a t t i t u d i n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  are 
c o s t l y  i n  terms of superv isory  t i m e ,  employee morale, passenger r e l a t i o n s ,  
and cockpi t  harmony. 
A s  a r e s u l t  of t h i s  r e sea rch  and s tudy ,  t h e  new-hire committee developed 
t h i s  philosophy of p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n  ( f i g .  4 ) :  S e l e c t  p i l o t s  who have bas i c  
f l y i n g  s k i l l s  p lus  t h e  appropr i a t e  a t t i t u d e  and p e r s o n a l i t y  t ra i t s  t h a t  make 
an outs tanding  employee and u l t i m a t e l y  an  outs tanding  cap ta in .  
To implement and conform t o  t h i s  philosophy w e  developed t h e  fol lowing 
mul t i - s tep  s e l e c t i o n  and t r a i n i n g  process  ( f i g .  5 ) :  
F i r s t  we  developed a computerized p i l o t  app l i can t  t r ack ing  system t h a t  
permits  a completely c e n t r a l i z e d  s e l e c t i o n  procedure whereby w e  are a b l e  t o  
select f o r  processing t h e  b e s t  candida tes  r e g a r d l e s s  of where 
(geographical ly)  they  make a p p l i c a t i o n .  
Second, a series of psychological  tests w a s  s e l e c t e d  and va l ida t ed  by 
t e s t i n g  p a r t  of our  incumbent p i l o t  group. This  allowed us  t o  develop a 
p r o f i l e  t o  be s u r e  a p p l i c a n t s  possessed t h e  requi red  a t t i t u d e  and 
pe r sona l i ty  traits .  
The a t t i t u d e  and p e r s o n a l i t y  t raits  w e  a t  United consider  important are 
l i s t e d  i n  f i g u r e  6 .  I t h i n k  w e  gene ra l ly  ag ree  wi th  M r .  Webster, bu t  l e t  m e  
i n  any case t e l l  you what we  mean by each of t h e s e  t e r m s :  
The ind iv idua l  must be motivated by a career i n  a v i a t i o n  i t s e l f ,  n o t  by 
t h e  high pay o r  o t h e r  advantages.  
The p i l o t  must have a congruent in teres t  p a t t e r n .  Divergent i n t e r e s t s  
are a nega t ive  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  I n t e r e s t s  should be  predominantly i n  
t echn ica l  areas but  w i th  some i n t e r e s t s  i n  i n t e r a c t i n g  wi th  people.  
P i l o t s  should be confident of t h e i r  a b i l i t y  and c a p a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r o l  
t h e i r  environment, bu t  no t  t o  t h e  po in t  of overconfidence.  
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A reaZistic out look  
important.  A p i l o t  must 
impat ient  . 
By conscientious w e  
behavior.  
on l i f e ,  f r e e  from abnormal anx ie ty  r e a c t i o n s ,  i s  
make d e c i s i o n s  based on f a c t s  and no t  be  ove r ly  
mean someone who e x h i b i t s  good goal-directed 
Cooperative - accep t s  a u t h o r i t y  and procedures , and ques t ions  when 
a p p r o p r i a t e  - not  a maverick. 
Consistency - not  always looking f o r  ways t o  do th ings  d i f f e r e n t l y ;  
w i l l i n g  t o  fo l low a c o n s i s t e n t  h a b i t  p a t t e r n .  
And f i n a l l y ,  startZe threshotd. An i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  t h i n k  
l o g i c a l l y  and quickly under stress. Ind iv idua l s  who f r e e z e  o r  respond t o  
inappropr i a t e  s t i m u l i  under stress have a low s tar t le  threshold .  
Third ( f i g .  5 ) ,  w e  designed a s imula tor  eva lua t ion  t o  appra i se  an  
app l i can t '  s p i l o t  s k i l l s  and provide  some a d d i t i o n a l  i n s i g h t  i n t o  s e v e r a l  
a t t i t u d e  and p e r s o n a l i t y  traits. S t a r t l e  th reshold  and self-confidence are  
assessed  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  bas i c  psychomotor and information processing 
s k i l l s .  This  eva lua t ion  is  computer-administered and computer-graded under 
t h e  superv is ion  of a f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  manager. The app l i can t  f l i e s  a DC-10 
s imula tor  approximately 1 hour, performing seven c a r e f u l l y  s e l e c t e d  and 
h ighly  s t r u c t u r e d  maneuvers. 
Fourth,  an  in-depth in te rv iew designed t o  assess t h e  a p p l i c a n t ' s  
t echn ica l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  and probe h i s  a t t i t u d e  toward f l y i n g  and h i s  
motivat ion f o r  applying f o r  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of a i r l i n e  p i l o t .  
We b e l i e v e  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  i n  f l y i n g  and a t t i t u d e  may be more important 
than  educat ion and f l y i n g  experience i f  they  are combined wi th  t h e  pre- 
r e q u i s i t e  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  psychomotor s k i l l s  , and p e r s o n a l i t y  traits .  The 
in te rv iew is  s t ruc tu red  to  v e r b a l l y  explore  t h e  a t t i t u d e  and pe r sona l i ty  
t ra i ts  j u s t  mentioned. To conduct t h e  in te rv iews  w e  have c a r e f u l l y  
s e l e c t e d  and thoroughly t r a i n e d  a group of f l i g h t  managers from around our 
system. 
The a i r  crew s e l e c t i o n  test ,  o r  STANINE as it is more commonly known, i s  
adminis tered t o  o b t a i n  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  of p i l o t  a p t i t u d e  and is  a p red ic to r  of 
success  i n  t r a i n i n g .  Addi t iona l ly  w e  f e e l  t h i s  provides  a u s e f u l  measure of 
an  a p p l i c a n t ' s  c o g n i t i v e  s k i l l s ,  t hose  s k i l l s  w e  cons ider  s o  important i n  t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  t o  a new a i r c r a f t .  
F i n a l l y ,  an ex tens ive  medical assessment is accomplished. This  s t e p  is 
designed t o  measure c u r r e n t  h e a l t h  and a l s o  t o  p r e d i c t  long-term phys ica l  
s u i t a b i l i t y  f o r  an a i r l i n e  career. 
This mul t i - s tep  s e l e c t i o n  process  a l lows u s  t o  create a p r o f i l e  on each 
app l i can t  ( f i g .  7 ) .  The p r o f i l e  is then  presented t o  a board of review 
composed of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from F l i g h t  Operat ions,  Personnel ,  and Medical 
departments.  The board makes a f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  on p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n  based on 
a c a r e f u l  review of each p r o f i l e .  
Af te r  s e l e c t i o n  by t h e  board, t h e  p i l o t  e n t e r s  a 6-8 week new-hire 
t r a i n i n g  program followed by a 1-year l i n e  probat ionary  per iod .  
procedure i s  no t  f i n i s h e d  u n t i l  t h e  probat ionary year  i s  success fu l ly  
completed. 
The s e l e c t i o n  
New-hire t r a i n i n g  inc ludes  t h e  fol lowing t h r e e  p a r t s  ( f i g .  8 ) .  F i r s t ,  
t h e  use  of ind iv idua l ized  computer-managed and computer-assisted i n s t r u c t i o n .  
This  t r a i n i n g  is  cr i te r ion-based  and is  designed t o  ensure  adequate  
ae ronau t i ca l  knowledge and knowledge i n  o the r  areas appropr i a t e  t o  t h e  job  of 
being a f l i g h t  crewmember. 
Second, a p i l o t - s k i l l s  t r a i n i n g  and eva lua t ion  program i s  provided, 
based on t h e  p r e m i s e  t h a t  t h e  new-hire w i l l  n o t  func t ion  as a c a p t a i n  o r  
c o p i l o t  f o r  some time. It is t h e r e f o r e  imperat ive t h a t  an e a r l y  f l i g h t -  
s k i l l s  assessment be provided. 
Third,  a f l i g h t  engineer  t r a n s i t i o n  t r a i n i n g  program i s  included i n  
new-hire t r a i n i n g ,  s i n c e  i n i t i a l  l i n e  assignment w i l l  be  as second o f f i c e r .  
F i n a i l y ,  an  ex tens ive  probat ionary year l ine-eva lua t ion  program has been 
implemented t o  provide a cont inua t ion  of t h e  t o t a l  eva lua t ion  philosophy and 
t o  ensure t h e  new p i l o t  meets t h e  cr i ter ia  p r o f i l e  e s t ab l i shed  f o r  a United 
A i r l i n e s  p i l o t .  
This program ( f i g .  9) c o n s i s t s  of a l i n e  check each qua r t e r  of t h e  f i r s t  
year given by a f l i g h t  manager; a home s tudy  course  on four  f l i g h t -  
ope ra t ions  r e l a t e d  s u b j e c t s ;  and an  o r a l  examination on t h e  equipment t o  
which t h e  p i l o t  is  assigned.  
And f i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  is a n  a d d i t i o n a l  p i l o t  eva lua t ion  a t  t h e  t r a i n i n g  
c e n t e r ,  i f  p i l o t  s k i l l s  dur ing  new-hire t r a i n i n g  are i n  any way marginal.  
Although it  is  s t i l l  e a r l y  t o  reach  t o t a l l y  d e f i n i t i v e  conclus ions ,  a l l  
t h e  i n d i c a t i o n s  are t h a t  1978 w a s  one of our most success fu l  yea r s  of p i l o t  
employment. I n  t h a t  year  over  6,000 a p p l i c a n t s  progressed through some phase 
of t h e  s e l e c t i o n  process  descr ibed  earlier. 
From those  6,000 a p p l i c a n t s ,  494 p i l o t s  were h i r ed  i n  1978. They 
possess  a n  average of 16.2 yea r s  of educat ion,  3,300 hours of f l i g h t  t i m e  
experience,  and t h i s  i n  s p i t e  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  educat ion and f l i g h t  t i m e  
w e r e  no t  primary cons ide ra t ions  i n  s e l e c t i o n .  The group inc ludes  21 women 
and 47 members of m i n o r i t i e s ,  some wi th  educat ion and f l i g h t  t i m e  w e l l  below 
t h e  average. 
The a t t r i t i o n  rate i n  new-hire t r a i n i n g  w a s  less than 2%, and r e p o r t s  
from l i n e  f l i g h t  ope ra t ions  management i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e s e  people are out-  
s tanding  i n  t e r m s  of j ob  performance, motivat ion,  and a t t i t u d e .  
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Our work of examining, v a l i d a t i n g ,  and r e f i n i n g  app l i can t  cri teria may 
never be  f i n i s h e d ,  bu t  o v e r a l l  w e  f e e l  o p t i m i s t i c  about  t h e  r e s u l t s  of our  
process  so f a r  and expect  t o  b e n e f i t  even more i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
We a l s o  f e e l  i t  has  s i g n i f i c a n t  impl ica t ions  i n  t h e  contex t  of f l i g h t -  
But i t ' s  only 
deck r e source  management, s i n c e  t h i s  p r e c i s i o n  approach t o  p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n  
provides  u s  wi th  a well-defined, p r e d i c t a b l e  s t a r t i n g  po in t .  
a beginning. 
We may know through i n i t i a l  s e l e c t i o n  t h a t  w e  have a diamond i n  t h e  
rough. The shaping,  po l i sh ing ,  and s e t t i n g  of t h i s  gem t o  m e e t  our  needs 
comes next .  This  exp la ins  my i n t e r e s t  and t h e  i n t e r e s t  of United A i r l i n e s  
i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  conference.  
Thank you. Do you have any ques t ions  of comments? 
DISCUSSION 
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN, Scandinavian A i r l i n e s :  You mentioned you had a 
psychological  test of your most success fu l  and most unsuccessfu l  p i l o t s  i n  
your course.  Could I have t h e  cri teria f o r  how you deem a p i l o t  t o  be 
success fu l  and/or  unsuccessful ,  p l ease?  
CAPT. TRAUB: I can provide you wi th  t h e  names of t h e  tests t h a t  w e  
used. I ' m  no t  completely f a m i l i a r  w i th  how t h e  tests were scored.  I f  t h a t  
addresses  your ques t ion .  
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: How do you say  t h a t  t h e  p i l o t  i s  successfu l?  
CAPT. TRAUB: It w a s  based on f l i g h t  management assessment of t h e  
p i l o t ' s  performance and a l s o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  f e e l i n g  of j ob  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: Was t h a t  s u b j e c t i v e  eva lua t ion  of t h e  man by 
himself and by management? 
CAPT. TRAUB: Yes. 
UNIDENTIFIED: Did you h i r e  any of t h e  350-hour types? 
C U T .  TRAUB: Y e s ,  w e  d i d  h i r e  some wi th  very  low experience,  r i g h t  
about 350 hours.  
CAPT. SIMONS, Pan Am: How do you maintain t h e  f l i g h t  eng inee r ' s  
p i l o t i n g  s k i l l s  dur ing  h i s  t enure  as f l i g h t  engineer?  
CAPT. TRAUB: Over t h e  years, WE: have made s imula tor  t i m e  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  t h e s e  people t h a t  they  can  use  v o l u n t a r i l y  when they  go through a p i l o t  
o r  f l i g h t  engineer  t r a i n i n g  program. We a l s o  provide  some p i l o t  t r a i n i n g  
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dur ing  t h a t  per iod of t i m e .  
experience and u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  a i r p l a n e  experience as w e l l .  
It is  very  l imi t ed  but  w e  do provide s imula tor  
CAPT. SIMONS: This  vo lunteer  s imula tor ,  do you have a f l i g h t  
i n s t r u c t o r  w i th  them o r  j u s t  l e t  them f l y  t h e  s imula tor?  
CAPT. TRAUB: Most of t h e  t i m e  no t .  It is set up wi th  a t ape  
program and t h e y ' r e  f r e e  t o  use  t h e  t ape  i n  t h e  s imula tor  without  an  
i n s t r u c t o r .  
CAPT. SIMONS: What's your recovery rate on f l i g h t  engineers?  
We've got  f l i g h t  engineers  f l y i n g  f o r  8 o r  10  years  and they are now j u s t  
becoming f i r s t  o f f i c e r s  and w e ' r e  very  concerned about  t h e  success  of g e t t i n g  
t h e i r  p i l o t  s k i l l s  back a f t e r  being of f  t h a t  long a t i m e .  O f  a l l  your f l i g h t  
engineers  t h a t  have flown as f l i g h t  engineer  f o r  q u i t e  a while ,  were a l l  
success fu l  i n  coming back as a p i l o t ?  
CAPT. TRAUB: I can ' t  say t h a t  a l l  have been success fu l .  The v a s t  
major i ty  of them have been success fu l  wi th  varying degrees  of t r a i n i n g .  
CAPT. SIMONS: We've a l r eady  found t h a t  w e  have t o  g ive  them a l o t  
of excess  t r a i n i n g  when they  come back a f t e r  being f l i g h t  engineers  f o r  q u i t e  
a long t i m e ,  and I don ' t  know what kind of support  you g e t  from a p i l o t  
group. When you say vo lun tee r ,  i t ' s  l i k e  say ing ,  you know, come up on your 
b i r thday .  
system. 
P lus ,  you ' re  i n  Denver and you've got  your p i l o t s  a l l  over t h e  
CAPT. TRAUB: We have r e c e n t l y  introduced a new program. When a 
f l i g h t  engineer upgrades t o  f i r s t  o f f i c e r ,  he must come t o  Denver s e v e r a l  
weeks t o  a month before  t r a n s i t i o n  t r a i n i n g  t o  go through what w e  c a l l  
I n i t i a l  F i r s t  Of f i ce r  Tra in ing ,  which is r e a l l y  ground t r a i n i n g .  
But dur ing  t h a t  per iod w e  a l s o  o f f e r  them - w e l l ,  vo lun tee r ,  i f  you 
w i l l  - p i l o t  experience i n  t h e  s imula tor .  This  is wi th  an i n s t r u c t o r  and 
has been used by almost everyone r e c e n t l y .  
CAPT. SIMONS: One o the r  t h ing  t h a t  you could use  is  a b a s k e t b a l l  
cou r t .  
You g e t  r i d  of t he  dumb ones r i g h t  t h e r e .  
You can t e l l  a p i l o t  by h i s  phys i ca l  coord ina t ion  playing baske tba l l .  
CAPT. TRATJB: Maybe w e  should inco rpora t e  t h a t  i n t o  our  p i l o t  
s e l e c t i o n  procedure.  
UNIDENTIFIED: Do you do any e x p l i c i t  i n t e l l i g e n c e  t e s t i n g  o r  do 
you i n f e r  t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  level from how they behave on a l l  t hese  o the r  
tests? 
CAPT. TRAUB: Mostly t h e  la t ter .  The STANINE is, t o  some e x t e n t ,  
an  i n t e l l i g e n c e  tes t ,  o r  t h e  s tandard  i n t e l l i g e n c e  test  is  included i n  t h e  
STANINE. 
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MR. GERSZEUSKI, FAA: How do you d e f i n e  an  unsuccessful  p i l o t ?  
CAPT. TRAUB: W e  don ' t  say  unsuccessful ;  w e  s a y  not  as success fu l  
as o the r s .  Again, through f l i g h t  management eva lua t ion  of t h a t  p i l o t  and 
h i s  record i n  t r a i n i n g .  Some p i l o t s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  t ake  more t i m e  i n  
t r a n s i t i o n i n g  t o  new a i r p l a n e s .  
members become known over  a per iod of t i m e .  
Cockpit harmony and r e l a t i o n s  wi th  crew 
CAPT. SIMONS: One o the r  i t e m .  Af te r  your year  of probat ion ,  i t ' s  
my understanding you have fa l l -back  p r i v i l e g e s  f o r  anybody t r y i n g  t o  upgrade 
i n  any manner. How do you l i k e  t h a t  system? 
CAPT. TRAUB: What do you mean by fa l l -back  p r i v i l e g e s ?  
CAPT. SIMONS: Say, a f l i g h t  engineer  i s  going up t o  f i r s t  o f f i c e r .  
If he doesn ' t  do it success fu l ly ,  h e ' s  allowed t o  go back and f l y  as f l i g h t  
engineer .  
he f a l l s  back t o  being a f i r s t  o f f i c e r .  
up-or-out, you have up-or-back. H a s  t h a t  been success fu l ?  A r e  you happy 
wi th  t h a t  kind of t r a i n i n g  requirement - t o  f a l l  back t o  a previous 
p o s i t  ion?  
O r  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  t r y i n g  t o  upgrade t o  c a p t a i n ,  h e ' s  unsuccessfu l ,  
I n  o the r  words, you d o n ' t  have 
CAPT. TRAUB: Y e s ,  I t h i n k  w e  are happy wi th  t h a t  procedure.  
CAPT. SIMONS: How do you g e t  r i d  of t h e  person you r e a l l y  want t o  
g e t  r i d  o f ?  
CAPT. TRAUB: I ' m  s u r e  t h e  same way you i n  Pan American do. I t 's  
a case  of dec i s ion ,  a co rpora t e  d e c i s i o n  by t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  manager, and 
supported by h i s  d i r e c t o r .  
CAPT. SIMONS: I understand you haven ' t  f i r e d  a p i l o t  i n  many years .  
CAPT. TRAUB: Tha t ' s  n o t  c o r r e c t ;  w e  have. 
CAPT. SIMONS: The unsuccessful  p i l o t  you were t a l k i n g  about a 
whi le  ago w a s  t h e  one you'd l i k e  t o  g e t  r i d  o f ,  bu t  you c a n ' t ?  
CAPT. TRAUB: I th ink  w e  a l l  have t h a t  problem. 
CAPT. CRUMP, United A i r l i n e s :  I f  you e s t a b l i s h  any kind of a norm 
f o r  a p i l o t ,  obviously you ' re  going t o  have p i l o t s  t h a t  are supe r io r  t o  t h e  
norm and p i l o t s  t h a t  are i n f e r i o r  t o  t h a t  norm. I t h i n k  a very  c a r e f u l ,  
thorough s tudy  of t h e  background of a number of p i l o t s  c a r r i e d  out  by some 
of our personnel  i n  Denver has given u s  a real good idea  of a group of p i l o t s  
we  don ' t  want t o  g e t  r i d  of a t  a l l ,  bu t  who are no t  performing i n  t r a i n i n g  t o  
t h e  same level of p ro f i c i ency  t h a t  o t h e r  p i l o t s  do, and those  are t h e  p i l o t s  
we  u s e  as a measure of t h i s  $250,000 i n  a career. And i t ' s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  
t h e  case of poor performance on t h e  l i n e .  I n  many cases it 's i n a b i l i t y  t o  
t ake  a i r l i n e - t y p e  t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e  same manner t h a t  o the r  p i l o t s  are a b l e  t o  
do. 
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CAPT. SIMONS: Well, you know t r a i n i n g  t h a t  poor performer can 
r e a l l y  g e t  expensive.  You w e l l  know t h a t ,  I ' m  su re .  
CAPT. TRAUB: Measured i n  about 1975 d o l l a r s  w e  i nd ica t ed  about 
$250,000 over a 30-year career. 
j u s t  i n  e x t r a  t r a i n i n g  a t t e n t i o n  dur ing  t h e  career. 
Like you s a i d ,  very  expensive,  and t h a t ' s  
CAPT. WASTMAN, Flying Tigers :  Have you had any d i f f i c u l t y  i n  
te rmina t ing  a p i l o t  dur ing  h i s  probat ionary per iod? 
CAPT. TRAUB: No. 
CAPT. BORN, North Cent ra l :  Did I understand you c o r r e c t l y  t o  say  
t h a t  those  new h i r e s  t h a t  might be  ques t ionable  a t  t h e  end of t h e  probat ionary 
year were re turned  t o  Denver f o r  f u r t h e r  eva lua t ion?  O r  a l l  second o f f i c e r s ?  
CAPT. TRAUB: Tha t ' s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  conclusion of t h e  probat ionary 
per iod.  W e  provide a p i l o t  s k i l l s  assessment dur ing  new-hire t r a i n i n g ,  and 
a l s o  t h e r e  is  a pre-simulator eva lua t ion  t h a t  t h e  app l i can t  goes through. 
I f  e i t h e r  one of those  i s  i n  any way marginal,  then  dur ing  t h e  probat ionary 
period w e  br ing  t h e  ind iv idua l  back and provide equiva len t  of f i r s t  o f f i c e r  
t r a i n i n g  o r  c o p i l o t  t r a i n i n g  i n  one of our s imula tors .  That inc ludes  a 
management check similar t o  what would have t o  be passed when t h e  ind iv idua l  
upgrades t o  f i r s t  o f f i c e r .  W e  are t r y i n g  t o  avoid t h e  problems t h a t  t h e  
gentleman from Pan American w a s  a l l u d i n g  t o  la ter  on i n  t h e  career, a f t e r  
5 or  10 yea r s  as  a f l i g h t  engineer  and now upgrading t o  c o p i l o t .  W e  are 
t r y i n g  t o  determine as b e s t  w e  can t h a t  they  do have t h e  s k i l l s  and 
c a p a b i l i t y  t o  make t h a t  t r a n s i t i o n .  
CAPT. TURLINGTON, Pan American: I haven ' t  been i n  t h i s  business  
as long as some, bu t  I ' m  cu r ious  - i n  your 25 yea r s  i t  seems l i k e  
motivat ion and d e s i r e  were something w e  presumed a long t i m e  ago. Do you 
see a real d i f f e r e n c e  now i n  how deeply you g e t  i n t o  those  a s p e c t s  i n  your 
s e l e c t i o n  process? 
CAPT. TRAUB: We're t r y i n g  t o  test t h a t  now. I th ink  you ' re  r i g h t ,  
We're not  
w e  presumed t h a t  before .  I f  somebody w a s  applying f o r  t h e  job ,  and they had 
a good background, w e  presumed they had t h e  motivat ion and d e s i r e .  
assuming t h a t  any more - w e ' r e  t r y i n g  t o  test  f o r  i t .  
CAPT. ESTRIDGE, American: Would you d e s c r i b e  t o  u s  the  startle- 
threshold  technique you u s e  i n  t h e  s imula tor?  Is i t  a d i s t r a c t a b i l i t y  element 
o r  a d i v i s i o n  of a t t e n t i o n ?  
CAPT. TRAUB: Both, I guess.  Without t e l l i n g  you too much about 
t h e  s imula tor  eva lua t ion  - befo re  t h e  las t  maneuver t h a t  they are requi red  
t o  perform i n  t h e  s imula tor ,  w e  t e l l  t h e  a p p l i c a n t  t h a t  t h i s  is t h e  most 
important p a r t  of t h e  eva lua t ion .  It r e a l l y  i s n ' t ,  bu t  we  t e l l  them t h a t .  
We t e l l  them t h a t  they  w i l l  experience a c r i t i ca l  emergency dur ing  t h i s  
maneuver, and then w e  in t roduce  t h a t  emergency a t  some per iod dur ing  t h e  
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maneuver. So w e  t r y  t o ,  I guess,  overload them t o  some ex ten t  by t e l l i n g  
them t h a t  it is a very  important eva lua t ion ,  and t h a t  i t ' s  a l s o  t h e  most 
d i f f i c u l t  maneuver t h a t  they  are requi red  t o  perform dur ing  t h e  s imula tor  
eva lua t ion .  
CAPT. SCLIFO, Texas I n t e r n a t i o n a l :  How do you g e t  a guy wi th  350 
hours and put  him i n  a DC-10 s imula tor?  It seems l i k e  t h a t  would be a l i t t l e  
u n f a i r .  
CAPT. TRAUB: W e  don ' t  f l y  i t  n e c e s s a r i l y  as a DC-10 s imula tor ;  w e  
f l y  i t  j u s t  as an instrument-based t r a i n e r .  And a l l  a p p l i c a n t s  are w e l l  
b r i e f ed  on what t h e y ' r e  requi red  t o  perform i n  t h a t  s imula tor .  W e  do t o  
some e x t e n t ,  expect a l i t t l e  b i t  less of t h e  350-hour ind iv idua l  as opposed 
t o  t h e  3,000-hour a p p l i c a n t .  Does t h a t  answer your ques t ion?  
CAPT. SCLIFO: I j u s t  c a n ' t  imagine how you g e t  a guy wi th  350 
hours and put  him i n  a DC-10 s imula tor  and, say ,  wi th  t h e  s ta r t le  threshold  - 
i t  seems l i k e  i t  would be almost impossible.  
CAPT. TRAUB: I th ink  w e  are amazed a t  how w e l l  some of t h e  low-time 
a p p l i c a n t s  do. I f  they have a b a s i c a l l y  good instrument  background and some 
information-processing s k i l l s ,  they handle i t  q u i t e  w e l l .  They are graded 
a g a i n s t  each o the r  so  w e  develop a p r e t t y  good d a t a  base t o  make a judgment 
on t h a t  i nd iv idua l .  
CAPT. SIMONS: One o the r  area, B i l l .  Log book e n t r i e s  are hard t o  
v e r i f y  and you know you're  g e t t i n g  people  t h a t  say  they have 350 hours and 
i t ' s  q u i t e  w e l l  known, you know, they don ' t .  Is t h e r e  any way you people 
v e r i f y  t h e i r  l o g  books? 
CAPT. TRAUB: I mentioned t h a t  we  provided a p r e t t y  thorough 
t r a i n i n g  program f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  managers t h a t  are p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e  i n t e r -  
views, and w e  po in t  ou t  t o  t h e  managers t h a t  i t ' s  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  
b e s t  of t he i r  a b i l i t y  t o  make t h a t  v e r i f i c a t i o n .  Now, I ' m  s u r e  t h a t  some 
people do s l i p  by, bu t  I don ' t  t h i n k  t h a t  many do, i n  t h a t  they do have t o  
f l y  a DC-10 s imulator  and they answer some very t e c h n i c a l  ques t ions  based on 
t h e i r  level of experience i n  t h e  in te rv iew s i t u a t i o n .  
CAPT. SIMONS: The reason  I say t h a t  i s  t h a t  p i l o t s  who have been 
wi th  us  f o r  15  yea r s  w i l l  s ay  "Gee, I r e a l l y  only had 40 hours when I h i r ed  
on." I hear  t h a t  a l l  t h e  time. 
CAF'T. TRAUB: 
About a year  ago w e  found people who had made e r r o r s  i n  t h e i r  
W e  found t h a t  t o  be more t r u e  e a r l y  i n  t h e  h i r i n g  
program. 
logbooks. I t ' s  no t  t u rn ing  up n e a r l y  as f r equen t ly  now. 
CAPT. SIMONS: I b e t  they had more motivat ion though. 
CAPT. TRAUB: Right.  
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MR. SMITH, ALPA: To g e t  back t o  t h e  ques t ion  having t o  do wi th  
t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  assessment of t h e  f l i g h t  managers as t o  success fu l  o r  no t  s o  
success fu l  compared t o  t h e  norm. Was t h e  f l i g h t  manager requi red  t o  rate 
t h e  ind iv idua l  on a s i n g l e  s c a l e  o f ,  l e t ' s  say ,  1 t o  9,  which w a s  c o r r e l a t e d  
wi th  some psychological  t e s t ?  O r  w a s  i t  broken down i n t o  c e r t a i n  c a t e g o r i e s ,  
f o r  example, t r a i n a b i l i t y ,  1 t o  9;  i n t e rpe r sonne l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  1 t o  9; and 
then cross -cor re la ted  w i t h  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  psychological  tests? And if i n  
fact  i t  w a s ,  do you have any idea  what some of t h e s e  c o r r e l a t i o n  va lues  i n  
f a c t  are o r  w e r e ?  
CAPT. TRAUB: Our group i n  Chicago t h a t  had t h a t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f e l t  very comfortable wi th  t h e  high degree of c o r r e l a t i o n ,  and they d id  use  
both t h e  1-9 eva lua t ion ,  numerical eva lua t ion ,  p l u s  t h e  w r i t t e n  eva lua t ions .  
And our  psychologis t s  on the  s t a f f  had t h a t  information a v a i l a b l e  t o  them. 
MR. SMITH: You mean t h e  psychologis t s  determined t h e  scale o r  t h e  
f l i g h t  manager determined t h e  sca l e?  
CAPT. TRAUB: No, t h e  psychologis t s  set up t h e  eva lua t ion  
ques t ionnai re .  So, i n  e f f e c t ,  they  determined t h e  scale, and then  it w a s  
adequately explained t o  t h e  f l i g h t  managers. Not so  s u b j e c t i v e  is  t h e  
t r a i n i n g  record of t h e  same people.  By t r a i n i n g ,  I don ' t  mean j u s t  i n  our  
t r a i n i n g  c e n t e r  i n  Denver, but  t h e i r  l i n e  checks and so f o r t h ,  which w e r e  
a l s o  included i n  t h e  eva lua t ion .  Hopefully,  w e  were a b l e  t o  minimize t h e  
e r r o r s  by t e s t i n g  a l a r g e  enough group of people.  
MR. SMITH: But t h e  d i r e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  management people who then  
evaluated the  ind iv idua l s  w e r e  f a i r l y  s p e c i f i c  as t o  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  th ings  
t h a t  they were a c t u a l l y  scor ing?  
CAPT. TRAUB: Tha t ' s  c o r r e c t .  
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: How do you sco re  a man's motivat ion? What 
cr i ter ia  do you use?  I 
CAPT. TRAUB: Well, w e  provide a word d e s c r i p t i o n  of what a h ighly  
motivated p i l o t  is  ve r sus  a low motivat ion.  And I would suppose such th ings  
as abuse of s i c k  leave. 
and maybe has  problems wi th  p ro f i c i ency  checks,  might have low motivat ion.  
An ind iv idua l  who r e a l l y  p u t s  ou t  nothing e x t r a ,  
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: But i n  t h e  a p p l i c a n t s ?  
CAPT. TRAUB: Oh, a p p l i c a n t s .  W e  t r y  t o  look a t  t h e i r  background 
t o  judge t h e  motivat ion,  t o  see how they  prepare  themselves f o r  t h i s  job  
t h a t  t h e y ' r e  t r y i n g  t o  ob ta in .  Some of t h e  same q u a l i t i e s  t h a t  we looked f o r  
i n  our own p i l o t s  we  t r y  t o  see i n  t h e  app l i can t s .  
themselves i n  t h e i r  academic t r a i n i n g  and t h e i r  a v i a t i o n  t r a i n i n g .  
How they have appl ied  
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: Wouldn't i t  be  ve ry  easy t o  f ake  motivat ion? 
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CAPT. TRAUB: That ' s  c o r r e c t .  It is  easy t o  fake.  W e  j u s t  f e l t  
t h a t  wi th  a mult i -s tep process  l i k e  ou r s ,  no t  too many would s l i p  through. 
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  f o r  i n s t ance  a man who has  
been, o r  a boy who has  been a model a i r c r a f t  p i l o t  i n  h i s  youth,  is  t h a t  a 
good motivat ion o r  ---. 
CAPT. TRAUB: I th ink  t h a t ,  coupled wi th  adequate  t r a i n i n g  and 
performance as he w a s  educated, would mean t h a t  he  w a s  h ighly  motivated.  
UNIDENTIFIED: To what e x t e n t ,  what va lue  does p r i o r  m i l i t a r y  
f l y i n g  experience c a r r y  i n  your t o t a l  s e l e c t i o n  c r i t e r i a ?  
CAPT. TRAUB: W e  don ' t  t h i n k  t h a t  i t ' s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  important.  The 
m i l i t a r y  does provide very  good t r a i n i n g  and w e  recognize t h a t ,  bu t  beyond 
t h a t  t r a i n i n g  and how they  perform i n  t h a t  t r a i n i n g  w e  g ive  no p a r t i c u l a r  
c r e d i t  f o r  m i l i t a r y  ve r sus  nonmi l i ta ry .  I n  f a c t ,  about 35 percent  of t h e  
p i l o t s  w e  h i r ed  t h e  f i r s t  year w e r e  nonmi l i ta ry .  
MR. McEMBER, Eastern:  A s  a p i l o t - s e l e c t e e  flows through t h i s  
program, does he g e t  some i n d i c a t i o n  a t  c e r t a i n  s t a g e s  t h a t  h e ' s  doing w e l l  
o r  doing poorly,  o r  does it a l l  w a i t  ' t i l  t h e  end? 
CAPT. TRAUB: Unfortunately,  it r e a l l y  goes t o  t h e  end. The 
app l i can t  knows t h a t  through being i n v i t e d  back t o  t h e  next  s t a g e ,  h e ' s  
s t i l l  i n  t h e  process .  Of course,  i f  he ' s  no t  success fu l  a t  any s t e p ,  w e  
don ' t  provide any feedback as t o  why, and w e  d o n ' t  g ive  any i n d i c a t i o n ,  as 
f a r  as I know, ever  i n  t h e i r  c a r e e r  as t o  how they d i d  during new-hire 
s e l e c t i o n .  
DR. LAUBER: Thank you, B i l l .  The t a s k  of s e l e c t i o n  i s  very  
i n t e r e s t i n g .  Given c u r r e n t  p a t t e r n s  of career progress ion ,  i t  poses an  
i n t e r e s t i n g  problem, because t h e  i d e a l  s e l e c t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  f o r  a 
subord ina te  crewmember may, i n  f a c t ,  be  d i f f e r e n t  from the  i d e a l  s e l e c t i o n  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  f o r  t h e  ind iv idua l  who is i n  command, o r  who p lays  t h e  
primary management r o l e  i n  t h e  cockp i t .  
And y e t ,  because of t h e  way t h e  system ope ra t e s ,  you are, i n  t h e  s h o r t  
run ,  s e l e c t i n g  f o r  subord ina te  crewmembers who w i l l  n o t  upgrade t o  c a p t a i n  
f o r  many yea r s .  How do you select f o r  both r o l e s ?  
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1954 -HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE 
COMMERCIAL PILOT LICENSE 
MINIMUM 165 FLIGHT HOURS 
1966 - 2 YEARS CCLLEGE 
PRIVATE PILOT LICENSE 
1970 - 4 YEAR COLLEGE DEGREE 
COMMERCIAL PILOT LICENSE 
MINIMUM 500 FLIGHT HOURS 
1978 - HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE 
COMMERCIAL PILOT LICENSE 
MINIMUM 350 FLIGHT HOURS 
Figure  1.- P i l o t  app l i can t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  
1. EVALUATE PAST UNITED AIRLINES SELECTION 
PROCESSES 
2. GAIN EXPERTISE IN PILOT SELECTION METHODS: 
0 STATE OF THE ART 
0 PROCESSES USED BY OTHER AiRLlNES 
3. DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR: 
0 PILOT SELECTION 
0 NEW-HIRE TRAINING 
0 PROBATIONARY YEAR EVALUATION 
Figure 2.- P i l o t  new-hire committee. 
1. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC) 
vs UNITED AIRLINES -CONSENT DECREE 
2. VALIDATION OF SELECTION CRITERIA 
3. PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR MOST 
SUCCESSFUL PlLOTS 
4. LACK OF NECESSARY PSYCHOMOTOR SKILLS 
5. PSYCHOLOGICALLY NOT SUITED 
Figure  3 . -  New-hire committee cons idera t ions .  
7 3  
F i  
1. COMPUTERIZED PILOT APPLICANT TRACKING 
SYSTEM 
2. PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS 
3. SIMULATOR EVALUATION 
4. INTERVIEW 
5. AIRCREW SELECTION TEST - PILOT APTITUDE 
6. MEDICAL ASSESSMENT 
Figure 5.- P i l o t  s e l e c t i o n .  
e MOTIVATION 
e INTERESTS 
traits  
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Figure  7 .- P i l o t  s e l e c t i o n  p r o f i l e .  
1. INDlVlDUALlZED COMPUTER MANAGED 
INSTRUCTION 
2. PILOT SKILLS TRAINING AND EVALUATION 
3. FLIGHT ENGINEER TRAINING 
Figure  8. - New-hire p i l o t  t r a i n i n g .  
1. LINE CHECK EACH QUARTER 
2. HOME STUDY COURSE 
3. ORAL EXAMINATION 
4. PI LOTlNG SKILLS EVALUATION 
Figure  9.- Probat ionary  year  program. 
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BRITISH AIRWAYS' PRE-COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM 
Capt. L. P. J. Holdstock" 
Some t i m e  ago t h e r e  w a s  a r a d i o  program a t  home known as The Brain 
Trus t .  
of Professor  Jode. 
w a s  asked,  he always s t a r t e d  of f  by saying "Well, i t  depends upon what you 
mean by . , . I '  and then he  would answer about 1 4  d i f f e r e n t  ques t ions  before  he 
go t  back t o  t h e  one he  w a s  asked. 
There w a s  a cha rac t e r  who used t o  appear q u i t e  r e g u l a r l y  by t h e  name 
An i n t e r e s t i n g  man - i t  d i d n ' t  matter what ques t ion  he 
I f e e l  t h a t  way r a t h e r  about pre-command t r a i n i n g  because i t  r e a l l y  
depends on what you mean by pre-command. 
look,  and i t ' s  my opinion t h a t  pre-command t r a i n i n g  starts on t h e  day you 
f i r s t  g e t  i n t o  an a i r p l a n e  f o r  i n s t r u c t i o n .  
l ea rn ing ,  everything is prepar ing  f o r  command i n  some form. 
command of your f i r s t  so lo ,  bu t  even tua l ly  f o r  t h e  commercial p i l o t  i t ' s  
command of t h e  multi-crew a i r c r a f t .  
I ' m  r a t h e r  old-fashioned i n  my out- 
From t h a t  day on everything i s  
Maybe i t ' s  j u s t  
For t h e  purposes of t h i s  paper I j u s t  want t o  exp la in  what w e  do f o r  our  
p i l o t s  t o  he lp  them t o  meet t h e  b i g  day. 
Perhaps I ought t o  break o f f  a t  t h i s  po in t  j u s t  t o  expla in  our p i l o t  
source.  I n  1958 w e  suddenly r e a l i z e d  t h a t  t h e  supply of RAF p i l o t s  w a s  
dwindling. That t h e  inpu t  numbers t h a t  w e  could g e t  compared wi th  what w e  
thought w a s  going t o  be our  growth would no t  meet demand, and w e  took s t e p s  
t o  m e e t  t h a t  de f i c i ency  by opening up a c o l l e g e  of a i r  t r a i n i n g .  I n t o  t h a t  
c o l l e g e  we put young men who had never flown an  a i r p l a n e .  
o lds .  We had a s e l e c t i o n  problem, w e  are s t i l l  l ea rn ing ,  but  we  put  i n t o  t h e  
c o l l e g e  young men and we taught  them t o  f l y  and, i n  f a c t ,  from t h a t  day on, 
from 1960, w e  have r e l i e d  upon t h e  c o l l e g e  f o r  our  p i l o t  s t r eng th .  
They w e r e  18 year  
I n  t h e  l a t e  1960's w e  f e l l  a l i t t l e  s h o r t  because, of course,  w e  always 
asked planning people t o  look about  3 years  ahead, cons ider ing  both t h e  
s e l e c t i o n  and t h e  t r a i n i n g .  They seldom g e t  t h e i r  numbers r i g h t ,  and t h e r e  
w a s  t h i s  per iod when w e  had t o  f a l l  back on m i l i t a r y  p i l o t s .  
So, as f a r  as command i s  concerned, we  had a group of p i l o t s ,  some of 
whom w e r e  ex-service people.  They had u s u a l l y  experienced command i n  some 
degree r e g a r d l e s s  of what a i r c r a f t  they had come o f f .  
wi th  a t o t a l  of 225 hours  i n  whom w e  had t o  i n s t i l l  some idea  of what w e  
meant by command. 
We a l s o  had young men 
It w a s  something new t o  nea r ly  a l l  of them. Now, I should say  t h a t  t h e  
The source  is  changing now, bu t  i n s t r u c t o r s  a t  our c o l l e g e  are p r e t t y  good. 
i n  t h e  p a s t  they have been mainly ex-RAF i n s t r u c t o r s ,  and they  have had t h e  
J( 
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f a c i l i t y  of recognizing command p o t e n t i a l .  
desc r ibe  t h a t  w e ' r e  going t o  g e t  i n t o  deep water, bu t  I ' m  s u r e  t h a t  ex- 
perienced t r a i n i n g  cap ta ins  w i l l  know what I mean when I say  you can sense  
i t ,  and t h e s e  people d i d .  
H a m l j l e  who t h e  s e l e c t i o n  people had thought w a s  r i g h t ,  bu t  who along t h e  way 
showed a t o t a l  l a c k  of command p o t e n t i a l ,  then i t ' s  most un l ike ly  t h a t  young 
man would reach t h e  a i r l i n e .  
I know i f  w e  s tart  t r y i n g  t o  
So t h a t  i f  we had a young man t h a t  w e  had put  i n t o  
I ' d  l i k e  t o  make one o t h e r  po in t  here ,  and t h a t  is  t h a t  i t  w a s  our ex- 
per ience ,  r i g h t  a t  t h e  beginning, t h a t  about a year  a f t e r  t h e s e  young men 
a r r i v e d  wi th  us  they  re laxed .  They had been through t h e i r  school  l i f e ,  they 
had been picked up from school ,  they had been put  i n t o  our co l l ege ,  and 
suddenly you could sense  t h a t  they had a f e e l i n g  t h a t  they had i t  a l l  made. 
Af te r  a year  w e  had t o  p i ck  them up, t ake  them back i n t o  t h e  school ,  put  them 
wi th  a t r a i n i n g  cap ta in  and j u s t  p o l i s h  them up, remind them t h a t  they had a 
job  t o  do and make s u r e  t h a t  they d i d  i t  properly.  
Having got  t h a t  ou t  of t h e  way I t h i n k  we  can now look a t  what w e  do t o  
t r y  and he lp  t h i s  man toward t h e  command. 
W e  have fou r  inpu t s .  W e  have an  i n i t i a l  command p o t e n t i a l  assessment,  
and I'll come back t o  t h a t  i n  a moment. 
s t u d i e s  course ,  w e  have a pre-command course ,  and w e  have a command course  
i t s e l f .  
We have a pre-command management 
About 5 yea r s  a f t e r  t h e  young man e n t e r s  Hamble, t h a t  i s  about 3 yea r s  
a f t e r  he j o i n s  the  f l e e t  and becomes a l i n e  c o p i l o t ,  w e  make t h i s  i n i t i a l  
command-potential assessment.  I t 's  a long-winded name, but  t h a t ' s  what w e  
do, s o  t h a t ' s  what w e  c a l l  i t .  
W h a t  w e  do i s  a r r ange  f o r  a per iod of group f l y i n g  c o n s i s t i n g  of a 
minimum of 1 2  s e c t o r s  w i th  a t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n .  During t h i s  per iod no t  only 
is t h e  c o p i l o t  checked i n  h i s  normal d u t i e s  bu t  he is  a l s o  checked and 
assessed  i n  h i s  a b i l i t y  i n  command. H e ' s  being superv ised ,  of course.  
L i t t l e  t r a i n i n g  is  given. What w e  r e a l l y  want t h e  t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n  t o  
do a t  t h i s  s t a g e  i s  t o  j u s t  look  a t  t h e  young man as he is. Not as you can 
make him, but  as he i s  performing on t h i s  day. And a t  t h e  end of t hese  
per iods ,  t h i s  per iod  of l i n e  s e c t o r s ,  t h e  t r a i n i n g  cap ta in  makes a pre- 
l iminary assessment as t o  whether t h a t  young man w i l l  g e t  a command o r  no t .  
I n  t h e  event  t h a t  t h e  assessment is  unfavorable ,  then  w e  a r range  a 
course  of t r a i n i n g .  Obviously, t h e  t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n  w i l l  say  where t h e  
d e f i c i e n c i e s  are i n  h i s  mind, and w e  a r r ange  a cour se  of t r a i n i n g  i n  an  
e f f o r t  t o  e r a d i c a t e  them. I f ,  of course ,  t h e r e  are no problems, w e l l ,  a l l  
r i g h t ,  t h a t ' s  s t r a igh t fo rward .  
Our c o p i l o t s  are upgraded t o  sen io r  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  a f t e r  approximately 
8 yea r s .  And a t  t h a t  p o i n t  we  make a f i n a l  assessment as t o  whether t h e  
c o p i l o t  is  command material o r  no t .  
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It c u r r e n t l y  t akes  about 1 2  yea r s  t o  command i n  B r i t i s h  Airways. The 
lowest w e  have ever  seen  w a s  8 yea r s ,  t h a t  being 5 o r  6 years  ago. A t  t h e  
moment i t ' s  nea re r  15 years .  So over t h e  yea r s  you can say  w e  have had an  
average of about  12  years  t o  command. 
This  command assessment is made i n  t h e  l i g h t  of a l l  t h e  material t h a t ' s  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  a board, no t  j u s t  one ind iv idua l .  The f l y i n g  manager w i l l  set 
up a board. There w i l l  be  a t r a i n i n g  manager included i n  a board of about 
four  o r  f i v e  people t o  look  a t  t h e s e  ind iv idua l s .  I n  t h e  assessment one can 
feed i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  r e p o r t s  from t h e  ab  i n i t i o  course  a t  Hamble, you can 
feed i n  t h e  t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n ' s  assessment which has  been made earlier on, 
t h e  c u r r e n t  l i n e  record ,  t h e  t r a i n i n g  record ,  and t h e  ind iv idua l s '  q u a l i t i e s ,  
I f  s a t i s f a c t o r y  a t  t h i s  po in t ,  then  we  merely put  a no te  i n  t h e  t r a i n i n g  ' 
f i l e s  and t h e  personnel  f i l e s ,  and t h e  young man then  fol lows a normal pa th  
toward t h e  command course.  
I f  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  an  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  assessment is  made - e i t h e r  because 
t h e  o r i g i n a l  assessment w a s  never changed, w a s  a poor one then and never 
upgraded, f o r  personal  reasons ,  o r  f o r  cu r ren t  ope ra t iona l  reasons which 
have come t o  l i g h t  - then  w e  merely t e l l  t h e  young man. 
There 's  no l o s s  of s e n i o r i t y  involved. We p o i n t  ou t  h i s  d e f i c i e n t  
areas. 
t r a i n i n g  he needs i f  he comes t o  us .  W e  w i l l  provide f o r  s imula tor  t r a i n i n g ,  
w e  w i l l  provide l i n e  t r a i n i n g ,  bu t  i t ' s  up t o  him r e a l l y  t o  approach us  and 
say,  " W e l l ,  what can I do, and how can you he lp  m e  t o  achieve  command?'' And 
i f  he manages t o  do something about  i t ,  then,  of course ,  he can be 
reca tegor ized  and p u t  i n t o  t h e  command stream. 
W e  d o n ' t  p lan  any t r a i n i n g  f o r  him, but  w e  w i l l  g ive  him a l l  t h e  
The next  s t e p  i s  about 2 yea r s  before  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  command course.  
A s  I s a i d  earlier, p lanners  are seldom r i g h t ,  so sometimes we  m i s s .  But w e  
a i m  a t  about 2 years  t o  g ive  a man a management course.  
misunderstand t h a t  t e r m .  W e  are no t  teaching  him a t  t h a t  s t a g e  t o  be a 
manager, b u t  w e  do have a l o t  of input  from managers i n  va r ious  s e c t i o n s ,  and 
t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  course  are l a i d  down. They are t o  communicate informa- 
t i o n  on a wide range of activities and systems i n  our own a i r l i n e ,  i n  t h e  
B r i t i s h  Ai rpor t s  Authori ty ,  C i v i l  Aviat ion Authori ty ,  and any o t h e r  agencies ,  
s a f e t y  groups,  anyone wi th  whom they are l i k e l y  t o  come i n  c o n t a c t  later on. 
By c l o s e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a number of p r o j e c t  exe rc i se s ,  they are 
t o  g ive  him some experience i n  managerial  func t ions .  And t h i r d ,  they are t o  
create a climate of knowledge and understanding f o r  a l l  concerned. 
I don ' t  want you t o  
What w e  are r e a l l y  t r y i n g  t o  do is t o  relieve t h i s  young man of some of 
t h e  pe r iphe ra l  f l igh t -deck  problems. 
h i s  a i r l i n e  and what 's  going on around him, h e ' s  less l i k e l y  t o  be taken by 
s u r p r i s e  when problems do occur.  The course  i t s e l f  lasts f o r  2 weeks. I t ' s  
r e s i d e n t i a l  a p a r t  from t h e  middle weekend. And l i k e  most workshops t h e r e ' s  
q u i t e  a l o t  of evening work. W e  d i v i d e  t h e  course  i n t o  syndica tes  of fou r  
o r  f i v e  people depending on t h e  number. 
I f  he has  an  i n s i g h t  of t h e  work of 
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We usua l ly  have 16  t o  18 i n  t h e  course.  During t h e  2 weeks, w e  have 
l e c t u r e s  and t a l k s  by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of f l i g h t  opera t ions ,  f i r e  s e r v i c e ,  
cab in  crew, medical s e r v i c e ,  ramp s e r v i c e s ,  co rpora t e  planning,  pub l i c  
r e l a t i o n s ,  opera t ions  planning,  customer r e l a t i o n s ,  s e c u r i t y ,  personnel ,  and 
our computer services. This  g ives  a p r e t t y  broad p i c t u r e  of t h e  a i r l i n e .  
F l i g h t  managers make evening t r i p s  t o  t h e  h o t e l ,  and we  then  have pe r iods  of 
informal d i scuss ion  wi th  them. 
The course  a l s o  inc ludes  v i s i t s  t o  our main London passenger te rmina l ,  
t h e  engineer ing base and t h e  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l l e r  cen te r  f o r  t h e  London 
area. Our own genera l  t r a i n i n g  s t a f f  g ives  l e c t u r e s  on l a w  as i t  a f f e c t s  
t h e  p i l o t ,  and on manpower e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
There are some t a l k s  on management s t y l e s  and some he lp  wi th  p r o j e c t  
p repa ra t ion .  We always a s k  t h e  p i l o t s  t o  f i l l  i n  a ques t ionna i r e  a f t e rwards ,  
s o  w e  are cons t an t ly  changing t h e  conten t  of t h e  course  i n  t h e  l i g h t  of t h e  
feedback. 
w e l l  received.  
W e  a l s o  a s k  f o r  f r e e  and honest op in ions ,  and gene ra l ly  i t ' s  very  
When w e  f i r s t  t r i e d  t h e  course  w e  d id  i t  immediately before  t h e  command 
course ,  and i t  wasn ' t  w e l l  received.  The young man knew t h a t  j u s t  around t h e  
corner  w a s  a command course,  and what he wanted t o  do w a s  g e t  i n  t h e  l e f t -  
hand sea t ,  g e t  four  r i n g s  on h i s  a r m  and g e t  f l y i n g  t h e  a i r p l a n e .  
want t o  know about anything else. But by g iv ing  i t  t o  him about 2 years  
ahead w e  f i n d  t h e  i n t e r e s t  i s  the re .  H e ' s  n o t  r e a l l y  th inking  about  
command, and you can i n s t i l l  i n  him some of t h e s e  l i t t l e  b i t s  and p ieces  
j u s t  t o  he lp .  
H e  d i d n ' t  
The t h i r d  input  w e  make i s  j u s t  be fo re  t h e  command course,  t h e r e f o r e  
named pre-command. The l eng th  of t h e  course  is t a i l o r e d  t o  t h e  ind iv idua l .  
I f  you've got  a good ope ra to r ,  h i s  checks have been good, h i s  s tandard i s  
known t o  be good, l i n e  f l y i n g  when h e ' s  been a c t i n g  i n  command under 
superv is ion  is good, then  you don ' t  need t o  g ive  t h e  young man very  much. 
On t h e  o the r  hand, i f  he  i s  t r a i l i n g  a l i t t l e  then  w e  b r i e f  t h e  t r a i n i n g  
cap ta in ,  w e  b r i e f  t h e  p lanners ,  and w e  g ive  him a s l i g h t l y  extended course.  
One has t o  be c a r e f u l  about t h i s ,  of course ,  because i f  you g ive  one chap 
2 days and another  one 3 weeks, then  immediately they  s tar t  a s ses s ing  them- 
se lves .  
A t  any rate, we  know a f a i r  amount about t h e  chap. The course  i t s e l f  
is  no t  mandatory and has  no bear ing  on t h e  command course.  
man a t  t h i s  s t age .  The t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n  is b r i e f e d  t h a t  he is  t h e r e  t o  he lp ,  
h e ' s  t h e r e  t o  guide. 
W e  never f a i l  a 
All t h e  t r a i n i n g  is  c a r r i e d  o u t  w i th  t h e  young man i n  t h e  right-hand 
seat. 
c a p t a i n  and t h e  t r a i n e e  are encouraged t o  t a l k .  Now, don ' t  g e t  m e  wrong, I 
don ' t  want them t o  t a l k  about  t h e  n i g h t  ou t  they had t h e  previous n i g h t  and 
t h e  f o o t b a l l  r e s u l t s .  I want them t o  t a l k  about t h e  opera t ion .  
I t ' s  c a r r i e d  o u t  dur ing  revenue f l i g h t s ,  and both t h e  t r a i n i n g  
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We want them t o  progress  wi th  t h e  f l i g h t ,  t o  t h i n k  about t h e  f l i g h t .  
Where they are, what 's  beneath them, what t h e  weather i s  l i k e ,  what t h e  
d e s t i n a t i o n  weather is l i k e ,  what t hey ' r e  going t o  do i f  it does t u r n  nas ty .  
W e  l i k e  t o  involve them i n  passenger problems, t o  remind t h a t  they do have 
people behind them paying t h e i r  wages, and they ought t o  be looking a f t e r  
them. They need t o  look a f t e r  t h e  cab in  crew. So w e  need him t o  consider  
t hese  commercial a spec t s .  
On t h e  o the r  hand, obviously t h e  ope ra t iona l  a s p e c t s  of t h e  f l i g h t  are 
t h e  most important ,  and w e  j u s t  f o s t e r  t h i s  awareness a l l  t h e  way through 
t h e  opera t ion .  Even t h e  handling of t h e  a i r c r a f t  is of secondary 
importance, because t h e  command course  i t s e l f  is going t o  check h i s  f l y i n g  
a b i l i t y .  A l s o ,  i t  could w e l l  be t h a t  t h e  pre-command course  i s  being given 
i n  an  a i r c r a f t  t h a t  he  won't opera te ,  because w e  are cursed wi th  a number 
of a i r c r a f t  types ,  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e r e ' s  a f a i r  amount of switching goes 
on. But i t  doesn ' t  matter - you can g i v e  a pre-command course  on any air- 
c r a f t ,  and g ive  t h e  command course  on t h e  a i r c r a f t  h e ' s  going t o  opera te .  
Now, I w i l l  move on t o  t h e  command course.  I ' m  no t  going t o  go i n t o  it 
i n  depth because I note  someone is  fol lowing m e  t a l k i n g  about command 
courses ,  and I know from t h e  r e t u r n s  t h a t  t h e r e  are no r e a l l y  major 
d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  upgrading t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e  major a i r l i n e s .  But i t  is  
poss ib l e  t h a t  perhaps one o r  two of our p o l i c i e s  and phi losophies  are 
d i f f e r e n t  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  I would l i k e  t o  j u s t  mention them. 
One th ing  about which I a m  a b s o l u t e l y  i n s i s t e n t ,  and t h a t  is t h a t  any 
course  must be as rea l i s t ic  as poss ib l e .  I a m  opposed t o  people playing 
musical c h a i r s ,  s i t t i n g  i n  on d e t a i l s ,  pretending they are something o the r  
than t h a t  which they  are. And when a t r a i n e e  i s  t r y i n g  t o  l e a r n ,  I t h i n k  
t h e  least w e  can do is  g i v e  him t h e  b e n e f i t  of q u a l i f i e d  crew members i n  t h e  
o the r  seats. 
Apart from one o r  two per iods  on t h e  s imula tor  when w e  are r e a l l y  
f a m i l i a r i z i n g  t h e  young man wi th  t h e  a i r d r a f t  d r i l l s  and emergency procedures,  
t h e  whole of t h e  s imula tor  s e r v i c e  is  planned on a real-time b a s i s .  The 
t ra inee i s  cons t an t ly  aware t h a t  t h e  a i r c r a f t  is being operated between two 
p o i n t s ,  and t h e  f l i g h t  has t o  progress  r ega rd le s s  of t h e  problems. 
Obviously, t h e r e ' s  a f r e e z e  swi tch ,  and i t  is  used, but  t h e  use  of i t  i s  not  
encouraged. When d i scuss ion  is necessary ,  w e  i n s i s t  t h a t  someone has  t o  be 
looking a f t e r  t h e  shop. I t h i n k  t h e  express ion  used earlier w a s  " the  s to re . "  
W e  are w e l l  placed i n  r e s p e c t  t o  planning of d e t a i l s  because w e  have a 
number of s e c t o r s  - London-Paris, London-Brussels - a l l  of which t ake  
about an  hour i n  normal t i m e .  So t h a t  one can p l an  one of t h e s e  d e t a i l s  i n t o  
a 1-hour se s s ion .  
Normally we  do 2-hour se s s ions  i n  t h e  s imula tor ,  so  i t ' s  t h e  easiest 
th ing  i n  t h e  world t o  start bu i ld ing  i n  d ive r s ions  and u t i l i z i n g  t h e  2-hour 
per iod.  I don ' t  t h i n k  any f l i g h t  is  normal, I ' m  t a l k i n g  now about t r a i n i n g  
f l i g h t s  i n  t h e  s imula tor .  Weather and t echn ica l  problems are cons t an t ly  
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being faced,  but  a t  no t i m e  i s  it  suggested t h a t  w e  are t r y i n g  t o  overload 
t h e  p i l o t .  I t h i n k  one can load him up t o  a po in t ,  bu t  t h e r e  is  a l i m i t .  
W e  occas iona l ly  bu i ld  i n  e x e r c i s e s  from our  knowledge of i n c i d e n t s  i n  
o the r  a i r l i n e s  and our  own a i r l i n e ,  but  w e  only bu i ld  t h e s e  inc iden t s  i n  i f  
w e  are a b l e  t o  show t h a t  t h e  inc iden t  could have been avoided. The las t  
th ing  w e  want t o  do is t o  demonstrate a n  inc iden t  t h a t  f i n i s h e s  up wi th  an  
acc iden t ,  and then  p a t  him on t h e  back and say ,  "But you cou ldn ' t  have done 
anything anyway.'' 
s t a g e ,  of course ,  t h a t ' s  t h e  one th ing  you don ' t  want t o  des t roy .  
Tha t ' s  only going t o  r u i n  h i s  confidence,  and a t  t h i s  
We encourage our t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n s  t o  t h i n k  about  t h i s  young man as 
someone who has had f a i r l y  good t r a i n i n g ,  p e r i o d i c a l l y  assessed ,  and by t h e  
t i m e  he g e t s  t o  a command course  he should be a b l e  t o  become a cap ta in .  I f  
h e ' s  not  looking good, then t h e  f i r s t  th ing  t h e  t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n  does is 
look a t  himself and make s u r e  t h a t  he ' s  a l l  r i g h t ,  t h a t  he i s  not  t h e  
problem. Then i f  a l l  i s  w e l l ,  obviously,  t h e  young man w i l l  succeed. 
From what I 've s a i d  i t  looks as though we  are going out  of our way t o  
in su re  t h a t  everyone passes .  Tha t ' s  n o t  t r u e ;  w e  do have a f a i l u r e  rate, 
a l b e i t  a very  s m a l l  one. 
f a i l u r e  ra te  on t h e  command course i t s e l f  of 1 percent .  That f i g u r e  might be 
misleading because I ' m  t a l k i n g  about t h e  command course  i t s e l f .  
l o s t  q u i t e  a l o t  a long t h e  way because of t he  v a r i o u s  assessments w e  have 
made and t h e  courses  w e  have given,  bu t  on t h e  command course  i t s e l f  
1 percent .  
Amongst t h e  Hamble c a d e t s  we have, i n  f a c t ,  a 
W e  may have 
With t h e  m i l i t a r y  p i l o t s  t h a t  w e  had t o  t ake  i n  t h e  1960s, t h e i r  
f a i l u r e  rate,  having been given t h e  same f a c i l i t i e s ,  w a s  much higher .  I n  
f a c t ,  w e  l o s t  about 7 percent  t h e r e .  The Hamble c a d e t s  are no t  j u s t  pushed 
on t o  t h e  l i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t .  It may be of i n t e r e s t  t o  know t h a t  t h e s e  young 
men who went i n t o  t h e  school  i n  1958 o r  1960, they now have ... w e l l ,  w e  have 
an ex-Hamble t r a i n e d  p i l o t  i n  command of a l l  a i r c r a f t  i n  our f l e e t s  
inc luding  Concorde. Admittedly only  one, bu t  one young man has  made Concorde. 
I n  concluding, can I j u s t  say  a few words about t h e  f a i l u r e s .  Because 
w e  do, as I 've  t r i e d  t o  expla in ,  a tremendous amount t o  make s u r e  w e  don ' t  
g e t  f a i l u r e s .  
$250,000 i n  c o s t s .  It is  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  w e  came o u t  w i th  exac t ly  t h e  s a m e  
f i g u r e  when w e  were looking a t  i t  a whi le  ago. The only  d i f f e r e n c e  is  w e  
w e r e  t a l k i n g  i n  pounds. 
The po in t  has  a l r eady  been made t h a t  i t ' s  worth about  
But when I t a l k  about  t h e s e  f a i l u r e s  I th ink  it  comes i n t o  t h e  area i n  
It 's which we  are going t o  be  spending a l o t  of t i m e  i n  t h e  next  few days. 
a t o p i c  i n  which I have a l o t  of i n t e r e s t  bu t  very  l i t t l e  knowledge, because 
t h e  prime f a c t o r  i n  t h e  f a i l u r e s  w e  have had is  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of p e r f e c t l y  
good p i l o t s  t o  manage as w e l l  as f l y .  They become overloaded. And t o  u s e  a n  
express ion  t h a t  as I say,  we're going t o  hear  a l o t  about ,  they  seem t o  have 
no a b i l i t y  t o  l ead .  They have no l eade r sh ip  a t  a l l .  
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I know t h a t  t h e r e  are widely d ivergent  views on t h i s  matter from those  
who consider  t h a t  l eade r sh ip  is  born i n  people,  and t h e r e  are those  who t h i n k  
t h a t  i t  can be t r a ined  i n t o  people.  I would ag ree  t h a t  some people do appear 
t o  be  n a t u r a l  l e a d e r s ,  and some quick ly  acqu i r e  t h e  a b i l i t y  when given t h e  
oppor tuni ty .  But when w e  have a f a i l u r e  i n  t h i s  area, I ' m  s u r e  t h a t  i t ' s  too 
l a t e  f o r  t r a i n i n g  t o  help.  
I don ' t  t h ink  you can t each  l eade r sh ip  i n  a week. I th ink  you've got  t o  
p i ck  up t h i s  l a c k  of l eade r sh ip  as e a r l y  as you poss ib ly  can i n  a young man's 
career. Given t i m e ,  yes ,  I th ink  you can encourage it .  I ' m  no t  convinced 
t h a t  i f  t h e  man is completely lack ing  i n  t h a t  a b i l i t y  t h a t  you can put  i t  i n .  
I don ' t  know, time w i l l  t e l l .  And I ' m  no t  too s u r e  what I r e a l l y  mean by 
l eade r sh ip .  I th ink  w e  a l l  know what w e  mean by t h e  m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s ,  
h i s t o r y  i s  f u l l  of them. W e  know too  about  l e a d e r s  i n  management, and I 
t h i n k  some of t h i s  can be taught  - c e r t a i n l y  t h e r e  are very success fu l  
management courses .  But I t h i n k  our  l eade r  f a l l s  somewhere between these  two. 
W e  are  looking f o r  a young man who can  e x t r a c t  t h e  maximum s k i l l  from t h e  
o the r  members of h i s  crew, who has  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  inf luence  them, and who 
q u i t e  n a t u r a l l y  ea rns  t h e i r  r e s p e c t  through h i s  a b i l i t y .  I ' m  s u r e  t h i s  
c a n ' t  be  taught  qu ick ly .  It must be f o s t e r e d ,  encouraged, and eventua l ly ,  I 
th ink ,  you w i l l  f i n d  i t  i n  most of t h e  people who are p i l o t s .  Af te r  a l l ,  
w e  are a big-headed group. Most of u s  are conf ident  and given t h e  he lp  I 
t h i n k  t h a t  confidence can be used. 
J u s t  t o  end, I th ink  w e  are probably doing a l l  w e  can t o  assist our 
p i l o t s  t o  become c a p t a i n s ,  commanders, a i r c r a f t  managers, c a l l  them what you 
w i l l .  
how t o  teach  leadersh ip .  
I f  w e ' r e  f a l l i n g  down, I t h i n k  i t ' s  because w e  have y e t  t o  f i n d  ou t  
W e  have t r i e d ;  I ' m  no t  s u r e  t h a t  w e ' r e  success fu l .  Thank you. 
DISCUSSION 
MR. FELL, FAA: I n  t h e  po r t ion  you showed on i n i t i a l  command 
t r a i n i n g ,  t h e  very  f i r s t  po r t ion  on t r a i n i n g ,  you d iv ided  it  i n t o  8 o r  1 2  
what you c a l l e d  s e c t o r s .  Is t h a t  what I ' m  th inking  of as a f l i g h t  l e g ?  
C U T .  HOLDSTOCK: That ' s  r i g h t ,  a l e g  from A t o  B.  
MR. FELL: Is a l l  t h a t  t r a i n i n g  conducted under the  superv is ion  of 
one p i l o t - t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n ,  o r  are t h e r e  var ious . . . .  * 
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: W e  t r y  t o  conf ine  i t  t o  a maximum of two. I t ' s  
You can have a young man whose career 
almost a minimum and a maximum because i f  you only involve  one person, you 
can always have a p e r s o n a l i t y  c l a s h .  
w a s  t o t a l l y  ruined becauBe he had more success  on t h e  n i g h t  s t o p  wi th  
somebody o r  o t h e r .  These th ings  happen i n  l i f e ,  s o  i t  would be wrong t o  ask  
one t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n  t o  r e a l l y  assess a young man f o r  t h e  rest of h i s  l i f e .  
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But on t h e  o t h e r  hand, you don ' t  need t o  involve too  many. I f  you g e t  too 
many people involved t h e  r e c i p i e n t  g e t s  fed  up, he ' s  no t  s u r e  what 's  going on, 
and, a l s o ,  you could w e l l  g e t  c o n f l i c t i n g  assessments.  But if w e  can 
involve two people,  w e  f i n d  they usua l ly  g e t  toge ther  and they t a l k ,  and 
what goes i n t o  t h e  f i l e  is an  i n i t i a l  assessment,  an  agreed assessment of 
two people.  
MR. FELL: A r e  t hese  s e c t o r s  given over a s p e c i f i e d  per iod of t i m e ?  
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: No, but  once you s tar t  they  are continuous.  You' l l  
work f o r  2 o r  3 weeks j u s t  t o  complete them. 
DR. BILLINGS, NASA: Is t h e  young man always aware on t h e  f i r s t  go 
a t  t h i s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a pre-command assessment,  I b e l i e v e  you c a l l e d  i t? 
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Yes, he knows. When they  f i r s t  come t o  the  
a i r l i n e  w e  t e l l  them what we're going t o  do, what t h e i r  career s t r u c t u r e  is. 
They are aware t h a t  t h e s e  th ings  w i l l  happen and as each one comes up, of 
course ,  h e ' s  thoroughly b r i e fed  so  he knows what i t ' s  a l l  about.  
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MR. DANAHER, NTSB: Would you address  s e l e c t i o n  cr i ter ia  f o r  e n t r y  
i n t o  Hamble? 
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Y e s .  W e  have two s e l e c t i o n  teams. W e  have some 
t r a ined  s e l e c t o r s  based a t  Hamble. They are ex-RAF people,  people  who have 
spent  years  doing RAF s e l e c t i o n ,  f i n i s h e d  the i r .  per iod i n  t h e  service, and 
then  w e  t a k e  some of them on. 
Very b r i e f l y ,  w e  g e t  about 12,000 a p p l i c a t i o n s  a year .  We're looking 
f o r  about 120 on average. 
w h i t t l i n g  down t h e  12,000 t o  something l i k e  600 t o  700 who are looked a t ,  
and t h e  s e l e c t o r s  a t  Hamble look  a t  them and reduce t h e  number by about a 
h a l f .  So you are then down t o ,  say 350, perhaps 400 l i k e l y  ind iv idua l s .  The 
s e l e c t o r s  a t  Hamble are then jo ined  by two a i r l i n e  people who have been 
t r a i n e d  i n  s e l e c t i o n ,  and t h e r e  i s  a board then of t h r e e  people,  one from 
Hamble, two from t h e  a i r l i n e .  They spend t h e  day wi th  t h e s e  young men and 
a t  t h e  end of t h e  day you come o u t  w i t h  a n  assessment,  make o r  break,  
looking f o r  about  120 o u t  of t h e  o r i g i n a l  12,000. To go through t h e  a c t u a l  
c r i t e r i a  of how's and when's would t ake  a long t i m e ,  I ' m  a f r a i d ,  bu t  I'll 
give  you some t i m e  a f te rwards .  
Those people  a t  Hamble are re spons ib l e  f o r  
MR. DANAHER, NTSB: What is  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  s f  t h e  very  few, t h e  
1 percent  o r  so ,  t h a t  f a i l s  t h e  command course? 
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: They go down one of two roads.  W e  f i n d  
occas iona l ly  - w e ' l l  write and a young man w i l l  shrug h i s  shoulders  and 
say  "Well, I knew I should never have made it  anyway," and h e ' l l  go back t o  
running t h e  bank o r  t h e  garden o r  what have you. I n  f a c t ,  t h e r e  are t h r e e  
types.  I f  you 
won't have m e  as a cap ta in ,  I know I'll convince someone else," and they 
Others w i l l  s ay  "There's room f o r  m e  i n  t h e  o u t s i d e  world. 
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disappear .  O r ,  they become permanent c o p i l o t s ,  and one o r  two of those  
people who have become permanent c o p i l o t s  have f i n i s h e d  up by being e x c e l l e n t  
t r a i n i n g  people.  Don't a s k  m e  why, bu t  they have. 
UNIDENTIFIED: W e  have a n  express ion ,  those  t h a t  can do and those 
t h a t  can ' t  i n s t r u c t .  
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Well, I ' l l  go one f u r t h e r ,  those  t h a t  c a n ' t  
i n s t r u c t ,  i n s t r u c t  i n s t r u c t o r s .  
UNIDENTIFIED: Regarding t h e  ind iv idua l  who becomes a career f i r s t  
o f f i c e r  - I 've  heard comment t h a t  t h e r e ' s  a concern about t h e  l e g a l  
impl ica t ions  i n  our f a i l - s a f e  c r e w  concept.  That is, i f  t h a t  i nd iv idua l  
who has been r e j e c t e d  i n  t h e  command course  now becomes a permanent o r  
career f i r s t  o f f i c e r ,  and now you have a n  incapac i t a t ed  cap ta in  and t h e  
a i r p l a n e  comes under t h e  command of t h i s  r e j e c t e d  commander, as t o  what t h e  
l e g a l  impl ica t ions  are f o r  t h e  company? 
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Y e s ,  I see t h e  problem. I t ' s  one t h a t  hasn ' t  
been suggested t o  us .  
UNIDENTIFIED: This i s  t h e  up-and-out o r  fa l l -back  ques t ion  and 
t h e  impl ica t ions  t o  i t .  
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: You wouldn't l i k e  t o  keep t h a t  problem on your 
s i d e  of t h e  water ,  would you? 
UNIDENTIFIED: How do you handle your f l i g h t  engineer s i t u a t i o n ?  
Do you have p ro fes s iona l  f l i g h t  engineers ,  career f l i g h t  engineers ,  o r  p i l o t  
engineers?  
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: I ' m  a short-haul  man and have been. My back- 
ground w a s  BEA, and i n  BEA w e  d id  no t  have f l i g h t  engineers .  The three-crew 
a i r c r a f t  w e  had, l i k e  t h e  Tr ident  and t h e  1011, w e  f lew wi th  t h r e e  p i l o t s  
bu t  no t  w i t h  one of them confined t o  t h e  systems panel .  We t r a i n e d  t h e  
c o p i l o t s  as c o p i l o t s  i n  t h e  right-hand seat; w e  a l s o  t r a i n e d  them as systems 
panel  ope ra to r s ,  and they  changed around t h e  whole of t h e  t i m e .  Now, on 
long haul ,  t h e  o ld  BOAC, they  had p ro fes s iona l  f l i g h t  engineers .  And I say,  
they r e a l l y  are p ro fes s iona l  engineers  and t h e r e ' s  no upgrading; t h e y ' r e  
n o t  p i l o t s .  
MR. SMITH, ALPA: Could you expand on your pre-command management 
s tudy course  o r  program on what you ca l l  p r o j e c t  exercises? 
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Yes. What w e  do a t  t h e  beginning of t h e  2-week 
course ,  is d i v i d e  them up i n t o  synd ica t e s ,  and w e  f a c e  them wi th  t h e  p r o j e c t  
t h a t  t h e y ' r e  going t o  have. It could be, i f  you l i k e ,  command t r a i n i n g .  It 
could be something t h a t  is on t h e  commercial s i d e .  
problem, and g ive  them 2 weeks t o  s o r t  i t  out  and prepare  a p resen ta t ion  f o r  
But w e  g ive  them a 
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t h e  end of t h e  2 weeks. The las t  day is  devoted pure ly  t o  p r o j e c t  presenta-  
t i o n s ,  and as a group they come up wi th  t h e i r  answers, t h e i r  conclusions,  
t h e i r  recommendations, and they can do w h a t  they  l i k e  t o  make t h i s  presenta-  
t i o n .  I f  they want t o  u s e  v i s u a l  a i d s  o r  f i l m s  o r  anything w e  encourage 
them. 
MR. SMITH: I f  I could j u s t  cont inue,  i t  would appear t h a t  t h e  
system t h a t  you have placed t h i s  "command" th ing  be fo re  t h e  p i l o t  group, 
throughout t h e i r  e n t i r e  career. I n  o the r  words, they t h i n k  i n  terms of 
command on a very re-occurr ing b a s i s .  Can you i n d i c a t e  what t h e  p i l o t  
r e a c t i o n  t o  t h i s  system is? Like,  f o r  example, t h e  c a p t a i n  ve r sus  t h e  
c o p i l o t .  Can you g ive  us  any f e e l  f o r  how the  p i l o t s  i n  genera l  react t o  t h e  
system where your c o p i l o t s  are being t r a i n e d  as managers o r  cap ta ins  and so 
on a l l  t h e  way through, and t h e y ' r e  i n t e r a c t i n g  on t h e  l i n e  wi th  c a p t a i n s  who 
have a l r eady  gone through t h e  command course? 
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: This  w e  f i n d  i s  no problem a t  a l l .  The average 
cap ta in  i s  only too glad t o  t e l l  o the r  people how good he is and t o  impart 
h i s  knowledge and t o  help.  I would th ink  r e a l l y  about  50 percent  of our  
cap ta ins  t ake  p r i d e  i n  shar ing  t h e  ope ra t ion  and t a l k i n g  about  it and say ing  
what they would do under c e r t a i n  c i rcumstances,  helping t h e  young man make 
dec i s ions .  There a re  some, of course ,  who j u s t  come i n ,  t ake  t h e  money and 
go home. W e  a l l  know about those .  But t h e  c o p i l o t s  are not  f l y i n g  i n  a crew 
way; t h e y ' r e  cons t an t ly  f l y i n g  wi th  d i f f e r e n t  people so they g e t  amongst t h e  
good ones which is t h e  important  t h ing .  
MR. SMITH: Do you stress a c e r t a i n  c a p t a i n  requirement t o  be a 
t r a i n i n g  cap ta in?  
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: No, b u t  what w e  do say  is  t h a t  t h i s  young man 
f l y i n g  i n  t h e  o the r  seat could w e l l  save your l i f e .  The more he knows about 
t h e  opera t ion  t h e  b e t t e r .  
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN, Scandinavian A i r l i n e s :  Do you r e c r u i t  new 
f l i g h t  engineers  f o r  your long-haul opera t ions?  
C U T .  HOLDSTOCK: W e  haven ' t  had any i n  t h e  las t  yea r ,  but  w e  were 
s t i l l  r e c r u i t i n g  l a s t  y e a r ,  e a r l y  1978. 
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: So you are no t  s p e c i f i c  t o  th ree -p i lo t  
opera t ion?  
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Sorry,  I d i d n ' t  hear  t h a t  ques t ion .  
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: How many t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n s  do you have and are 
they s imula tor  cap ta ins?  
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: We have t h r e e  types of t r a i n i n g  capta ins .  When a 
man does become a t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n  t h e  only p l a c e  w e  u se  him i s  on t h e  l i n e ,  
f i r s t  of a l l  i n  doing t h e  job  t h a t  he knows. Then if he is success fu l  w e  
star t  us ing  him i n  t h e  s imula tor  as w e l l  as on t h e  l i n e ,  and i f  that is  
success fu l ,  then he graduates  t o  a l l  a s p e c t s  of t r a i n i n g .  That is ,  any air- 
c r a f t  conversion t r a i n i n g  t h a t ' s  necessary p l u s  t h e  s imula tor  p lus  t h e  l ine 
work. A t  t h e  moment w e  have something l i k e  150 t r a i n i n g  cap ta ins .  
MR. COHEN, FAA: Do I g e t  t he  idea  t h a t  a cons iderable  amount of 
t h e  t h r e e  s t e p s  of your t r a i n i n g  i s  on one 's  own i n i t i a t i v e .  
duty s t a t u s ,  pay s t a t u s  th ing?  Is a cons iderable  amount of t h i s  t r a i n i n g  
voluntary?  
This  is not  a 
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Some of i t ' s  voluntary .  Real ly ,  t h e  only 
voluntary  t r a i n i n g  is  where a man is d e f i c i e n t .  The a c t u a l  planning of t h e  
t h r e e  s t a g e s  i s  done by us ,  and i n  t h a t  sense i t  i s  mandatory. But you a l s o  
have t o  remember t h a t  w e  are no t ,  a t  t h e  moment on a f u l l  b id - l ine  system. 
W e  don ' t  have any worr ies  about who does what, where, o r  when. What's going 
t o  happen when w e  do go on a b id - l ine  system I ' m  no t  q u i t e  su re .  
MR. TURLINGTON, Pan Am: I ' m  cur ious  about t h a t  look a t  the  
personal  q u a l i t i e s  by t h a t  board of four  o r  f i v e  t h a t  comes a f t e r  about 8 
y e a r s ,  could you e l a b o r a t e  on t h a t ?  
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Well, a l l  the  t i m e  our  l i n e  cap ta ins  are pro- 
v id ing  r e p o r t s  on c o p i l o t s .  Nothing secret about  t h i s ,  t h e y ' r e  a l l  
counters igned by t h e  c o p i l o t ,  bu t  i f  a couple  f l y  toge ther  f o r  4 o r  5 days 
the  c a p t a i n  usua l ly  p u t s  i n  a r e p o r t .  But somehow t h e  f l i g h t  managers, they 
ge t  t o  know t h e i r  s t a f f ,  they g e t  t o  know t h e  problems, they g e t  t o  know t h e  
ones who are tak ing  t h e  va r ious  b a r s  a p a r t  i n  va r ious  p a r t s  of Europe. 
Maybe they do over he re ,  I don ' t  know. But you know t h e  ones who are having 
problems a t  home. 
wi fe  who's ill o r  family problems. 
people who are cons t an t ly  i n  t roub le .  And r e a l l y ,  h i s t o r y  te l ls  us  t h a t  
those people don ' t  make good commanders. 
having most t roub le ,  t h a t ' s  t h e  day they make a s i l l y  dec is ion .  
I ' m  n o t  t a l k i n g  now about odd in s t ances  where one has a 
I ' m  t a l k i n g  about long-term problems, 
Because on t h e  day t h a t  t h e y ' r e  
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Three years ago, the American Airlines Captain 
Upgrade program constituted a detailed study of 
rules, policies and procedures. Special emphasis was 
placed on such subjects as Weather, Communication, 
Administration, etc., as published in a document 
entitled, Flight Manual Part I. This program was 
labeled, “Duties and Responsibilities” or “D & R.” 
Naturally, in addition to the “D & R ’  training, each 
new Captain also completed a flight training program 
and the required rating rides in the left seat of the 
equipment he would be assigned to fly. 
Originally, the “D & R” program was conducted by 
an instructor in a classroom/workshop format. However, 
many complaints about the program seemed to highlight 
the lack of standardization in the presentations. As a 
result, the program was produced on color video tape, 
using a panel format with the members being three of 
American’s key Check Airman supervisors. The total 
video program required eleven hours of running time 
which was presented in forty minute sessions, each 
followed with a question and answer period. 
This reduced the complaints concerning the “Duties 
and Responsibilities” program, but not to the point 
the training staff was satisfied. Therefore, it was 
decided that a survey was needed to determine the 
critical needs, or objectives, of the Captain’s Upgrade 
program. Acting on that decision, a training 
development specialist visited several of the domicile 
bases and interviewed base management pilots and 
Captains, who had upgraded within the past year. 
The conclusions resulting from those interviews were: 
1. Upgrading Captains averaged from ten to fifteen 
years with the company as cockpit crewmembers 
and had been exposed to the entire contents of 
Flight Manual Part I many times during their career. 
They believed a detailed review of the operational 
rules and policies could be accomplished by the 
individual through self-study. 
2. Captains are advised they are an important 
representative of management, therefore it is 
absolutely necessary they become aware of the 
various company functions and programs that are 
in support of their day-to-day operation as pilot- 
in- command. 
3. To assist new Captains in effectively directing the 
activities of other crewmembers, training was 
needed in Interpersonal Skills. 
4. Proper importance should be afforded to the 
significant milestone in a pilot’s career of being 
promoted to Captain. 
To meet those identified objectives, a completely new 
Captain’s Upgrade program was developed. The 
requirement to  provide information on “various 
company functions and programs” was met by 
conducting the following presentations, all followed 
by question and answer periods. 
Captain Ehmann and his immediate staff, during their 
presentations, mainly emphasize the importance of 
each Captain’s new responsibility. They also outline 
major principles that Captains should consider in the 
decision making process as the Pilot-In-Command. 
The other speakers describe their major responsibilities 
and problem areas, and describe how they might be 
contacted and provide assistance to the Captains 
during future years. 
1. Captain D. E. Ehmann, Vice President - Flight, 
2. Air Traffic Control Director 
3. Flying Operations Technical Director 
4. Dispatch - Director 
5. Crew Schedule - Director 
6. Director - Flying Training 
7. Director --Operational Engineering 
8. Manager F/E Standards 
9. Manager - Flight Service Training 
10. AA General Manager DFW Airport 
11. Manager - Aircraft Maintenance DFW Airport 
In addition to those company functions, providing 
information on two supporting activities outside of 
the company seemed essential: 
1. A visit to the Fort Worth Air Route Traffic Control 
Center where individual briefings are provided. 
2.A presentation made by the FAA Principal 
Operations Inspector. This presentation covers 
compliance with FAR’S, FAA’s role in American 
Airlines’ operations, etc. 
In two one-half day sessions scheduled on the‘third 
and fourth days of the overall three and one-half day 
program, the recommended Interpersonal Skills 
training is conducted. During presentations on the 
first two days, several of the speakers, starting with 
Captain D. E. “Bud” Ehmann, Vice President- Flight, 
the importance of open two-way communications in 
the cockpit is emphasized. Also, the need for effective 
two-way communications with other supporting 
personnel is stressed: Cabin crewmembers, gate 
agents, maintenance, dispatch, etc. 
and Staff 
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The core of the Interpersonal Skills training is a five 
part 35mm color slide and audio program. This program 
was developed by American Airlines to train customer 
contact personnel - ticket agents, reservation agents, 
etc., and is titled TACT (Transactional Analysis in 
Customer Treatment). However, during the Captain 
Upgrade program the intzoduction and the discussions 
that follow the presentation of each part of the TACT 
program is directed to the cockpit work world. In terms 
of Transactional Analysis concepts the program 
discusses the make up of the personality, identified 
as three ego states. These ego states are identified 
colloquially as the PARENT, the ADULT, and the 
From that basis individual transactions between two 
people are analyzed. Following the discussions 
students are then given an opportunity to analyze 
several transactions presented in slide tape format. 
During the remainder of the program students learn 
additional concepts which help them to understand 
many of the common transactions occurring daily on 
the job. 
To provide additional importance to the promotion to 
Captain, besides congratulations stated during the 
Flight Academy presentations, an attractive brochure 
is presented to each new Captain. On the cover, 
Captain’s wings and the individual’s name is embossed 
in silver. The first page is a letter of congratulations 
from Captain Ehmann and the remaining pages 
constitute a notebook outline of the entire program 
with adequate space for note taking during each 
presentation. This brochure is presented to the new 
Captain before leaving for the Flight Academy Training 
program. 
A highlight of the program at the Flight Academy is a 
dinner for the class hosted by Captain Ehmann. This 
provides an added opportunity for emphasizing the 
availability and interest of Flight Management in the 
new Captain’s point of view. 
. .  . - 
CHILD (P-AX). -.- .” 
The fifth day is spent at American Airlines Maintenance 
and Engineering facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma. There, 
they receive a briefing by Mr. R. J. (Rocky) Masiello, 
Vice President M & E, and his staff, folllowed by a 
detailed tour of all M & E shops. 
These briefings and tours provide the new Captains 
with an understanding of the complexities and 
thoroughness of the Company’s maintenance and 
engineering responsibilities. 
At  this time the basic program is complete and each 
new Captain commences his Operating Experience 
phase. Upon completion he continues a normal 
schedule as Pilot-In-Command. Soon thereafter 
an important part of this new Captain Upgrade 
program is conducted - a two to three month line 
check, This provides an opportunity for an experienced 
Check Airman to answer any questions the new Captain 
may have and to put a final polish on his techniques 
and methods of being a Captain for American Airlines. 
The concluding step of the Captain Upgrade program 
is a one day visit to the General Office in New York 
City, Approximately six months after the Flight 
Academy program, each new Captain is scheduled 
with seven to ten other new graduates to spend a day 
with Mr. Don Lloyd-Jones, Senior Vice President- 
Operations, and his staff. In view of recent line 
operating requirements, all new Captains have not 
had the opportunity to visit the General Office on 
schedule. However, it is believed this is an appropriate 
conclusion to our effective program and hopefully 
future upgrading Captains will have this day of 
important training. 
Since the beginning of this Upgrade program, student 
critiques have consistently and with unusual enthusiasm 
praised the merits of this new approach. Therefore, 
plans are being considered for including segments of 
thisprogramintheFirstOfficerandNewHireprograms. 
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(Mansf i e l d )  
When w e  were faced wi th  t h e  r eques t  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  crewmembers and 
base managers t h a t  i n t e rpe r sona l  s k i l l s  t r a i n i n g  be included i n  t h e  c a p t a i n  
upgrade program, I f e l t  w e  had t o  concern ourse lves  wi th  two cons ide ra t ions  
i n  s e l e c t i n g  what t h e  t r a i n i n g  would be. 
The f i r s t  one w a s  b a s i c a l l y  a n  assumption. That assumption is t h a t  most 
of t h e  candida tes  i n  t h e  cap ta in  upgrade program had not  had any s p e c i f i c  
t r a i n i n g  i n  in t e rpe r sona l  s k i l l s ,  a t  least  wi th in  t h e  las t  10 t o  15 years .  
The second one w a s  a f a c t ,  and t h a t ' s  t h e  elements of t i m e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
and resources .  I t h i n k  w e  are a l l  faced wi th  t h a t  i n  a profit-making 
organiza t ion .  Af te r  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  t h i s  f a r  i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  symposium, I 
would c e r t a i n l y  suggest  t h a t  w e  have a l l  our cap ta ins  sit i n  on t h i s  kind of 
a d iscuss ion .  That would be q u i t e  i d e a l ,  a l though no t  q u i t e  real is t ic .  
Faced wi th  t h a t  assumption and t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  f a c t ,  I f i n a l l y  chose a 
program t h a t  had been developed w i t h i n  my company, one t h a t  I had been us ing  
f o r  some t i m e  i n  t h e  check-airman t r a i n i n g  program. This  program i s  a two- 
p a r t  program, tak ing  2-112 days,  and i t  i s  b u i l t  around a s l ide - t ape  program 
of which I'll show you p a r t .  Actua l ly ,  i t  w a s  pu t  t oge the r  t o  t r a i n  customer 
con tac t  people;  i t ' s  one t h a t ' s  been i n  ex i s t ence  i n  American A i r l i n e s  f o r  
some t i m e .  This  program w a s  developed t o  t r a i n  t h e  t i c k e t  agen t s ,  t h e  
r e s e r v a t i o n s  agents ,  those  kinds of people t h a t  have a very  s h o r t  but  very  
important con tac t  wi th  our  customers,  and t h a t  would inc lude  our f l i g h t  
a t t e n d a n t s  - t h e  people t h a t  probably have t h e  most e f f e c t  on whether our 
customers come back t h e  second t i m e .  
I t h i n k  a l l  of u s ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of our  company, c e r t a i n l y  wish t o  s t r i v e  
f o r  t h a t  kind of f e e l i n g  i n  our people  and i n  t h e i r  t r a n s a c t i o n s  with 
customers.  
A s  I s t a t e d ,  I 've  been us ing  t h i s  program i n  t h e  check-airman t r a i n i n g ,  
and i n  view of t h e  need t o  f i n d  something t h a t  would address  t h e  sub jec t  of 
i n t e rpe r sona l  s k i l l s  i n  a r a t h e r  s h o r t ,  conc ise  way, t h i s  seemed appropr i a t e .  
The program i s  b u i l t  around a method developed r a t h e r  r ecen t ly ,  c a l l e d  
t r a n s a c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s .  
Now, how t o  t e l l  you about  t h i s ?  I pondered on it  a l i t t l e .  I could 
go through a long v e r b a l  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  bu t  I thought probably t h e  b e s t  way 
is t o  show you a couple  of segments. 
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I ' m  a c t u a l l y  going t o  show you t h e  f i r s t  segment exac t ly  as i t ' s  
presented t o  t h e  cap ta ins .  I precede t h e  showing of t h a t  s e c t i o n  wi th  a n  
in t roduc t ion .  
t o  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  i s  t h a t  they 've had 10 t o  15 yea r s  of experience s i t t i n g  
i n  t h e  o the r  two seats, r e a l i z i n g  f u l l  w e l l  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  c a p t a i n  has  
on t h e  tone ,  on t h e  atmosphere, and on t h e  working condi t ions  t h a t  t ake  p l a c e  
wi th in  t h e  cockp i t .  
I won't go through a l l  of i t ,  but  one of t h e  th ings  I br ing  
Secondly, I h i g h l i g h t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  t h a t  uniform wi th  those  four  
s t r i p e s  he  a l s o  has cons iderable  e f f e c t  on t h e  young people  t h a t  come 
through t h e  cabin  door t r y i n g  t o  conduct bus iness  i n  t h e  cabin  who are co- 
o rd ina t ing  wi th  t h e  f r o n t  end, wi th  t h e  maintenance man on t h e  end of t h e  
pushback l i n e ,  t h e  d i s p a t c h  c l e r k ,  t h e  scheduler ,  and many o the r  people 
wi th in  t h e  company t h a t  are t h e r e  t o  support  t h e  ope ra t ion  of g e t t i n g  our 
passengers  s a f e l y  from A t o  B. 
With t h a t ,  I then  say  le t ' s  use  a v e h i c l e  c a l l e d  " t r a n s a c t i o n a l  
ana lys i s "  t o  t a l k  about your work world, and t h a t  is exac t ly  what w e  do. 
So what I ' d  l i k e  t o  do is  a c t u a l l y  demonstrate a s l ide - t ape  po r t ion  of 
t he  program. 
program now speak f o r  i t s e l f .  
Synopses of four  of t h e  t ape  programs used by American A i r l i n e s  are 
I ' m  going t o  revert t o  a master s l i d e  changer and l e t  the  
given he re  : 
Synopsis No. 1 
The TACT Program opens wi th  a Prologue which, through images and music, 
p re sen t s  a day i n  t h e  l i f e  of Everyman. Af te r  t h e  s tuden t  has  i n f e r r e d  t h e  
dehumanizing a s p e c t s  of l i f e  i n  a technologica l  s o c i e t y ,  t h e  n a r r a t i o n  
commences w i t h  a r e fe rence  t o  t h e  b e s t s e l l i n g  book, I ' M  OK - YOU.'RE OK, by 
D r .  Thomas A. Harris, which provides  t h e  behaviora l  theory (Transac t iona l  
Analysis)  around which t h e  TACT Program revolves  (Transac t iona l  Analysis  i n  
Customer Treatment). 
The f i r s t  teaching po in t  is  t h a t  t h e  human b r a i n  func t ions  l ike  a high- 
f i d e l i t y  t ape  recorder  which s t o r e s  our earliest experiences and f e e l i n g s .  
These record ings  are permanent; then  cannot be e rased .  These p a s t  events  and 
our o r i g i n a l  f e e l i n g s  about  them rep lay  today i n  response t o  today's 
s t i m u l i ,  and t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e s e  v i s i t s  t o  our p a s t  are gene ra l ly  f a r  
g r e a t e r  than  t h e i r  d u r a t i o n  which may be only  a f r a c t i o n  of a second. 
The next  teaching  po in t  i s  t h a t  con t inua l  observa t ion  has supported t h e  
assumption t h a t  t h r e e  ego states exist  i n  a l l  people.  These ego states are 
i d e n t i f i e d  c o l l o q u i a l l y  as t h e  parent, t h e  adul t ,  and t h e  chi ld  (PAC). 
These t h r e e  ego states comprise t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  and each has  a v i t a l  va lue  
f o r  t h e  human being. 
actual experiences of e x t e r n a l  and i n t e r n a l  events .  
of d a t a  acquired and computed through exp lo ra t ion  and t e s t i n g .  
The parent and t h e  c k Z d  are  record ings  i n  t h e  b r a i n  of 
The adult is  a recording 
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Synopsis No. 2 
I n  t h i s  po r t ion  of t h e  course ,  t h e  s tuden t  observes  t h e  formation of t h e  
parent, adult, and child ego states i n  one l i t t l e  boy. The s tudent  a l s o  
l e a r n s  how t h e  p a i n f u l ,  c i v i l i z i n g  process  which t h i s  e n t a i l s  l e a d s  t o  t h e  
almost u n i v e r s a l  l i f e  p o s i t i o n  I ' M  NOT OK - YOU'RE OK. 
The f i r s t  teaching poin t  i s  t h a t  t h e  parent con ta ins  t h e  taught  concept 
of l i f e ;  t h e  mother and f a t h e r  become record ings  i n s i d e  t h e  l i t t l e  person who 
obs erved them. 
The next  teaching po in t  is t h a t  t h e  chiZd con ta ins  t h e  f e l t  concept of 
l i f e ,  t h e  responses of t h e  s m a l l  person t o  what he sees and hears .  These 
events  and f e e l i n g s  (pr imar i ly  NOT OK f e e l i n g s )  a l s o  are recorded. 
A t h i r d  teaching poin t  i s  t h a t  t h e  adult con ta ins  t h e  thought concept of 
The adult i s  a data-processing computer t h a t  g r inds  
l i f e ,  t h e  record ing  of d a t a  acquired from about 10  months on through 
exp lo ra t ion  and t e s t i n g .  
out  dec i s ions  a f t e r  computing t h e  information from t h r e e  sources:  
t h e  child,  and t h e  d a t a  which t h e  adult has gathered and is ga ther ing .  
t h e  parent, 
The dec i s ion  I ' M  NOT OK - YOU'RE OK is, perhaps,  one of t h e  f i r s t  
func t ions  of' t h e  i n f a n t ' s  a t tempt  t o  make sense  out  of l i f e .  Once h i s  l i f e  
p o s i t i o n  i s  decided,  he has  something t o  work wi th ,  some b a s i s  f o r  p re -  
d i c  t a b  il i t y  . 
Synopsis No. 3 
Having developed a language, w e  come t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  technique: us ing  
t h a t  language t o  analyze a t r ansac t ion .  The t r a n s a c t i o n  c o n s i s t s  of a 
s t imulus  by one person and a response by another ,  which response i n  t u r n  
becomes a new s t imulus  to which t h e  f i r s t  person responds. The purpose of 
t h e  a n a l y s i s  t o  d iscover  which p a r t  of each person - parent, adult, and 
child - is  o r i g i n a t i n g  each s t imulus  and response.  
The s tudent  is  f i r s t  provided wi th  phys ica l  and v e r b a l  c l u e s  f o r  each 
ego state. This  b r ings  u s  t o  t h e  f i r s t  r u l e  of communication i n  Trans- 
a c t i o n a l  Analysis:  When s t imulus  and response on t h e  P-A-C t r a n s a c t i o n a l  
diagram make p a r a l l e l  l i n e s  ... t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  can go on i n d e f i n i t e l y .  
The second r u l e  of communication is  t h a t :  
on t h e  P-A-C t r a n s a c t i o n a l  diagram, communication s tops .  Examples of 
"pa ra l l e l "  and "crossed" t r a n s a c t i o n s  are provided. 
When s t imulus  and response c r o s s  
The s tudent  is  then  given an  oppor tuni ty  t o  ana lyze  s e v e r a l  t rans-  
a c t i o n s .  
n a r r a t i o n  and i n  a no te  t o  t h e  s c r i p t  fol lowing S l i d e  6.60.) 
( I n s t r u c t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  d r i l l  are provided both i n  t h e  taped 
Following t h e  taped exe rc i se s ,  a b r i e f  d i scuss ion  is  scheduled dur ing  
which t h e  d i scuss ion  l eade r  makes several c o m e n t s  concerning P-A-C 
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terminology, and r eques t s  t h e  s tuden t  t o  provide w r i t t e n  examples of parallel  
and crossed t r a n s a c t i o n s  (one each) f o r  d i scuss ion  a t  t h e  next  s e s s i o n  of t h e  
TACT program. 
Synopsis No. 4 
I n  t h i s  po r t ion  of t h e  TACT program, t h e  s tuden t  l e a r n s  a d d i t i o n a l  
P-A-C concepts  which he lp  him t o  understand many of t h e  common t r a n s a c t i o n s  
occurr ing  d a i l y  on t h e  j o b  and elsewhere.  These concepts  are stroking, 
trading s tarrips , and games. 
Stroking is l i t e r a l l y  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  our e a r l y  s u r v i v a l  as i n f a n t s .  
Today, stroking, i n  t h e  form of r ecogn i t ion ,  i s  j u s t  as e s s e n t i a l  f o r  our 
psychological  well-being. 
of s o c i a l  a c t i o n .  
t h e  u n i t  of s o c i a l  i n t e rcour se .  
Hence a stroke may be used as t h e  fundamental u n i t  
An exchange of strokes c o n s t i t u t e s  a transaction, which is  
Trading starrips symbolize t h e  nega t ive  ( d i r t y  stamp) f e e l i n g s  and t h e  
p o s i t i v e  (gold stamp) f e e l i n g s  t h a t  people save up t o  cash  i n  f o r  g u i l t - f r e e  
p r i z e s .  Stamp redemption i s  one technique used by people  t o  d e a l  wi th  t h e i r  
uncomfortable,  NOT OK f e e l i n g s .  
Another technique used t o  d e a l  w i t h  NOT OK f e e l i n g s  is games. Games are 
s p e c i a l ,  u l t e r i o r  t r a n s a c t i o n s  programmed by t h e  child.  Such t r a n s a c t i o n s  
d i f f e r  from simple paral le l  o r  crossed t r a n s a c t i o n s  i n  t h a t  they  ope ra t e  on 
two levels,  an  o s t e n s i b l e  o r  s o c i a l  l e v e l ,  and an  u l t e r i o r  o r  psychological  
level.  G a m e s  are always resolved on t h e  psychological  l e v e l .  
The s tudent  is  then  given examples of how stroking, s t q  coZZecting, 
and games a f f e c t  him on t h e  job ,  and is shown how p u t t i n g  t h e  aduZt i n  charge 
of a t r a n s a c t i o n  can o f t e n  s t o p  a game from progress ing  t o  i ts  payoff .  
Tha t ' s  exac t ly  how t h e  program i s  designed i n  t h e  f i r s t  s e c t i o n ,  repre- 
sen t ing  about  one - f i f th  of t h e  t o t a l  s l i d e  p re sen ta t ion ,  A t  t h e  conclusion 
of t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  s e c t i o n  t h a t  w e  j u s t  l i s t e n e d  t o ,  w e  then have a d iscuss ion  
t r y i n g  t o  relate t o  t h e i r  work world some of t h e  concepts  introduced. 
For in s t ance ,  my f i r s t  ques t ion  u s u a l l y  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  prologue o r  t h e  
in t roduc t ion ,  and I a s k  them what w a s  t h e  i n t e n t  of t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t ro -  
duc t ion .  It t akes  a l i t t l e  whi le  t o  g e t  some answers s t a r t e d ,  bu t  i t ' s  a 
p r e t t y  a ler t  group, and it  doesn ' t  t ake  them long t o  d e f i n e  t h a t  t hose  w e r e  
t h e r e  t o  po r t r ay  t h e  experiences t h a t  t a k e  p l ace  i n  people ' s  everyday l i f e  
and some of t h e  f e e l i n g s  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  those  kinds of experiences,  both 
good and bad. 
They do a good j o b  desc r ib ing  t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n s ,  t h e  aloneness ,  t h e  
va r ious  o the r  happenings t h a t  t ake  p l a c e  t h a t  genera te ,  maybe unhappy, bu t  
some of them happy f e e l i n g s  t h a t  go along wi th  t h e  work day. 
Following t h a t  I u s u a l l y  a s k  them what t akes  p l a c e  i n  t h e i r  workday t h a t  
b r ings  about those  same kinds of f e e l i n g s  of f r u s t r a t i o n ,  etc. By t h i s  t i m e  
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they can w a r m  up r a p i d l y ,  and I won't r e p e a t  a l l  t h e  responses  I g e t ,  bu t  
some examples are "The c a p t a i n  I f lew wi th  las t  month,'' o r  "The day a t  t h e  
g a t e  over which I had no control , ' '  and so on. 
We then  go i n t o  t h e  a c t u a l  concept of t r a n s a c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  and d i s c u s s  
some p a r t s  of t h e  program, t h e  adut t ,  parent, and chitd that's a l r eady  been 
presented,  and go i n t o  a l i t t l e  f u r t h e r  development before  t h e  second p a r t  is  
presented.  
I n  t h e  second p a r t  t h e  s l i d e  p re sen ta t ion  addresses  more of t h e  how's 
and why's i n  t h e  development of t h e  t h r e e  ego states, and what some of t h e  
c l u e s  are t h a t  you and I can observe.  I r e a l i z e  I ' m  address ing  t h i s  t o  
people who may not  know about t r a n s a c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  bu t  w e  do go i n t o  
d e t a i l  because most of t h e  c a p t a i n  candida tes  have no t  heard of t h i s  method, 
nor have they had any d i r e c t  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  s k i l l s  t r a i n i n g .  A f t e r  t h e  second 
s e c t i o n  i s  shown w e  aga in  have a d i scuss ion  per iod and i t  g e t s  l i ve l i e r  as 
you go deeper .  
The t h i r d  p a r t  is  t h e  m e a t  of t h e  whole th ing ,  so I ' d  l i k e  t o  show you 
about 2 o r  3 minutes of that t h i r d  p a r t  t o  g ive  you a n  idea  of how t h i s  
program flows. [ S l i d e s  w e r e  shown.] 
A s  I s t a t e d ,  t h a t ' s  j u s t  a l i t t l e  segment of t h e  t h i r d  p a r t  of t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  program. And, aga in ,  fol lowing t h e  conclusion of t h i s  w e  g e t  i n t o  
d i scuss ion  i n  which t h e r e  are some p r a c t i c e  t r ansac t ions .  
The t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  p r e s e n t l y ,  are i n  t h e  t i c k e t  agen t ' s  work l i f e .  W e  
are designing some t o  be i n  t h e  cockpi t  work l i f e ,  bu t  even as p resen t ly  
shown, t h e  crewmen can re la te  very  w e l l  t o  a t i c k e t  agent  and t r a n s f e r  t h e  
event t o  t h e  happenings t h a t  t ake  p l a c e  around them. 
The f o u r t h  p a r t  of t h e  program addresses  o the r  concepts  of t r ans -  
a c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  involving reinforcement ,  both p o s i t i v e  and negat ive ,  and 
a l s o  some of t h e  more complex t r a n s a c t i o n s  t h a t  D r .  Berne, t h e - o r i g i n a t o r ,  
has  t i t l e d  Trading Stamps, G a m e s ,  e t c .  
I conclude t h e  program wi th  some p r a c t i c e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  and a 30-minute 
f i l m  t h a t  summarizes t h e  idea of t r a n s a c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  and does an  
e x c e l l e n t  j ob  of showing t h e  role-playing of games t h a t  people g e t  involved 
i n  on t h e  job .  
A s  t o  t h e  success  of t h e  program, as Capt. Es t r idge  s a i d ,  w e  have pre- 
sented t h i s  as p a r t  of t h e  captain-upgrade program t o  about 700 candidates .  
Ce r t a in ly  t h e  w r i t t e n  and spoken c r i t i q u e s  have been i n  l a r g e  p a r t  favorable .  
I t h i n k  t h e  most important b e n e f i t  is t h a t  i t  poss ib ly  makes each cap ta in ,  
o r  most of them anyway, a l i t t l e  more aware of how they might o p e r a t e  i n  
t r a n s a c t i n g  o r  dea l ing  wi th  o t h e r  people ,  e s p e c i a l l y  those  people  who are s o  
c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  s a f e  ope ra t ion  of a n  a i r p l a n e ,  t h e  cockpi t  crew f i r s t  and 
c e r t a i n l y  a l l  t h e  o t h e r  suppor t ing  people. 
Based on what I have observed as a r e s u l t  of inc luding  t h i s  i n  t h e  up- 
grade program, I would l i k e  t o  see some extens ion  of t h e  approach. Poss ib ly  
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t h i s  bas i c  explana t ion  and then  some r o l e  p lay ing ,  such as w e  do f o r  our 
check-airmen. Then w e  hope t h a t  w e  can soon g e t  i n t o  LOFT t r a i n i n g  where t h e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t r a n s a c t i o n  is  d iscussed  dur ing  t h e  c r i t i q u e .  
DISCUSSION 
DR. LAUBER: I ' m  s u r e  t h a t  t h e s e  gentlemen w i l l  be hapiy t o  answer 
ques t ions .  
DR, TANNER, NASA: Do you have any thought of doing t h i s  on a 
r ecu r ren t  bas i s?  
MR. MANSFIELD: No, i t  hasn ' t  been d iscussed .  The only  th ing  t h a t  
might address  what you are ask ing ,  i s  t h a t  we have thought of backing i t  up 
i n  t i m e ,  as i t  were, because one of t h e  f i r s t  comments a t  t h e  conclusion of 
t h e  in t e rpe r sona l  s k i l l s  t r a i n i n g  w a s ,  "Why d i d  I have t o  w a i t  t o  become a 
cap ta in  t o  g e t  t h i s  kind of t r a i n i n g ? "  So t h e  thought w a s  t o  i n s e r t  t h a t  
kind of t r a i n i n g  both i n  t h e  f i r s t - o f f i c e r  upgrade and t h e  new-hire program, 
a t  least  f o r  a per iod of 4-5 yea r s ,  u n t i l  we've covered everybody on t h e  low 
end. Regarding t h e  e n t i r e  program i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  in t e rpe r sona l  s k i l l s ,  
we have been chal lenged on how w e  can p resen t  t h i s  t o  cap ta ins  who have 
a l r eady  been upgraded. That cha l lenge  hasn ' t  been m e t  as y e t .  
CAF'T. ESTRIDGE: A ques t ion  t h a t ' s  o f t e n  asked i n  t h e  class by 
candida tes  is "Why d i d n ' t  you g ive  t h a t  t o  o l d  Joe ,  he s u r e  could have used 
it ." And t h e r e ' s  a good po in t  t o  t h a t .  
abso lu t e ly  convinced - t h a t  a h o s t i l e  cockpi t  atmosphere, o r  even one t h a t ' s  
uneasy, i n  which a f r e e  exchange of i deas  and thoughts  and responses  are 
i n h i b i t e d ,  is a dangerous cockpi t .  
happen. And t h e r e  i s  a method t o  t h i s  madness, because t h i s  pays o f f ,  i t  
works, and I hope w e  can develop it  even a l o t  b e t t e r  than  w e  have. 
I ' m  f i rmly  convinced - I ' m  
I t ' s  an  acc iden t  looking f o r  a p l ace  t o  
CAPT. FRINK, Pan Am: Have you any evidence t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  o ld  
Joes  don ' t  e x i s t  any more since t h i s  7 yea r s  of a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h i s  i n t e r -  
personal  s k i l l s  program on t h e  700 new men t h a t  have gone through i t? 
C U T .  ESTRIDGE: I wish I could answer you i n  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e  and 
say o ld  Joes  don ' t  e x i s t ,  bu t  they do. Of course ,  t h i s  has  been j u s t  3 
yea r s  and we've done 700; t h a t ' s  on ly  a t h i r d  of t h e  c a p t a i n  populat ion.  
C U T .  FRINK: But among t h i s  new group, do you s t i l l  have some of 
t h e  o ld  J o e  types  even though they 've  seen  t h i s ?  
CAPT. ESTRIDGE: 
of them are performing 100 percent .  
I guess w e  don ' t  have p o s i t i v e  feedback t h a t  a l l  
MR. MANSFIELD: A s u b j e c t i v e  response t o  t h a t ,  which I 've  heard ex- 
pressed by some of our base managers, e s p e c i a l l y  those  a t  t h e  smaller bases  
and those  bases  where t h e  new cap ta ins  are going, i s  that they f e e l  t h a t  i t ' s  
e f f e c t i v e ,  t h a t  it is helping.  
t h e  b e s t  feedback I can provide.  
But t h a t ' s  a s u b j e c t i v e  judgment, and t h a t ' s  
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CAPT. CARROLL, United A i r l i n e s :  Thinking l o g i s t i c a l l y  of t h e  
numbers you say you have plowed through t h i s  program i n  3 years ,  w h a t ' s  t h e  
frequency of t h e  t i m e  you hold a command course,  what are t h e  numbers that 
are i n  t h e  course? The reason I a s k  is  t h a t  g e t t i n g  them a l l  a c t i v a t e d  a t  
t h e  same t i m e  and i n  p o s i t i o n  t o  t a k e  t h i s  course  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  t o  go t o  
Tulsa a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  and make the  v i s i t  t o  New York a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  
becomes q u i t e  a problem. I ' m  concerned about  it from t h e  s tandpoin t  of some 
of t h e  programs t h a t  w e  run, t h a t  is, of t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of t h e  p r i n c i p a l s ,  
as an example, t o  be on scene t o  do t h i s  kind of thing.  It 's kind of a 
complicated ques t ion ,  but  how o f t e n ,  and how many, and what do you do f o r  t h e  
p r i n c i p a l s  being the re?  
CAPT. ESTRIDGE: W e l l ,  i t ' s  t r igge red  by t h e  number of cap ta in  
upgrades t h a t  w e  need f o r  t h e  a i r l i n e .  They are programmed i n t o  t h e  f l i g h t  
academy on t h e  b a s i s  of b i d s  opening up, and i t ' s  j u s t  a matter of numbers. 
L o g i s t i c a l l y ,  they g e t  t h e r e  because we  need them t o  f l y  i n  t h e  l e f t  seat. 
I t ' s  averaged about 20 a month f o r  t h e  p a s t  3 yea r s  i n  upgrade. A s  f a r  as 
tak ing  the  program t o  t h e  rest of t h e  a i r l i n e  o r  t ak ing  t h e s e  people t o  a l l  
of t h e s e  func t ions  t h a t  w e  descr ibed ,  such as t h e  maintenance and engineer ing 
v i s i t ,  w e  have been a b l e  t o  success fu l ly  do t h a t  except f o r  t h e  l as t  c l a s s  
l a s t  week, which w e  weren ' t  a b l e  t o  g e t  i n t o  t h e  engineer ing c e n t e r .  
t h e  one p a r t  of t h e  program w e  do have d i f f i c u l t y  i n  schedul ing is t h e  
genera l  o f f i c e  v i s i t  downstream a month o r  two. 
work because of t h e  schedules  of t h e  ind iv idua l s  involved. It i s  a real  
problem, it t akes  a l o t  of e f f o r t ,  and i t  could be  q u i t e  expensive.  
But 
That ' s  s o r t  of d i f f i c u l t  t o  
MR. MANSFIELD: The gene ra l  o f f i c e  v i s i t  has  not  been f u l l y  
success fu l .  We're hoping t h a t  w i t h  t h e  genera l  o f f i c e  move, w e  could 
schedule  t h a t  kind of a v i s i t  as they come i n ,  maybe each 6 months on t h e i r  
semi-annual r ecu r ren t  s e s s ion .  
CAPT. TRAUB, United A i r l i n e s :  Did you say t h a t  you had a 2-3 month 
l i n e  f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n  program? 
CAPT. ESTRIDGE: No, t h e  l i n e  f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n s  are t h e  25 hours done 
immediately a f t e r  t h e  upgrade checkout course,  
of 2 t o  3 months i n  t h a t  area l i n e  check of t h e  new c a p t a i n s ,  i n  which a 
check-airman goes wi th  him on several segments t o  t a k e  a look and d i scuss  a 
l o t  of t h e  good th ings  t h a t  you'd want t o  r e i n f o r c e  a t  t h a t  t i m e .  
But then  w e  have a follow-up 
DR. TANNER, NASA: You mentioned t h a t  i n  t h e  cource of t h e  TA 
t r a i n i n g  t h e r e  are t i m e s  when t h e r e ' s  r o l e  p lay ing  by t h e  candidate? 
MR. MANSFIELD: No, i t ' s  j u s t  a d iscuss ion .  What I s a i d  w a s ,  t h e  
f i r s t  a d d i t i o n  I ' d  l i k e  t o  make is r o l e  playing.  
airman t r a i n i n g  program w e  r e q u i r e  c e r t a i n l y  t h e  s a m e  t r a i n i n g  as i n  t h e  
c a p t a i n  upgrade. 
For ins tance ,  i n  our check- 
Secondly, w i t h i n  t h e  check-airman's f i r s t  year  w e  t r y  t o  schedule  him 
f o r  a 3 o r  4-day workshop, conducted by t h e  management t r a i n i n g  sec t ion .  
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I n  t h i s  workshop c e r t a i n  r o l e s  have been t a i l o r e d  f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  department.  
I t ' s  done wi th  t h e  u s e  of video playback and c r i t i q u e .  That I would l i k e  t o  
see a l s o  i n  t h e  c a p t a i n  upgrade program. 
MR. RANDALL, NASA: I can see a l o t  of advantages t o  what you ' re  
doing; I t h i n k  i t 's  very  commendable. I t h i n k  one of t h e  main thingo you g e t  
ou t  of it is  happy employees who have probably a l i t t l e  b e t t e r  company 
o r i e n t a t i o n  than  they had previous ly ,  bu t  do you see any evidence t h a t  
t h e y ' r e  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  manage resources  i n  t h e  cockpi t?  
C U T .  ESTRIDGE: Y e s ,  I t h i n k  t h a t ' s  a d i r e c t  f a l l o u t  t h a t  w e  are 
a b l e  t o  observe.  And t h e  base f l i g h t  managers, t h e  check p i l o t s ,  and t h e  
people who have observed them s u b j e c t i v e l y  have repor ted  t h a t  cockpi t  
communications and i n t e r a c t i o n s  between crewmen are b e t t e r  than they were. 
I t 's  r a t h e r  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  were a few s p e c i f i c  i nd iv idua l s  about 
whom they  made observa t ions  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  they have d e f i n i t e l y  made an  
improvement; t h e r e  are a couple  I would l i k e  t o  see improve even more. 
MR. MANSFIELD: The o the r  recommendation t h a t  I would l i k e  t o  see 
implemented is t h a t  w e  adopt t h e  LOFT concept soon. There t h e  dec is ion-  
making process  o r  crew coord ina t ion  can not  only be observed, bu t  i t  a l s o  
can be used t o  p r a c t i c e  what w e  have taught  p r i o r  t o  t h e  LOFT t r a i n i n g .  
I n  t h a t  way w e  can r e i n f o r c e  t h e  t r a i n i n g  by providing experiences i n  
something of a real-time s e t t i n g .  I t h i n k  t h a t  a d d i t i o n  is much needed. 
CAPTAINS' TRAINING AT SWISSAIR 
Capt. N. Grob * 
I n  t h e  fol lowing s h o r t  l e c t u r e  I should l i k e  f i r s t l y ,  t o  comment on some 
of t he  l i m i t a t i o n s  as r ega rds  p i l o t s ,  w i th in  which our A i r l i n e  has  t o  
ope ra t e ,  and secondly,  t o  examine t h e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  c r u c i a l  p o i n t s  and 
problems of t h e  ind iv idua l  phases of t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  bas i c  t r a i n i n g .  What I 
have t o  say completes and emphasizes t h e  e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t s  mentioned i n  t h e  
Working Paper submitted by Capt. Griinewald, our  F l i g h t  Tra in ing  Manager ( see  
appendix B) . 
W e  a l l  have t h e  same t a r g e t :  w e  want t o  t r a i n  c o p i l o t s  t o  become 
c a p t a i n s ,  c a p t a i n s  t o  whom w e  can e n t r u s t ,  wi th  a clear conscience,  
passengers  and material of immense va lue .  Each a i r l i n e ,  however, has  t o  a 
g r e a t e r  o r  lesser e x t e n t ,  dif ferent  prerequisites. 
f o r  example, t h e  requirements vary  considerably.  Not on ly  t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
but  a l s o  t h e  f l y i n g  c a p a b i l i t i e s  are very  d i f f e r e n t .  
r e c r u i t  A i r  Force p i l o t s ;  o t h e r s  p r e f e r  ab i n i t i o  app l i can t s .  On t h e  one 
hand a ma t r i cu la t ion  may be demanded; on t h e  o t h e r  a r e l a t i v e l y  lower 
s tandard of educat ion i s  s u f f i c i e n t .  Also vary ing  considerably are t h e  
systems of promotion, t h e  demands and p res su res  from the  unions.  And 
c e r t a i n l y  t h e  va r ious  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  departments are a l s o  sub jec t  t o  varying 
economic p res su res  exer ted on them by t h e i r  managements. 
Already i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n ,  
One company may only 
With t h i s ,  I must s ay  t h a t  I don ' t  expect t o  r e c e i v e  a gold medal f o r  
Swis sa i r ' s  methods, bu t  r a t h e r  t o  o f f e r  a s o l u t i o n ,  based on experience,  t h a t  
func t ions  w e l l  e s s e n t i a l l y  as f a r  as our marginal requirements are concerned. 
These can  be descr ibed  as fol lows.  We r e c r u i t  yea r ly  about 4 0  p i l o t s ,  
of whom one t h i r d  are from t h e  A i r  Force and two t h i r d s  ab i n i t i o  app l i can t s .  
The average a g e  is about 25 years .  A t  p r e sen t ,  a f t e r  bas i c  t r a i n i n g ,  they 
f l y  about 1 2  years  as  c o p i l o t .  A s  regards  assignment t o  a i r c r a f t  type,  t h e  
management has  a f ree  hand where c o p i l o t s  are conceFned. 
f i r s t  5 t o  6 yea r s ,  c o p i l o t s  f l y  t h e  short-range DC-9, a f t e r  which f o r  about 
6 years  they  change t o  one of t h e  long-range a i r c r a f t  types  - DC-8, DC-10, 
o r  -747 ( f i g .  1). Then fo l lows  a r e t r a i n i n g  per iod  on t h e  DC-9, a 2-month 
assignment as DC-9 c o p i l o t ,  and f i n a l l y  comes t h e  long awaited i n i t i a l  
upgrading t o  cap ta in .  The c a p t a i n ' s  career is  i n  3 s t e p s :  c a p t a i n  of a 
DC-9, cap ta in  of a DC-8, and c a p t a i n  of a DC-10 o r  -747.  
Usually f o r  t h e  
Wherein l i e s  t h e  exac t  problem i n  the captain's training? In my 
opinion,  the  main a i m  is  t o  f u r t h e r  t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  p i l o t  t o  recognize 
c l e a r l y  s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  r e q u i r e  him t o  make dec i s ions  and t o  make those  
dec i s ions  i n  good t i m e ,  w i th  t h e  b e s t  means a v a i l a b l e .  This  w e  can d e f i n e  as 
management. P r e r e q u i s i t e s  are knowledge and f l y ing  a b i l i t y .  
* 
Divis ion  Manager, Cockpit C r e w s ,  Swissa i r .  
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For a long t i m e  w e  only concentrated on t h e s e  two l i n e s .  In  a c t u a l  
f a c t ,  it s t a r t e d  o r i g i n a l l y  only wi th  f l y i n g  a b i l i t y  - l o c a l i z e d  i n  t h e  
ex tens ion  of t h e  spine! Nowadays, Swissair  bases i ts  c a p t a i n ' s  t r a i n i n g  on 
t h r e e  p o i n t s  : 
1. TheoreticaZ know2edge has taken on immense propor t ions  i n  t h e  f i e l d s  
of aerodynamics, performance, a i r c r a f t  systems, r egu la t ions ,  and so on. 
2 .  Flying ski22 or abi2ity is s t i l l  demanded t o  a high degree;  i t  is 
not  y e t  replaced by progress ive  automation. For t h e  next  few yea r s ,  w e  s h a l l  
s t i l l  be l i v i n g  i n  t h i s  demanding i n t e r i m  phase. A p i l o t  must be capable ,  
on t h e  one hand, of being a back-up system f o r  normal opera t ions  and primary 
system f o r  abnormal ope ra t ions ;  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, he must a c t  as programmer 
and superv isor  of t h e  automatic  systems. Both areas, manual f l y i n g  as w e l l  as 
automatic  f l y i n g ,  must s t i l l  be demanded i n  t h e i r  e n t i r e t y .  
3 .  Management, t h a t  is t h e  a b i l i t y  (1) t o  recognize  s i t u a t i o n s  and 
problems i n  good t i m e ,  (2) t o  analyze,  and (3)  t o  f i n d  t h e  bes t  poss ib l e  
so lu t ion .  
A high f a i l u r e  rate i n  t h e  e a r l y  1970's  forced  u s  t o  in t roduce  tu0 
innovations ( f i g .  2 )  : 
1. For one morning, approximately 1 year  before  t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  course  
begins ,  a l l  a s p i r a n t s  from t h e  same age  group are b r i e fed  as t o  t h e  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  course  s t r u c t u r e  and o rgan iza t ion ,  and t h e  problems and possi-  
b i l i t i e s  of p repa ra t ion  by t h e  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  manager, t h e  DC-9 chief  p i l o t ,  
and myself .  . 
The mental  p repa ra t ion  and motivat ion toward a higher  personal  
commitment are e s s e n t i a l .  
change from i d l e  i n t o  top  gear! 
A cold engine doesn ' t  t a k e  k indly  t o  a quick 
2 .  Whereas earlier t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  from long-range t o  short-range air- 
c r a f t  w a s  combined wi th  t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  course,  w e  have now made a d e f i n i t e  
s epa ra t ion .  The p i l o t  is  consequently no t  so overtaxed.  H e  completes t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  course  as c o p i l o t ,  under less stress, and f o r  2 months has  t h e  
oppor tuni ty  t o  f a m i l i a r i z e  himself w i t h  t h e  new equipment, t h e  new r o u t e  
s t r u c t u r e ,  and t h e  new rhythm of short-range opera t ions .  The w e l l  known 
so-called "slow starters" now have a b e t t e r  chance. 
I n  add i t ion ,  w e  have t h e  oppor tuni ty ,  i n  such cases where weaknesses 
are observed i n  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  course ,  t o  extend t h e  per iod as c o p i l o t  by a 
few weeks, o r  even months, thereby a l s o  reducing t h e  r i s k  of f a i l u r e s .  W e  
s t i l l  come a c r o s s  t h e  occas iona l  case each year ,  however. 
And now comes t h e  b i g  hurd le .  
The Captain's Course ( C C )  . On t h e  average, w e  t r a i n  24 new c a p t a i n s  
each yea r ,  of whom 3 t o  4 ,  o r  about  15 percent ,  f a i l  t o  pass  t h i s  p a r t  of t h e  
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t r a i n i n g .  For humanitarian and economical reasons ,  t h i s  f i g u r e  is  s t i l l  too  
high and w e  are not  s a t i s f i e d  wi th  t h e  r e s u l t .  S tud ie s  of each ind iv idua l  
ca se  make it e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  our  s e l e c t i o n ,  teaching  methods, and a i d s  are 
con t inua l ly  examined and improved. These unsuccessfu l  p i l o t s  cont inue  f o r  a t  
least one year as DC-9 c o p i l o t s  be fo re  g e t t i n g  a second chance. Half p a s s  a t  
t h e  second a t t e m p t ;  f o r  t h e  o t h e r s ,  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  is t o  remain as long- 
range c o p i l o t .  
Af te r  s e v e r a l  nega t ive  r e s u l t s ,  w e  have abandoned t h e  procedure of 
g iv ing  a t h i r d  chance, because only  more damage i s  done. L i t t l e  hope and a 
minimum of se l f -conf idence  are destroyed completely - t h e  process  borders  on 
t o r t u r e !  
The reasons for failure are mostly a n  accumulation of poor f l y i n g  
a p t i t u d e s  , mental i n f l e x i b i l i t y ,  and meager l eade r sh ip  q u a l i t i e s .  I n  some 
cases, performance w a s  d e f i n i t e l y  shadowed by p r i v a t e  problems. W e  have t o  
accept  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a p i l o t ' s  p rogress  cannot be f o r e c a s t  exac t ly  during t h e  
s e l e c t i o n ,  and t h a t  i n  t h e  course  of t i m e  as c o p i l o t ,  o u t s i d e  in f luences  are 
a t  work over which w e  have no c o n t r o l .  The long c o p i l o t  per iod is  i n  i t s e l f  
a problem and could q u i t e  w e l l  provide a t o p i c  f o r  such a workshop. 
The objective of t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  course  is c l e a r l y  recognizable .  The 
a s p i r a n t  must understand t h e  normal and abnormal f l i g h t  procedures and be 
a b l e  t o  apply them i n  t h e  s imulator  and i n  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  Compared t o  t h e  
demands made of t h e  c o p i l o t ,  w e  add (1) engine f a i l u r e  i n  a l l  phases,  and 
(2 )  approaches and landings  wi th  abnormal conf igu ra t ions  (0-flaps,  s lats,  
e t c . ) .  
The c a p t a i n ' s  course  comprises t h e  fol lowing ( t a b l e  1 ) :  
1. One day ( 6  hours)  theory f l i g h t  procedures,  which comes under t h e  
heading of knowledge 
2 .  F ive  s e s s i o n s  (9 hours a t  t h e  c o n t r o l s )  s imula tor  and f l y i n g  s k i l l s  
3 .  Three se s s ions  ( 4  t o  5 hours)  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  and f l y i n g  s k i l l s  
4 .  Three s e s s i o n s  (10 hours)  s imula tor  and management 
I n  t h e  f l i g h t  training, w e  concen t r a t e  f o r  t h e  most p a r t  on VMC c i r c u i t  
work, which i s  s t i l l  requi red  f o r  a few poorly equipped a i r p o r t s .  
o v e r a l l  ma jo r i ty  of our d e s t i n a t i o n s  o f f e r  nav iga t iona l  luxury,  t h e  t r a i n i n g  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  low c i r c u i t s  are s m a l l .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  A i r  Force p i l o t s  
have more experience compared wi th  ab  i n i t i o  p i l o t s .  
A s  t h e  
Now t h a t  t h e  ind iv idua l  b r i c k s  are provided, it is  up t o  t h e  would-be 
cap ta in ,  as a l a s t  s t e p ,  t o  assemble them and make a bui ld ing .  H e  must d e a l  
wi th  va r ious  real is t ic  t r o u b l e  s i t u a t i o n s  independently,  r i g h t  up t o  t h e  
landing  . 
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The f o c a l  po in t  is  management. Here t h e  prospec t ive  c a p t a i n  must not  be 
t h e  s o l o i s t  bu t  r a t h e r  t h e  conductor,  making t h e  opt imal  u se  of h i s  
o rches t r a  t o  bu i ld  up a harmony, u s ing  h i s  knowledge and s k i l l ,  h i s  c o p i l o t  
(we have a two-man concept) and t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  of ATC, d i spa tche r ,  e t c .  
Thereupon t h e  ch ief  p i l o t  t akes  over .  I n  a 5-day theory course ,  t h e  
so-cal led Captain's Theory Course I ( f i g .  2), w e  want t o  in t roduce  our f u t u r e  
manager i n t o  t h e  domain of t h e  la rge-sca le  e n t e r p r i s e  of S w i s s a i r ,  a t  t h e  
same t i m e  going i n t o  t h e  d e t a i l s  of t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  right ful  position. 
Captains are  i n  a sense  i s o l a t e d ,  as a r e s u l t  of t h e  na tu re  of t h e i r  
work. Ground personnel ,  being s t a t i o n e d  i n  one p lace ,  gene ra l ly  f e e l  
themselves more in t eg ra t ed  i n t o  t h e  company as a whole. Together wi th  400 
c a p t a i n s ,  t h e r e  are about 15,000 employees p u l l i n g  on t h e  same s t r i n g ,  A l l  
want t o  c a r r y  a l a r g e  number of s a t i s f i e d  passengers s a f e l y  over our rou te  
network. There i s  a n  enormous p r o f i t  t o  be gained from a good cooperat ion 
between a l l  departments,  bu t  t h i s  depends e n t i r e l y  on understanding t h e  
problems and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  of t h e  o t h e r s  - above a l l ,  mutual r e spec t .  The 
c a p t a i n ,  i n  h i s  work, comes i n t o  e i t h e r  d i r e c t  o r  i n d i r e c t  con tac t  wi th  
p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  departments connected wi th  t h e  a i r l i n e  business .  
W e  s t r i v e  f o r  a c l o s e  coord ina t ion  and cooperat ion by g e t t i n g  t o  know, 
above a l l ,  t h e  d i r e c t  con tac t  o f f i c e r s ,  such as d i spa tch ,  crew coord ina tor ,  
ATC, s t a t i o n  manager, and so on - but  not  f o r g e t t i n g  those  who remain 
r a t h e r  more i n  t h e  background. The managers of t h e  va r ious  departments 
appear personal ly  as speakers .  Although under p re s su re  of work, they 
accept  t h i s  du ty  w i l l i n g l y .  
These e f f o r t s  br ing  real rewards and t h e  r e s u l t s  of a harmonious 
i n t e g r a t i o n  of f l i g h t  personnel  can be e a s i l y  recognized as a sound 
mot iva t ion  and hea l thy  working atmosphere as a whole. 
And now we  throw t h e  a s p i r a n t s  i n t o  t h e  pool ,  w i th  t h e  swimming teacher  
s tanding  watch. For about  150 hours ,  w e  t r a i n  t h e  would-be cap ta ins  i n  
practice. This  phase we  c a l l  upgrading ( f i g .  2 ) .  During t h e  f i r s t  70 hours ,  
t h e  a s p i r a n t  sits i n  t h e  l e f t  seat wi th  t h e  r o u t e  i n s t r u c t o r  tak ing  t h e  
p l ace  of t h e  c o p i l o t  i n  t h e  right-hand seat, t h e  r e g u l a r  c o p i l o t  occupying 
t h e  observer  seat. A t  t h e  end of t h e  70 hours ,  t h e  r o u t e  i n s t r u c t o r  changes 
places wi th  t h e  c o p i l o t ,  a l lowing t h e  c a p t a i n  and c o p i l o t  t o  work toge ther  as 
a normal cockpi t  team. During t h e  f i r s t  phase, some a s p i r a n t s  occas iona l ly  
have d i f f i c u l t i e s  playing t h e  r o l e  of boss ,  i n  t h e  presence of t h e  
experienced r o u t e  i n s t r u c t o r .  
The upgrading is made up of t h r e e  phases ( f i g .  3)  : 
1. I n  t h e  Introduction Phase, mistakes are by a l l  means accepted,  as 
long as s a f e t y  is not  a f f e c t e d .  
2. I n  t h e  Second Phase, t h e  q u a l i t i e s  of l eade r sh ip ,  crew superv is ion ,  
i n i t i a t i v e ,  powers of dec i s ion ,  and coopera t ion  wi th  o t h e r  departments come 
more t o  t h e  f r o n t .  
100 
3 .  I n  t h e  Final Phase, w e  want t o  make s u r e  t h a t  t h e  prospec t ive  
cap ta in  is  now i n  t h e  pos i t i on ,  as p i l o t  as w e l l  as manager, t o  master h i s  
j ob  and prove h i s  c a p a b i l i t i e s  r e g u l a r l y .  
I n  t h e  upgrading, w e  seldom have f a i l u r e s .  Each a s p i r a n t  f l i e s  wi th  
approximately e i g h t  route instructors.  
with  t h e  a s p i r a n t ,  personal  experiences imparted and, by means of a sy l l abus ,  
knowledge of t h e  f l i g h t  ope ra t ions  manual, a i r c r a f t  systems, performance and 
f l i g h t  procedures are explained and checked. Each r o u t e  i n s t r u c t o r  i s s u e s  a 
qua 1 i f  ica t ion. 
Each day t h e  mistakes are discussed 
A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e  ch ief  p i l o t  can assess t h e  progress  of h i s  pup i l s  and 
can t ake  immediate a c t i o n  and t h e  necessary measures, f o r  each case 
ind iv idua l ly ,  should any d i f f i c u l t i e s  arise. 
Our system demands much a d a p t a b i l i t y  on t h e  p a r t  of our would-be 
c a e t a i n s :  adap ta t ion  t o  d i f f e r e n t  viewpoints ,  p e r s o n a l i t i e s ,  and 
temperaments. Di f fe rences ,  however, have t h e  b ig  advantage i n  t h a t  they 
provoke d i scuss ion  and t h e  a n a l y s i s  of a problem. Not only t h a t ,  but t h e  
r o u t e  i n s t r u c t o r s ,  and f i n a l l y  t h e  management of f l i g h t  opera t ions ,  are 
forced t o  con t inua l ly  r e f l e c t  on t h e  bas i c  po in t s .  
Out of a t o t a l  complement of 200 DC-9 c a p t a i n s ,  w e  have 50 r o u t e  
i n s t r u c t o r s  who are i n  d i r e c t  con tac t  w i t h  t h e  ch ief  p i l o t .  
each r o u t e  i n s t r u c t o r  cal ls  a 1-day meeting, a t  which genera l  information i s  
exchanged and problem cases and ques t ions  d iscussed .  W e  t r y  con t inua l ly ,  
us ing  examples, t o  come t o  a unanimous assessment of t h e  a s p i r a n t  concerned. 
Every 2 months 
These r o u t e  i n s t r u c t o r  meetings g i v e  us ,  i n  every r e spec t ,  a clear 
i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  working atmosphere, t h e  worr ies  and needs of our crews; 
w e  can o b t a i n  va luab le  information from them. 
The c a p t a i n ' s  appointment i s  ce l eb ra t ed  wi th  a d inne r ,  a t  which a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  top  management, u s u a l l y  t h e  P res iden t  h imsel f ,  i s  
p resen t .  The wives are a l s o  i n v i t e d  t o  t h i s  ce l eb ra t ion .  Shor t ly  a f t e r  t h e  
appointment, a l l  t h e  new cap ta ins  are i n v i t e d  once more t o  a secluded 
c e n t e r  i n  t h e  Swiss Alps. Using examples of some of t h e  problems i n  l i n e  
ope ra t ions  - with  cab in  personnel ,  passengers ,  s t a t i o n  and h o t e l  personnel ,  
etc.  - w e  work out  management p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  t h e  cap ta in ,  i n  group 
d i scuss ions .  
W e  p l ace  t h i s  course  a t  t h e  end of t h e  t r a i n i n g  ( f ig .  2 ) ,  and after t h e  
appointment as cap ta in ,  because wi th  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of people  who are no 
longer  under duress ,  and who can  in t roduce  problem s i t u a t i o n s  which they  
themselves have experienced, w e  can  achieve  an e s s e n t i a l l y  g r e a t e r  success .  
This  f i n a l  3-day course  is  conducted by t h e  DC-9 ch ief  p i l o t .  
To conclude, a l low m e  t o  make a few s ta tements ,  which I hope w i l l  ac t  
as s t imu la t ion  f o r  t h e  working group act ivi t ies  t h a t  start tomorrow. 
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It i s  no probZem t o  t r a i n  our c o p i l o t s  t o  become e n t h u s i a s t i c ,  w e l l -  
motivated,  and q u a l i t a t i v e l y  e x c e l l e n t  cap ta ins .  Subsequently,  however, 
f o r c e s  are a t  work over which w e  have no power of c o n t r o l .  I n s u f f i c i e n t  
cha l lenge  i n  d a i l y  r o u t i n e ;  t h e  changing r o l e  of t h e  p i l o t ;  t h e  s ink ing  image 
of t h e  p ro fes s ion  i n  t h e  eyes of soc ie ty ;  t h e  e f f e c t s  of top  salaries f o r  a 
minimum of c r e a t i v i t y  and having a say  i n  matters; t h e  changing s o c i a l  and 
family s t r u c t u r e s  and t h e  r e s u l t a n t  i nc reas ing  personal  problems are j u s t  a 
few of t h e  animating keywords. 
The main problem l ies i n  maintaining the standard of our young f i r s t -  
ra te  cap ta ins  u n t i l  t h e i r  re t i rement .  
DISCUSSION 
DR. LAUBER: A r e  t h e r e  ques t ions  of Capt. Grob?' 
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN, Scandinavian A i r l i n e s :  Did you say every 
month, a few days wi th  t h e  r o u t e  i n s t r u c t o r ?  
CAPT. GROB: No, every two months a 1-day meeting. 
CAPT. FRINK, Pan Am: Did I understand t h a t  t h e  p re s iden t  of your 
company personal ly  g r e e t s  each new cap ta in?  
CAPT. GROB: Right.  
CAPT. FRINK: That ' s  wonderful. 
CAPT. GROB: We t ake  them a l l  toge the r ,  about  12.  W e  have t h e  
c e l e b r a t i o n  t w i c e  a year ,  and then  t h e  p re s iden t  w i l l  be  present  f o r  t h a t  
c e l  ebra  t ion  
JOAN BARRIAGE, FAA: Would you comment on what type  of t r a i n i n g  
you have f o r  t h e  t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n s  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  r e source  management? 
Your cap ta ins  are imparting t o  your new c a p t a i n s  a concept of how they  
manage i n  t h e  cockpi t  - I w a s  wondering what p r i n c i p l e s  o r  what background 
might be common t o  a l l  of your t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n s  i n  regard t o  t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  a spec t  of t r a i n i n g ?  
C U T .  GROB: Our t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n s  are t r a i n e d  i n  a course.  T h a t  
course  t akes  about  5 t o  6 days and t h e r e  a l l  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  are discussed.  
And a l s o  t h e s e  r o u t e  i n s t r u c t o r  meetings are f o r  t h a t  purpose - t o  
s t anda rd ize  procedures and t o  f i n d  t h e  "uni t6  d e  doc t r ine ."  
answer your quest ion? 
Does t h a t  
JOAN BARRIAGE: 1 understand then  t h a t  i t  is through t h i s  j o i n t  
meeting of t e ind iv idua l s  t h a t ,  shall w e  say,  a common approach evolves i n  
dea l ing  then  wi th  t h e  whole range of a n t i c i p a t e d  problems i n  t h e  cockpi t?  
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CAPT. GROB: Yes. 
CAPT. FRISTOE, United Ai r l ines :  I n  connection wi th  t h e  f l y i n g  
s k i l l s ,  you s t a t e d  you had f i v e  s e s s i o n s  i n  t h e  s imula tor  and t h r e e  se s s ions  
of i n - f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g .  Would you b r i e f l y  d e s c r i b e  what each one of t h e s e  
days involves?  What is  t h e  l e n g t h  of t r a i n i n g  involved, and s o  on? 
CAPT. GROB: Yes. You mean t h i s  here?  
CAPT. FRISTOE: Yes. It says  you have f i v e  s e s s i o n s  over a period 
of f i v e  days; t h a t  would be  one s e s s i o n  a day, i s  t h a t  c o r r e c t ?  
CAPT. GROB: Tha t ' s  r i g h t ,  every day a se s s ion .  
CAPT. FRISTOE: What i s  t h e  l e n g t h  of t h a t  day and what does t h e  
se s s ion  b a s i c a l l y  involve? 
CAPT. GROB: A s e s s ion  t a k e s  about 3 hours i n  t h e  s imula tor  and 
then comes t h e  b r i e f i n g  t i m e .  And w e  go through a l l  t h e  f l i g h t  procedures,  
a l l  normal and abnormal procedures. So w e  bu i ld  t h e  b r i c k  he re ,  w e  form t h e  
b r i cks .  That ' s  t h e  reason  f o r  these se s s ions .  I n  t h e  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  w e  
c a n ' t  go through a l l  t h e  f l i g h t  procedures,  w e  j u s t  select a few of them. 
I ' d  say  mainly t h e  VMC p a r t ,  which c a n ' t  be simulated completely i n  t h e  
s imula to r ,  and a l s o  t h e  landings  wi th  abnormal conf igu ra t ions ,  are done 
dur ing  t h e  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g .  And t h e s e  3 days and t h r e e  s e s s i o n s  he re ,  (post  
f l i g h t  s imula to r )  w e  have d i f f e r e n t  problems, s i t u a t i o n s  which t h e  new 
c a p t a i n  has  t o  d e a l  wi th .  
ana lyse  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  and t o  manage h i s  resources .  W e  had j u s t  two cases 
i n  t h e  l a s t  2 months where w e  could see t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  q u i t e  a problem and 
q u i t e  a b i t  of progress  t o  be made, and w e  t h i n k  t h a t  w e  w i l l  extend t h e s e  
3 ses s ions  here.  Here t h e  c a p t a i n  can l e a r n  something r e a l l y  new - 
something t h a t  they have t o  know f o r  t h e i r  f u t u r e  job .  
T h a t ' s  where w e  t each  him t o  assess t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  
MR. COEN, FAA: Capt. Grob, is t h a t  what we're c a l l i n g  LOFT, t h a t  
l a s t  t h r e e  se s s ions?  
C U T .  GROB: Yes, r i g h t ,  t h a t ' s  t h e  same. 
MR. MANSFIELD, American A i r l i n e s :  That being t h e  case, wi th  t h e  
new c a p t a i n ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be q u a l i f i e d  l i n e  crewmembers i n  t h e  o the r  two 
seats, i n  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  three-member a i r p l a n e ?  
CAPT. GROB: Yes. 
MR. MANSFIELD: A r e  they undergoing some kind of t r a i n i n g  o r  j u s t  
t h e r e  t o  support? 
CAPT. GROB: J u s t  t h e r e  t o  support .  
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CAPT. GILSTRAP, United A i r l i n e s :  You mentioned t h e  reasons f o r  
f a i l u r e .  Lack of p i l o t  a p t i t u d e ,  I t h i n k  w a s  one, and t h e  t h i r d  one w a s  a 
l a c k  of l eade r sh ip  q u a l i t i e s .  What w a s  t h e  s nd one i n  between those  two? 
C U T .  GROB: Y e s ,  it is t h e  l a c k  of f l e x i b i l i t y .  
CAPT. GILSTW: Could you expand on any of t h e s e  three, ,  i n  any 
way, as t o  what you see t h e r e  i n  t h e  way of f a i l u r e s ?  
CAPT. GROB: W e l l ,  w e  thought a l o t  about  how w e  could reduce t h i s  
number of f a i l u r e s ,  of course.  I ' m  no t  s u r e  i f  w e  should inves t  more t i m e .  
W e  have q u i t e  a b i g  program, I t h i n k ,  compared wi th  t h e  programs you have he re  
i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
provement. 
make any sense  t o  go on f u r t h e r .  
and w e  s tar t  aga in  i n  1 year ."  
We w i l l  g ive  t r a i n i n g  as long as we  can see a n  im- 
However, very  o f t e n  t h e  improvement s t o p s ,  and then it  doesn ' t  
So our way is t o  say ,  " then w e  s top  here ,  
DR. LAUBER: Capt. Grob, thank you very  much. 
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TABLE 1.- CAPTAINS COURSE 
THEORY - FLIGHT PROCEDURES - 1 DAY - 
KNOWLEDGE 
SIMULATOR - 5 SESSIONS - 5 DAYS - 
FLYING ABILITY 
0 FLIGHT TRAINING - 3 SESSIONS - 3 DAYS - 
FLYING ABILITY 
SIMULATOR - 3 SESSIONS - 3 DAYS - 
MANAGEMENT 
-12 yr 
5558 
-6 yr 
-6 yr 
(SHO RTH AU L) 
Figure 1.- P i l o t  career progression. 
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Figure  2.- Course program. 
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Figure  3 . -  I n i t i a l  upgrading. 
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LINE-ORIENTED FLIGHT TRAINING 
Captain Berton E. Beach 
Manager-In te rmedia te  Jet Training 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 
Miami, Florida 
I'd like to  talk about some ideas on Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT): 
0 
0 
Why we at Eastern chose t h a t  program as a training tool; 
How we've developed our program; 
0 What it has done f o r  us so f a r  at Eastern Air Lines, and; 
0 What uses we plan f o r  it in t h e  future. 
The  environment in which w e  opera te  continues to become more  demanding of 
management  skills on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  pilot conducting t h e  flight. This is directly 
re la ted to t h e  complexity of a n  operation intended to a t ta in  absolute safety 
while conducting all weather  flight. W e  recognize t h e  need to shift f rom training 
in manipulative skills to something closer to management  skills. 
Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) is n o t  a new idea. W e  used a similar 
format  at Eastern in t h e  late 1950's on our DC-8 and Boeing 720 ser ies  a i rcraf t .  
A t  t h a t  t ime, t h e  simulators available had no motion, nor visual capabilities. As 
a result, we were  unable, until recently, to develop a training environment t h a t  
would simulate t h e  real world with acceptable  fidelity. W e  needed to i l lustrate  
t h e  value of standard operating procedures as they a f f e c t  t h e  l ine pilot in 
everyday operation. The  advent  of simulators with motion, plus t h e  visual 
system ability to  reproduce a realist ic a i rport  scene, provided us with t h e  tools 
w e  needed to construct a worthwhile line-oriented fl ight training program. 
Our f i r s t  e f f o r t  to implement  LOFT was a scenario w e  developed in 1975, 
wherein t h e  c rew took a three-leg, four-hour fl ight t h a t  satisfied all require- 
ments  of Appendix F, except  for  s teep  turns  and approaches to stall. By t h e  end 
of t h e  four-hour period, t h e  c rew had seen a major faul t  in every system on  t h e  
aircraft .  They conducted at least two ILS approaches and  two non-precision 
instrument approaches p e r  pilot. Most, i f  n o t  all, of t h e  emergency procedures 
had been reviewed. 
To accommodate  all this  activity,  t h e  legs between t h e  ci ty  pairs used in t h e  
scenario were  shortened electronically. Shortly a f t e r  this  time, Eastern applied 
for,  but  was not  granted, permission to  opera te  under a n  exemption from 
Appendix F. Appendix F lists t h e  requirements f o r  t h e  demonstration of 
competency as outlined by t h e  Federal  Aviation Administrator. In fairness to t h e  
Administrator, I mus t  point out t h a t  this regulation is intended to accommodate  
all operators  under Part 121, including those car r ie rs  who may n o t  have t h e  most  
modern training devices. 
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Since ours was a special case, we f e l t  t h a t  s t r ic t  compliance with t h e  regulation 
would not  provide t h e  flexibility needed to shif t  emphasis from training in "man- 
ipulative skillsI1 to  training in management  skills. W e  were  unable to obtain t h e  
exemption and  LOFT was put  aside for a time. 
Our cur ren t  format  was developed a f t e r  guidelines for  exemption were  published, 
and  we found t h a t  we were  not  required to conform to Appendix F at a l l  - except  
t h a t  we must  maintain our landing cer t i f icat ion to Category I1 o r  Category IIIa 
minimums. This was no real  d e t e r r e n t  s ince our visual systems a r e  capable of 
visibility reductions, to whatever degree is required. If individual performance 
indicated a need for  remedial training in normal VFR approach and landings, this  
could be completed as a n  add-on to t h e  LOFT session.. Right now we have two 
programs in operation, both approved by t h e  Federal  Aviation Agency (FAA). 
One  is for  t h e  Boeing 727 aircraf t ,  t h e  o ther  f o r  t h e  Douglas DC-9. LOFT 
programs f o r  t h e  Lockheed L-1011 and t h e  A300 a r e  being developed now. W e  
expect  to have these programs approved by t h e  end of 1979. 
Our present  program consists of six scenarios per  a i rc raf t  type. Each scenario 
contains t h r e e  legs. T h e  scenarios a r e  designed to f i t  within t h e  four-hour t ime 
f r a m e  ordinarily used for a training period. 
When we develop our programs, we emphasize s t r ic t  realism. All t h e  legs are 
flown in real  time. The problems presented f o r  t h e  c rews  to  solve a r e  those 
which can, and in some cases, have happened in real  a i rcraf t .  The  visual systems 
c a n  construct t h e  airport  environment with considerable fidelity. T h e  picture  
t h e  pilot sees on approach to a runway in our simulator is amazingly close to  
what  h e  would see in t h e  real  world. These visual breakthroughs add 
immeasurably t o  t h e  flight crew's acceptance  of LOFT, and  therefore,  enhance 
our program's value materially. 
When we began to c r e a t e  scenarios, we needed to consider some key items: 
1. What route  segments  and  airports  should we use which would give t h e  best  
indication of t h e  Captain's management  skill? The approach briefing, 
individual task assignments, c r e w  coordination and  t h e  command presence 
were  some of t h e  i t e m s  w e  considered. For  example, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, gives us a chance  to work on  Category 11. I t  a lso affords us 
t h e  opportunity to  use a n  inner marker  for  decision height ra ther  t h a n  a 
radio alt imeter.  
The  VOR approach to Runways 5 o r  36 in Charlotte,  North Carolina, 
compels t h e  fl ight c rew to  make a n  approach to what is commonly known 
as a "black hole" type a i rpor t  - which is to say, there  a r e  no  per imeter  
l ights to rely on f o r  a t t i t u d e  judgment. T h e  only things you see when you 
break out  a r e  t h e  runway lights and  those l ights adjacent  to t h e  terminal. 
So, we chose Char lo t te  to i l lustrate  t h a t  particular problem at night. 
Operations in and  out of Atlanta, Georgia, g a v e  us a chance  to opera te  in a 
complex air t ra f f ic  control environment, and  another  try at Category I1 
approaches as well. 
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W e  chose Miami, Florida, because .of the v of approaches available in 
generally VFR weather. Previous experi in upgrade training from 
Second Officer (Flight Engineer) to  First Officer (Co-Pilot) has indicated a 
need for training in approach and landing based on visual perception rather 
than electronic guidance. 
2. What aircraft systems and procedures should we examine and where should 
we put them in the scenario to  ensure the highest degree of realism? For 
instance, current emphasis is being placed on the use of maximum braking 
in the  event of a rejected takeoff. This is the result of industry experience 
which indicates that: 
A. The rejected takeoff is more likely to be the result of some 
malfunction, such as a blown tire, or a fire warning indication, rather 
than a failure of the  most critical power plant; and, 
B. Admonitions to the flight crews to go "easy on the brakes" - konsider 
costs" - lldonlt try to  make that first turn-off," have resulted in the use 
of less-than-maximum braking when needed. 
In the scenario, we can consider including the rejected take off, to 
physically demonstrate maximum brake pedal deflection, and the 
effectiveness of ground spoilers and reverse thrust in reducing roll-out 
distance, and by using a n  airport layout in the visual scene, such as 
Washington National, the  results of non-standard operating procedures 
on a rejected takeoff can be dramatically displayed. 
3. Finally, how should we tailor these scenarios to  f i t  the  four-hour time 
frame? 
First, we decided what approaches we would "shoot" into what airports. Then we 
took city pairs and linked them together to form the legs of the  scenarios. W e  
decided, on each leg of each "flight,'* what problems we would present for the 
crews to solve and also, how many problems, and where they should occur. After 
we roughed out our plans, we went to our dispatch department, and drew from 
the computer actual flight plans that  a r e  stored there, selecting those city pairs 
we had chosen. Once we had those plans in hand, we began to f i t  the  segments 
together to form the four-hour training period needed to satisfy our require- 
ments. 
As soon as all six scenarios were composed and all of the legs were laid out, we 
test-flew them in the simulator to be certain that they f i t  within the four-hour 
time frame. W e  allowed adequate time between legs for short breaks for the 
crew. When all of the scenarios were put together, we invited three different 
groups to fly the  scenarios, and we solicited comments from each group. 
First, our simulator flight instructors wete scheduled to fly the scenarios. In 
each case, they were asked to consider: 
EAL flight segment. 
0 Whether the flight plan was realistic and could related to a typical 
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0 Was the routine excessively demanding? and, 
a Could the  expected response by the  crew be indicative of a lack of 
management skills? 
Next, the  Training Committee from ALPA reviewed the scenarios and flew one. 
Since all members of the  committee a re  regular line pilots, we felt that  their 
input as potential users would be significant. 
W e  then invited a group of Air Carrier Inspectors from the FAA to try a scenario 
or  two and give their opinions. W e  felt that  FAA participation at the early stage 
of program development was important. Since they would be the  approving 
authority, we could use their input to help identify any possible problems which 
might delay program approval. Once we had collected all of the ideas, 
comments, and suggestions, we put a final polish on the total package and passed 
it to the FAA for its official approval. 
The training period begins with the  full crew attending for the examination of 
the  flight departure papers. At Eastern Air Lines, all of those flight departure 
papers are stored; tha t  is, dispatch releases, flight plans, fuel requirements, 
weather sequences, and forecasts a r e  all in the  computer and are recalled as 
each crew requires them prior to departure. Since we strive for considerable 
realism in the LOFT program, we also have the flight departure papers for the 
program stored in the  computer, accessible to  us in training. They are recalled 
by the  instructor prior to briefing his crew, before the training sequence. 
As in normal operations, the crew examines the papers for minimum equipment 
items, fuel requirements, notices to  airmen, and so forth. They also check the  
appropriate weather sequences and forecasts, determine fuel requirements, and 
perform any other preparations that a Captain may require. 
When the Captain decides that sufficient time has been spent on briefing, the 
crew proceeds t o  the  simulator. While in the  simulator, the Instructor/Check 
Airman links normal communications among s ta r t  crew, ground control, tower, 
departure control, and so forth. He does not, under any circumstance, interfere 
with normal operation or functioning of the  crew. 
Once under way, the crew must solve all problems according to their own best 
judgment. W e  took great care t o  avoid overloading the scenario. Had we 
cluttered it with unrealistic situations, we might have induced mismanagement. 
But, any of the  crew's mistakes or errors in judgment, or ignorance of 
procedures, will remain until corrected, or until t he  "aircraft" is on the ground. 
The training requirement is for four hours, and all the legs need not be 
completed. 
A word about scripting is appropriate at this time. All sequences are tightly 
scripted, and deviations and additions a re  not permitted, except that  items may 
be deleted i f  there is not enough time in the  four-hour period left to perform 
them. As a timing aid to  the instructor who is conducting the  scenario, we 
designed t h e  last leg with an adjustable time frame. The script is so written that 
the  instructor has the  option of selecting tha t  point at which the  problem will be 
presented which best utilizes the training time remaining. 
110 
When t h e  simulator period ends, t h e  InstructorlCheck Airman leads t h e  crew's 
debriefing session. 
In t h e  year  and a half since Eastern Air Lines began t h e  LOFT program, we have 
come to see it as t h e  training vehicle of t h e  future. W e  believe tha t  LOFT can  
provide more realistic initial training because, from t h e  f i rs t  day of training, we 
c a n  emphasize t h e  kinds of skills needed to  operate  a particular aircraft  in 
today's complex environment. W e  believe t h a t  LOFT develops considerable 
judgment skills and provides excellent experience in structuring priorities. It 
also illustrates t h e  consequences of poor resource management, ignorance of 
proper procedures, and lack of command presence. 
Training conducted in simulation, very closely matching t h e  environment in 
which t h e  crew normally operates, gives a crew t h e  best  opportunity to see 
normal and abnormal situations and their solutions. For example: in t h e  
simulator, a Category I1 approach to a runway closely approximates what t h e  
pilot will see in t h e  real world. But in a trainer aircraft ,  as soon as you "pop t h e  
hood,'' t h e  pilot finds himself in a n  entirely visual environment. For this reason, 
we feel t h a t  LOFT provides considerably more realism. 
In addition to its value as a training vehicle, a line oriented training program is 
a n  excellent evaluation exercise. The simulator's ability to accurately reproduce 
t h e  line pilot's normal working environment, plus t h e  instructor's briefing prior to 
t h e  s t a r t  of t h e  period, emphasizes to t h e  crew t h a t  they a r e  expected to 
perform in t h e  simulator exactly as they would perform in t h e  real world. This 
permits us to  see a more accura te  picture of how t h e  crew functions in such 
areas  as decision-makin cockpit discipline, t h e  Captain's command presence, 
crew coor nation, a n  other  resource management skills. Th e crew IS also 
briefed that the  LOFT program is not  constructed as a pass or  fail check ride; i t  
is, rather, a n  evaluation of their skills to uncover in what areas, if any, they may 
need additional training. W e  feel  t h a t  it is important to remove any threa t  of 
embarrassment or  punitive action. By so doing, we diminish t h e  tendency of t h e  
crew to respond in t h e  way t h a t  they think t h a t  t h e  instructor wishes them to 
respond, and apply instead their own best  solution. W e  believe t h a t  this 
environment produces a very clear picture of t h e  capabilities of t h e  crew being 
evaluated. 
W e  have found LOFT to  be excellent for remedial training. W e  have taken crews 
off t h e  line who have had a problem of one  kind or  another, put them in a LOFT 
training format  to duplicate t h e  problem o r  circumstances they experienced, and 
l e t  them pinpoint t h e  moment when things go wrong. W e  c a n  show them what 
they did, find out why they did it, and demonstrate t h e  be t te r  way to  do it next  
time. 
As a result of our success with this approach in remedial training, we a r e  now 
experimenting with t h e  construction of modules to  be  stored in t h e  computer. 
Each one  will be  fabricated to illustrate a particular problem or abnormality 
that,  if mishandled, could have serious consequences. 
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When we g e t  a c r e w  requiring remedial work, f o r  whatever reason, we hope to 
retr ieve these modules f rom t h e  computer,  examine them, and  ex t rac t  those 
which, when linked, will result  in a LOFT scenario f o r  t h a t  particular c rew to  
exercise  in. Eventually, we hope to  have enough modules to cover  t h e  majority 
of difficult ies w e  see on  t h e  line. In this  fashion, w e  will tai lor a training 
program, almost  exactly, to f i t  t h e  kind of training required. 
W e  also intend to use LOFT to evaluate  our cur ren t  operational procedures for  
both normal and  abnormal situations, a n d  to help us determine needs for, and  t h e  
effect iveness  of, new procedures. For instance, at Eastern Air Lines, we have no 
wri t ten procedure to  cover c r e w  incapacitation, both subtle and  dramatic. By 
observing t h e  c rews  as they handle these situations, we will 'decide whether o r  
n o t  we should have in writing some procedures f o r  c rew incapacitation, and if so, 
what  they shoud be. 
W e  intend to fur ther  use LOFT to  spot  any trends indicating weak spots  in our 
training program. 
When a l l  of our simulators a r e  approved f o r  t h e  landing maneuver, LOFT will 
make it possible to  complete  all phases of training in t h e  simulator. W e  want  
training programs t h a t  will assure  competency in t h e  a r e a  of manipulative and  
management  skills prior to  assignment to scheduled operations. The  l ine 
operating experience will se rve  to validate t h e  effect iveness  of t h e  training 
program. 
To sum up: Line-Oriented Flight Training, as it has been  developed at Eastern 
Air Lines, represents  t h e  bes t  training vehicle w e  have seen thus far. W e  believe 
it matches all our training needs more than anything y e t  devised. 
W e  shall, of course, use LOFT programs in training, and  f o r  t h e  annual a n d  semi- 
annual proficiency checks. Soon w e  will build i t  in to  initial training. W e  see it 
as a marvelous device f o r  remedial training as well, and  f o r  reviewing t h e  
effect iveness  of operational procedures. As a tool f o r  developing new 
procedures, we have found it to be unequalled. W e  a r e  confident t h a t  LOFT will 
l ead  us to z e r o  a i rc raf t  time. 
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DISCUSSION 
MR. RANDALL, NASA: I a g r e e  wi th  you, t h e  C G I  systems are r e a l l y  
c l a s s y ,  bu t  I ' v e  never seen  a genera t ion  of te rmina l  weather wi th  those  
th ings .  Is i t  done e l e c t r o n i c a l l y  o r  o p t i c a l l y ?  
CAPT. BEACH: No, i t ' s  e l e c t r o n i c .  
MR. RANDALL: Could you d e s c r i b e  how it  looks? 
CAPT. BEACH: The b e s t  d e s c r i p t i o n  I can  g ive  you as t o  how i t  
looks  is  - I ' l l  go back t o  t h e  example I used t o  begin with.  I n  Category 
11, f o r  i n s t ance ,  t h e  only th ing  t h a t  you do no t  see i n  t h e  v i s u a l  system, 
i f  you ' re  looking a t  fog  a t  t h e  a i r p o r t ,  is t h e  ha lo  around t h e  l i g h t s  - 
we have done everything but  t h a t .  The d i sc r imina t ion  of t h e  runway t e x t u r e ,  
t h e  numbers, t h e  s l i g h t  b l u r r i n g  of the. c e n t e r l i n e ,  a l l  of t h a t ,  touchdown 
zone l i g h t s ,  t h e i r  i n t e n s i t y .  I f  you ' re  no t  c a r e f u l  you t h i n k  you ' re  i n  a 
real a i r p l a n e ,  t h a t ' s  how good it is. The only  th ing  w e  don ' t  have i n  t h e  
v i s u a l  system now i s  the  occu l t ing  of bu i ld ings .  A s  you t a x i  up t o  t h e  
te rmina l ,  f o r  i n s t ance ,  a t  Washington Nat ional  A i rpo r t  i n  Washington, D.C. ,  
you can see through t h e  bu i ld ings .  It is only  a s l i g h t  i n f i d e l i t y ,  bu t  i t  
is no t  t oo  dandy and w e ' r e  working on it .  
MR. RANDALL: Do you have t h e  phenomenon of broken clouds - now 
you see i t ,  now you don ' t ?  
CAPT. BEACH: Y e s ,  t h a t  mode is  c a l l e d  scud. I ' m  no t  s u r e  w h a t  
t h e  random occu l t ing  is, bu t  t h e r e  is  a random, patchy fog t h a t  w e  can use.  
A s  a matter of f a c t ,  w e  u s e  i t  f o r  a missed-approach maneuver, now you see 
i t ,  now you don ' t ,  you've go t  t o  go. 
UNIDENTIFIED: How do you handle  a n  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  o r  less- than-  
capable  crewmember? 
CAPT. BEACH: What is done depends e n t i r e l y  on w h a t  t h e  check 
c a p t a i n  f e e l s  is requi red .  Since t h e r e  i s  no pass  o r  f a i l ,  w e  t a k e  t h e  
i n s t r u c t o r ' s  recommendation as t o  what kind of t r a i n i n g  is requi red  t o  b r ing  
t h e  man up t o  our  s tandards ,  how much and i n  what d i r e c t i o n .  W e  r e l y  
completely upon t h e  i n s t r u c t o r  t o  g i v e  us  t h a t  i npu t .  I f  Capt. Jones needs 
a 4-hour t r a i n i n g  per iod wi th  emphasis on nonprecis ion approaches,  that's 
what he  g e t s .  Then another  eva lua t ion .  
MR. MANSFIELD, American A i r l i n e s :  I understand what you ' re  going 
t o  do i n  t h e  next  s t e p ,  bu t  up t o  t h i s  po in t  i n  t i m e  do you use  LOFT a t  a l l  
i n  t h e  s tandard  t r a n s i t i o n  program, and i f  so, how? 
CAPT. BEACH: On J u l y  1 w e  are beginning t o  use  LOFT concepts  t o  
reduce a i r c r a f t  t i m e .  We're doing what r e a l l y  amounts t o  a d r e s s  r e h e a r s a l  
f o r  t h e  type  r a t i n g  r i d e .  It w i l l  be  done i n  our  AST s imula tor ,  and I have 
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cons t ruc ted  a s m a l l  mini-scenario t o  be  used by t h e  t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n  as a 
d r e s s  r e h e a r s a l .  That ' s  t h e  beginning. I d e a l l y  what I want t o  do, and I 
th ink  w e  w i l l  when w e  have t h e  development-type s imula tor ,  is u s e  l i ne -  
o r i en ted  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  i n  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g .  The f i r s t  s imula tor  per iod o r  
two w i l l  be  devoted t o  systems and procedures,  a f t e r  which i t  begins  t o  be  a 
l i n e  t r i p .  Tha t ' s  next .  
CAPT. SESSA, Allegheny A i r l i n e s :  Af t e r ,  say ,  a p i l o t  r ece ives  
4 hours of emphasis on nonprecis ion approaches,  how is the  reeva lua t ion  
conducted? Is it  under a LOFT b a s i s ,  o r  on a normal prof ic iency  check? 
CAPT. BEACH: On t h e  normal prof ic iency  check, because w e  r e q u i r e  
f o r  a LOFT program a l i n e  crew. Which is  t o  say,  i f  t h e  l i n e  crew is not  
p re sen t ,  w e  c a n ' t  do LOFT. For one th ing ,  t h e  exemption, I th ink ,  p r o h i b i t s  
us  from p u t t i n g  check people  i n  t o  be used as a d d i t i o n a l  crew members. So 
because t h e  crew he went through t h e  LOFT program wi th  is  gone, p lus  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  w e  want t o  focus on h i s  i nd iv idua l  problem, w e  t ake  him a s i d e  and 
plug him i n t o  t h e  ord inary  program. 
MR. COEN, FAA: L e s t  w e  scare some of t hese  o the r  people o f f ,  t he  
r u l e  w a s  changed about 9 months ago t o  a l low f o r  LOFT t r a i n i n g ,  under 
Subpart N and 1 2 1 .  So now you have t h e  t h r e e  op t ions  of 409 t r a i n i n g ,  
Appendix E and o the r  p ro f i c i ency  checks f o r  t h e  LOFT t r a i n i n g ,  and i t  s p e l l s  
out  t h e  r egu la t ions .  
CAPT. BEACH: I ' m  no t  e n t i r e l y  s u r e  t h a t  I have seen  t h a t  
p a r t i c u l a r  modi f ica t ion  ac ross  my desk,  but  I ' m  glad t o  hear i t .  
MR. COEN: Anybody who wants t o  can go i n t o  LOFT; we don ' t  want 
t o  s c a r e  you o f f .  
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK, B r i t i s h  Airways: We have gone down t h i s  road, 
and, l i k e  you, I do a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  va lue .  However, f o r  t h e  per iod t h e  f l i g h t  
is  a c t u a l l y  going on t h e r e  is no t r a i n i n g .  
n o t ,  we're checking, we're eva lua t ing .  
t h e  deb r i e f ing .  However, t h e r e  are t i m e s  when a mistake has taken p l ace  
dur ing  t h e  f l i g h t ,  and t h e  one th ing  you need t o  do f o r  t h e  ind iv idua l  i s  t o  
r i g h t  i t ,  then  and the re .  You don ' t  want t o  send him home wi th  t h e  thought 
t h a t  he  d id  something s tup id  o r  w a s  incapable  of f l y i n g  t h e  procedure - 
you want t o  put  i t  r i g h t .  Do you have any f a c i l i t y  i n  t h i s  t r a i n i n g ?  
We c a l l  i t  t r a i n i n g ,  but  we're 
The t r a i n i n g  comes a t  t h e  end wi th  
CAPT. BEACH: We have done perhaps t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  of t h e  same 
co in  you ' re  t a l k i n g  about .  We s p e c i f i c a l l y  do n o t  i n t e r r u p t  t h e  flow of t h e  
f l i g h t  as i t  proceeds.  For example, t h e  DC-9 a i r c r a f t  e lectr ical  f i r e  and 
smoke i s  one of t h e  more f r i g h t e n i n g  th ings  about t h a t  a i r p l a n e .  I f  you 
f i n d  a crew t h a t  simply cannot handle  i t ,  w e  s i t  back and l e t  t h e  th ing  
c rash .  
But once he has  crashed,  i f  t h a t ' s  what t u r n s  ou t  t o  be t h e  case, once t h e  
a i r c r a f t  is back on t h e  ground aga in ,  then by d e b r i e f i n g  immediately 
t h e r e a f t e r  w e  can begin t o  show him what he d i d  wrong. But w e  d o n ' t  
The idea  being w e  want t h e  man t o  d i g  as deep a hole  as he  can d ig .  
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i n t e r f e r e  wi th  th ings  as they are happening. W e  used t o  do t h a t  on what w e  
c a l l e d  t h e  4-hour t r a i n i n g  per iod i n  l i e u  of a p ro f i c i ency  check. Launch t h e  
a i r c r a f t ,  p re sen t  a problem, put  t h e  s imula t ion  on f r eeze ,  and l e t ' s  t a l k  
about what you've seen  - why d i d  t h i s  happen o r  why d id  t h a t  happen. W e  
crammed a weal th  of information i n t o  t h a t  4-hour t r a i n i n g  per iod,  and you 
could see it  l e a k  out  of t h e  man as he walked away from t h e  s imula tor .  
W e  f e l t  t h a t  you never l e a r n  b e t t e r  than when you embarrass your se l f ,  
i f  i t  comes t o  t h a t .  Those kinds of t h ings  t h a t  make a dramatic  impression 
on you o r  those  kinds of events  where you could have k i l l e d  your se l f .  So w e  
f e l t  r a t h e r  than,  and w e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  ta lked  about  t h a t  s u b j e c t ,  r a t h e r  
than put  it r i g h t  a t  t h a t  t i m e ,  w e ' l l  u s e  t h e  d e b r i e f i n g  f o r  t h a t .  
f e e l  t h a t  w e  have made t h e  man ove r ly  humble, then  w e ' l l  pu t  him back i n  t h e  
machine aga in ,  and l e t  him do i t  r i g h t ,  j u s t  t o  prove t o  himself t h a t  he can. 
I f  w e  
CAPT. FRINK, Pan Am: Can you t e l l  m e  t o  what ex ten t  you are 
requi red  t o  do a d d i t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c  remedial  o r  brush-up-type t r a i n i n g  
fol lowing t h e  LOFT exe rc i se?  Also, how do you f a c e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  t h e  
normal course  of a man's l i n e  f l y i n g ,  he does no t  come upon an  engine c u t  
on t a k e o f f ,  he does not  come upon a two-engine approach o r  three-engine missed 
approach. 
and our t r a i n i n g  i n  l i e u  of checks t o  g i v e  him p r a c t i c e  i n  maneuvers t h a t  
w e  f e e l  they need. To g ive  him a smat te r ing  of t h e s e ,  bu t  no t  a l l  of them, 
i n  a LOFT program has caused u s  t o  look  very ,  very  c a r e f u l l y  a t  t h e  concept 
of t h e  LOFT because of t h e  economic e f f e c t  i t  would have. On t h e  one hand, 
i t  would f o r c e  us  t o  double  our t r a i n i n g  i n  o rde r  t o  acccomplish t h e  
p r a c t i c e  p i ece  of t h i s  t h ing ,  y e t  on t h e  o the r  hand it would obviously 
t ake  advantage of t h e  c r e w  concept a s p e c t  and t h e  management a spec t  of LOFT 
i t s e l f .  It would be very  h e l p f u l  t o  u s  i f  you could t e l l  u s  exac t ly  how much 
a d d i t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  it w i l l  r e q u i r e  i f  w e  were t o  go t o  t h e  LOFT concept f o r  
our t r a i n i n g  i n  l i e u  of check. 
Y e t  throughout t h e  years  w e  have been us ing  our  p e r i o d i c  checks 
CAPT. BEACH: W e  haven ' t  found a s p e c i f i c  amount of t i m e  requi red .  
Maybe I can address  your ques t ion  by answering t h e  l a s t  ha l f  of i t  f i r s t .  
P a r t  of what you ' re  t a l k i n g  about is  those  kinds of th ings ,  as I mentioned 
'earl ier,  when w e  had t h e  4-hour t r a i n i n g  per iod ,  where he s a w  one each of 
everything t h a t  could poss ib ly  go wrong. 
of t h e  727,  a n  engine-fai led approach, an engine-fai led missed approach, 
double-engine f a i l u r e ,  s ingle-engine landings ,  electrical f i r e  and smoke, 
abnormal i t ies  - a l l  of t h a t  i n  4 hours.  A s  you j u s t  s a i d ,  it doesn ' t  
happen a l l  t h e  time. But maybe he ought t o  see i t  once a yea r ,  a t  least, 
t o  r e f r e s h  h i s  memory on why th ings  happen l i k e  that. Tha t ' s  what w e  used 
t o  do. But w e  f e l t ,  a l l  of u s  who t a lked  about i t  i n  concer t ,  t h a t  t h a t  
kind of t h ing  lasts j u s t  about t h e  l eng th  of t i m e  i t  t akes  him t o  walk o u t  
t h e  door i f  you pu t  t h a t  much i n t o  a program. W e  f e l t  t h a t  w e  were teaching 
b e t t e r  management of t h e  f l i g h t  by s e l e c t i n g  those  k inds  of t h ings  which, i f  
improperly managed, could be ca t a s t roph ic .  For in s t ance ,  one of t h e  
scena r ios  is  an  engine explosion t h a t  throws p i eces  through t h e  c e n t e r  
engine; as a r e s u l t ,  you are on one engine about a 100 m i l e s  from P i t t sbu rgh .  
Engine f a i l u r e  a t  V-1 i n  t h e  case 
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There i t  is ,  100 m i l e s  away, you can see i t ,  what do you do? 
looking a t  s i n g l e  engine d r i f t  down. W e  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  l eng th  of t i m e  t h a t  
w e  exposed t h e  people t o  t h a t  problem w a s  f a r  more b e n e f i c i a l  than  running 
them through t h r e e  an t i - i c ing  e x e r c i s e s  perhaps.  But t h a t  a n t i - i c i n g  
exe rc i se  is  p a r t  of t h e  scenar io .  So w e  covered t h e  k inds  of t h ings  t h a t  
could g e t  you i n  t h e  deepes t  t roub le ,  engine f a i l u r e  a t  VR, t h a t  kind of 
th ing .  W e  f e l t  t h a t  we  should cover r e a l l y  those  th ings  t h a t  would be 
b e n e f i c i a l  t o  t h e  crew r a t h e r  than gyro f a i l u r e  o r  compass f a i l u r e ,  which 
don ' t  r e a l l y  provide a g r e a t  base t o  bu i ld  a t r a i n i n g  problem on. With our  
approach, a l though t h e r e ' s  no pass  o r  f a i l ,  w e  have had t o  t ake  some people  
out  of t h e  program and r e t r a i n  them o r  upgrade t h e i r  t r a i n i n g .  There has  
been no s p e c i f i c  amount of r e t r a i n i n g  t h a t  w e  have had t o  do - it  depends 
on t h e  ind iv idua l .  W e  have had people  come through who can almost walk on 
water, and w e  have some who don ' t  wash. Between those  two i s  t h e  ord inary  
p ick  and shovel  a v i a t o r  l i k e  myself who manages t o  stumble through it  every 
t i m e .  So w e  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  program r e a l l y  hadn ' t  caused us  any e x t r a  
t r a i n i n g  a t  a l l  except f o r  those few who r e a l l y  need i t ,  and they would be 
t h e  ones who would probably f a i l  t h e  PIC check o r  t he  semiannual check 
anyway. So t h e r e  has been no t r a i n i n g  generated i n  excess of what w e  
o r d i n a r i l y  do. I hope t h a t  answers your ques t ion .  
O r  you ' re  
MR. SMITH, ALPA: Has t h i s  had any e f f e c t  on your i n s t r u c t o r s  i n  
terms of what t h e y ' r e  requi red  t o  know and t o  be a b l e  t o  t ransmi t  i n  terms 
of information? How do you f e e l  t h i s  has  a f f e c t e d  s t anda rd iza t ion  of 
procedures under emergency s i t u a t i o n s ?  
CAPT. BEACH: The e f f e c t  on i n s t r u c t o r s  has been cons iderable  
because when w e  f i r s t  pu t  t h e  program toge the r ,  i t  w a s  incumbent upon us  t o  
be s u r e  t h a t  t h e  i n s t r u c t o r  conducting t h e  program, which i s  r e a l l y  an  
eva lua t ion ,  knows what h e ' s  doing. 
It is, as probably you have ga thered ,  q u i t e  s u b j e c t i v e  i n  scope. 
Whether t h e  man is good, bad, o r  i n d i f f e r e n t  depends e n t i r e l y  on how t h e  
i n s t r u c t o r  f e e l s .  So w e  have,  I won't say  r i g i d ,  bu t  r a t h e r  comprehensive 
b r i e f i n g s  among t h e  i n s t r u c t o r s  who are LOFT q u a l i f i e d  and myself ,  about 
what t h e  program is  about .  I n  our  handout, t h e  s c r i p t  w e  g ive  t o  t h e  
i n s t r u c t o r s  t o  u s e  is a foreword t h a t  g ives  my ideas  of what l ine-or ien ted  
f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  is  and what t h e  i n s t r u c t o r ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  are, and w e  
d i s c u s s  those  when he comes i n  t o  t a l k  t o  m e  before  h e ' s  LOFT-qualified. 
It hinges very  much on t h e  i n s t r u c t o r ,  and h e ' s  very  much aware of t he  f a c t  
t h a t  t h a t ' s  h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  and w e  t r a i n  him f o r  t h a t .  
MR. SMITH: But i n  t h e  s t anda rd iza t ion  of t h e  emergency pro- 
cedures ,  has  t h e r e  been any problem i n  t e r m s  of t h e  i n s t r u c t o r s '  
techniques t o  s o l v e  a problem? 
CAPT. BEACH: No, t h e r e  i s  no ind iv idua l  opinion i n  t h e  l i n e -  
o r i en ted  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  as w e  cons t ruc ted  i t .  The emergencies are handled 
according t o  t h e  s tandard  procedures  as s p e l l e d  out  i n  t h e  a i r p l a n e  f l i g h t  
manual. That doesn ' t  mean t o  say t h e  c a p t a i n  c a n ' t  u se  whatever s o l u t i o n  
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he  f e e l s  b e s t ,  bu t  i n  d e b r i e f i n g  he should be prepared t o  defend it. I f  you 
d e v i a t e  from s tandard  procedure,  w e  expect you t o  say  why. One b e n e f i t  of 
t h e  LOFT program w e  f e e l  may be t h a t  i f  w e  f i n d  your procedure is  b e t t e r  
than t h e  one we  have w r i t t e n ,  w e  may change t h e  one w e  have w r i t t e n .  W e  
haven ' t  y e t ,  though. 
CAPT. FRINK: The t r a i n i n g  committee requested of t h e  FAA, when 
they w e r e  cons ider ing  t h i s  r egu la to ry  change, t h a t  they change t h e  t i m e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  LOFT t o  3 hours f o r  t h e  scena r ios  and a l low us  1 hour 
remaining t o  do s p e c i f i c  maneuver p r a c t i c e  t h a t  may be a seasonal  th ing .  W e  
might want w e t  runways, i c y  runways, w e  might want crosswinds,  w e  might n o t  
want wind shea r ,  something of t h i s  na ture .  But w e  f e l t  a ve ry  g r e a t  need 
t o  be a b l e  t o  have some t i m e  t o  concent ra te  once a year  on s p e c i f i c  needs 
t h a t  t h e  ope ra t ions  has ind ica t ed  are t h e r e .  I n  your opin ion ,  having used 
t h e  LOFT t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  you have, would a 3-hour per iod be adequate  t o  
do t h e  job  t h a t  you ' re  t r y i n g  t o  do? 
CAPT. BEACH: A 3-hour per iod aga in  would depend on what kinds of 
t h ings  you want t o  see. Our ope ra t iona l  requirements ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  
a i r p l a n e s  I ' m  involved wi th ,  are un l ike  yours .  
probably looking a t ,  where maybe you g e t  one landing a day, doesn ' t  apply 
t o  us .  So you would perhaps need t h a t  e x t r a  per iod t o  focus on t h e  kinds of 
t h ings  you f e e l  t h e  crew may no t  o r d i n a r i l y  g e t  t o  see. Because of t h e  way 
w e ' r e  opera t ing  and t h e  kinds of a i r p l a n e s  and r o u t e  s t r u c t u r e  w e  have, w e  
e l ec t ed  t o  go t h e  f u l l  4 hours f o r  l ine-or ien ted  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  and have 
t h r e e  l e g s  t o  develop t h e  kinds of t h ings  w e  wanted t o  see. Can you do it  
i n  two? Y e s ,  I th ink  you can. You would have t o  s i t  down wi th  t h e  people 
who are going t o  cons t ruc t  t he  program and dec ide  your p r i o r i t i e s  and then 
cons t ruc t  3 hours based on what you f e e l  is r e a l l y  important ,  which i s  what 
w e  r e a l l y  d i d  f o r  4 hours.  
The s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  you are 
MR. COEN: 1 would l i k e  t o  suggest  t h a t  maybe we  ought t o  have a 
t r a i n i n g  committee meeting. 
of t h e  carriers have i s  nothing bu t  a race through a l l  of t h e  maneuvers of 
Appendix E. Now, when you g e t  i n t o  LOFT, i t ' s  Appendix E t r a i n i n g  i n  a 
l o g i c a l  sequence, i n  a r e a l i s t i c  sense.  And t h e  grading o r  t h e  p a s s - f a i l  
s i t u a t i o n  is  no d i f f e r e n t  f o r  LOFT t r a i n i n g  than  i t  is  f o r  409 t r a i n i n g ,  
us ing  a l l  of Appendix E i n s t ead  of l i n e  check. So t h e r e  is r e a l l y  no g r e a t  
change i n  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  t h a t  would be r equ i r ed  t o  b r ing  a man up t o  
a s tandard  i f  he i n  f a c t  w a s  no t .  I don ' t  know how many carriers are us ing  
it ,  bu t  t h e r e  are many. So t h e r e  is  no real g r e a t  change here .  
The 409 t r a i n i n g  p resen t ly  i n  t h e  book t h a t  a l o t  
The o t h e r  t h ing  i s  t h a t  t h e  LOFT t r a i n i n g  program, a t  t h e  recommendation 
of t h e  t r a i n i n g  committee, r e q u i r e s  a minimum of 3 hours  and 20 minutes and 
t h e  o the r  40 minutes are t h e r e  f o r  such th ings  as wind shear  and w h a t  have 
you. 
CAPT. BEACH: Every a i r l i n e  has  i t s  own f l a v o r ,  I be l i eve ,  based 
But I t h i n k  i f  you adopt  a 
on t h e  k inds  of t h ings  t h a t  you f e e l  you need f o r  ope ra t iona l  requirements .  
Ours may taste d i f f e r e n t l y  from yours .  
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l ine-or ien ted  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  program t h a t  s u i t s  your needs i t  probably 
won't be d i f f e r e n t  completely from my own, bu t  w i l l  be  every b i t  as good f o r  
t h e  kind of t r a i n i n g  you need t o  do from your p a r t i c u l a r  po in t  of view. 
DR. LAUBER: Thank you, B e r t .  I ' d  l i k e  t o  underscore a couple  of 
t h ings  t h a t  B e r t  brought ou t  and Capt. Holdstock brought up. One of t h e  
th ings  t h a t  Tom Nunn d i d  up a t  Northwest w a s  t o  adminis te r  a ques t ionnai re  
t o  people who had gone through h i s  program t o  g e t  some idea  of what t h e i r  
i deas  and impressions were about t h e  program. Tom provided those  d a t a  t o  
us ,  and w e  analyzed them i n  an  at tempt  t o  f i n d  o u t  what people who had been 
through t h e  program thought they learned  about  i t .  There are a couple  of 
s e l e c t e d  comments t h a t  w e  go t  back t h a t  I t h i n k  r e a l l y  speak f o r  themselves. 
These are d i r e c t  quota t ions .  
"Judgment i n  f l y i n g  can be descr ibed  as t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  p l ace  r e l a t i v e  
importance on many v a r i a b l e s  whi le  i n  d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s .  LOFT a l lows  t h e  
ind iv idua l  t o  e x e r c i s e  t h i s  judgment . I '  
Another comment, "LOFT o f f e r s  t h e  chance t o  t ake  a s i t u a t i o n  t o  i t s  
conclusion r e g a r d l e s s  of whether t h e  procedure s e l e c t e d  w a s  good o r  bad. 
f o r c e s  them t o  c a r r y  through wi th  a series of a c t i o n s  and f o r c e s  them t o  
t h i n k  about it . I '  
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Another one, "It w a s  a real  eye-opener t o  see a crew l o s e  i t s  co- 
o rd ina t ion .  It brought ou t  two th ings  t o  m e .  One, t h e r e ' s  a heavy load on 
t h e  second o f f i c e r  dur ing  emergencies and two, t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  d e l i b e r a t i o n  
before  t ak ing  a c t i o n .  You must t h i n k  about t h e  consequences of every ac t ion . "  
I t h i n k  these  are some i n d i c a t i o n  of t h e  i n s i g h t  t h a t  people  g e t  i n t o  
t h e i r  own behavior when they  go through t h i s .  Two f i n a l  ones. 
One, "This program should make a few maverick l o n e r s  r e a l i z e  how much 
w e  need coord ina t ion  wi th in  t h e  cockpi t . "  
And t h e  f i n a l  one: t h i s  i n d i v i d u a l  learned  "How easy i t  w a s  t o  compound 
ignorance wi th  damned fool i shness ."  
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The indus t ry ,  and s p e c i f i c a l l y  United Airlines,  went through a per iod 
when th ings  were going j u s t  about t h e  way w e  wanted. It w a s  a s t a b l e  per iod 
from approximately 1970 t o  1977. Things w e r e  going w e l l  ope ra t iona l ly ,  but  
our p i l o t s  c a l l e d  i t  t h e  per iod of s t agna t ion .  W e  had very  l i t t l e  movement, 
very  f e w  promotions, very  l i t t l e  a t t r i t i o n  through normal r e t i r emen t  o r  
people having t o  re t i re  because of i l l n e s s .  We d id  r e a l i z e  one b e n e f i t ,  
however, because wi th  t h i s  s t agna t ion  w e  w e r e  bu i ld ing  up a very  h igh  level 
of experience i n  our cockp i t s .  A s  a r e s u l t  of t h i s  l a c k  of movement 
people w e r e  i n  t h e  same a i r p l a n e ,  t h e  same seat f o r  a long per iod  of time. 
And obviously,  when you do t h e  same th ing  over and over aga in  you should 
become more p r o f i c i e n t  and t h e r e  should be fewer i n c i d e n t s  and acc iden t s .  
However, i n  s p i t e  of t h ings  going so w e l l  w e  found w e  were beginning t o  
g e t  a l i t t l e  uneasy. Things were r e a l l y  going very  w e l l ,  bu t  w e  began t o  
worry j u s t  a l i t t l e  b i t  because they  were going so w e l l .  W e  reasoned t h a t  i f  
i t ' s  going t h i s  w e l l ,  t h e  only way it can go is  down. Every a i r l i n e ,  as 
J .  D.  Smith, our r e s i d e n t  exper t  s ays ,  has a s a f e t y  f o o t p r i n t ,  and what i t  
te l l s  u s  i s  t h a t  i n  a c e r t a i n  per iod of t i m e  you can a n t i c i p a t e  t h a t  you ' r e  
going t o  have an  acc iden t .  It v a r i e s  between a i r l i n e s ,  but  you can look a t  
the  record and say i n  "x" number of months o r  yea r s  you ' re  going t o  have a 
major acc iden t .  
On United A i r l i n e s  w e  had a s a f e t y  f o o t p r i n t  of 4 years  between major 
acc iden t s .  A t  t h i s  time w e  had gone 4 yea r s  and hadn ' t  had a major a c c i d e n t ,  
s o  wi th  each succeeding month w e  wondered j u s t  what w e  were doing s o  w e l l ,  o r  
what w a s  about t o  happen. 
Other t h ings  were g iv ing  concern.  We w e r e  becoming, as f a r  as t h e  
crews w e r e  concerned, r a t h e r  complacent - perhaps because s o  many th ings  
were being done f o r  us .  
vec to r ing ,  INS systems; a l l  of t h e  conveniences and t h e  advances of 
technology w e r e  r e a l l y  l ead ing  us  i n t o  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of tak ing  f o r  granted 
t h a t  t h ings  w e r e  going t o  be "okay." 
made i n  one o r  more of t h e  p re sen ta t ions  i n  t h e  last day o r  so of t h e  Dul les  
i nc iden t  when a crew took a vec to r  and an a l t i t u d e  f o r  gran ted .  
The automated f l i g h t  planning,  t h e  ex tens ive  r ada r  
A s  a n  example, I t h i n k  mention w a s  
A l l  t h e s e  th ings  s t a r t e d  t o  cause a vague concern,  and then  w e  found 
t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w a s  about t o  be  compounded. 
s t agna t ion ,  and w e  s t a r t e d  t o  expand. 
i nc rease  and w e  s t a r t e d  w h a t  B i l l  Traub r e f e r r e d  t o  as t h e  new-hire program. 
W e  a n t i c i p a t e d ,  as w e  approached t h e  new-hire program, a n  a d d i t i o n  of 1,800 
persons over a 5-year per iod ,  o r  roughly 360 persons a year .  With t h i s  
movement w e  found w e  were l o s i n g  t h e  advantage t h a t  w e  had of s t a b i l i t y  
We passed t h e  per iod of 
The a t t r i t i o n  rate w a s  beginning t o  
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and experience,  because wi th  t h e  pot  being s t i r r e d  w e  had new people  i n  a l l  
of our  seats i n  a l l  of our a i r p l a n e s .  
We could conceivably,  and I ' m  q u i t e  s u r e  i t  w i l l  cont inue  t h a t  way f o r  
some t i m e ,  f i n d  w i t h i n  a cockpi t  a c a p t a i n  brand new t o  t h e  a i r p l a n e ,  a f i r s t  
o f f i c e r  f l y i n g  h i s  f i r s t  t r i p  a f t e r  having moved up from second o f f i c e r ,  and 
a new-hire second o f f i c e r  i n  t h e  t h i r d  seat. And t h e  new second o f f i c e r  
could i n  t h i s  case be a female. Depending on t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  crew, t h a t  
could exacerba te  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a l i t t l e  more. 
So w e  a l l  of a sudden went from a p o s i t i o n  of s t a b i l i t y  and experience 
t o  one of mob i l i t y  and low experience.  
Toward t h e  end of t h i s  per iod of growth, w e  a l s o  found a l o t  of 
i nc iden t s  beginning t o  occur.  The win ter  of 1976-77 on United A i r l i n e s  w a s  
t h e  worst  winter  w e  had had f o r  a long,  long t i m e .  There w a s  ground damage 
t o  equipment, off-the-side-of-the-runway excursions,  wi th  no b i g  damage t o  
t h e  a i r p l a n e ,  bu t  a t  nuch too g r e a t  a frequency, blowing out  windows i n  t h e  
te rmina l ,  going of f  t h e  end of runways - w e  would go 3 or  4 f e e t  o f f  t h e  
end of t h e  runway wi th  no damage t o  t h e  a i r p l a n e ,  but  more than  a l i t t l e  
embarrassment t o  t h e  crew. 
We were appr i sed  by our Western Div is ion  v i c e  p re s iden t  who at tended a 
meeting i n  Hong Kong t h a t  Japan A i r  L ines  s a i d  they  had had exac t ly  t h e  
same experience about  t h a t  t i m e ,  w i th  an  inc reas ing  number of i nc iden t s .  We 
were not  unique, and t h e r e  w a s  a n  o v e r a l l  concern i n  t h e  indus t ry .  
W e  then conducted what w e  ca l l  a road show, t ak ing  a l l  of t h i s  t o  t h e  
f i e l d  t o  t e l l  people about  i t  and what w e  thought they  could do about it. 
And we'd l i k e  t o  b e l i e v e ,  s i n c e  w e  spent  t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  of a m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  
doing t h a t ,  t h a t  t h e  road show w a s  ve ry  b e n e f i c i a l  because our  performance 
t h e  next  winter  w a s  a b ig  improvement. 
We had one acc iden t  a t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e ,  t h e  one a t  S a l t  Lake Ci ty ,  
and i t  w a s  i n  t h e  v e i n  of what we've been t a l k i n g  about he re  - poor resource  
management and tak ing  f o r  granted what you were t o l d .  
But w e  a t  least thought t h a t  t h e  road show had helped u s  i n  t h e  area of 
minimizing, i f  no t  e l imina t ing ,  our  i nc iden t s .  
And then  t h e  win ter  of 1978-79 turned r i g h t  around, and w e  had a 
problem a l l  over aga in ,  w i th  one more acc iden t  t h a t  involved resource  
management, w e  be l ieve .  I r e a l i z e  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  i s n ' t  o u t ,  b u t  t h e  pre- 
l iminary  r e p o r t ,  which Bob Helmreich quoted a l though he d i d n ' t  i d e n t i f y  t h e  
acc iden t ,  i nd ica t ed  t h a t  t h a t  w a s  perhaps a con t r ibu t ing  f a c t o r  t o  t h e  
acc iden t .  
Throughout t h i s  per iod uneas iness  w a s  growing i n  t h e  indus t ry ,  and t h e  
ATA Training Committee came up wi th  t h e  expressed need f o r  what they c a l l e d  
a more meaningful l i n e  check. Due t o  a f e e l i n g  a t  t h a t  t i m e  t h a t  perhaps w e  
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w e r e  not  being as a t t e n t i v e  t o  our  l ine-check superv is ion  as w e  should,  t h a t  
because of t h e  s t agna t ion  - t h e  same crews, t h e  same people working wi th  
t h e  same check-airman - w e  were becoming comfortable  wi th  each o t h e r ,  and 
weren't  address ing  as a t t e n t i v e l y  as w e  might, t h e  need f o r  co r rec t ion .  
W e  pu t  a l l  of t h e s e  th ings  toge ther  wi th  t h e  r ecogn i t ion  t h a t  wi th  t h e  
sudden turnaround and t h e  expansion w e  were having, w e  were a l s o  a s s ign ing  a 
l o t  of new superv isory  people,  new f l i g h t  managers as w e  c a l l  them. 
were having t o  work wi th  a l o t  of new crewmembers i n  a new environment f o r  
those  crewmembers, whi le  they themselves w e r e  new t o  t h e  job.  
They 
Now, what w e  recognized a t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e  a l s o  w a s  t h a t  our 
approach t o  career planning had been based p r imar i ly  on what B i l l  Traub 
covered by saying t h a t  when w e  h i r ed  someone w e  h i r ed  a capta in .  W e  looked 
a t  them i n  t h e  p a s t  and s a i d ,  "When we  h i r e  you i t ' s  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  t h a t  
you're going t o  be a cap ta in ,  so w e ' r e  t r y i n g  t o  h i r e  good people." Our 
career planning and succession planning,  as f a r  as management w a s  concerned, 
only c a r r i e d  it  one s t e p  f u r t h e r .  I f  you h i r e  a good cap ta in ,  n a t u r a l l y  
you ' re  going t o  have a good manager. 
neve r the l e s s  I t h i n k  t h a t ' s  what w e  premised i t  on. And w e  r e a l l y  d i d n ' t  
c a r r y  i t  much f u r t h e r  than t h a t .  
That ' s  a r a t h e r  f a l s e  philosophy, but  
I t h i n k  w e  a l s o  recognized t h a t  what w e  had done i n  t h e  p a s t  as a way of 
s e l e c t i n g  our managers w a s  more p o l i t i c a l  than i t  w a s  ob jec t ive .  It w a s  a 
buddy system t o  a degree.  
area, and they then became t h e  manager, aga in  premised on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  if 
they were good cap ta ins  they would be  good managers. 
It w a s  a case  of who knew whom i n  what p a r t i c u l a r  
With t h e  r ecogn i t ion  of a l l  of t h e s e  problems w e  decided t h a t  wi th  t h e  
numbers of people t h a t  we had on our a i r l i n e  (we have 9 bases ,  6,000 p i l o t s ,  
a few more than 2,000 cap ta ins )  - t h a t  t o  t r y  t o  address  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  
crewmembers t h e  cur ing  of a l o t  of t hese  th ings  w a s  probably j u s t  t oo  much t o  
b i t e  o f f  a t  one t i m e .  
But w e  could t ake  i t  down t o  a smaller group of people  - our f l i g h t  
management. And i f  w e  d id  w h a t  w e  should 'have done a long t i m e  ago f o r  
them, t r a i n e d  them b e t t e r ,  then they would be i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  pass  on what 
they could t o  t h e  f l i g h t  crews. 
So t h e  sub jec t  of what I'll be covering today is twofold. One program 
w a s  t h e  spec ia l i zed  educat ion and t r a i n i n g  of ou r  f l i g h t  management people. 
And the  t h r u s t  w a s  t o  a i d  our managers i n  helping our  p ro fes s iona l  p i l o t s  
be more p ro fes s iona l .  
g e t  people,  w e  weren ' t  ou t  t o  t r y  and c rack  t h e  whip, w e  were j u s t  t r y i n g  t o  
smooth out  our ope ra t ions  by he lp ing  p ro fes s iona l s  be more p ro fes s iona l .  
That w a s  t h e  t h r u s t  behind our management t r a i n i n g  program. 
We weren't  going on a wi tch  hunt ,  w e  weren' t  ou t  t o  
The second th ing  t h a t  w e  recognized, f o r  a v a r i e t y  of reasons I ' l l  
cover later,  w a s  t h e  r a t h e r  urgent  need of our  c r e w  members f o r  some t r a i n i n g  
i n  command o r  resource  management. W e  i n i t i a l l y  termed it ,  and w e  are 
a d j u s t i n g  our  th inking  now, as command t r a i n i n g  f o r  p i l o t s .  
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Management recognized t h i s  need, t h e  f l i g h t  crewmembers themselves 
recognized it .  It w a s  being asked f o r  t o  a degree  t h a t  w a s  d i s t u r b i n g ,  
because obviously i t  p o i n t  ou t  t o  management that w e  hadn ' t  f u l f i l l e d  a 
need. 
of our managers. 
F i r s t ,  however, I ' l l  review t h e  program w e  evolved f o r  t h e  t r a i n i n g  
To understand where t h i s  f i t s ,  l e t  m e  g ive  you a very  b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  
of how United A i r l i n e s  ope ra t e s .  W e  have, as I s a i d ,  9 bases .  W e  d i v i d e  
them i n t o  3 d i v i s i o n s ,  w i th  a d i v i s i o n  vice p res iden t .  Each one of those  
d i v i s i o n  v i c e  p re s iden t s  then has t h r e e  bases  r e p o r t i n g  t o  him, headed up by 
a d i r e c t o r  of f l i g h t  ope ra t ions  who has f l i g h t  managers working f o r  him. I n  
a couple  of our  bigger  bases  w e  have a n  in te rmedia te  level c a l l e d  f l i g h t  
ope ra t ions  manager who have some of t h e  f l i g h t  managers r epor t ing  t o  them. 
A s  e a r l y  as 1973 w e  recognized that from t h e  second level of management 
on up w e  had 25 persons,  a l l  but  one of whom were going t o  re t i re  i n  9 yea r s .  
Tha t ' s  a p r e t t y  good turnover .  
W e  a l s o  recognized t h a t  as w e  s t a r t e d  t o  expand w e  would have even more 
people pumping i n  a t  t h e  bottom wi th  a need t o  be t r a ined .  So, hopefu l ly ,  
whatever t r a i n i n g  w e  could g ive  would he lp  them, as they progressed i n  
management, t o  he lp  o t h e r s  who would eventua l ly  work f o r  them. 
I n i t i a l l y ,  and going back t o  t h e  per iod of t i m e  when I w a s  s e l e c t e d  as 
H e  a manager w e  used t o  have e s s e n t i a l l y  a s imple way of p ick ing  managers. 
had t o  be  and t h i s ,  of course ,  is  s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g ,  a b e t t e r  than  average 
p i l o t .  H e  had t o  have some s k i l l s  i n  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which 
would have been evidenced through ALPA a c t i v i t y  and i n  some cases, a l s o  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  myself ,  i n  cont inuing  m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t y ,  and have a r e p u t a t i o n  
of being a good commander and one t h a t  people  could work with.  
With that as a l i s t  of cr i ter ia  t o  use ,  I repor ted  t o  t h e  f l i g h t  o f f i c e  
and my manager s a i d ,  "Good morning, i t ' s  n i c e  t o  have you wi th  us." I s a i d ,  
"Fine, w h a t  would you l i k e  m e  t o  do?" H e  s a i d ,  "Your desk is  back t h e r e ,  go 
t o  work." 
And t h e r e  w a s  my i n d o c t r i n a t i o n ,  t h e r e  w a s  my t r a i n i n g ,  t h e r e  w a s  my 
s e l e c t i o n ,  and I w a s  t o l d  I now had 70 crewmembers ass igned t o  m e  and I 
should supe rv i se  them. 
I s a i d ,  What s p e c i f i c a l l y  would you l i k e  m e  t o  do?" H e  s a i d ,  " W e l l ,  
most of your work is going t o  be going ou t  and g iv ing  l i n e  checks.  
have taken them - go ou t  and g i v e  them." 
You 
T h a t  w a s  our  program. They paid people  a l o t  of money t o  do t h a t  s o r t  
of th ing .  
over themselves wi th  l augh te r  t h a t  you paid t h a t  kind of money and gave t h a t  
kind of t r a i n i n g  t o  somebody i n  that p o s i t i o n .  
I f  they  d i d  t h a t  i n  any o t h e r  i ndus t ry ,  I t h i n k  they'd f a l l  a l l  
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But w e  now recognized, very  f o r c e f u l l y ,  t h a t  w e  needed a f l i g h t  
management t r a i n i n g  program. 
as w e  c a l l  i t ,  w a s  devoted t o  t h e  bas i c  ope ra t iona l  concerns of a f l i g h t  
manager i n  dea l ing  wi th  h i s  people,  p l u s  some i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  work and 
some philosophy and psychology t h a t  would address  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  superv is ion  
of people.  
W e  pu t  i t  toge ther  i n  f i v e  phases.  Phase one, 
W e  decided w e  would b a s i c a l l y  want t o  pu t  toge ther  a course  f o r  
management candida tes  but  w e  had t h e  r ecogn i t ion  t h a t  t h e r e  would be problems 
if w e  threw these  neophytes i n t o  t h e  f i e l d  wi th  a l l  t h i s  h i g h f a l u t i n  
t r a i n i n g ,  philosophy and theory w e  had given them, and they then got  i n t o  a 
domici le  wi th  some of t h e  o ld  hands, t h e  managers who had been around awhile  
who would say t o  them, "What are you doing?" 
p a r t i c u l a r  area i n  t h i s  way?" And they 'd  say ,  "That ' s  what they taught  me . "  
They'd be t o l d ,  "Oh, ignore  t h a t ,  w e  don ' t  do i t  t h a t  way." 
"Why are you pursuing t h i s  
So what w e  d id  w a s  cyc le  our incumbent managers through f i r s t .  But 
u l t i m a t e l y  it w i l l  be  a course f o r  management candida tes .  
With known a t t r i t i o n ,  i n  a given year w e  w i l l  t r a i n  t h e  number of 
candida tes  t h a t  w e  a n t i c i p a t e  w e  w i l l  have t o  put  i n t o  t h e  system i n  t h e  
fol lowing year o r  6 months. 
managers through these  classes and t h e  mix has  been good because t h e  exchange 
i s  good. 
g e t  t h e  enthusiasm of t h e  candida tes .  
W e  have pu t  some candida tes  and some incumbent 
The group sha res  experience wi th  t h e  incumbent managers, and they 
B r i e f l y ,  what w e  cover i n  t h e  course  i s  f i r s t ,  an in t roduc t ion  by the  
sen io r  v i c e  p re s iden t  of ope ra t ions  t o  a t t e s t  t o  t h e  importance of t h e  
program. W e  do some t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e  job  of managing given by some pro- 
f e s s i o n a l  t eache r s  and i n s t r u c t o r s  t h a t  w e  have i n  our  headquarters  t r a i n i n g  
group. W e  a l s o  cover what w e  b a s i c a l l y  c a l l  our "den concept." 
W e  c a l l  our  f l i g h t  managers "den mothers." W e  a s s ign  70-some people,  
up as high as 90 o r  100 depending on t h e  domici le ,  t o  one manager and h e ' s  
r e spons ib l e  f o r  a l l  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  We treat what w e  c a l l  t h e  "whole man 
concept," no t  only ope ra t iona l ly ,  bu t  personal ly .  The f l i g h t  managers are 
concerned with t h e i r  personal  problems as w e l l  as t h e i r  educat ion i n  o the r  
areas. 
During t h e  t r a i n i n g  w e  have a "hangar f ly ing"  s e s s i o n  on one of t h e  
evenings i n  which people g e t  a l i t t l e  more re laxed ,  ( t h e  a t t i t u d e  adjustment 
hour) ,  and exchange opinions.  We a l s o  go i n t o  some personnel  po l i cy  so t h a t  
they can l e a r n  t o  handle  t h e  personnel  s i t u a t i o n s .  
W e  review t h e  process  of eva lua t ion  which a t  f i r s t  is a theory-type 
approach. W e  cover t h r e e  ope ra t iona l  areas t h a t  w e  c a l l  t h e  ope ra t iona l  
approach t o  checking, which i s  given by our d i r e c t o r  of f l i g h t  s tandards  and 
procedures,  o r  one of h i s  f l i g h t  managers. There w e  emphasize t h e  need f o r  
o b j e c t i v i t y  i n  checking on prof ic iency  checks and r a t i n g  r i d e s ,  which our 
managers w i l l  handle a t  some time. We po in t  ou t  t h a t  when you do t ake  an  
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opera t iona l  approach t o  a check, you a s k  ques t ions  on o r a l s  and approach 
t h e  sub jec t  from t h e  cockp i t  ou t  r a t h e r  than  t h e  system in ;  t h a t  is ,  "What 
can you do about  i t ? "  
s i t u a t i o n ? "  We encourage them t o  a s k  t h e  ques t ions  i n  t h a t  way r a t h e r  than 
e s o t e r i c a l l y ,  and t o  avoid g e t t i n g  deeply  i n t o  a system over which they have 
no con t ro l .  
"What's your a b i l i t y  t o  handle  a p a r t i c u l a r  
W e  cover - and I have handled t h i s  myself - w e  cover enroute  checks,  
and then  move on t o  t h a t  more meaningful l i n e  check. The reason I handled 
t h i s  one i n i t i a l l y  wi th  t h e  incumbent managers, q u i t e  candidly,  is t o  
emphasize how s e r i o u s l y  t h e  company f e l t  about what we  were a f t e r ,  t h a t  w e  
r e a l l y  meant what w e  were saying.  The sen io r  vice p res iden t  f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  
w a s  b e s t  done by having an  o f f i c e r  of t h e  company convey t h e  information.  
We wanted a l i t t l e  more p ro fes s iona l  approach t o  enroute  checking. 
" C a l l  them as you see them." 
a t t e n t i o n  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  change." Not j u s t  t o  w r i t e  t h ings  up, j u s t  t o  
put  something i n  t h e  record .  A s  most of u s  who are i n  t h i s  business  
recognize,  t h e  worst  t h ing  i n  t h e  world w e  can have is  something i n  our 
record t h a t  somebody can go back and look a t .  
"Record what you see." "Bring t o  people ' s  
So w e  br ing  t o  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  t h a t  t h i s  approach is what w e  want t o  
avoid.  But given t h e  r ecogn i t ion  t h a t  t h e s e  s o r t s  of t h ings  w i l l  t ake  p l ace ,  
w e  po in t  ou t  t h a t  un le s s  w e  record them when w e  do see them w e  sometimes 
don ' t  g e t  people ' s  a t t e n t i o n .  
We a l l  indulge i n  an  ego t r i p  too  many t i m e s  I th ink .  I can only speak 
f o r  United A i r l i n e s  people,  bu t  i t 's  probably t r u e  of everyone. When you 
supe rv i se  p i l o t s ,  everyone th inks  h e ' s  t h e  world 's  g r e a t e s t  p i l o t .  You 
know, "You c a n ' t  be, I am." 
But when you take  t h a t  approach as f a r  as superv is ion  of people  i s  
concerned, t h e  ego spreads  t o  t h e  p o i n t  where you say,  "I n o t i c e  t h i s ,  I 
recognize t h i s .  But I ' m  so good t h a t  I ' m  going t o  be a b l e  t o  b r ing  t o  t h i s  
i nd iv idua l  t h e  r ecogn i t ion  of what he has  t o  do t o  change, and he  w i l l  
change because I ' m  g iv ing  i t  t o  him, and h e ' l l  be b e t t e r  f o r  i t ." 
I f  you indulge  i n  t h i s  ego t r i p ,  almost every t i m e  you do, t h e  f i r s t  
r i d e  is  f o r  f r e e ,  because you always say  t o  y o u r s e l f ,  "The poor guy never 
had t h e  oppor tuni ty  t o  be  given what I can b r ing  t o  him, nobody else ever  
t o l d  him t h i s  I know, and now t h a t  I have t o l d  him, it w i l l  
aga in .  'I 
I ' m  going t o  d i g r e s s  f o r  a moment on t h i s  ego f a c t o r .  
know t h i s  s t o r y ,  I don ' t  know. I l i k e  t o  t e l l  i t  because I 
apropos of t h e  ego t h a t  w e  a l l  indulge  i n .  
never happen 
L e e  Bolman might 
t h ink  i t s  very  
This  has  t o  do wi th  John Kenneth Galbra i th .  When I went t o  t h e  
Advanced Management Program a t  Harvard, I heard t h i s  from one of t h e  Harvard 
p ro fes so r s .  John Kenneth Ga lb ra i th  is supposed t o  be  t h e  b igges t  egomaniac 
124 
i n  t h e  world, and I guess h i s  s tuden t s  were aware of t h i s  t o  a very  high 
degree,  and they got  a l i t t l e  s i c k  of i t  a f t e r  awhile .  One of them, t r y i n g  
t o  br ing  t o  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  t h a t  he w a s  very  e g o t i s t i c a l ,  chose Christmas t o  
send him a b i r thday  card .  
class a f t e r  t h e  hol idays  he appr i sed  t h e  group of s tuden t s  t h a t  he had 
received a b i r thday  ca rd ,  bu t  obviously somebody made a mistake - they 
should have s e n t  i t  t o  h i s  son. 
But he w a s  no t  a t  a l l  taken aback. Coming back t o  
Now, sad ly  enough a l o t  of management people indulge i n  t h e  same type  of 
ego t r i p .  "I can handle  anything as long as I have t h e  oppor tuni ty ,  and 
they w i l l  be b e t t e r  f o r  it." 
t o  another  a i r p l a n e ,  t o  another  supe rv i so r ,  and s ta r t  t h e  process  a l l  over 
aga in .  O r ,  as one of our e n t e r p r i s i n g  f l i g h t  o f f i c e r s  found, a l l  he had t o  
do w a s  t r a n s f e r  from domici le  t o  domici le  t o  g e t  ou t  from under t h e  problem. 
Then he f o r g e t s  t h a t  t h e  ind iv idua l  may change 
A t  any ra te ,  w e  do cover a l l  of t h i s ;  w e  a l s o  cover o v e r a l l  eva lua t ions .  
A t  t h e  end of t h e  year w e  write what w e  c a l l  a "green sheet"  - i t ' s  a 
personnel  eva lua t ion .  
And a t  t h a t  po in t  w e  emphasize aga in  t h e  need, i n  handling these  70 or  
more people assigned t o  u s ,  f o r  c a l l i n g  them as  w e  see them, f o r  having a n  
o b j e c t i v e  a p p r a i s a l  a t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e ,  because t h e  only th ing  t h a t  
remains wi th  t h e  man through h i s  career i s  t h a t  annual a p p r a i s a l .  
We a l s o  t r a i n  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  which Rod G i l s t r a p  has  handled 
many t i m e s ,  and so has Bob Crump. And t h a t ' s  a very  i n t e r e s t i n g  day and a 
ha l f  s e s s ion .  We cover c o n t r a c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  d i s c i p l i n e  and gr ievance,  
and a new one, t he  employee a s s i s t a n c e  program, which is  t h e  approach t o  
problems of people who are involved i n  a l coho l  dependency. 
We g e t  i n t o  management counsel ing s k i l l s ,  wi th  r o l e  p lay ing ,  so  they 
can see how they handle  themselves i n  s i t u a t i o n s  o r  how they should handle  
themselves. 
W e  review acc ident  and inc iden t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  so  t h a t  i t ' s  done 
c o r r e c t l y  and w e  l e a r n  from i t ,  not  j u s t  go through t h e  paper work. John 
Perkinson is  involved i n  our  s a f e t y  department and can a t t e s t  t o  the  f a c t  
t h a t  too many t i m e s  w e  have put  toge ther  an  acc ident  o r  i nc iden t  inves t iga-  
t i o n ,  and i t ' s  j u s t  been a case of g e t t i n g  t h e  paper work ou t  of t h e  way. 
We haven ' t  r e a l l y  learned from i t ,  o r  disseminated what w e  d id  l e a r n  t o  t h e  
rest of t h e  crews. 
To wrap i t  up, another  s e s s ion  is l e d  by t h e  sen io r  vice p res iden t  t o  
g e t  t h e  r e a c t i o n s  of t h e  people;  t h e  r e a c t i o n s  so f a r  have been very ,  very 
f i n e .  What they say i s ,  "We have needed t h i s  f o r  a long t i m e ;  no one ever 
t o l d  us  t h i s  before ."  
We inc lude  a l i t t l e  precourse s tudy and a l i t t l e  homework whi le  t h e y ' r e  
t h e r e  dur ing  t h e  week. I t ' s  i n  our Training Center i n  Chicago, so i t ' s  away 
from home, and they can  address  themselves more in t ense ly  t o  t h e  sub jec t .  
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The second phase of our  management t r a i n i n g  i s  check-airman t r a i n i n g .  
W e  u sua l ly  g ive  t h a t  j u s t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  assignment of t h e  man as a manager. 
H e  spends 5 t o  7 days i n  Denver l ea rn ing  how t o  be  a check-airman g iv ing  
prof ic iency  checks and r a t i n g  r i d e s .  
I f  you have never thought about  it, i t 's  a very  tough th ing  t h e  f i r s t  
t i m e  you a p p r a i s e  a f l i g h t  crew. 
t o  an  a p p r a i s a l  of a f l i g h t  crew is our own s tandards ,  t h e  way We f l y .  
The only  th ing  most of u s  could ever  br ing  
Consider t h a t  most of our people who are assigned as managers are w e l l  
above average p i l o t s  so t h a t  they can have c r e d i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  ope ra t iona l  
superv is ion  of o the r  people.  When you do approach t h e  t a s k  you have a very  
high set of s tandards ,  but  you r e a l l y  are  only looking f o r  a passing per- 
formance of an average p i l o t .  
No p i l o t  wants t o  b e  c a l l e d  average. It 's t h e  worst  t h i n g  i n  t h e  world 
you could put  down, "He d i d  a good, average job. ' '  That goes crossways i n  
your t h r o a t .  But you have t o  g e t  i n t o  t h e  atmosphere and recognize what i t  
is t h a t  is  a good s o l i d  performance, and i t  i s  a l ea rn ing  experience.  You 
a l s o  have t o  l e a r n  how t o  communicate wi th  t h e  people i n  a p o s i t i v e  sense ,  
so t h a t  i t ' s  c o n s t r u c t i v e  and y o u ' l l  be  a b l e  then t o  t ransmi t  reinforcement 
t o  t h e  ind iv idua l  so he can b e n e f i t  by i t .  
The r e a c t i o n s  t o  t h a t  phase of t r a i n i n g  are always very  p o s i t i v e .  
They ' re  always a l i t t l e  shaky, because i t ' s  a l i t t l e  tough t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  
people go through it. But i t ' s  a very  b e n e f i c i a l  th ing .  
W e  a l s o  g i v e  them r i g h t  seat t i m e  - o f f s e t  approaches so t h a t  when 
t h e y ' r e  ou t  shot-gunning people ,  t h e y ' r e  i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  recognize what they 
should be looking f o r  and how t o  c o r r e c t  f o r  i t .  
The t h i r d  phase of our t r a i n i n g  i s  what w e  c a l l  our Executive Of f i ces  
Seminar. This  is similar t o  what a l o t  of you have d iscussed  i n  t h e  p a s t  day 
o r  so ,  i n  which w e  cover a l l  of t h e  o the r  departments i n  t h e  company. 
Who i s  behind t h a t  vo ice  on t h e  phone, who can you c a l l  about a 
s i t u a t i o n .  Al so  t h e  t o t a l  r ecogn i t ion  t h a t  - again ,  going back t o  t h e  ego 
p o s i t i o n  - most of t h e  f l i g h t  opera t ions  people have. "You are no t  t h e  
only ones i n  t h e  world who run t h i s  a i r l i n e ,  i t  t akes  a l o t  of people t o  
br ing  t h a t  product t o  you. And when they  do b r ing  i t  t o  you, you have t o  do 
a good j o b  so  you can b r ing  t h e  passengers  back again." 
A l l  of those  th ings  and a11 of t h e  departments i n  t h e  company are  
brought t o  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  i n  t h e  week of t r a i n i n g  a t  our  headquarters  i n  
Chicago. 
w i th in  t h e  f i r s t  6 months of t h e i r  assignment. 
It is  done e i t h e r  j u s t  before  t h e i r  assignment as a manager o r  
Phase four  of t h e  t r a i n i n g  f o r  managers, which w e  are working on r i g h t  
now, has  t o  do w i t h  enhancement modules. This  covers  material i n  t h e  course  
t h a t  perhaps they  would not  have been i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t o  absorb i n i t i a l l y ,  
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and t h a t  they wouldn't have been assigned r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i n  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  
assignment as a manager. Such th ings  as h i j ack ing  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e  i d e n t i f i -  
c a t i o n  and s e l e c t i o n  of f u t u r e  management candida tes ,  motivat ion and pro- 
d u c t i v i t y  - a l o t  of t h ings  prepar ing  some of our people  f o r  second-level 
p o s i t i o n s .  W e  cover i ndus t ry  and agency media involvement , and business  
p r i n c i p l e s ,  s i n c e  they start g e t t i n g  involved i n  budgets,  e t c .  A l s o ,  some 
hazardous materials t r a i n i n g .  
The f i n a l  phase of our t r a i n i n g ,  and one t h a t  w e  have gone i n t o  very  
l i t t l e  so  f a r ,  i s  going t o  be devoted p r imar i ly  t o  t h e  people who show real 
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  advancement t o  o t h e r  p o s i t i o n s  and who are going t o  be given 
o u t s i d e  t r a i n i n g .  Such th ings  as t h e  advanced management program a t  Harvard 
o r  Stanford - a course  run  by Chicago Univers i ty  t o  which some people have 
been sen t  and, of course ,  Michigan. W e  weren ' t  too e n t h r a l l e d  wi th  t h e  one 
a t  Michigan but  i n  case anybody's he re  from Michigan, i t ' s  only because it 
d i d n ' t  s e rve  our purpose. But w e  are  t ak ing  advantage of o u t s i d e  t r a i n i n g .  
So much f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  management a spec t  of t r a i n i n g .  
Now t o  t h e  need f o r  command t r a i n i n g .  A s  you have probably recognized 
i f  you have worked a t  i t ,  and i f  you have a program a t  t h e  p re sen t  t i m e ,  a 
l o t  of t h e  th ings  t h a t  you people  had i n  your command courses  w e  are g iv ing  
i n  a d i f f e r e n t  way. Our EX0 seminar covers  t h e  rest of t h e  company. Some of 
you people have t h a t  included i n  your command t r a i n i n g ,  bu t  w e  are r e f e r r i n g  
t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  sub jec t  of command, human resource  management. 
We a t  United have been t a l k i n g  about  i t  f o r  a year  and a h a l f .  
Corporate approaches t o  th ings  being what they  are, p r i o r i t i e s  being what 
they are, i t  t akes  t i m e  t o  g e t  peop le ' s  a t t e n t i o n .  We ta lked  about i t  i n  
February of 1978 but  i t  wasn't  u n t i l  February of 1979 t h a t  w e  had our f i r s t  
meeting of t h e  t a s k  f o r c e  put  t oge the r  by t h e  sen io r  v i c e  p re s iden t  of 
f l i g h t  ope ra t ions  t o  address  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  problem. 
W e  found, f i n a l l y ,  t h a t  no t  on ly  w a s  management aware of t h e  need f o r  
t h i s  command t r a i n i n g ,  but  a l s o  t h a t  t h e  l a s t  two acc iden t s  w e  had had high- 
l i g h t e d  t h e  need. Some ing red ien t s  i n  both of them suggested t h a t  t h e  
management of resources  wi th in  t h e  cockpi t  perhaps could have precluded t h e  
acc iden t .  The second acc ident  r e a l l y  go t  our a t t t e n t i o n ,  s o  w e  s t a r t e d  t o  
work on i t .  
Then t h e  s t r i k e  in te rvened ,  and w e  r e a l l y  weren ' t  a b l e  t o  do very much 
u n t i l  t h e  s t r i k e  w a s  over.  We f l lna l ly  had t h e  t h i r d  meeting of our  t a s k  
f o r c e  he re ,  Monday, of t h i s  week, and w e  intend t o  m e e t  aga in  tomorrow 
morning f o r  a n  hour o r  more and then  aga in  tomorrow af te rnoon a t  t h e  con- 
c l u s i o n  of t h e  conference t o  condense what w e  have been a b l e  t o  p i c k  up from 
you and what w e  perhaps might want t o  u s e  i n  our approach t o  command 
t r a i n i n g .  
We have asked a l o t  of ques t ions .  We took a sampling of our  people  and 
w e  had personal  letters from some people  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  need f o r  t h i s  
t r a i n i n g .  W e  put  a l l  t h i s  toge ther  and went ou t  wi th  a ques t ionnai re ,  and 
t h e  answers w e  go t  back were ra,ther easy t o  fol low.  
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Some of t h e  gene ra l  conclusions were t h a t  people be l i eve  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  
command o r  t o  lead  can be enhanced. They b e l i e v e  t h a t  a command o r  leader -  
sh ip  l ea rn ing  experience should inc lude  philosophy, psychology, and i n t e r -  
personal  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  s k i l l s .  Also some of t h e  b a s i c  management and human 
resources  management s k i l l s ,  and d e c i s i o n  making and problem a n a l y s i s  s k i l l s .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y  and i n  descending o rde r  of p r i o r i t y  t h e  responses  state 
1. That i t  w a s  necessary t o  have an  understanding of people.  
2 .  
t h e  rest of h i s  crew, and of t h e  c r e w  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e ,  cooperate ,  and 
communicate. 
There had t o  be a wi l l i ngness  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  commander t o  u s e  
3 .  In t e rpe r sona l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  s k i l l s  are  obviously very  necessary.  
4 .  There had t o  be a r ecogn i t ion  of t h e  n e c e s s i t y  t o  accept  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The knowledge of j o b  procedures,  t h e  ope ra t iona l  aspects 
were very low on t h e  l i s t .  
L e t ' s  cons ider  where w e  are r i g h t  now and what w e ' r e  going t o  be doing. 
It is a b ig  problem t o  make 6,000 people aware of t h e  environment and 
atmosphere necessary f o r  good command. 
"When you ' re  going t o  have t o  eat an  e lephant ,  t h e  b e s t  way i s  one l i t t l e  b i t e  
a t  a t i m e . "  W e  have a n  e lephant  he re ,  w i th  6,000 people p lus  t h e  cabin crew 
people t o  inc rease  t h e i r  awareness of t h e  problems. 
I r e c e n t l y  picked up an  expression,  
W e  a n t i c i p a t e  t h a t  probably t h e  f i r s t  people  w e  are going t o  t r a i n  are,  
aga in ,  our  managers. When they are aware of what i t  i s  t h a t  is necessary ,  
they can look f o r  i t ,  b e t t e r  assess it ,  and then  more cons t ruc t ive ly  com- 
municate t h e  need f o r  adjustment on t h e  p a r t  of o t h e r s ,  W e  w i l l  t ake  i t  i n  
s t e p s .  Perhaps w e  w i l l  do it next  w i th  our new cap ta ins ,  and then take  i t  on 
from t h e r e .  
We th ink  one of t h e  th ings  t h a t ' s  going t o  enhance our a b i l i t y  t o  do 
t h i s  s o r t  of t h ing  is  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  we  have t h e  CDC PLATO system, which 
American A i r l i n e s  i s  a l s o  involved i n  us ing .  W e  have go t t en  approval  from 
our  Board of D i rec to r s  t o  buy our own computer and put  i n  our own in-house 
program. I f  you ' re  no t  f a m i l i a r  wi th  t h e  PLATO system, i t ' s  a computer- 
managed and computer-assisted program wi th  which w e  can do ind iv idua l ized  
t r a i n i n g .  
i n s t a l l  t e rmina ls .  W e  a n t i c i p a t e  s t a r t i n g  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  of next  year .  
Once w e  have t h e  te rmina ls  on t h e  scene i n  t h e  domic i les ,  then  w e  w i l l  have 
t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  b r ing  i n  groups of people without  having t o  br ing  them t o  one 
c e n t r a l  l o c a t i o n ,  and w e ' l l  be a b l e  t o  do it  much quicker  and g e t  b e t t e r  
exposure. 
W e  are going t o  extend i t s  u s e  t o  our  domici les  where w e ' l l  
Obviously, what w e  t each  i s  going t o  have t o  be d i f f e r e n t  f o r  each group 
of people.  But, neve r the l e s s ,  w e  a n t i c i p a t e  t h a t  w i l l  enhance our  a b i l i t y  t o  
do it. 
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Right now w e  are f i r s t  reviewing t h e  ques t ion  of what w e ' l l  inc lude  i n  
t h i s  course.  A s  I s a i d ,  i t  w i l l  be theory,  psychology, t h e  p r a c t i c e  of 
command on United A i r l i n e s .  Then t h e  methods t h a t  we perhaps can use  t o  g ive  
t h i s  kind of t r a i n i n g ,  inc luding  r o l e  playing s i n c e  t h a t  s t r i k e s  u s  as being 
one of t h e  b e s t  ways t o  proceed. W e  might even have f i l m s  t o  show a t  t h e  
domici les .  
But w e  do be l i eve  without  ques t ion  t h a t  i t  has  t o  be done wi th  a l l  of 
t h e  people who are involved i n  t h e  opera t ion  of t h e  a i r p l a n e ,  t h e  cockpi t  and 
t h e  cabin  crew, so  t h a t  they w i l l  a l l  recognize t h a t  command i s  a very  lone ly  
p o s i t i o n ,  and t h a t  when it  comes t i m e s  t o  make a dec i s ion ,  i t  may no t  always 
be popular wi th  everyone. But i f  w e  can educate  a l l  of t h e  crew members t o  
t h e  r ecogn i t ion  of what i t  means t o  be a commander, and what i t  takes  on t h e  
p a r t  of t h e  rest of t h e  c r e w  t o  he lp  t h a t  commander, t h e  p o s i t i o n  w i l l  no t  be 
q u i t e  so lone ly .  When it  comes t i m e s  t o  make a dec i s ion ,  support  w i l l  be more 
r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  - more cooperat ion w i l l  be  ev ident .  
I n  c los ing ,  one of t h e  th ings  t h a t  I have recognized i n  l i s t e n i n g  t o  
what a l o t  of you have given us  as t h e  b e n e f i t  of your knowledge and ex- 
per ience ,  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  are d i s t i n c t i o n s  t o  be made between a i r l i n e s .  What 
can and c a n ' t  be  done depends on t h e  economic c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  a l o t  of u s  
are  confronted wi th ,  and a l s o  t h e  s i z e  of our  a i r l i n e s .  
I ' v e  always been one who has  g r e a t  admirat ion f o r  t h e  Swiss. Anything 
they do they approach wi th  g r e a t  f i n e s s e ,  g r e a t  s k i l l ,  g r e a t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
d e t a i l .  Anything they manufacture they  do on a l imi t ed  b a s i s  so they can 
c o n t r o l  t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e  product.  I n  t h e i r  case, Nick Grob i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
he handles  24 cap ta ins  a yea r ,  and he  uses ,  I be l i eve ,  50 route-qual i fy ing  
cap ta ins .  
as many c a p t a i n s  a year ,  and I would need 15 t i m e s  as  many route-qual i fy ing  
cap ta ins .  Also, I do i t  i n  6 weeks, and he takes  9 months. I ' m  a f r a i d  my 
q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  is n o t  q u i t e  as good as h i s .  
c o n s t r a i n t s  i n  being a p r i v a t e  organiza t ion .  
end r e s u l t  - w e ' r e  looking f o r  t h e  bes t  product w e  can poss ib ly  t u r n  
I f  I equate  t h a t  wi th  my opera t ion  I ' d  be p u t t i n g  through 15 t i m e s  
I a l s o  have d i f f e r e n t  economic 
But we  are a l l  a f t e r  t h e  same 
out .  
W e  hope t h a t  t h e  two programs t h a t  I have ou t l ined  he re  today w i l l  be 
as good as t h e  b e s t ,  and i n  not  too long a per iod of t i m e .  
DISCUSSION 
CAPT. BEACH, Eas te rn  Ai r l ines :  Talking about  r e c r u i t i n g  managers, 
and t h e  idea  of someone who knows someone who would be a good one, w e  have 
probably a l l  done t h a t  s i n c e  year  1. Since you f i n d  t h a t  less than 
acceptab le ,  how do you r e c r u i t ?  Where do your managers come from? 
CAPT. CARROLL: W e  have i n  our  group he re  today a t  least one man 
who has  n o t  been a t  t h e  job  too  long,  and he  may c o r r e c t  m e  when I say  this .  
What w e  do now, i n  r ecogn i t ion  of how bad our  system has  been i n  t h e  p a s t ,  i s  
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screen  t h e  people  i n  each den. Each group of p i l o t s  ass igned t o  a manager is  
screened by t h a t  manager f o r  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t h a t  he sees i n  t h e  ind iv idua l  f o r  
being a manager. The nex t  s t e p  is t o  d i s c u s s  them wi th  h i s  d i r e c t o r .  I f  
t he re  i s  no ob jec t ion  by t h e  d i r e c t o r  t o  t h e  use  of t h a t  i nd iv idua l  as a 
p o t e n t i a l  manager, then  an in t e rv i ew is  conducted t o  f i n d  out  what h i s  
i n t e r e s t  is. I f  he is i n t e r e s t e d ,  then  w e  w i l l  p rocess  him through a 
management eva lua t ion  by our people i n  Chicago, psychological  t e s t i n g ,  e tc .  
Not too d i s s i m i l a r  t o  what w e ' r e  t a l k i n g  about wi th  t h e  new h i r e  approach, 
except  t h i s  i s  new management. 
from t h e  psychologis t  and t h e  candida te  i s  s t i l l  i n t e r e s t e d  - w e  then put  
him through t h i s  management t r a i n i n g  program. It could be t h a t  c u r r e n t l y  
t h e  b e s t  candida te  f o r  a vacancy is from M i a m i  and t h e  vacancy is  i n  S e a t t l e .  
This  would mean t e a r i n g  up t h e  ind iv idua l  and h i s  family,  paying f o r  t h e  
move on t h e  p a r t  of t he  company t o  g e t  him ou t  t o  S e a t t l e  and then perhaps 
when he g e t s  i n t o  t h e  job  d iscover  t h a t  it wasn't  h i s  cup of tea.  
l i k e  being a manager. 
I f  t h i s  a l l  pans ou t  - w e  g e t  good feedback 
H e  d i d n ' t  
So, t o  avoid t h i s ,  w e  are s t i l l  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of us ing  p r imar i ly  
people from wi th in  a domici le  as much as w e  always have, but  now we  do i t  on 
t h e  b a s i s  of a much more s e l e c t i v e ,  much more d e t a i l e d  approach. Not t h a t ,  
" I ' ve  known J o e  a l l  my l i f e  and w e  p lay  golf toge ther  and w e  go t o  c o c k t a i l  
p a r t i e s  toge ther  and we're good f r i e n d s  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  I ' d  l i k e  him t o  work 
f o r  me.' ' Tha t ' s  how most of i t  w a s  done i n  t h e  p a s t ,  inc luding  second, 
t h i r d ,  and f o u r t h  l e v e l  promotions, bu t  no t  anymore. 
Since 1976 w e  have had a s e n i o r  v i c e  p re s iden t  who t akes  an  e n t i r e l y  
d i f f e r e n t  approach t o  success ion  planning. The ears of people  who are on 
t h a t  success ion  p lan  should burn because w e  go through a d i scuss ion  several 
t i m e s  a year  on those  ind iv idua l s .  W e  d i scuss  whether they s t a y  where they 
are i n  t h e  p lan ,  o r  whether they are moved o f f .  
I ' m  ve ry  proud of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  w e  have a ve ry  f i n e  system r i g h t  now. 
I t ' s  been i n  ope ra t ion  f o r  3 years .  
i t  should be.  We've g o t  i t  p ro jec t ed ,  on a t e n t a t i v e  b a s i s ,  5 yea r s  i n t o  
t h e  f u t u r e  t o  account f o r  a l l  of t h e  recognized a t t r i t i o n  t h a t ' s  going t o  
t ake  p lace .  
About 5 yea r s  from now it  w i l l  be  what 
That ' s  a l s o  how we  program t h e  t r a i n i n g  through va r ious  phases f o r  a 
manager, based on t h e  p o t e n t i a l  they 've shown. 
CAPT. BEACH: May I ask you one more ques t ion  on t h a t .  When you 
come i n t o  t h e  program as a bottom-level manager, have you a goal  t h a t  
you ' re  looking a t ,  o r  do they j u s t  f l o a t  as t h e i r  a b i l i t y  d i c t a t e s ?  
C U T .  CARROLL: Personal ly  they may have a goal .  The company has  
no goa l  f o r  them a t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e ,  n o t  u n t i l  they  prove themselves. 
U n t i l  they f i n d  out  i f  they r e a l l y  want i t ,  and w e  dec ide  w e  want them t o  
cont inue.  It is  no bad t h i n g  f o r  an ind iv idua l  t o  go back on t h e  l i n e .  
I know your system is  a r o t a t i o n  system. 
of a n  advantage i n  being a manager and t h e r e ' s  no ques t ion  t h e  working 
Economically t h e r e ' s  no t  t h a t  much 
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cond i t ions  are a l o t  worse from t h e  s tandpoin t  of t i m e  o f f .  
has  a goa l  f o r  them when they  start t o  show p o t e n t i a l .  They ' l l  probably 
recognize t h a t  t h e y ' r e  showing t h a t  p o t e n t i a l  by t h e  assignments t h e y ' r e  
given,  by t h e  t r a i n i n g  t h a t  t hey ' r e  given,  by t h e  cha l lenges  t h a t  are 
addressed t o  them. But t h a t  t akes  t i m e .  A t  least i t ' s  a formalized manage- 
ment program and t h e r e  are products  of t h a t  program i n  t h i s  room r i g h t  now. 
Four of them t h a t  I can see, who have been p a r t  of t h a t  system s i n c e  i t  
s t a r t e d ,  and I th ink  t h e y ' r e  p r e t t y  f i n e  people.  
than w e  were when w e  f i r s t  s t a r t e d  ou t .  
But t h e  company 
We're doing a l o t  b e t t e r  
JOAN GALLOS, ASSISTANT TO LEE BOLMAN: You mentioned a problem t h a t  
w a s  r e f e r r e d  t o  yesterday,  namely, t h e  growing p o t e n t i a l  problem of cockpi t  
cohesiveness wi th  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of women and also some of t h e  m i n o r i t i e s  i n  
the  cockpi t .  
program t o  s u r f a c e  and d e a l  wi th  some of those i s sues?  
I wonder what you ' re  doing i n  t h e  redes igning  of your t r a i n i n g  
C U T .  CARROLL: I don ' t  know t h a t  I can say w e  are  address ing  i t  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n  t h e  area of females and m i n o r i t i e s ,  because I don ' t  t h i n k  w e  
ever  want t o  address  i t  t h a t  way. I t h i n k  what w e  want t o  do is  address  i t  
as t h e  cockpi t .  Of course ,  w e  have t o  have t h e  r ecogn i t ion  t h a t  t h e r e  are  
ing red ien t s  t h a t  go i n t o  i t ,  but  w e  don ' t  want a program t h a t  says ,  "For 
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  manager, who may have women assigned t o  him, a d i f f e r e n t  
approach t o  th ings  is  needed." 
So f a r ,  w e  have 2 1  women i n  our system and 48 o r  49 minor i t i e s .  
address  myself s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  t h e  women. They have done a n  outs tanding  
job .  One of t h e  women i n  our f i r s t  class w a s  t h e  daughter  of one of our 
DC-8 c a p t a i n s .  A t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e  about  3,500 o r  3,600 people had been 
processed through t h e  system and had been t e s t e d ,  and she  had scored the  
second h ighes t  of t h e  3,500 people.  
I'll 
I hones t ly  b e l i e v e  t h e y ' r e  doing a f i n e  job.  I don ' t  know how many of 
you read t h e  book "She ' l l  Never G e t  Off The Ground" w r i t t e n  by Rod Se r l ing ,  
but t h a t  addresses  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  f i r s t  woman a i r l i n e  p i l o t  and a l l  of t h e  
emotional involvements. The problem is t h e r e ,  bu t  I don ' t  t h i n k  t o  t h e  
degree t h a t  i t ' s  been magnified.  What w e  are doing t o  address  t h e  problem, 
without  being s p e c i f i c  about females and m i n o r i t i e s ,  i s  t o  address  t h e  
cohesiveness quest ion i n  t h e  cockpi t  i n  genera l .  We t h i n k  t h a t  as a r e s u l t  
of our  command t r a i n i n g  approach and t h e  exposure of a l l  t h e  o the r  people i n  
t h e  cockpi t  t o  t h e  same information,  a l l  have an  awareness of t h e  a rena  i n  
which w e  ope ra t e  and t h e  need f o r  cohesiveness .  W e  have examples of what can 
t ake  p l ace  i f  w e  don ' t  have t h e  cohesiveness  i n  t h e  cockpi t .  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  address  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  area, because w e  don ' t  t h i n k  w e  should.  
W e  t h i n k  w e  should t a k e  i t  as one problem and no t  two. 
So w e  don ' t  
MR. MURPHY, NASA: You mentioned t h a t  you e i t h e r  are o r  intend t o  
t r a i n  i n  decisionmaking and problem ana lys i s .  Is some of t h a t  being taught  
now i n  classes? 
success  do you have? 
Would you say  a l i t t l e  more about  t h a t ,  what kind of 
1.3 1 
CAPT. CARROLL: W e  w i l l  address  it i n  t h e  command course.  I 've 
been through a course  on problem a n a l y s i s  and dec i s ion  making. 
address  i t  as it p e r t a i n s  t o  t h e  gene ra l  ques t ion  of problem a n a l y s i s  and 
dec i s ion  making, but  more s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  t h e  type  of ques t ions  and problems 
t h a t  would arise wi th in  a cockpi t .  
W e  w i l l  no t  
W e  w i l l  preserrt some theory on t h e  s u b j e c t ,  and then  w e ' l l  go i n t o  r o l e  
playing.  To f o r e c a s t  t h e  success  of i t ,  I t h i n k  is something w e  are no t  
going t o  be a b l e  t o  do r i g h t  now. Not because 
i t ' s  u s ,  bu t  because of t h e  people w e ' r e  working wi th .  A l l  f l i g h t  crew- 
members, those  i n  t h e  cockpi t  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  are a c u t  above t h e  average,  i n  
many r e s p e c t s .  They a l s o  have had a p r e t t y  high s tandard  of l i v i n g ,  so  they 
move i n  p r e t t y  f i n e  c i rc les  and p i ck  up a l o t  from t h e i r  travels and people 
wi th  whom they a s soc ia t e .  I t h i n k  t h e y ' r e  a n  e a s i l y  t r a i n e d  group and 
t h e y ' r e  hungry f o r  t h i s  kind of information.  
I t h i n k  w e ' l l  be  good a t  i t .  
I t h i n k  w e  should be success fu l .  
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LEFT SEAT COMMAND OR LEADERSHIP? FLIGHT 
LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND RESEARCH AT 
NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES 
Capt. G r a m e r  C.  Foster* and Michael C .  Garvey+ 
I t ' s  r e f r e sh ing  t o  be wi th  a working group t h a t  is t a l k i n g  about t h e  how 
and what form resource  management t r a i n i n g  should t ake  r a t h e r  than  debat ing  
the  i s s u e  of whether o r  no t  i t  should t ake  place.  Although w e  a t  North 
Cent ra l  have recognized t h e  need f o r  f l i g h t  l eade r sh ip  t r a i n i n g  f o r  some 
t i m e ,  w e  found it  a r e a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  s u b j e c t  around which t o  write a 
d e f i n i t i v e  program. I n i t i a l l y  we  thought w e  could do i t  our se lves ,  bu t  i t  
soon became apparent  t h a t  t h e  job  w a s  more d i f f i c u l t  than w e  had o r i g i n a l l y  
thought.  
F i r s t  w e  were hampered by t h e  absence of e i t h e r  good resource  material 
o r  a good r e l i a b l e  d a t a  base.  Soon w e  were seeking someone from t h e  o u t s i d e  
who could provide t h e  i n s i g h t s  and pe r spec t ive  w e  lacked. A t  about t h e  same 
t i m e ,  and t h i s  is going back about 2 yea r s ,  our company had engaged M r .  Michael 
Garvey, management consu l t an t ,  t o  provide t r a i n i n g  f o r  a l l  management people 
a t  North Cent ra l .  
The program conducted f o r  our  management personnel  had as i t s  
foundat ion t h e  Blake and Muton managerial  g r i d  a long wi th  i t s  r a t h e r  sub- 
s t a n t i a l  d a t a  base.  For those  of you no t  f a m i l i a r  w i th  t h e  g r i d  i t  al lows 
you t o  measure your own s t y l e ,  and i t  provides  you wi th  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  
management language a g a i n s t  which you can measure any number of management 
behaviors .  
previously u t i l i z e d  f o r  f l i g h t  crews, w e  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  similarities between 
good co rpora t e  and good cockpi t  management made t h i s  instrument a reasonable  
choice.  And an a d d i t i o n a l  p lus  t o  t h i s  concept i s  t h a t  it provides  our 
p i l o t s  wi th  a management language t h a t  is  common wi th in  our  company. 
Garvey agreed t o  he lp  u s  put  toge ther  a program t o  he lp  c a p t a i n s  improve 
t h e i r  f l i g h t  management s k i l l s .  
Although t h e  Blake and Muton management g r i d  had not  been 
Mike 
Since w e  intended t o  spend q u i t e  a sum of money on t h e  p r o j e c t ,  it w a s  
necessary t o  secu re  approval  from our  p re s iden t ,  Bud Sweet. I n  w r i t i n g  t h e  
r a t i o n a l e  f o r  our  p r o j e c t  w e  n o t  only spoke t o  t h e  i s s u e  of a i r  s a f e t y ,  bu t  
we  a l s o  argued t h a t  a cap ta in  e x e r c i s e s  a t  least some c o n t r o l  over  an 
enormous amount of ope ra t iona l  money, and, t h e r e f o r e ,  should be a f forded  
some management t r a i n i n g  i n  o rde r  t o  b e t t e r  manage t h e s e  resources .  This  
w a s  probably t h e  c l i n c h e r  a long wi th  t h e  a i r  s a f e t y  argument, and our  p r o j e c t  
w a s  approved. 
With f inanc ing  ensured w e  s t a r t e d  prepar ing  our  f i r s t  seminar. S ince  
Mike would be doing t h e  bulk of t h e  program, and s i n c e  w e  d id  need t o  d e f i n e  
some of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between bus iness  and cockpi t  management, w e  set up a 
"Director ,  F l i g h t  Standards,  North Cent ra l  A i r l i n e s .  
+Pres ident ,  M. C. Garvey and Assoc ia tes ,  Inc.  
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program designed t o  f a m i l i a r i z e  Mike wi th  as many a s p e c t s  of a p i l o t ' s  l i f e  
as poss ib l e .  I n  t h e  process  Mike rode  endless  hours  of jump seat t i m e  and 
he interviewed many, many p i l o t s ,  both c a p t a i n s  and c o p i l o t s .  H e  a l s o  i n t e r -  
viewed f l i g h t  a t t e n d a n t s ,  mechanics, s t a t i o n  agents ,  d i spa tche r s ,  tower and 
ACT people ,  and, I ' m  no t  sure,  bu t  I t h i n k  even some FAA people.  
When Mike f e l t  conf ident  t h a t  he had a good f e e l  f o r  t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  
r o l e ,  w e  put  t h e  f i n i s h i n g  touches on our f i r s t  product ,  and i n v i t e d  a m i x  of 
20 check p i l o t s  and ALPA r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  a t t e n d .  
f o r  our f i r s t  program because w e  wanted the  very  b e s t  and most cons t ruc t ive  
cri t icism w e  could g e t .  
e f f o r t  t h e  ALPA group i n  our a i r l i n e  has  been most h e l p f u l ,  even t o  the  po in t  
of supplying some of t h e  manpower necessary  f o r  our success .  
W e  chose t h e s e  people 
I t 's  worthy t o  no te  he re  t h a t  through t h i s  e n t i r e  
Our f i r s t  program w a s  a 2-day a f f a i r ,  and, as w e  have a t  t h e  end of 
each seminar,  w e  asked t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  t o  f i l l  ou t  a n  anonymous c r i t i q u e  
form. Fur the r ,  w e  asked t h a t  w i th in  30 days they w r i t e  an  unsigned letter 
t e l l i n g  us  what w a s  r i g h t  and what w a s  wrong about  t h e  program. 
Now, w e  a l l  know how d i f f i c u l t  i t  is  t o  g e t  a p i l o t  t o  t ake  pen i n  hand, 
bu t  t h e  response t o  t h e  r eques t  w a s  tremendous. Out of 20 p a r t i c i p a n t s  w e  
received 15  follow-up letters,  many of them typewr i t t en  pages running t h r e e  
o r  four  pages i n  l eng th .  They contained both p r a i s e  and c o n s t r u c t i v e  
c r i t i c i s m .  
expanded. 
many of t h e  let ters,  and t h a t  w a s  t h a t  w e  hadn ' t  been p r e s c r i p t i v e  enough 
f o r  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s .  
A l l  bu t  one thought t h e  course  should be continued and even 
There w a s  one c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  d id  have kind of a common thread i n  
I n  our  subsequent seminars w e  expanded t o  a very  f u l l  3-day program, 
wi th  t h e  t h i r d  day spent  a t  t h e  a i r  r o u t e  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  c e n t e r ,  and then 
we  went back i n t o  t h e  classroom f o r  a s e s s i o n  t h a t  w e  have dubbed s i t u a t i o n  
a n a l y s i s .  
To d a t e  we  have conducted four  seminars f o r  a t o t a l  of about 80 p i l o t s .  
The response has  been good t o  a l l  fou r  programs, bu t  w e  s t i l l  have r eques t s  
f o r  more p r e s c r i p t i v e  so lu t ions .  
r eques t s  i n  a couple  of ways. F i r s t ,  w e  are planning a home s tudy  course  
f o r  upgrading cap ta ins .  That w i l l  cover r egu la t ions ,  d i spa tch  requirements ,  
a l t e r n a t e  weather requirements and t h e  l i k e .  Addi t iona l ly ,  w e  are designing 
an  i n i t i a l  l i n e  assignment sy l l abus ,  which is designed t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  home 
study program, and, a l s o  t o  expose t h e  new c a p t a i n  t o  a more organized l i n e  
check. 
W e  hope i n  t h e  f u t u r e  t o  s a t i s f y  these  
W e  want t o  fo l low t h i s  wi th  our  r e s t r u c t u r e d  command seminar.  Notice  
t h a t  I have changed from f l i g h t  l eade r sh ip  seminars t o  command seminar. 
A poet  of some-renown once asked what 's  i n  a name, and I w a s  amused and 
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  Bob Helmreich's s t o r y  about  t h e  Merchant Marine cap ta ins  who 
resented  being c a l l e d  shipboard managers. This  s t r u c k  a f a m i l i a r  chord 
because our  e a r l y  e f f o r t s  bore t h e  t i t l e  F l i g h t  Leadership Seminar. There 
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w a s  a vague f e e l i n g  among t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  t h a t  t h i s  somehow undercut t h e i r  
command, so our more r ecen t  program w a s  c a l l e d  Command Seminar. The p i l o t s  
seemed t o  l i k e  t h i s  b e t t e r .  We don ' t  pretend t o  have a l l  t h e  answers, 
indeed w e  don ' t  have a l l  t h e  quest , ions.  
proving, and I th ink  t h a t ' s  what counts .  
But w e  are t r y i n g ,  and w e  are im-  
I have given you a quick overview of our  e f f o r t s .  Now I ' d  l i k e  t o  t u r n  
it over t o  Mike Garvey f o r  h i s  u sua l  f i n e  j o b  of expla in ing  t h e  d e t a i l s  of 
both t h i s  program and some of t h e  r e sea rch  programs which w e  have on t h e  
horizon . 
(Mike Garvey) 
You're going t o  g e t  p e r i l o u s l y  few d e t a i l s  i n  t h e  approximately 10 o r  
15  minutes remaining t o  g ive  them t o  you. 
as much information as I could t o  you about what w e  cover wi th  t h e  cap ta ins ,  
how w e  go about i t ,  and g ive  you my observa t ions  about  t h e  r e s u l t s .  
I thought what I ' d  do is provide 
General ly ,  you have go t t en  feedback from G r a m e r  t h a t  w e  do g e t  very 
good eva lua t ions ,  bu t  I ' d  l i k e  t o  g ive  you my observa t ions  about what seems 
t o  go smoothly and where t h e  s t i c k i n g  p o i n t s  remain. 
F i r s t ,  I ' m  going t o  g ive  you a n  overview of t h e  management g r i d  
concept.  
and those  of you who haven ' t  may want t o  t a k e  some notes .  
d i scuss  how w e  apply t h a t  concept i n  our  work wi th  cap ta ins .  
a l s o  t i e  back i n t o  some of t h e  data-gather ing r e s u l t s  of in te rv iewing  t h e  
work groups who work wi th  t h e  capta ins :  f i r s t  o f f i c e r s ,  f l i g h t  a t t endan t s ,  
and so  on. 
Those of you who have been exposed t o  i t  before  can bear wi th  m e ,  
Then I ' d  l i k e  t o  
And t h a t  w i l l  
And then I ' d  l i k e  t o  go back through t h e  rest of t h e  o u t l i n e  w e  have 
l a i d  out  he re  ( t a b l e  1) and touch on how we approached t h e  areas of com- 
municat ions.  
Later on i n  t h e  second day w e  switch over t o  some departmental  repre-  
s e n t a t i v e  p re sen ta t ions  and d i scuss ions .  
I ' d  l i k e  t o  now s tar t  wi th  t h e  g r i d  ( f i g .  1). Blake and Muton were 
s o c i a l  psychologis t s  wi th  t h e  Univers i ty  of Texas who s tudied  t h e  management 
l i t e r a t u r e  about t h e  b e s t  ways t o  manage ve r sus  t h e  not  s o  good ways t o  
manage. They t r i e d  t o  organize  t h a t  information i n t o  some kind of a system 
t h a t  would make i t  more s e n s i b l e  and more e a s i l y  usab le  by t h e  management 
audience.  They reduced t h e  s tudy  of management t o  two o v e r a l l  dimensions. 
One dimension w a s  t h e  concern f o r  product ion o r  ou tput ,  t h a t  a manager 
might have. They decided t h i s  concern w a s  no t  something t h a t  would be 
e i t h e r  a l l  p re sen t  o r  a l l  absent .  
scale, and they appl ied  t h e  numbers of 1 through 9 t o  r ep resen t  t h a t  scale. 
Nine, i n  t h i s  case, would r ep resen t  a manager's maximum concern,  a very h igh  
concern, f o r  ou tput .  One, would r ep resen t  t h e  abso lu te  minimum concern t h a t  
It can be represented  on some kind of a 
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a manager could have f o r  g e t t i n g  t h e  job  done. 
output  and product ion concerns i n  a very  broad way. 
information,  q u a l i t y  of information,  q u a l i t y  of dec i s ions ,  s o l u t i o n s  t o  
problems, o r  it could be manufacturing care. 
The o the r  dimension they focused on w a s  t h e  dimension of concern f o r  
By t h e  way, l e t ' s  consider  
It could be amount of 
people.  This  w a s  no t  people  i n  t h e  sense  of passengers ,  f o r  example; t h i s  
w a s  people i n  t h e  sense  of employees; o r  those  resources  that are a v a i l a b l e  
t o  us  t o  accomplish whatever ou tput  i t  is  t h a t  we  need t o  ob ta in .  
Once aga in  they put  t h i s  on a scale from low t o  h igh ,  1 t o  9 ,  such t h a t ,  
when they completed t h i s  g r i d ,  they wound up wi th  9 x 9 o r  81 d i f f e r e n t  ways 
i n  which a manager can combine h i s  o r  her  concern f o r  output  and f o r  people.  
Each one of t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  ways r e p r e s e n t s  a d i f f e r e n t  s t y l e  o r  d i f f e r e n t  
approach t o  dea l ing  wi th  people t o  accomplish r e s u l t s .  
Rather than  focusing on 81 s t y l e s ,  they focused on t h e  f i v e  major 
s t y l e s .  The f i r s t  one w a s  c a l l e d  9-1, which r e p r e s e n t s  a very  output-  
o r i en ted  s t y l e ,  wi th  minimum concern f o r  people.  An oppos i te  s o r t  of s t y l e  
is 1-9, minimum concern f o r  ou tput ,  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  a maximum concern f o r  
people.  The s t y l e  somewhere i n  t h e  middle is c a l l e d  5-5 which r e p r e s e n t s  a 
moderate concern f o r  output  counterbalanced by a n  equal ly  moderate concern 
f o r  people.  So he main ta ins  some kind of a balance wi th  people who are h i s  
resources  f o r  g e t t i n g  th ings  accomplished. 
There is  a l s o  a s t y l e  c a l l e d  1-1 which i s  kind of a do-nothing s t y l e  of 
There 's  more of 
management. Blake and Muton desc r ibe  t h i s  as an  impoverished s t y l e  of 
management wi th  only minimum concern f o r  ou tput  and people .  
t h a t  than you might imagine. 
We usua l ly  start ou t  i n  a class s i t u a t i o n  wi th  t h e  c a p t a i n s  laughing 
and jok ing  about how r i d i c u l o u s  t h a t  is. Af ter  looking a t  some of t h e  
behaviors  of 1-1 they  say ,  "Oh yes .  There are some people who g ive  you a 
cold vacant  stare," which may mean, "My God, i t ' s  me." 
The l as t  s t y l e  t h a t  they focus on i s  a s t y l e  c a l l e d  9-9, maximum concern 
f o r  output  and a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  maximum concern f o r  people involved i n  
helping t o  g e t  t h a t  ou tput .  These 
c a t e g o r i e s  of behaviors .  
You could l a b e l  t h i s  s t y l e  of 
l a b e l  t h i s  s t y l e  (1-9) a real n i c e  
n i c e  and product ion w i l l  take care 
This  s t y l e  (5-5) on t h e  o the r  
d i f f e r e n t  s t y l e s  r ep resen t  d i f f e r e n t  
behavior (9-1) as a u t o c r a t i c .  You could 
guy, country c l u b  approach. Treat people 
of i t s e l f .  
hand, is represented  by a n  awful l o t  of 
compromise. 
s t y l e  w e ' r e  t a l k i n g  about  a d i sp ropor t iona te  amount of compromise. 
Acceptable,  perhaps,  only mediocre r e s u l t s ;  j u s t  something t o  w a f f l e  through 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
There is nothing wrong wi th  compromise per  se  , but  i n  t h i s  
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And, of course,  he re  (1-l), as I 've a l r e a d y  ind ica t ed ,  an  appropr i a t e  
l a b e l  might be "Impoverished Management " 
Of course ,  h e r e  (9-9) t h e  l a b e l  t h a t  we'd apply probably is  team 
manager. Not always i n  t e a m  meetings,  bu t  t r y i n g  t o  manage t h e  
t h e  most ou tput  and t h e  b e s t  q u a l i t y  output  poss ib l e ,  y e t  keep t h e  resources  
motivated and p a r t  of t h e  t o t a l  t e a m  e f f o r t .  
Now, i n  us ing  t h i s  concept w i t h  t h e  cap ta ins  w e  go through a b i t  more 
d e t a i l e d  explana t ion  than I j u s t  gave you. 
reading ar t ic les  and o t h e r  p i eces ,  as much as w e  could f i n d  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  
Then w e  qu ick ly  s h i f t  from t h e  management g r i d  concept per  se and i n t o  i t s  
a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  cap ta ins .  
They a l s o  have a number of pre- 
W e  begin wi th  t h e  s t y l e  9-1 and I a s k  t h e  c a p t a i n s  t o  he lp  m e  bu i ld  a 
p r o f i l e  of t h e  k inds  of behaviors  they  would expect  from a 9-1 cap ta in .  They 
have no t r o u b l e  a t  a l l  i n  doing t h i s .  
And a f t e r  w e  bu i ld  a behavior p r o f i l e  of 9-1, w e  switch t o  1-9, and once 
aga in  I a s k  t h e  cap ta ins  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  k inds  of behaviors  they  would expect .  
Once aga in ,  no real d i f f i c u l t y  i n  bu i ld ing  up dozens and dozens of descr ip-  
t i o n s  of t h e  kinds of behaviors  t h a t  t h e s e  s t y l e s  of c a p t a i n s  would use  i n  
i n t e r a c t i n g  wi th  members of t h e  c r e w .  
W e  then do a very  i n t e r e s t i n g  th ing ,  I th ink .  W e  switch from t h e  
behaviors  themselves t o  t r y i n g  t o  explore  what might be t h e  consequences, 
t h e  r e a c t i o n s  on t h e  p a r t  of d i f f e r e n t  work groups,  f i r s t  o f f i c e r s ,  f l i g h t  
a t t endan t s ,  c o n t r o l l e r s ,  and s o  on. Once w e  can reasonably ag ree  on what 
t h e  normal r e a c t i o n s  might be,  w e  focus on what might be some of t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  consequences of t h e s e  r e a c t i o n s  along four  d i f f e r e n t  dimensions. 
One of t hese  is t h e  motivat ion of o t h e r  persons a f f e c t e d  by t h i s  s t y p e  
of management. The next  i s  economic cons ide ra t ions ,  t h a t  i s ,  t o t a l  Republic 
A i r l i n e s  success .  The t h i r d  is passenger service, t h e  q u a l i t y  of passenger 
se rv i ce .  And, of course ,  t h e  f o u r t h  is f l i g h t  s a f e t y .  
I ' d  l i k e  t o  show you t h e  format t h a t  w e  u s e  w i t h  t h e  c a p t a i n s  ( f i g .  2 ) .  
Based on our  p r i o r  d i scuss ion  of t h e  g r i d ,  w e  a s k  them t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  
t y p i c a l  behaviors  of each s t y l e  of cap ta in .  Then, focusing on d i f f e r e n t  
work groups a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t s  i n  t i m e ,  f o r  example, t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r ,  w e  
focus on what might be t h e  t y p i c a l  f i r s t  o f f i c e r ' s  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e s e  k inds  
of c a p t a i n s '  behaviors .  Once t h e  t y p i c a l  r e a c t i o n s  are developed, w e  
explore  some of t h e  p o t e n t i a l  consequences a s soc ia t ed  wi th  t h e s e  r eac t ions .  
The c a p t a i n s  d i d  a very  good job  as a t o t a l  group. 
t h e r e  w e r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  group members, bu t  they  d id  a very  good 
job  i n  l ay ing  ou t  t h e  behaviors ,  r e a c t i o n s ,  and p o t e n t i a l  consequences. 
A s  you might be l i eve ,  
Here are some examples of t y p i c a l  behaviors  of a 9-1 c a p t a i n  toward a 
f i r s t  o f f i c e r :  Au thor i t a r i an ,  d i c t a t o r i a l  - commands without  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  
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i npu t ,  perhaps even a t  a l l  - no de lega t ion  of a u t h o r i t y  - may do a l l  
t akeof f s  and landings  himself o r  h e r s e l f  - minimal communication, and t h e  
communication t h a t  is  used i s  very one-way - over- reac ts  i n  a very  p u n i t i v e  
way t o  mistakes t h a t  might be made - very picky about t h e  kinds of dec i s ions  
and choices  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  would make when he ' s  f l y i n g  t h e  l e g .  
The t y p i c a l  r e a c t i o n s  t h a t  you might expect  from f i r s t  o f f i c e r s ,  a l s o ,  
as these  c a p t a i n s  r e l a t e d  it: f i r s t  o f f i c e r  would normally become defens ive ,  
clam up - become in t imida ted  - avoid confront ing  t h e  cap ta in  o r  c l a r i f y i n g  
information wi th  t h e  c a p t a i n  - would have f e a r  of f a i l u r e ,  h igh  tens ion ,  
and s o  on. 
Some of t h e  p o t e n t i a l  consequences are obvious: more mistakes - more 
v i o l a t i o n s  - s a f e t y  would be compromised - passenger s e r v i c e  would tend t o  
go down - may be a l i t t l e  s t ronge r  ego commitment t o  a wrong dec i s ion  than 
a cap ta in  should have. For example: f l y i n g  through rough weather without 
tu rn ing  around because he had made t h a t  d e c i s i o n  i n i t i a l l y .  
One of t h e  th ings  t h a t  is  kind of i n t e r e s t i n g  i s  t h a t  many f i r s t  
o f f i c e r s  spend a l o t  of t i m e  t r y i n g  t o  g e t  ou t  of c e r t a i n  c a p t a i n ' s  block 
of t i m e .  There is a l o t  of f a t i g u e  f o r  a f i r s t  o f f i c e r  working wi th  t h i s  
kind of a c a p t a i n ,  and a much higher  experience of stress. 
Now, l e t ' s  c o n t r a s t  those  kinds of behaviors  and p o t e n t i a l  conse- 
quences t o  t h e  kinds of responses  w e  go t  when w e  looked a t  o the r  s t y l e s  of 
management. The cap ta ins ,  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  one o r  two workshops, took t h e  
f i v e  major s t y l e s  of t h e  g r i d  and shortened up t h e  process  f o r  u s .  They 
s a i d ,  "We're very  concerned about t h e  9-1 s t y l e ,  ve ry  concerned about t h e  9-9 
s t y l e ,  bu t  w e  a l r eady  have a phrase  i n  our  indus t ry  t h a t  f i t s  some combina- 
t i o n  of 1-9, 1-1, and 5-5, and f o r  u s  i t ' s  complacency, t he  complacent 
capta in ."  
So from t h a t  po in t  forward w e  began t o  lump those  t h r e e  s t y l e s  toge ther  
and i t  saved u s  some t i m e  i n  t h e  workshops. 
The k inds  of behaviors  they  would expect from a complacent cap ta in :  
i n  s u b t l e  ways t o  a l low t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  t o  begin t o  run t h e  f l i g h t  - 
al low him t o  i n i t i a t e  t h e  r o u t i n e  procedures  - e x h i b i t  a l o t  of behaviors  
t o  ga in  approval  - accep t s  "spi t -outs"  from t h e  system; p r e t t y  much "What- 
ever  t h e  system says ,  t h a t ' s  it" - a l lows  t h e  system i t s e l f  t o  support  and 
c a r r y  t h e m  r a t h e r  than manage t h e  system - very  h e s i t a n t  t o  g e t  i n t o  a 
disagreement wi th  anyone - kind of a l lows  t h e  f l i g h t  t o  run  i t s e l f  wi th  
minimum c a p t a i n  involvement. 
'Typical r e a c t i o n s  of a f i r s t  o f f i c e r :  probably a tendency f o r  t h e  f i r s t  
o f f i c e r  t o  t r y  t o  t a k e  over  t h e  f l i g h t  - c e r t a i n l y  would hold t h e  c a p t a i n  
i n  less esteem - might a l s o  be sloppy themselves, have no real reason t o  
main ta in  competency and profess iona l i sm - probably less pre-planning - 
t h e r e  might be a l o t  of confusion around t h e  area of communications and 
a u t h o r i t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  ques t ions  of who's r e a l l y  i n  charge and so on. 
L e t  m e  j u s t  qu ick ly  run  through some of t h e  behaviors  t h e  c a p t a i n s  
would expect of a 9-9 cap ta in :  t h e  9-9 c a p t a i n  i n  behaving toward a f i r s t  
o f f i c e r  would more o f t e n  seek inpu t  on ope ra t iona l  problems and feedback on 
h i s  own problem so lv ing  and dec i s ions  - would l i s t e n  more t o  t h e  f i r s t  
o f f i c e r  - would teach  and coach t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  - would l e a r n  from 
mistakes - would he lp  t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  l e a r n  from mistakes - would be 
c o n s t r u c t i v e l y  c r i t i ca l  - would abso lu te ly  demand q u a l i t y  performance - 
would be very  assertive, etc. 
Reactions of t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  t o  these  k inds  of behaviors ,  as you might 
guess: very  motivated - f o r  t h e  most p a r t ,  very  suppor t ive  of t h e  
c a p t a i n ' s  dec i s ions  - probably provide b e t t e r  q u a l i t y  work - b e t t e r  f l i g h t  
planning - more a t t e n t i o n  t o  d e t a i l  - more alert  - f e e l  more chal lenged - 
quicker  t o  in te rvene  wi th  t h e  c a p t a i n  t o  c l a r i f y  misunderstood d a t a ,  etc.  
Very p o s i t i v e  p o t e n t i a l  consequences i n  terms of f l i g h t  s a f e t y ,  motiva- 
t i o n ,  passenger s e r v i c e ,  and so  on. 
So w e  u s e  these  kinds of d e s c r i p t i o n s  of behaviors ,  r e a c t i o n s ,  and 
p o t e n t i a l  consequences t o  g e t  a c r o s s  t o  t h e  c a p t a i n s  t h e  e f f e c t s  of d i f f e r e n t  
approaches t o  managing t h e  l eade r sh ip  s i t u a t i o n  and t o  dea l ing  w i t h  
problems i n  t h e  cockpi t  and between t h e  cockpi t  and t h e  cabin  crew. It 
usua l ly  goes very  w e l l .  
W e  then  make a r a t h e r  abrupt  s h i f t  from a p p l i c a t i o n s  of management 
s t y l e  t o  communications. W e  t each  communications t o  t h e  cap ta ins  by us ing  a 
l ea rn ing  s imula t ion .  This  is  n o t  t o  be confused wi th  w h a t  you usua l ly  ca l l  a 
s imula t ion  wi th in  your indus t ry .  It is a communications e x e r c i s e  which 
t akes  about a n  hour f o r  t h e  cap ta ins  t o  go through. Then w e  spend about a n  
hour ana lyz ing  what took p l ace  dur ing  t h a t  e x e r c i s e  i n  t e r m s  of good and poor 
communications p r a c t i c e s .  
W e  t r y  t o  make t h i s  a personal  l ea rn ing  experience f o r  t h e  cap ta ins .  
We cover a l o t  of l e a r n i n g  areas, one-way and two-way communications, t h e  
e f f e c t  of t ak ing  a pub l i c  s t ance  on a dec i s ion ,  and t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of 
changing your mind and moving on t o  another  p o s i t i o n .  
W e  cont inue  wi th  communications t h e  next  morning from t h e  s tandpoin t  of 
t h e  in te rgroup a spec t  of communications, cooperat ion,  and r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  We 
have a n  a d d i t i o n a l  s imula t ion  w e  p u t  t h e  c a p t a i n s  through, which focuses  on 
t h e  k inds  of r e l a t i o n s h i p  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  arise when members of d i f f e r e n t  
employee and occupat iona l  groups must i n t e r a c t  f o r  some j o i n t  purpose. 
r e s u l t  of t h e  l e a r n i n g  from t h i s  s imula t ion ,  w e  ana lyze  ways t o  improve 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  between cap ta ins  and f i r s t  o f f i c e r s ,  c a p t a i n s  and f l i g h t  
a t t e n d a n t s ,  c a p t a i n s  and maintenance, and even c a p t a i n s  and a i r - t r a f f i c  
c o n t r o l l e r s .  
A s  a 
That a f te rnoon w e  spend 2-3 hours  touching b r i e f l y  on motivat ion.  One 
concept w e  p re sen t  is c a l l e d  t h e  s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g  prophecy, o r  t h e  Pygmalion 
e f f e c t  . 
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We d i s c u s s  wi th  t h e  c a p t a i n s  how t h e i r  expec ta t ions  of t h e  o t h e r  people 
wi th  whom they i n t e r a c t  can, over a period of t i m e ,  begin t o  bu i ld  c e r t a i n  
behaviora l  responses from t h e  o t h e r  person. These behaviors t a k e  on t h e  form 
of f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  expec ta t ions  - t h e r e f o r e ,  a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g  
prophecy. 
I n  o t h e r  words, i f  I as a c a p t a i n  regard  my f i r s t  o f f i c e r  as a very  
competent, probably s u c c e s s f u l ,  very  a l e r t  person, I treat him t h a t  way, I 
show those  expec ta t ions .  Some of t h e  ways i n  which I behave i n  doing t h i s  
I ' m  no t  even aware o f ;  i t ' s  nonverbal communication. But I communicate those  
high expec ta t ions  t o  t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r ,  and I consequently,  over t i m e ,  begin 
t o  g e t  t h a t  kind of behavior back i n  r e t u r n .  
Cont ras t  t h a t  w i th  regard ing  my f i r s t  o f f i c e r  as ve ry ,  very  j u n i o r  i n  
a l l  r e s p e c t s ,  probably n o t  too competent, probably prone t o  f a i l u r e  and 
making mis takes .  I communicate t h a t ,  and, as you might expec t ,  t h a t ' s  t h e  
kind of performance I r e c e i v e  from t h a t  f i r s t  o f f i c e r .  Before t h i s  po r t ion  
of t h e  workshop ends w e  spend a cons ide rab le  amount of t i m e  t r y i n g  t o  pu t  a l l  
t h a t  w e  have done up t o  t h a t  po in t  i n  some kind of pe r spec t ive .  W e  go back 
t o  t h e  g r i d  concept and r e i n f o r c e  t h e  9-9 s t y l e .  However, w e  t r y  t o  g e t  
away from t h e  mystique of saying t h a t  you have t o  change your whole s t y l e ,  
t h a t  i f  you ' re  a 9-1 c a p t a i n  you have t o  move completely t o  9-9. That ' s  
q u i t e  a l e a p ,  and probably involves  more change t h a t  most of us  are capable 
of accomplishing. 
So w e  t r y  t o  g e t  away from that .  We t r y  t o  g e t  t h e  c a p t a i n  t o  t h i n k  of 
t h i s  g r i d  framework and t h e  r e l a t e d  d a t a  as a pe r spec t ive  t o  u s e  t o  improve 
h i s  judgments and p r e d i c t i o n s  about what kind of behavior i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n  
a c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n  wi th  f i r s t  o f f i c e r s ,  f l i g h t  a t t e n d a n t s ,  and o t h e r s .  W e  
t r y  t o  g e t  t h e  c a p t a i n  t o  t h i n k  i n  t e r m s  of a d j u s t i n g  behaviors ,  r a t h e r  than 
g e t t i n g  too  focused i n  on changing o v e r a l l  s t y l e .  
Probably t h e r e  a re  very  few 9-9 managers i n  t h e  world, and s i m i l a r l y  
very  few 9-9 c a p t a i n s ,  although I t h i n k  w e  have been b lessed  i n  having some 
i n  our classes. 
Now I ' d  l i k e  t o  t u r n  t h i s  back t o  G r a m e r  t o  qu ick ly  d i s c u s s  t h e  
remainder of t h e  program. Then, be fo re  w e  break i n t o  ques t ions  and 
answers, w e ' l l  qu ick ly  d e s c r i b e  t h e  r e sea rch  p r o j e c t  coming up. 
(Capt. Fos t e r )  
There is one t h i n g  I ' d  l i k e  t o  j u s t  touch on b r i e f l y .  An i n t e r e s t i n g  
output  of t h e  Blake and Muton r e sea rch  wi th  regard  t o  t h e  managerial  g r i d  i s  
t h a t  something l i k e  65% o r  70% of a l l  of t h e  managers i n  t h e  major corpora- 
t i o n s  i n  America f i t  t h e  5-5 s t y l e .  
where t h e  f l i g h t  crews f i t .  
It 's i n t e r e s t i n g  f o r  u s  t o  t r y  t o  see 
Wherever they  f i t ,  w e  show them t h a t  they  don ' t  
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have t o  s t a y  i n  t h a t  s t y l e ,  t h a t  a l though t h a t  may be t h e i r  b a s i c  management 
s t y l e ,  they can s l i p  ou t  of it i f  they  recognize t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  and manage i n  
a b e t t e r  way. 
Af te r  Mike does s t y l e s  i n  pe r spec t ive ,  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  from F l i g h t  
Control ,  perhaps t h e  Direc tor  of F l i g h t  Control ,  comes i n  and speaks wi th  t h e  
c a p t a i n s  about va r ious  d i spa tch  problems and d i s p a t c h  requirements.  
g e t s  t o  be a kind of two-way program i n  which t h e r e ' s  a good d e a l  of g ive  and 
take.  
That 
W e  a l s o  inc lude  Maintenance Control and t h e  F l i g h t  Attendant group. 
What we've t r i e d  t o  do is  inc lude  t h e  people  wi th  whom t h e  c a p t a i n  
i n t e r a c t s  t h e  most, d i scount ing  t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r ,  of course.  So t h a t  t h e  
cap ta in  g e t s  a b e t t e r  f e e l  f o r  some of t h e  problems t h a t  they have, and 
where t h e y ' r e  coming from, and t h e r e  is a good f low of i deas  and interchange 
of i deas .  
The t h i r d  day is spent  a t  t h e  Minneapolis A i r  Route T r a f f i c  Control  
Center ,  t h a t  is ,  4 hours of i t  are. 
The t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  people have worked out  a real s l i c k  program f o r  us ;  
w e  are very  happy wi th  i t .  It a c t u a l l y  starts a t  7:30 A.M. and f i n i s h e s  a t  
12:OO P.M., and dur ing  t h i s  t i m e  w e  in t roduce  them t o  bas i c  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  
procedures.  
You know how a p i l o t  t y p i c a l l y  f e e l s  he could c o n t r o l  t r a f f i c  b e t t e r  
than anyone else. Well, w e  manage t o  g e t  the p i l o t  i n t o  t h e  ATC s imula tor ,  
which has  become quote  popular,  and w e  shoot  a l o t  of problems t o  him. It 
g ives  t h e  p i l o t  a l i t t l e  pe r spec t ive  on t h e  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  
problems. 
and neck and, of course,  t h e  p i l o t  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  p o s i t i o n  has  no 
d i f f i c u l t y  saying United do a 360 and North Cen t ra l  cont inue  on. 
They w i l l  t y p i c a l l y  put  North Cen t ra l  and another  carrier neck 
But they  f i n d  ou t  t h a t  doesn ' t  always work. 
c o n t r o l  p o s i t i o n s  on a one-to-one b a s i s  wi th  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l l e r s .  
i n t o  a s e c t o r  and a c t u a l l y  s i t  t h e r e  and observe t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  work 
t r a f f i c ,  and d i s c u s s  t h e  p r o b l e m  a t t endan t  w i th  working t h e  t r a f f i c .  
been a very  popular p a r t  of our  seminar. 
Then t h e  p i l o t s  move on t o  
They plug 
I t ' s  
W e  r e t u r n  i n  t h e  a f te rnoon t o  t h e  classroom once aga in  and he re  aga in  
we  t r y  t o  address  some of t h e  previous cr i t ic ism t h a t  w e  haven ' t  spoken t o ,  
p r e s c r i p t i v e  means of so lv ing  problems. For t h i s  w e  have a s e s s i o n  t h a t  is 
c a l l e d  s i t u a t i o n  a n a l y s i s .  
This  is a program t h a t  Sherm Cornel1 and I have been doing, i n  which w e  
o u t l i n e  a given problem, and then,  t ak ing  t h e s e  20 c a p t a i n s  who have had 
t h i s  exposure t o  some new i d e a s  and concepts ,  w e  l e t  them present  t h e i r  
i deas  on how they would s o l v e  t h e  problem. 
i n t e r a c t  i ons  the re .  
W e  g e t  some q u i t e  i n t e r e s t i n g  
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Then a t  t h e  end we  have t h e  w r i t t e n  eva lua t ion ,  which is  done i n  t h e  
anonymous form, followed by t h e  let ter.  I t h i n k  t h a t  p r e t t y  w e l l  covers  i t .  
A t  t h i s  t i m e  w e  might throw it open f o r  ques t ions .  
DISCUSSION 
CAPT. PERKINSON, United Air l ines :  How long have you been us ing  
t h i s  technique a t  North Cent ra l?  
CAPT. FOSTER: W e  s t a r t e d  about 2 years  ago. We've done a t o t a l  
of 4 seminars.  W e ,  l i k e  most people i n  t h e  indus t ry ,  are impeded by p i l o t  
shor tages  and t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of people f o r  t h e  programs. So we  have only 
been a b l e  t o  do 4 t o  d a t e ,  o r  a t o t a l  of 80 people.  W e  do have a u t h o r i z a t i o n  
t o  cont inue.  We plan  t o  p ick  up wi th  a n  improved format ,  and p lan  t o  make i t  
an ongo ing  th ing  . 
CAPT. TRAUB, United A i r l i n e s :  You mentioned i n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
a n a l y s i s  s e s s i o n  you p resen t  a problem. 
type of problem? 
Could you g ive  us  an example o f ' t h e  
CAPT. FOSTER: W e  might present  a c a p t a i n  wi th  a r e c a l c i t r a n t  
f i rs t  o f f i c e r ,  a f i r s t  o f f i c e r  who i s n ' t  performing up t o  s tandards ,  some- 
th ing  l i k e  t h a t .  Then w e  go around the  room and l e t  each one i n d i c a t e  how he 
th inks  he might handle t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  W e  might do t h a t ,  w e  might have an  ill 
passenger ,  any number of t h ings .  
DR. HELMREICH: I w a s  j u s t  cur ious  t o  hear  a l i t t l e  b i t  about where 
you ' re  going wi th  t h e  r e sea rch  and eva lua t ions?  
MR. GARVEY: I ' l l  t r y  t o  g ive  you a couple  of quick thoughts on 
t h a t .  L e t  m e  t e l l  you about our motivat ion f i r s t .  One of our cons tan t  
concerns about our  workshop is  w i t h  t h e  i s s u e  of d a t a .  
now l i k e  we  have a n  adequate  d a t a  base of information t o  provide t o  t h e s e  
cap ta ins  about  t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  behaviors  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  t a l k  about understanding and changing those  behaviors .  W e  do it as b e s t  
w e  can  given a model l i k e  t h i s ,  and i t  goes very  w e l l  f o r  w h a t  i t  is. 
W e  don ' t  f e e l  r i g h t  
W e  would love  t o  be a b l e  t o  provide t h e  c a p t a i n s  coming i n t o  our  work- 
Then w e  could g ive  them b e t t e r  he lp  i n  a d j u s t i n g  t h e i r  behaviors .  
shop wi th  a p r o f i l e  of how he o r  she  th inks ,  approaches s i t u a t i o n s ,  and 
behaves. 
The o the r  concern we  have about our workshop is t h a t  w e  are unable  t o  
do any kind of v a l i d  pre-post t e s t i n g  on j u s t  how much e f f e c t  our  workshop 
has.  Does i t  he lp?  Does i t  hur t ?  Does i t  do anything a t  a l l ?  
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I f  w e  had an  instrument  t h a t  would f u l f i l l  t h e  i n i t i a l  d a t a  need, and 
then could be readminis tered 3,  6 ,  o r  8 months later t o  g ive  both t h e  c a p t a i n  
and us some feedback as t o  how t h a t  program a f f e c t e d  t h a t  person,  i t  would be 
very h e l p f u l  t o  a l l  concerned. 
That l e d  us t o  t h e  r e sea rch  p r o j e c t .  W e  have begun t o  formulate  a 
research  e f f o r t  wi th  a consu l t ing  o rgan iza t ion  i n  Plymouth, Michigan by t h e  
name of Human Synerg i s t i c s .  They have over 10 y r s  of h i s t o r y  i n  using t h e i r  
instrument  wi th  t h e  gene ra l  management populat ion.  They have developed 
norms on over 100,000 managers throughout t h e  country.  These p r o f i l e s  and 
norms are not  based on psychological  i l l n e s s ;  i n s t ead  they are based on 
psychological  h e a l t h .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t hese  instruments  measure t h e  th inking  
p a t t e r n s  of t hese  managers and how t h e s e  p a t t e r n s  cause d i f f e r e n t  behaviors .  
We'd l i k e  t o  use  t h e s e  instruments  on a group of p i l o t s  and see if w e  
couldn ' t  develop norms t h a t  would be p r e d i c t i v e  of more e f f e c t i v e  and less 
e f f e c t i v e  cap ta ins .  Of course ,  w e  a l s o  have t o  develop cr i ter ia  f o r  
de f in ing  cap ta in  e f f ec t iveness .  
We don ' t  y e t  know i f  t h e  instruments  w i l l  work on t h e  p i l o t  group, as 
they have wi th  t h e  gene ra l  management populat ion.  
answer t h a t  ques t ion  wi th  t h e  r e sea rch  r e s u l t s .  The cu r ren t  proposal  is  t o  
work wi th  a sample of 25 cap ta ins  and 25 f i r s t  o f f i c e r s  from North Cent ra l ,  
and an a d d i t i o n a l  25 cap ta ins  and 25 f i r s t  o f f i c e r s  from Southern Airways. 
But we're hoping t o  
I f  w e  wind up wi th  a good set of p r o f i l e s ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  use  of t hese  
d a t a  would be f o r  t h e  development of cap ta ins  i n  our  workshops. The 
ind iv idua l  d a t a  would go s t r a i g h t  t o  t h e  p i l o t  and not  t o  t h e  company, 
thereby p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  p i l o t ' s  anonymity. Later it could be used as a 
s e l e c t i o n  t o o l  as w e l l .  
C U T .  CRUMP, United A i r l i n e s :  Were you going t o  make any a t t e m p t  
t o  select those  c a p t a i n s  and f i r s t  o f f i c e r s  f o r  any q u a l i t y  o r  w e r e  you j u s t  
going t o  t ake  an o v e r a l l , .  . , 
MR. GARVEY: The i n i t i a l  a t tempt  w a s  planned t o  be random. The 
d i f f i c u l t y  w i l l  be  i n  coming t o  an agreement on t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of a n  
e f f e c t i v e  cap ta in ,  t h e  same i s s u e  we  discussed a couple  of t i m e s  yesterday.  
CAF'T. CRUMP: I j u s t  wanted t o  comment t h a t  somewhere downstream 
you're  going t o  have t o  eva lua te  what type  of a performer he is  on t h e  
a i r l i n e  i n  order  t o  v a l i d a t e  your t e s t i n g .  
MR. GARVEY: Oh, su re ,  t h a t  w i l l  have t o  happen as  a companion 
i s sue .  
MR. MANSFIELD: You say  t h e  cont inuing  e f f o r t  w i l l  s t i l l  be a 
random choice? 
MR. GARVEY: No, t h e  continued e f f o r t  would not .  This  is  j u s t  
i n i t i a l  r e sea rch  t o  see whether t h e s e  instruments  w i l l  be  p r e d i c t i v e  of a 
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p i l o t ' s  behavior o r  n o t ,  as they have been wi th  managers. We may need a 
completely d i f f e r e n t  instrument .  W e  may j u s t  need t o  develop eva lua t ion  
cri teria.  W e  don ' t  know. 
MR. MANSFIELD, American A i r l i n e s :  Maybe I d i d n ' t  s ta te  t h e  
ques t ion  c l e a r l y .  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  i n  t h i s  program? 
How w i l l  you choose t h e  candida tes  t h a t  are going t o  
MR. GARVEY: That ' s  vo luntary .  A t  t h i s  po in t ,  w e  are encouraging 
cap ta ins  t o  come i n  t o  t h e  workshop. Pseudo volunteer ing?  G r a m e r ,  I th ink  
you'd b e t t e r  f i e l d  t h a t .  
CAPT. FOSTER: The workshop has  been f u l l  pay and c r e d i t ;  w e  
haven ' t  asked anybody t o  do it on a f r e e b i e  b a s i s .  
pay l o s s ,  f u l l  expenses, h o t e l  b i l l s ,  t h e  whole b i t .  W e  t r y  t o  make i t  a 
p r e s t i g i o u s  th ing ,  and w e  do p r e t t y  w e l l  a s s i g n  t h e  people t o  it. We've 
had a l i t t l e  grumbling by some of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  wondering why they w e r e  
s e l e c t e d ,  and th inking  t h a t  perhaps we had them i n  mind f o r  some reason o r  
o t h e r .  And sometimes w e  d id .  But u sua l ly  they went away saying,  "Although 
I had some r e s e r v a t i o n s  and wondered why you s e l e c t e d  m e ,  I ' m  very  happy 
t h a t  I came, and I go t  a l o t  ou t  of it.'' We have had some r e a l l y  good 
feedback. 
We are paying them f l i g h t  
MR. FELL, FAA: A r e  t h e r e  any p lans  f o r  Republic t o  expand t h i s  
i n t o  a r e c u r r e n t  type course  o r  update type? 
CAPT. FOSTER: No, no t  cu r ren t ly .  Although i t ' s  obvious t h a t  a 
program of t h i s  kind is  an  i d e a l  foundat ion,  and t h a t  t h e r e  should be some- 
th ing  b u i l t  upon i t  i n  an ongoing way, I t h i n k  t h a t  something i n  t h e  way of 
a fu l l -miss ion  s imula t ion  might be a n  i d e a l  method of doing i t  i n  an  ongoing 
way. 
CAPT. TURLINGTON, Pan American: A r e  you a t  present  j u s t  i n v i t i n g  
cap ta ins  t o  t h i s  program? 
CAPT. FOSTER: For t h e  most p a r t ,  yes.  W e  have taken some very  
sen io r  f i r s t  o f f i c e r s  who have not  y e t  flown as cap ta in ,  bu t  who are about  t o  
f l y  cap ta in ,  and had them i n  t h e  program. I f  t h e r e  are no o the r  ques t ions ,  
I ' d  l i k e  t o  express  our apprec i a t ion  f o r  your a t t e n t i o n ;  thanks again.  
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Figure 1.- Management g r id .  
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Figure 2 . -  Reactions and consequences of d i f f e r e n t  management s t y l e s .  
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THE WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
TRAINING - NASA/INDUSTRY WORKING GROUP MEETINGS 
INTRODUCTION 
DR. LAUBER: A t  t h i s  t i m e  I would l i k e  t o  t u r n  t h e  proceedings of 
t h i s  workshop over t o  C a p t .  A 1  Fr ink ,  Vice P res iden t  of F l i g h t  Standards f o r  
Pan Am, t o  g ive  you some words of advice .  
* CAPT. FRINK: I don ' t  presume t o  g ive  you words of advice  r e a l l y ,  
I t h i n k  everybody he re  knows what t h e y ' r e  doing, and we've seen ample  
evidence of t h a t  f o r  t h e  l a s t  day and a h a l f .  
John indica ted  t h a t  he had done something r i g h t  wi th  some of t h e  
speakers  t h a t  w e  have heard here ,  and I ' d  l i k e  t o  say t h i s  is  one of t h e  most 
ou ts tanding  groups of speakers  a t  a meeting such as t h i s  t h a t  i t  has ever 
been my p leasu re  t o  l i s t e n  t o .  They've been t o  t h e  po in t  and i n t e r e s t i n g  i n  
t h e i r  p re sen ta t ions ,  and I f u l l y  ag ree  w i t h  John t h a t  w e  owe them a debt  of 
g r a t i t u d e .  
I want t o  quote from t h e  recommendations made by t h e  Nat ional  Transporta- 
t i o n  Sa fe ty  Board about t h e  acc iden t  t h a t  occurred i n  Port land some t i m e  ago. 
The complexity of c u r r e n t  a i r  carrier f l i g h t  opera t ions  
imposes cons iderable  demands on f l i g h t  crewmembers, par- 
t i c u l a r l y  under h igh  workload condi t ions .  Moreover, acc iden t  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  experience,  a s  mentioned above, i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
c a p t a i n s  have f a i l e d ,  sometimes a t  c r i t i c a l  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  f l i g h t ,  
t o  t a k e  advantage of important resources  t h a t  are a v a i l a b l e  t o  
them. 
These resources  have included not  only a v a i l a b l e  equipment 
and suppor t ing  services, but  a l s o  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  of t h e  co- 
ord ina ted  crew. F i r s t  and second o f f i c e r s  have not  i n  some 
cases  adequately monitored f l i g h t  progress ,  p o s i t i v e l y  communica- 
ted  t h e i r  observa t ions ,  o r  a c t i v e l y  a s s i s t e d  t h e  c a p t a i n  i n  t h e  
management of t h e  f l i g h t .  Therefore ,  t h e  Sa fe ty  Board b e l i e v e s  
t h a t  p re sen t  e f f o r t s  t o  f o s t e r  improved f l i g h t  deck management 
should be expanded t o  inc lude  a l l  a i r  carrier ope ra to r s .  
Accordingly, t h e  Nat iona l  Transpor ta t ion  Sa fe ty  Board 
recommends t h a t  t h e  Federa l  Aviat ion Adminis t ra t ion i s s u e  a n  
opera t ions  b u l l e t i n  t o  a l l  a i r  carrier ope ra t ions  i n s p e c t o r s  
* 
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d i r e c t i n g  them t o  urge  t h e i r  ass igned ope ra to r s  t o  in su re  t h a t  
t h e i r  f l i g h t  crews are indoc t r ina t ed  i n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of f l i g h t  
deck resource  management, w i th  p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis on t h e  merits 
of p a r t i c i p a t i v e  management f o r  c a p t a i n s  and a s s e r t i v e n e s s  
t r a i n i n g  f o r  o t h e r  cockpi t  crewmembers. 
Gentlemen, f l i g h t  deck resource  management is  a recognized need. I 
th ink  w e  a l l  know t h a t  need. Everything t h a t  we've heard f o r  t h e  p a s t  day 
and a ha l f  has  ind ica t ed  t h i s .  A s  Gramer mentioned j u s t  a few seconds ago, 
i t ' s  very  rewarding t o  see t h a t  we're not  d i scuss ing  t h i s  as a p o s s i b i l i t y  
but  as a f a c t ,  and how t o  achieve it .  Accidents t h a t  w e  have s tud ied ,  t h e  
e f f i c i e n c y  t h a t  w e  need, t h e  complacency t h a t  w e  have observed over t h e  
years, a l l  have very d e f i n i t e l y  ind ica t ed  a need f o r  t h i s  kind of t r a i n i n g  
and f o r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h i s  s u b j e c t .  
One of t h e  th ings  t h a t  I t h i n k  w e  have t o  guard a g a i n s t  is that: w e  a l l  
t h ink  we're doing p r e t t y  w e l l .  
day and a h a l f ,  have ind iv idua l  programs t h a t  w e  t h i n k  are f ac ing  some of t he  
i s s u e s  t h a t  we're t a l k i n g  about .  
Some of u s ,  as we've seen here  i n  t h e  l a s t  
Some of u s  have been f o r t u n a t e  enough t o  go f o r  years  without an 
acc iden t ,  s o  w e  t h ink  w e ' r e  doing p r e t t y  w e l l .  Some of u s  have been chosen 
as managers without t h e  b e n e f i t  of some of those  g r e a t  programs t h a t  Ed 
C a r r o l l  r e f e r r e d  t o  a wh i l e  ago. But I th ink ,  Ed, i n  t h i s  room t h e r e  are a 
l o t  of people who, d e s p i t e  t h a t  r a t h e r  random s e l e c t i o n ,  are s t i l l  with i t ,  
and I t h i n k  doing a p r e t t y  good job .  But w e  do recognize t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a 
real  need f o r  some of t h e  procedures  t h a t  Ed ou t l ined .  
I t h i n k  t h a t  w e  a l l  have t o  put  a s i d e  f o r  t h e  moment our p r ide ,  our ego 
as t o  what w e  have a l l  done, and t o  accept  as a primary premise t h a t  w e  can 
improve. Each and every a i r l i n e  he re  and each person he re  can improve, and 
w e  should go i n t o  our seminars wi th  t h a t  thought uppermost i n  our minds. 
W e  have heard some s p e c i f i c  i deas ,  w e  have heard some g e n e r a l i t i e s ,  w e  
have heard t h e o r i e s  very  w e l l  expressed.  Bob Helmreich ta lked  about  group 
and goa l  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  and Lee  Bolman very  c l e a r l y  ou t l ined  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
t h a t  w e  are involved wi th  he re  today. W e  have heard some wonderful pre- 
s e n t a t i o n s  about s p e c i f i c  methods t h a t  are being used, and i t ' s  now our job ,  
your j o b ,  t o  determine how and when - w e  a l r eady  know why - t o  apply these  
ideas .  
So w e  should,  i n  t h e s e  groups t h a t  w e  are about t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n ,  be 
very f r e e  i n  coming up wi th  any new ideas ,  very  f r e e  wi th  thoughts  of when 
t o  use  them. 
W e  should not  be  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  methods of t r a i n i n g  t h a t  
happen t o  be f a m i l i a r  p a t t e r n s  t h a t  w e  are us ing  now. 
minds. Maybe t h e r e  are d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n s  of t r a i n i n g ,  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e s  they 
should be done. 
t o  new thoughts .  
L e t ' s  open up our 
Maybe i t ' s  a cont inuing  process .  L e t ' s  open up our  minds 
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How much of i t  is t r a i n i n g  r e a l l y ?  How much of i t  is  t h e  development 
of t h e  h a b i t  patterns of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  and how do w e  go about dea l ing  wi th  
t h a t ?  How much of i t  i s  procedural? D o  w e  accomplish some of t h i s  i n  our 
manuals? Do w e  accomplish some of t h i s  through our communications wi th in  our 
a i r l i n e s ,  as separate from t r a i n i n g ?  And how much of i t  do w e  accomplish i n  
t h e  s e l e c t i o n  process and t h e  weeding-out process  i t s e l f ?  
So t h e s e  are t h e  ques t ions  t h a t  w e  should f r e e l y  f ace .  I ' m  going t o  
suggest t h a t  when w e  a l l  break up and go i n t o  our s m a l l  working groups, t h e  
f i r s t  t h ing  w e  should a l l  do i s  t o  have a n  open mind, t o  l i s t e n  t o  t h e  o t h e r  
f e l l o w ' s  thoughts,  and t o  poss ib ly  expand and comment on t h a t .  
I know t h a t  each person here  has  done a l o t  of th inking  about t h i s .  
Each person r e p r e s e n t s  an  a i r l i n e  o r  a group t h a t  has done some t h i n g s  t h a t  
you ' re  probably proud o f .  Good. Express t h a t ,  e x p l a i n  i t ,  but d o n ' t  home i n  
on t h a t  so much t h a t  t h e  progress  of your group is held'back. This is a 
cha l lenge  t o  t h e  chairmen. The chairmen are going t o  have t o  see t o  i t  t h a t  
no one person wi th  an  axe t o  gr ind  - and I guess t h a t ' s  everyone i n  t h i s  
room - no one of u s  dominates t h e  groups t o  t h e  e l imina t ion  o r  t h e  d i l u t i o n  
of t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  o t h e r s  i n  t h e  group. 
Try t o  t h i n k  of a l l  t h e  means of a t t a i n i n g  t h e  goa l s  t h a t  w e ' r e  shoot ing  
f o r .  And above a l l ,  w e  are challenged wi th  coming up wi th  recommendations. 
The recommendation s e c t i o n  of t h i s  working group should be s p e c i f i c .  
group should a t t e m p t  o r i g i n a l l y  t o  organize  t h e i r  method of approach t o  t h e s e  
problems wi th  t h e  s p e c i f i c  goa l  i n  mind of coming up wi th  recommendations. 
The 
B e  gene ra l  a t  f i r s t ,  d i s c u s s  concepts a t  f i r s t ,  and then come down t o  
recommendations. W e  are going t o  have t o  come up wi th  a r e p o r t  from each of 
t h e  working groups tomorrow morning, and i n  those  r e p o r t s  w e  should have 
s p e c i f i c  recommendations. (A handout, " I n s t r u c t i o n s  f o r  Working Groups," is 
shown i n  appendix C . )  
I t h i n k  w e  have a very  b ig  j o b  c u t  ou t  f o r  ou r se lves  i n  t h e s e  working 
The speakers  have set a ve ry ,  very  f i n e  example f o r  t h i s  seminar, groups. 
and I hope t h a t  t h e  working groups w i l l  c a r r y  on t h a t  w e l l .  The chairmen 
have a b ig  cha l lenge  ahead, so  l e t ' s  go t o  i t .  
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RECURRENT TRAINING AND LINE OPERATION 
* Capt. Ron Sessa 
Chairman, Group 5 
CAPT. FRINK ( In t roductory  comments): Today is r e p o r t  card day f o r  
a l l  of us .  
our d i scuss ions .  
t h r e e  t o  fou r  o 'c lock  yesterday af te rnoon and see t h e  h o r r i b l y  worried f a c e s  
on a l l  of t h e  chairmen i n  those  rooms, and then t o  v i s i t  w i th  them t h i s  
morning and see them a l l  smil ing and happy. So something happened between 
fou r  o 'c lock  yes te rday  af te rnoon and e a r l y  t h i s  morning t o  make them f e e l  
comfortable.  It had t o  be t h a t  you a l l  cont r ibu ted  enough t o  g ive  them a 
r e p o r t  t o  be proud o f .  
We're going t o  f i n d  o u t  j u s t  exac t ly  how w e l l  w e  d i d  yesterday i n  
It w a s  very i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  m e  t o  move among t h e  groups from 
N o r m l l y  I would l i k e  t o  have gone through our working groups i n  t h e  
order  of t h e  progress  of t h e  ind iv idua l  t o  h i s  career, but  because Ron Sessa 
has t o  leave, we're going t o  break t h e  r o u t i n e  and start of f  wi th  Ron's 
r e p o r t .  W e  are f u r t h e r  going t o  break t h e  r o u t i n e  t o  have some d i scuss ion  
on h i s  committee's r e p o r t  before  he leaves, so  t h a t  h e ' l l  be  a b l e  t o  answer 
any ques t ions  t h a t  any of you have. Ron w a s  t h e  chairman of Working Group 5,  
Recurrent Training and Line Operations.  
CAPT. SESSA: Thanks, A l .  The approach of our  committee w a s  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  s p e c i f i c  recommendations toward implementation of resource  
management t r a i n i n g  t o  t h e  f l igh t -deck  crewmembers i n  r e c u r r e n t  ground 
school ,  s imula tor ,  and l i n e  opera t ions .  Our o b j e c t i v e  w a s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
in t roductory  methods t h a t  would educate  crew members t o  t h e  importance of 
resource  management and t h a t  would motivate  them t o  develop and t o  u t i l i z e  
those  s k i l l s  i n  t h e i r  day-to-day opera t ions .  We f e l t  t h a t  ground school  
i n t roduc t ion  t o  resource  management, p r i o r  t o  p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  s imula tor  and 
on t h e  l i n e ,  w a s  t h e  b e s t  method f o r  i n t roduc t ion  of t h i s  type  of t r a i n i n g  
a t  t h e  r e c u r r e n t  ground school  l e v e l .  
Our s p e c i f i c  recommendations f o r  t h e  in t roduc t ion  of resource  management 
t r a i n i n g  i n  r e c u r r e n t  ground school ,  s imula tor ,  and l i n e  ope ra t ions  w a s ,  
f i r s t ,  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a program f o r  proper t r a i n i n g  of i n s t r u c t o r s .  This  
t r a i n i n g  could be accomplished e i t h e r  inhouse, o u t s i d e ,  o r  i n s i d e  w i t h  
o u t s i d e  a s s i s t a n c e ,  depending on t h e  ind iv idua l  a i r l i n e ' s  a v a i l a b l e  
resources .  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  comprehensive resource  management t r a i n i n g  per  se f o r  
t h e  i n s t r u c t o r s ,  w e  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  t r a i n i n g  should a l s o  stress s i t u a t i o n  
a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  importance of t e c h n i c a l  competence i n  applying resource  manage- 
ment techniques,  and t h a t  comprehensive t r a i n i n g  i n  observa t ion  s k i l l s  should 
be included.  
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Secondly, w e  f e l t  t h a t  an  aud iov i sua l  program should be developed f o r  
p re sen ta t ion  a t  r e c u r r e n t  ground school ,  wi th  course  conten t  focusing on t h e  
fol lowing areas: (1) leade r sh ip  and a u t h o r i t y ;  (2) c r e w  coord ina t ion  and 
communications; (3) awareness, and t h e  e f f e c t  of f a t i g u e ,  stress, boredom 
and work load on t h e  level of awareness; and ( 4 )  planning, wi th  emphasis on 
f l e x i b i l i t y  and t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  change p l ans  according t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
W e  would then  recommend development of LOFT scena r ios  o r  o the r  s imula tor  
s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  would s t i m u l a t e  crew i n t e r a c t i o n  and r e q u i r e  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
of learned  resource  management techniques.  The r e s u l t  of t h i s  e x e r c i s e  
would be  s u b j e c t  t o  eva lua t ion ,  c r i t i q u e  and a d d i t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  when 
necessary.  Some p o s s i b l e  enhancements t h a t  w e r e  suggested t o  t h i s  phase of 
t h e  t r a i n i n g  included video t ap ing  of p e r t i n e n t  po r t ions  of t h e  se s s ion  o r  a t  
l eas t  audio tap ing  i n  order  t o  improve recal l  of r e s u l t s  f o r  deb r i e f ing  and 
c r i t i q u e s .  
The t h i r d  s t e p  a t  t h i s  l e v e l  f o r  t h e  p i l o t  would occur on t h e  f i r s t  l i n e  
check fol lowing t h e  completion of h i s  ground school  and s imula tor  sess ion .  
This  would a l low s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  f o r  exposure t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  before  a c t u a l  
o n l i n e  eva lua t ion  w a s  performed. W e  f e l t  - I t h i n k  most of u s  d id  - t h a t  
t h i s  would inc rease  t h e  p i l o t ' s  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  program i f  s t a r t e d  ou t  
gradual ly  without  a connotat ion of t e s t i n g  immediately. 
An a d d i t i o n a l  recommendation is f o r  t h e  development of a LOFT planning 
committee t o  o f f e r  recommendations t o  indus t ry  regard ing  LOFT scenar ios .  The 
i n t e n t  would be t o  u t i l i z e  t h e  experience of carriers a l r eady  us ing  LOFT, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  management t r a i n i n g  o r  resource  management 
t r a i n i n g .  
W e  had some re sea rch  recommendations. I n  any new system, t h e r e  w i l l  be 
ques t ions  about t h e  b e s t  way t o  proceed t o  i n s u r e  a good product wi th  a high 
d o l l a r  r e t u r n .  
techniques,  bu t  are n o t  r e a l l y  i n  a good p o s i t i o n  t o  do ex tens ive  r e sea rch  
s t u d i e s  t o  answer t h e s e  ques t ions .  W e  would seek  a s s i s t a n c e  from appropr i a t e  
agencies  o u t s i d e  our  companies t o  address  t h e s e  i s s u e s .  
W e  i n  i ndus t ry  can  pose ques t ions  about  methods and 
Areas i n  which i t  appears  w e  should seek  suppor t  inc lude  t h e  fol lowing:  
determining t h e  conten t  of LOFT-type t r a i n i n g  programs t h a t  w i l l  develop t h e  
appropr i a t e  behaviors  f o r  eva lua t ion  and t r a i n i n g ;  developing techniques f o r  
t r a i n i n g  and expe r t  i n s t r u c t o r s  who can pe rce ive  and eva lua te  resource  
management behavior;  p repar ing  gu ide l ines  f o r  t h e  planning and development of 
LOFT-type t r a i n i n g  s c e n a r i o s ;  dea l ing  wi th  t h e  ques t ions  of f i d e l i t y  of 
t h e  scena r io  and conten t  of t h e  t r a i n i n g  s i t u a t i o n ;  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  scena r io  
s t r u c t u r e ,  l eng th  of t r a i n i n g  se s s ion ,  e x t e n t  of t i m e  impression, how a 
s imula t ion  can be promoted, and t h e  e f f e c t s  of r e a l i t y  i n  t r a i n i n g  as 
p e r t a i n s  t o  real f l i g h t .  
Some o t h e r  ques t ions  were a l s o  r a i s e d .  How does one t each  r e source  
management t r a i n i n g  once resource  management is  recognized as d e f i c i e n t ?  
And t h e  whole ques t ion  of cr i ter ia ,  eva lua t ion ,  feedback of r e s u l t s  f o r  
program eva lua t ion  and modi f ica t ion  - how can inappropr i a t e  behavior be 
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modified us ing  behavior modi f ica t ion  techniques t h a t  are acceptab le  and 
e f f i c i e n t ?  W e  f e l t  t h a t  a l o t  of t hese  ques t ions  and s t u d i e s  should be 
conducted by a n  o u t s i d e  agency. 
I n  summary, our  o b j e c t i v e  w a s  t o  in t roduce  resource  management t r a i n i n g  
u t i l i z i n g  t h e  bas i c s ,  w i th  t h e  i n t e n t  t o  enhance t h e  program t o  a higher  
l e v e l  i n  subsequent years .  A t  t h e  r e c u r r e n t  level,  every p i l o t  would a t  
least have been exposed t o  t h e  bas i c s  i n  one year .  W e  d i d n ' t  f e e l ,  as a 
committee, t h a t  w e  had s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  t o  i d e n t i f y  what t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  
t r a i n i n g  o r  ongoing t r a i n i n g  beyond 1 year  should inc lude ,  o r  make any 
recommendations along those  l i n e s .  But i t  should be married t o  t h e  o the r  
t r a i n i n g  programs t h a t  would be i n s t i t u t e d  by an a i r l i n e  i n  t h e  resource  
management t r a i n i n g .  Tha t ' s  t h e  end of my r e p o r t .  A r e  t h e r e  any ques t ions?  
CAPT. CARROLL, United Ai r l ines :  Speaking of t h e  review during 
r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g  of t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  involved i n  resource  management, I have 
two ques t ions .  How deep d id  you f e e l  t h a t  you wanted t o  go a t  t h a t  
p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e ?  And as a r e s u l t  of t h a t  depth,  how long would you be 
keeping t h e  ind iv idua l  t h e r e  j u s t  f o r  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  po r t ion  of r ecu r ren t  
t r a i n i n g ?  
CAPT. SESSA: W e  f e l t  t h a t  a t  t h e  ground school  l e v e l  t h e r e  would 
be  no eva lua t ion ,  t h a t  i t  would b e  a p resen ta t ion ,  an audiovisua l  package, 
l a s t i n g  1 o r  2 hours. And t h a t  t h a t  would inc lude  those  th ings  t h a t  I 
mentioned - a u t h o r i t y ,  l eade r sh ip ,  crew coord ina t ion  and communications, 
awareness, and planning. It should not  be made any more comprehensive than 
t h a t .  But i n i t i a l  exposure t o  t h i s  type t r a i n i n g  should be r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
bas i c s .  W e  would have i t  presented by a t r a i n e d  i n s t r u c t o r .  H e  would be 
t h e r e  t o  t u r n  a machine on and o f f ,  answer ques t ions ,  and be kind of a 
salesman, i f  you w i l l ,  t o  g e t  t h e  b a l l  r o l l i n g ,  g e t  a p o s i t i v e  response t o  
t h i s  type  t r a i n i n g ,  and have i t  accepted by t h e  p i l o t s .  
C U T .  CARROLL: You use  t h e  word i n i t i a l l y .  I ' m  th inking  of t h i s  
i n  t h e  contex t  of r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g ,  meaning t h a t  every year w e  would be 
doing t h i s  f o r  t h e  ind iv idua l .  Do 1: hear  you saying t h a t  w e  would be doing 
e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same type  review, perhaps r ev i sed  s l i g h t l y ,  each year?  
CAPT. SESSA: Revised each year .  I n  o the r  words, what w e  would 
env i s ion  is t h a t  t h e  next  year  t h e  program would be enhanced, brought t o  a 
higher  level because everyone would a l r eady  have been exposed t o  i t .  A t  
t h e  level w e  w e r e  asked t o  make our  recommendations, we  f e l t  t h a t  i t  w a s  
important ,  i f  t h i s  w e r e  pu t  i n t o  p r a c t i c e  a n d  w e  s t a r t e d  tomorrow, t h a t  i n  
a year  we'd have every p i l o t  exposed a t  a c e r t a i n  l e v e l ,  everybody would 
have t h e  bas i c s .  And t h a t  then you could expand upon t h a t  i n  year-to-year 
r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g ,  and a l s o  i n  spec ia l i zed  programs f o r  upgrade and 
t r a n s  i t  ion .  
CAPT. TRAUB, United A i r l i n e s :  Would t h e  LOFT scena r io  then fo l low 
t h i s  aud i o v i s u a l  ? 
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CAPT. SESSA: Y e s .  We envis ion  t h e  LOFT scena r io  following t h e  
aud iov i sua l ,  where now t h e  p i l o t  could u t i l i z e  some of t h e  s k i l l s  he had 
learned  i n  t h e  aud iov i sua l  p re sen ta t ion  a long  wi th  some b r i e f i n g  and so on, 
and then a c r i t i q u e  a f t e rwards .  The sugges t ion ,  I t h i n k  where carriers were 
a b l e  t o  do i t ,  is t o  v ideo  t a p e .  Video t ap ing  i s  good because you see t h e  
whole s i t u a t i o n .  I t h i n k  we  a l l  ag ree  t h a t  i t  would be an  i d e a l  s i t u a t i o n  t o  
video t a p e  i t ,  and t o  s o r t  of a l low t h e  p i l o t  t o  observe himself.  
And w e  f e l t ,  t o  go on wi th  your ques t ion ,  t h a t  he should no t  be evaluated 
i n  h i s  own world, t h a t  is ,  t h e  cockpi t  on- l ine  ope ra t ion ,  u n t i l  he had 
adequate exposure t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  some t r a i n i n g  i n  i t ,  and p r i o r  evalua- 
t i o n  on a simulated b a s i s  f o r  t h e  most p a r t .  
CAPT. CARROLL: This v ideo  tap ing  t h a t  you r e f e r  t o ,  Ron, would i t  
be of each ind iv idua l  s e s s ion?  O r  would i t  be of a s e s s i o n  t o  be used as a 
t r a i n i n g  v e h i c l e  f o r  o t h e r s ?  I n  e i t h e r  case, i n  t h e  v ideo  t ap ing ,  how d i d  
you envis ion  w e  would avoid t h e  d i s t r a c t i o n  of t h e  video t ap ing ,  o r  t h e  
personal  embarrassment i n  us ing  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  s e s s i o n  f o r  o t h e r s ,  t o  see i f  
t h e r e  were obvious i n d i c a t i o n s  of l a c k  of r e source  management? 
CAPT. SESSA: Well, w e  hadn't  envisioned us ing  i t  beyond t h a t  
s e s s i o n  f o r  only t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t  t o  observe.  
of those  o t h e r  i s s u e s .  We d i d n ' t  r e a l l y  address  those  o the r  i s s u e s  except 
f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  would no t  be seen by anyone except t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t .  
We r e a l l y  d i d n ' t  g e t  i n t o  some 
CAPT. CARROLL: So t h a t ' s  j u s t  done a t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  s e s s ion?  
CAPT. SESSA: Right.  
CAPT. FRINK: Did you cons ider  a t  a l l  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a mock 
s e s s i o n ,  t h a t  i s ,  video t a p e  a mock s e s s i o n  where mis takes  may be made, bu t  
obviously made, because of a l a c k  of o rgan iza t ion  as a t o o l ?  
CAPT. SESSA: Not s p e c i f i c a l l y .  W e  t a lked  about some s t a g i n g  
during LOFT scena r ios  by one o r  more of t h e  crewmembers, but w e  d i d n ' t  
t a l k  about c r e a t i n g  a mock s i t u a t i o n  p e r  se. 
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SELECTION AND INITIAL TRAINING 
* Capt. R. E. Crump 
Chairman, Group 1 
CAPT. FRINK ( In t roductory  comments): A t  t h i s  po in t  w e ' l l  s t a r t  
with Working Group 1 and go r i g h t  on through t h e  rest of t h e  groups. Working 
Group 1 w a s  headed by Bob Crump, of United A i r l i n e s ,  wi th  John Lauber as h i s  
a s s i s t a n t .  
CAPT. CRUMF': Thank you very much. This  has been t h e  most thought- 
provoking, s t imu la t ing ,  informative,  hard working workshop t h a t  I have ever  
a t tended .  Resource management s k i l l s ,  behavior and p r o f i c i e n c i e s  are c r i t i c a l  
t o  t h e  s a f e ,  e f f i c i e n t  ope ra t ion  of a carrier 's  a i r c r a f t .  We have a l l  read 
t h e  acc ident  r e p o r t s  t h a t  g raph ica l ly  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  po in t .  Working Group 1, 
which I rep resen t ,  w a s  asked t o  look a t  resource  management i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
earliest  events  i n  an  a i r l i n e  p i l o t ' s  c a r e e r ,  h i s  o r  her  s e l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  of aircrewmember, and t h e  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g  t h a t  fol lows t h a t  
s e l e c t i o n .  L e t  m e  d i s c u s s  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  process  f i r s t .  
Development of resource  management s k i l l s ,  behavior and prof ic iency  
begins  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  a s tuden t  p i l o t  e n t e r s  t h e  cockpi t ,  whether t h e  person 
is aware of it o r  no t .  The process  cont inues  as t r a i n i n g  becomes more i n t e n s e  
and t e c h n i c a l ,  and by t h e  t i m e  t h e  ind iv idua l  a p p l i e s  f o r  a p o s i t i o n  as  an 
a i r l i n e  p i l o t ,  he o r  she has gained a c e r t a i n  level of p ro f i c i ency  t h a t  i s  t h e  
r e s u l t  of a number of f a c t o r s ,  among them bas i c  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  nonf ly ing  
educat ion background, and p i l o t  t r a i n i n g .  D i f f e ren t  a p p l i c a n t s  obviously have 
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of prof ic iency  i n  resource  management a t  t h i s  po in t .  I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  a p p l i c a n t s  have d i f f e r e n t  p o t e n t i a l  as f a r  as f u r t h e r  develop- 
ment of t h e s e  c r i t i ca l  s k i l l s  is  concerned. 
A t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  wi th  t h e  b e n e f i t  of what w e  have learned a t  t h i s  work- 
shop, i t  is apparent  t h a t  i t  is important t h a t  both t h e  l e v e l  of resource  
management s k i l l  a t  t h e  t i m e  of a p p l i c a t i o n  and t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  improving 
t h e s e  s k i l l s  t o  a l e v e l  t h a t  w i l l  a l low a person t o  become a s a f e ,  e f f i c i e n t  
aircrewmember, be measured and evaluated i n  making candida te  s e l e c t i o n .  
How are w e  doing i n  t h i s  a r ea?  I can ' t  speak f o r  everyone, bu t  from my 
experience i n  helping t o  develop t h e  United A i r l i n e s  P i l o t  S e l e c t i o n  Program 
and from what I ' v e  heard here ,  I b e l i e v e  we are not  doing w e l l  a t  a l l .  This  
matter i s  no t  being adequately addressed and I t h i n k  t h i s  has  s e r i o u s  s a f e t y  
impl ica t ions .  There is  a measure of eva lua t ion  of present  s k i l l s  t h a t  i s  
lumped i n t o  our o t h e r  c r i t e r i a  f o r  s e l e c t i o n ,  but  i t  i s n ' t  s p e c i f i c .  I n  t h e  
area of measuring p o t e n t i a l ,  even less is  being done. 
I n  o rde r  t o  be a b l e  t o  eva lua te  s k i l l  level and p o t e n t i a l ,  i t  is  
necessary t o  e s t a b l i s h  a s tandard a g a i n s t  which t o  measure t h e  a p p l i c a n t s .  
Our committee f e e l s  s t rong ly  t h a t  no such s tandard  e x i s t s  today. Although 
w e  i n i t i a l l y  t r i e d  t o  d e a l  w i th  t h i s  i n  our d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  i t  quick ly  became 
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obvious t h a t  t h e  t a s k  w a s  beyond us ,  i n  f a c t ,  overwhelming. A g r e a t  d e a l  of 
r e sea rch  needs t o  be  done. Who can do t h i s ?  The ind iv idua l  a i r l i n e s  
poss ib ly .  Perhaps ind iv idua l  a i r l i n e s  i n  t i m e  could develop t h e  resources ,  
but  i t  would be t i m e  consuming and very  expensive.  
We b e l i e v e  what is  needed i s  a n  indus t ry  approach t o  these  twin 
problems. It i s  our recommendation t h a t  t h e  indus t ry  and NASA j o i n t l y  
develop a r e sea rch  program t o  provide t h e  t o o l s  t o  measure both resource  
management s k i l l s  and p o t e n t i a l .  W e  are sugges t ing  t h a t  t h i s  s tudy concern 
i t s e l f  wi th  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a l i s t  of a t t r i b u t e s  and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which b e s t  
equip an  a i r l i n e  p i l o t  t o  perform a t  a high level of s k i l l  i n  resource  
management; a p r o f i l e  of t he  success fu l  p i l o t ,  t h e  high achiever  i n  t h i s  
area. W e  f u r t h e r  be l i eve  t h a t  w e  should begin by looking a t  t h e s e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i n  a broad spectrum of our  p re sen t  a i r l i n e  p i l o t  populat ion,  
from t h e  long-haul Boeing 747 p i l o t  t o  t h e  short-haul  DC-9 p i l o t .  
t he  p r o f i l e  should a l low us  t o  screen  i n  good candida tes ,  no t  sc reen  out  
poor ones.  
We’believe 
L e t  m e  l i s t  some of t h e  o the r  concerns w e  f e e l  should be addressed;  t he  
l i s t  is  not  intended t o  be exhaust ive.  F i r s t ,  t h e  r o l e  of t h e  p i l o t  has  
changed s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n  t h e  las t  10 yea r s  and w i l l  cont inue t o  change i n  
t h e  f u t u r e  as w e  in t roduce  such a i r c r a f t  as t h e  Boeing 767. What implica- 
t i o n s  does t h i s  have when it comes t o  e f f e c t i v e  p i l o t  resource  management? 
Do w e  have t o  look f o r  d i f f e r e n t  a t t r i b u t e s  i n  p i l o t s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ?  It 
seems t h i s  may be poss ib l e .  It needs t o  be s tud ied .  
Second, as more females are en te r ing  t h e  a i r l i n e  p i l o t  ranks ,  w e  f e e l  
t h a t  t h i s  may i n  some way a f f e c t  cockpi t  resource  management. W e  f e e l  t h a t  
t h i s  should be a sub jec t  of a phase of t h e  recommended s tudy.  
Third,  educat ion i s  an  important resource  t h a t  t h e  p i l o t  app l i can t  
b r ings  t o  h i s  job .  W e  recommend t h a t  t h e  s tudy look a t  what type of 
educa t iona l  background b e s t  s u i t s  a person f o r  a p i l o t  career, and more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  what type  educat ion enhances t h e  n a t i v e  a b i l i t y  p i l o t  
t r a i n e e s  have i n  t h e  area of resource  management. Our group f e l t  t h a t  a 
4-year co l l ege  educat ion wi th  perhaps equal  emphasis on bus iness ,  s c i ence ,  
and t h e  humanities might be b e s t ,  bu t  we  would l i k e  more guidance i n  t h i s  
area. From t h i s  s tudy ,  i t  i s  hoped, would come a p r o f i l e  of t he  p i l o t  who 
would be s k i l l e d  i n  r e source  management. It would be up t o  t h e  ind iv idua l  
a i r l i n e  t o  r e f i n e  t h i s  p r o f i l e  t o  s u i t  t h e i r  own needs.  The s tudy ,  t o  be  
success fu l ,  would have t o  be l o n g i t u d i n a l ,  would have t o  cont inue over a 
long per iod i n  order  t o  v a l i d a t e  t h e  s tudy;  t h i s  i s  an  important p a r t  of our 
recommendation. 
t h e  s tudy .  Without t h e  wholehearted p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of t h i s  organiza t ion ,  t h e  
s tudy could no t  be success fu l .  
The ALPA would have t o  p l ay  a v i t a l  r o l e  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  
Another a spec t  of p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n  and resource  management concerns t h e  
supply of q u a l i f i e d  p i l o t s .  The pool of experienced a p p l i c a n t s  w i l l  d ry  up. 
The s tudy we  are recommending could g ive  co l l eges  wi th  a v i a t i o n  programs 
guidance i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of h igh  q u a l i t y  s t u d e n t s  f o r  t h e i r  programs. 
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Resource management t r a i n i n g  and eva lua t ion  could become a p a r t  of t h e  
program. This  would provide t h e  a i r l i n e s  wi th  higher  q u a l i t y  a p p l i c a n t s .  
L e t  m e  now address  t h e  second por t ion  of our r e p o r t ,  new-hire t r a i n i n g .  
It fol lows t h a t  i f  w e  b e l i e v e  i t  v i t a l  t o  test f o r  resource  management s k i l l s  
and p o t e n t i a l  i n  our  app l i can t  populat ion and select  wi th  t h i s  i n  mind, w e  
s t rong ly  advocate  management s k i l l s  t r a i n i n g  dur ing  new-hire school .  For t h e  
purpose of t h i s  d i scuss ion ,  Working Group 1 def ined  i n i t i a l  new-hire t r a i n i n g  
as c o n s i s t i n g  of t h e  fol lowing phases:  
F i r s t ,  ba s i c  ground school ,  which covers  FAR, company po l i cy  and 
opera t ing  procedures ,  and o the r  i t e m s  of genera l  i n t e r e s t .  
Two, t echn ica l  t r a i n i n g  equipment s p e c i f i c s  and checkout as e i t h e r  
f l i g h t  engineer  o r  c o p i l o t ,  depending on a i r c r a f t  type.  
Three, supervised l i n e  experience o r  t h e  shotgun phase. 
Four, t h e  remainder of t h e  probat ionary yea r .  I th ink  i t ' s  important t o  
no te  t h a t  w e  f e e l  t h a t  new-hire t r a i n i n g  extends i n t o  t h e  probat ionary year .  
The group thus examined t h e  requirements f o r  t r a i n i n g  and, equal ly  
important ,  t h e  eva lua t ion  of resource  management s k i l l s  i n  each of t hese  
four  phases.  
Here are our recommendations: Working Group 1 be l i eves  t h e  cu r ren t  
new-hire t r a i n i n g  programs do not  address  resource  management i n  s u f f i c i e n t  
depth.  Fu r the r ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  c u r r e n t  approaches t o  eva lua t ing  new-hire 
performance do not  adequately address  resource  management s k i l l s .  
Accordingly, w e  recommend t h a t  t h e  new-hire i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g  program in-  
corpora te  r e source  management t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e  bas i c  ground school  phase. W e  
f u r t h e r  recommend t h a t  more e f f e c t i v e  use  of t h e  oppor tun i t i e s  f o r  eva lua t ing  
and t r a i n i n g  resource  management be made by check-airmen during t h e  pro- 
ba t ionary  phase. 
We have t h r e e  s p e c i f i c  t r a i n i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  : f i r s t  , d e f i n i t i o n  of crew 
members' r o l e s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  W e  recommend t h a t  new-hire t r a i n e e s  
should be thoroughly indoc t r ina t ed  i n  the  b a s i c  mul t i -p i lo t  opera t ion .  This  
must inc lude  c l e a r  d e f i n i t i o n  of each c r e w  member's r o l e  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
The importance of monitor ing,  cross-checking, and e f f e c t i v e  communication 
should be s t r e s s e d .  This  d e f i n i t i o n  of c r e w  r o l e s  should extend beyond t h e  
cockpi t  t o  inc lude  a d e f i n i t i o n  of how c r e w  member r o l e s  are in t eg ra t ed  wi th  
those of t h e  a i r l i n e  management. We recommend t h a t  t h e s e  r o l e s  be def ined 
i n  such a way t h a t  t h e  new h i r e  c l e a r l y  sees t h a t  he o r  she must con t inua l ly  
work on improving r e source  management s k i l l s  i n  o rde r  t o  success fu l ly  move 
i n t o  p o s i t i o n s  of increas ing  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
Two, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of resources  a v a i l a b l e .  The new-hire i n i t i a l  
t r a i n i n g  program should c l e a r l y  make t h e  po in t  t h a t  f l igh t -deck  resource  
management i s  not  j u s t  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of t h e  cap ta in ,  bu t  t h a t  a l l  crew 
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members have resources  t o  manage. To s u c c e s s f u l l y  accomplish t h i s ,  t h e  
resources  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  new-hire f l i g h t  engineer  o r  c o p i l o t  must be 
c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d .  These resources  inc lude  t h e  fol lowing:  
1. Manuals - t h e  f l i g h t  engineer  u sua l ly  has  access t o  manuals t h a t  
are not  a v a i l a b l e  t o  o the r  crewmembers. 
2 .  Charts  - an  obvious resource  f o r  p i l o t s ,  but  a l s o  important f o r  
f l i g h t  engineers  because they make cross-checking and monitoring more 
e f f ec  t i v e  . 
3 .  Log book - t h e  f l i g h t  engineer  may o f t e n  be i n  t h e  b e s t  p o s i t i o n  
t o  i d e n t i f y  o r  diagnose t h e  problem because of h i s  o r  her  knowledge of t h e  
mechanical h i s t o r y  of t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
4 .  Systeps pane ls  - a resource  t h a t  is  not  o f t e n  considered,  but  i t  
is  of some importance. Some systems, p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  f o r  example, can be 
operated i n  a manual o r  automatic mode, thus  modifying workloads. 
5. Other crew members are a resource  - t h e  new h i r e  should be t r a ined  
t o  recognize s i t u a t i o n s  involving high workload o r  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which 
c l o s e  monitoring o r  superv is ion  is requi red .  I n  these  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e  new 
h i r e  should be t r a i n e d  t o  a s k  f o r  a s s i s t a n c e .  For example, ask ing  t h e  
cap ta in  o r  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  t o  v e r i f y  t h a t  t h e  proper f u e l  cu tof f  l e v e r  has 
been s e l e c t e d  p r i o r  t o  s h u t t i n g  down an  engine.  
6 .  Other human resources  - t hese  inc lude  t h e  cabin  crew and, via 
company r a d i o ,  maintenance, d i spa tch ,  and o the r  sources  of a s s i s t a n c e .  H i s  
o r  her  experience as an  airman i s  a resource  even i f  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l .  This  
i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  va luab le  f o r  he lp ing  t h e  monitoring and cross-checking 
process .  
7 .  Related t o  t h i s  i s  t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of t h e  f l i g h t  engineer  o r  f i r s t  
o f f i c e r .  P ro fes s iona l  airmen should s t r i v e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  c r e d i b i l i t y  w i th  
t h e i r  f e l low crewmembers because t h i s  makes f o r  more e f f e c t i v e  crew co- 
o rd ina t ion .  "I can r e l y  on Joe  t o  do a good job ,"  t r a n s l a t e s  i n t o ,  "I don ' t  
have t o  spend too much t i m e  monitoring J o e ' s  work.'' 
8. Another va luab le  resource  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  f l i g h t  engineer  is  h i s  
unique vantage po in t  i n  the  cockpi t .  The f l i g h t  engineer  i s  f r equen t ly  i n  
t h e  b e s t  p o s i t i o n  t o  observe,  monitor,  and cross-check t h e  o the r  crew- 
members. 
Now, I want t o  t a l k  about i n t e rpe r sona l  and communications s k i l l s .  W e  
recommend t h a t  new h i r e s  be given s p e c i f i c  t r a i n i n g  i n  in t e rpe r sona l  s k i l l s  
and e f f e c t i v e  communications. 
e f f e c t i v e  only i f  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  process  are e f f e c t i v e l y  communicated t o  
t h e  appropr i a t e  r e c i p i e n t .  Furthermore, t h i s  t r a i n i n g  should inc lude  methods 
and ways of a d j u s t i n g  t o  the  domineering cap ta in  t h a t  t h e  new h i r e  w i l l  
i n e v i t a b l y  f l y  wi th  sometime i n  h i s  o r  her  career. 
Monitoring and cross-checking can be 
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Now, f o r  s p e c i f i c  t r a i n i n g  approaches. Many of t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  
i d e n t i f i e d  above can be e f f e c t i v e l y  and economically m e t  throu 
c a t i o n  of audiovisua l  programs. 
programs could be produced and made a v a i l a b l e  on an  industry-wide b a s i s .  
Other p o s s i b i l i t i e s  inc lude  r o l e  playing and o t h e r  group techniques.  
Furthermore, t h e  check-airman and t h e  f l i g h t  manager should play an  important 
t r a i n i n g  and eva lua t ion  r o l e  dur ing  t h e  supervised l i n e  experience and 
probat ionary phases by c l o s e l y  observing the  r e source  management performance 
of t h e  new-hire t r a i n e e  and providing feedback, advice ,  and guidance t o  he lp  
r e f i n e  h i s  sk i l l s .  
It would be d e s i r a b l e  i f  a l i b r a r y  of such 
General ly ,  reading material - f o r  example, f l i g h t  ope ra t ions  news- 
letters and va r ious  awareness-generating programs - should a l s o  be made 
a v a i l a b l e .  Simulat ion,  e s p e c i a l l y  LOFT, w i l l  a l s o  play an  important r o l e  
i n  t h e  t r a i n i n g .  That b r ings  my r e p o r t  t o  a c lose .  
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RECURRENT TRAINING AND LINE OPERATION 
R. C. Houston* 
Chairman, Group 2 
CAPT. FRINK ( In t roductory  comments): Working group 2 w a s  headed 
by Bob Houston, who is  a l s o  involved wi th  r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g  and l i n e  
ope ra t ions ;  Duncan D i e t e r l y ,  of NASA, w a s  h i s  cohor t .  
DR. HOUSTON: W e  have some recommendations and conclusions very  
similar t o  those  of Ron Sessa ' s  group. W e  had a l i v e l y  and s p i r i t e d  d i s -  
cuss ion ,  and covered a l o t  of t o p i c s  t h a t  I ' m  no t  going t o  be a b l e  t o  review 
here .  
The group f e l t  t h a t  t h e  papers  t h a t  we presented were very  h e l p f u l ,  
provided a good b a s i s  f o r  group d i scuss ion ,  and t h a t  t h e  concepts presented 
by L e e  Bolman, Bob Helmreich, and Mike Garvey had a d e f i n i t e  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  
a i r l i n e  ope ra t ions .  I n  our  group, w e  had r e a l l y  no s e r i o u s  d i f f e r e n c e s  of 
opinion. We d i d  recognize t h e  necessary d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  a i r l i n e  approaches 
because of d i f f e r e n t  requirements of r o u t e  s t r u c t u r e  and volume of t r a i n i n g ,  
and f o r  t h a t  reason w e  d i d n ' t  t r y  t o  g e t  s p e c i f i c  as t o  exac t ly  how some 
t r a i n i n g  should be conducted. 
We d i d  have f u l l  agreement on t h e  need f o r  r e source  management t r a i n i n g  
and t h e  urgency f o r  i t .  A s  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p  we  t r i e d  t o  d e f i n e  resource  
management. 
and e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  of resources  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  crew, inc luding  
personnel ,  f a c i l i t i e s ,  equipment, and manuals.'' 
The genera l  d e f i n i t i o n  t h a t  w e  came up wi th  w a s  "The optimum 
W e  decided t h a t  t h e  need f o r  resource  management s k i l l  c e r t a i n l y  i s  not  
l imi t ed  t o  t h e  cap ta in ,  bu t  i t ' s  most evident  as t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  responsi-  
b i l i t y ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  when a c r e w  member upgrades t o  cap ta in .  W e  d i d  
ag ree  t h a t  company management has  a cer ta in  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  make s u r e  t h a t  
t h e  resources  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  c r e w  are appropr i a t e  and proper and no t  un- 
n e c e s s a r i l y  redundant;  t h i s  would inc lude  manuals and paperwork and approach 
c h a r t s .  Ce r t a in ly  we  want t h e  crew members t o  u s e  t h e i r  p r in t ed  resources ,  
bu t  i t ' s  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  t h e  resources  be proper ly  designed so t h a t  they can 
be e f f e c t i v e l y  used. 
W e  t a lked  about t h e  c r i t i ca l  components of r e source  management, and w e  
w i l l  t r y  t o  cover a few of them. Some over lap  wi th  t h e  information t h a t  John 
Lauber presented earlier i n  t h i s  symposium. One of t h e  broad headings of 
resource  management w a s  t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  a u t h o r i t y  and c o n t r o l .  
subsc r ibe  t o  Lee  Bolman's theory  of advocacy and inqu i ry  i n  which t h e  c a p t a i n  
should test and seek  and diagnose t h e  information sources  a v a i l a b l e .  H e  
should check c o n f l i c t i n g  information from t h e  advocacy o r  group o r i e n t a t i o n  
po in t  of view. He should be cons ide ra t e  of t h e  needs and p o i n t s  of view of 
t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  and t h e  f l i g h t  engineer .  I n  t e r m s  of t h e  management g r i d ,  
c e r t a i n l y  he should be people  o r i en ted  as w e l l  as goal  o r i en ted .  
Under t h a t  w e  
American A i r l i n e s .  * 
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The c a p t a i n  aga in ,  i n  exe rc i s ing  h i s  a u t h o r i t y ,  should ensure  clear 
de lega t ion  of r o l e s  dur ing  normal and emergency procedures.  I n  some of t h e  
acc iden t s  t h a t  w e  d i scussed ,  a c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r  w a s  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  not  a 
c l e a r  de l ega t ion  of what each crew member w a s  supposed t o  be doing, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  wi th  r e fe rence  t o  f l y i n g  t h e  a i r p l a n e .  That de l ega t ion  should 
no t  only be c l e a r ,  bu t  p o s i t i v e ,  and t h e  c a p t a i n  should be a b l e  t o  depend on 
t h e  o ther  crew members t o  be a b l e  t o  accomplish t h e  d u t i e s  t h a t  he has 
ass igned them. 
A second area t h a t  w e  considered as one of t h e  c r i t i c a l  components w a s  
t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  set p r i o r i t i e s .  I n  some s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e  
p r i o r i t i e s  are obvious; however, they are no t  so clear i n  o t h e r s ,  f o r  
example, i n  s i t u a t i o n s  where t h e r e  are c o n f l i c t i n g  requirements,  as i n  t h e  
case  of mul t ip le - fac tor  emergency. The cap ta in  then  must e s t a b l i s h  t h e  
sequence of events ;  he must minimize d i s t r a c t i o n s ;  eva lua te  o the r  poss ib l e  
information;  e l imina te  t h e  n o i s e  o r  t h e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  of l i g h t s  t h a t  come on 
i n  t h e  cockpi t  t h a t  are not  urgent ;  and then t i e  toge ther  t he  v a r i e t y  of 
procedures.  
Another major heading is t h a t  of i n t e rpe r sona l  r e l a t i o n s ,  which Ron 
Sessa has a l r eady  covered. One of t h e  th ings  t h a t  w a s  pointed out  w a s  t h a t  
communication between c r e w  members cannot w a i t  u n t i l  t h e  crew is i n  t h e  
cockp i t ,  bu t  i t  has t o  start  i n  Operat ions,  wi th  t h e  very bas i c  s t e p  of 
having t h e  crew members in t roduce  themselves t o  each o the r .  It c a n ' t  j u s t  
s tart  when t h e  f l i g h t  starts, but  r a t h e r  as soon as poss ib l e  i n  t h e  whole 
f l i g h t  sequence. 
Another major heading is  dec i s ion  making. W e  d iscussed t h e  r o l e  of 
procedures ve r sus  t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  innovat ive  c a p a b i l i t y ,  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  use  
o the r  a d d i t i o n a l  resources .  
We agreed t h a t  t h e r e  had t o  be s p e c i f i c ,  wel l -out l ined procedures,  but  t h e r e  
a l s o  had t o  be room f o r  t h e  c a p t a i n  t o  e x e r c i s e  h i s  proper judgment when 
circumstances requi red .  I th ink  w e  agreed t h a t  j u s t  e s t a b l i s h i n g  new 
procedures o r  a d d i t i o n a l  procedures wasn't  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  
decisionmaking process .  
W e  d i d n ' t  r e a l l y  a r r i v e  a t  a conclusion.  
Another f a c t o r  (another  component) i s  s i t u a t i o n  a n a l y s i s .  I n  t h i s  
connect ion,  w e  ta lked  about some of L e e ' s  [Bolman] concepts  of t h e  theory of 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  and whether i t ' s  a c o r r e c t  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
A s  p e r t a i n s  t o  t r a i n i n g  t o  m e e t  t h e  requirements  of resource  manage- 
ment, we  much ag ree  wi th  t h e  previous committee r e p o r t .  W e  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  
t r a i n i n g  should start e a r l y  i n  a person ' s  career and, w e  hope, i f  we're 
success fu l  i n  t r a i n i n g  our  c a p t a i n s  t o  be t h e  i d e a l  model of resource  
management, t h a t  t h e  j u n i o r  crew members w i l l  l e a r n  from t h a t  model. Now, 
t h a t ' s  a n  i d e a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  bu t  i t  would be n i c e  i f  t h a t  could be brought 
about .  I f  we're going t o  t r a i n  f o r  resource  management, f i r s t  w e  have t o  
d e f i n e  a l i t t l e  more s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h e  management s k i l l s  t o  be t r a i n e d ,  and 
t h a t  w a s  one of our ob jec t ives .  
s p e c i f i c  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  i f  w e ' r e  going t o  develop good t r a i n i n g  programs. 
W e  need t o  g ive  examples and come ou t  wi th  
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W e  do need t o  spend some t i m e  i n  t h e  r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g  process  i n  a 
classroom o r  wi th  audiovisua l  t ape  o r  computer-based i n s t r u c t i o n  program t o  
ge t  a c r o s s  t h e  concepts  t h a t  w e  t h i n k  are important f o r  resource  management. 
W e  would ag ree  wi th  t h e  need t o  sell  t h e  concept.  There w a s  one suggest ion 
of playing back some of t he  audio t apes  of crew conversa t ions  p r i o r  t o  some 
recen t  acc iden t s ,  as a means of convincing t h e  crewmembers t h a t  t h e  resource  
management p r i o r  t o  those  acc iden t s  w a s  no t  what it could have been. Playing 
back those  conversa t ions ,  wi th  some graphic  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  of where t h e  air-  
plane was and what w a s  happening, could be an  e f f e c t i v e  method (even without  
f u r t h e r  comments) of convincing t h e  crewmembers t h a t  they r e a l l y  d id  need t o  
pay a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h i s  area. 
And then,  of course ,  w e  f e l t  t h a t  we  need t o  t r a i n  t h e  managers f irst ,  
t h a t  i s ,  start  from t h e  top down so t h a t  they would have a f u l l  understanding 
of what w a s  meant by resource  management and what t h e  o the r  crew members are 
being t r a ined  f o r .  We suggested t h a t  ro le -p lay ing  could p l ay  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
p a r t  he re  i n  teaching t h e  concepts t h a t  w e  want t o  g e t  across .  It w a s  a l s o  
suggested t h a t  t h e  crewmembers themselves could create some scenar ios .  A t  
American they have found t h a t  t o  be very  e f f e c t i v e .  
Having done a l l  t h i s  teaching w e  might f i n d  t h a t  t h e  crew member has ,  t o  
u se  Lee's t e r m ,  an espoused theory  of opera t ion .  But w e  need t o  f i n d  out  
whether he can a c t u a l l y  put  t h a t  theory i n t o  opera t ion ;  whether i t  can be a 
theory of p r a c t i c e .  We concluded t h a t  a well-designed LOFT s i t u a t i o n  w a s  t h e  
p lace  where w e  could determine whether t h e  crewmember w a s  a b l e  t o  put  t h e  
concept i n t o  p r a c t i c e .  
This  aga in  would r e q u i r e  that t h e  check-airmen and i n s t r u c t o r s  be 
thoroughly t r a ined  so  t h a t  they would be a b l e  t o  observe t h e  crew's 
performance. W e  d id  t a l k  about t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of record ing  o r  video tap ing  
e i t h e r  some role-play se s s ions  o r  a c t u a l  s e s s i o n s ,  bu t  w e  d i d n ' t  g e t  i n t o  t h e  
d e t a i l s  of exac t ly  how t h i s  would be done. 
LOFT t r a i n i n g  is  c e r t a i n l y  a f e a s i b l e  concept t h a t ' s  supported by a l l  
of t h e  papers  t h a t  w e r e  handed out  t o  u s  p r i o r  t o  our  meeting. It would 
enable  u s  t o  put  t he  crewmembers i n  realist ic emergency s i t u a t i o n s  and l e t  
them see f o r  themselves how they can respond and handle  those  s i t u a t i o n s .  
The th ing  t h a t  needs t o  be addressed,  of course ,  is  t h e  observa t ion  of t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  t o  manage t h e i r  resources ,  t o  work wi th  t h e  o t h e r  crew members, t o  
use  information t h a t ' s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  them both i n  t h e  a i r c r a f t  i t s e l f ,  t h e  
ins t rumenta t ion ,  t h e  ope ra t ing  manuals, procedures,  and so on. This  r e q u i r e s  
t h e  development of t r a i n e d  observers ,  who can debr i e f  t h e  crews af te rward  and 
make sugges t ions  as t o  how t h e i r  management of t h e i r  resources  could be 
improved. . 
Simi lar  oppor tun i t i e s  occur i n  l i n e  checks f o r  which w e  need proper ly  
t r a i n e d  check-airmen whp are aware of t h e  need f o r  good resource  management. 
Well-trained observers  could counsel  and guide t h e  crewmembers i n  improving 
t h e i r  a b i l i t y  i n  resource  management. 
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One suggest ion f o r  a r e sea rch  p r o j e c t  would be t h e  development of a 
s e l f - t e s t  t o  eva lua te  an  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  resource  management c a p a b i l i t y .  
Now, t h i s  would be h i s  espoused theory ,  i n  Lee  Bolman's terms. And 
then,  r e l a t e d  t o  t h a t ,  of course,  would be t o  e s t a b l i s h  LOFT-type-scenario 
measurements wi th  r e fe rence  t o  resource  management. I n  o ther  words, we'd 
have a measure of t h e  man's espoused theory ,  pu t  him i n  a LOFT s i t u a t i o n ,  
and do some research  t o  develop ways of measuring more e f f e c t i v e l y  h i s  
resource  management i n  t h e  LOFT s i t u a t i o n .  I thought t h a t  w a s  a good 
combination. 
There 's  one o the r  quest ion t h a t  may be a l i t t l e  con t rove r s i a l .  The 
suggest ion w a s  made by one member t h a t  a f t e r  t h e  crewmembers have gone 
through LOFT t r a i n i n g  they ra te  each o t h e r  i n  t h e  management of t h e i r  
resources .  A s  I say,  t h a t  go t  mixed r ecep t ion  from t h e  committee, but  
t h a t ' s  always a p o s s i b i l i t y  depending on t h e  a i r l i n e  s i t u a t i o n .  
It  w a s  a l s o  suggested t h a t  t h e r e  be some re sea rch  on t h e  e f f e c t  of 
automation and self-confidence on t h e  l e v e l  of resource  management and on 
t h e  p i l o t ' s  self-image and job  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  W i l l  t h e  automation, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  f u t u r e  a i r c r a f t ,  reduce t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  c a p a b i l i t y  i n  
resource management and reduce h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  innovate  and use  a d d i t i o n a l  
resources?  
Another recommendation w a s  t o  encourage v a l i d a t i o n  of a managerial  
concept i n  t h e  cockpi t  s e t t i n g ,  t h e  program t h a t ' s  under way a t  North Cent ra l  
now. 
va l ida t ed  i n  a cockpi t  s e t t i n g .  
The concept proposed by Bob Helmreich and L e e  Bolman can be f u r t h e r  
Another i s ,  do some f u r t h e r  r e sea rch  on t h i s  gap between t h e  espoused 
theory and the  theory i n  use  i n  a cockpi t  s e t t i n g .  That,  I th ink ,  
. a t t r a c t e d  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  and i n t e r e s t  of a l l  of u s .  
We need t o  do a b e t t e r  j ob  of de f in ing  and perhaps rank-ordering f o r  
t r a i n i n g  emphasis t h e  c r i t i c a l  components of resource  management, and t o  
g ive  examples and i d e n t i f y  behaviors .  And then w e  need t o  develop measures 
of c a p a b i l i t y  i n  resource  management. 
One f i n a l  recommendation - r e sea rch  i n t o  t h e  e f f e c t  of f a t i g u e  on 
resource  management f a c i l i t y .  Is i t  conceivable  t h a t  resource  management 
s k i l l  i s  more s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  f a t i g u e ,  e i t h e r  as a r e s u l t  of a long f l i g h t  
o r  what went on p r l o r  t o  a f l i g h t  o r  t h e  number of segments? Do w e  tend t o  
become less e f f e c t i v e  i n  our in t e rc rew communications and in t e rpe r sona l  
s k i l l s  a f t e r  many segments of a long f l e g h t  o r  under f a t i g u e  condi t ions ,  
more so than  w e  drop o f f  i n  a c t u a l  s k i l l  i n  f l y i n g  t h e  a i r p l a n e  t echn ica l ly ,  
f o r  example, i n  making t h e  approach? 
I n  summary, I learned  a l o t  i n  our  workshop. Now I ' m  anxious t o  g e t  
back and see what w e  can do t o  apply some of t h e s e  concepts a t  American 
A i r l i n e s .  W e  have a l i t t l e  work t o  do t o  develop some of t h e  d e t a i l s  and 
some of t h e  economic impl ica t ions .  
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TRANSITION AND UPGRADE TRAINING 
Cap t .  L. F. 3. Holdstock* 
Chairman, Group 3 
CAPT. FRINK ( In t roductory  comments): I t ' s  obvious t h a t  a l o t  of 
good information is  coming ou t .  W e  have a l o t  l e f t  t o  do though, and i t ' s  
a sad th ing  that many a i r l i n e s  are no t  represented  here .  So w e  are going t o  
a sk  NASA t o  g e t  something ready as a r e s u l t  of t h i s  s o  t h a t  t h e  o the r  a i r -  
l i n e s  w i l l  b e n e f i t  from t h i s  work t h a t  you people have done. 
va luable  work and t h e  whole indus t ry  i s  going t o  b e n e f i t .  
I t ' s  very 
Working Group 3 w a s  a l s o  concerned wi th  t r a n s i t i o n  and upgrade t r a i n i n g .  
The chairman w a s  Len Holdstock; h i s  a s s i s t a n t ,  from NASA, w a s  Ren Curry. 
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Our group t r i e d ,  f i r s t  of a l l ,  t o  agree  i n  t h e i r  
own minds on what w a s  meant by t r a n s i t i o n  and upgrade t r a i n i n g .  
4 hours of d i scuss ion  and some very  e r u d i t e  explana t ions ,  you w i l l  be pleased 
t o  know w e  are s t i l l  i n  t h e  dark .  
And a f t e r  
W e  then  decided t o  conf ine  our  thoughts  t o  those a t t r i b u t e s  i n  which 
resource  management could p l ay  a p a r t .  
exe rc i se ,  and w e  immediately found t h a t  wi th  t r a n s i t i o n  and upgrade t r a i n i n g  
w e  w e r e  looking both backward and forward. 
coming from behind us  as we  were prepar ing  people  f o r  a f u t u r e .  W e  then 
decided t h a t  w e  had t o  make some assumptions.  
That seemed t o  be  the o b j e c t  of t h e  
W e  were dependent on material 
The f i r s t  of t h e s e  assumptions w a s  t h a t  f l i g h t  crews have t o  be t r a ined  
t o  appropr i a t e  s t anda rds .  We want he re  t o  stress t h e  importance of f l y i n g  
s tandards  and t e c h n i c a l  s t anda rds ,  and t h a t  t h e  t r a i n i n g  has t o  meet both 
company and r egu la to ry  requirements .  
The second assumption w e  made is  t h a t  t h e  r o l e s  a l l o c a t e d  t o  each crew- 
member are understood and respec ted  by t h e  o the r  crewmembers, so t h a t  t h e  
inf luence  of resource  management is known t o  a l l .  
Thi rd ly ,  we  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  t h e r e  could be a number of f a c t o r s  changing 
i n  t h e  world of a v i a t i o n .  I n  t h e  las t  few days,  w e  have heard of energy 
problems. 
ou t s ide  in f luences ,  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l ,  a l l  of which may change t h e  r o l e s  of 
t h e  c r e w .  For t h e  purposes of t h i s  exe rc i se ,  w e  assumed t h a t  i n  t h e  fore-  
s eeab le  f u t u r e ,  t h e r e  would be no changes. 
There may w e l l  be no t  problems but  changes i n  equipment and 
And l a s t l y ,  w e  assumed t h a t  any recommendations w e  made o r  any thoughts 
w e  had would no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  be a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a l l  groups and a l l  a i r l i n e s .  
* 
B r i t i s h  Airways. 
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W e  then went on t o  t r y  and answer t h e  quest ion’posed i n  t h e  paper by 
NASA, ’What are t h e  s p e c i f i c  management resource  s k i l l s ,  behavior and pro- 
f i c i e n c i e s  t o  be developed?’’ One poin t  made s t r a i g h t  away, l a r g e l y  i n  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t r a n s i t i o n  t r a i n i n g ,  is t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be  d i f f e r e n t  levels  of 
resource  management a v a i l a b l e  a t  any p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e .  To e n l a r g e  on t h a t ,  
immediately a f t e r  t r a i n i n g  t h e r e  i s  a b a s i c  level  of competency. Following 
t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be change, t h e r e  w i l l  be  increased competency, and as t h a t  
competency changes, so w i l l  t h e  resources  a v a i l a b l e  change. 
Now, t h e  u l t i m a t e  o b j e c t i v e ,  of course,  i s  t o  i n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  crew, 
under t h e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  c a p t a i n ,  w i l l  eventua l ly  o p e r a t e  as a t o t a l l y  co- 
ord ina ted  u n i t  w i t h  t h e  maximum level  of e f f i c i e n c y .  W e  then went on t o  
l ist  those  s k i l l s  t h a t  w e  t h i n k  are  necessary,  bu t  I must emphasize t h a t  w e  
are n o t  l i s t i n g  them i n  any order  of importance o r  p r i o r i t y .  We merely l i s t  
them as t h e  group discussed them. 
We have put them under t h r e e  recommended headings,  f i r s t  of a l l  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  s o c i a l  and communication s k i l l s .  Although w e  haven’t  l i s t e d  them i n  
any p r i o r i t y ,  w e  d i d  c l a s s i f y  them e i t h e r  above o r  below a l i n e .  The ones 
above t h e  l i n e ,  w e  thought,  should be s p e c i a l l y  emphasized i n  upgrade and 
t r a n s i t i o n  t r a i n i n g ;  those  below t h e  l i n e  should be taught  as g e n e r a l l y  
d e s i r a b l e  a t t r i b u t e s .  
Thus, as  shown i n  t a b l e  1, the  in te rdepar tmenta l  r e l a t i o n s  are l i s t e d  
above t h e  l i n e .  In te rdepar tmenta l  
TABLE 1.- SOCIAL AND COMMUNICATION r e l a t i o n s  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  
SKILLS between t h e  crew and t h e  cabin crew 
crews, maintenance - anyone who i s  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  s a f e  opera t ion .  
CONS1 D E R AT 10 N And below t h e  l i n e  w e  then put  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n  of everyone else.  Con- 
FAIRNESS s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  rest of your crew, 
both i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
INSIDE COCKPIT When cons ider ing  them, w e  thought 
t h a t  t h e r e  must be a degree of f a i r -  
nes s ,  f a i r n e s s  i n  judgment. One has  OUTSIDE COCKPIT 
t o  bear  i n  mind t h a t  a f a s t  judgment o r  a judgment based on incomplete in- 
formation could w e l l  impair t h e  f u t u r e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of an  ind iv idua l .  And 
t h i s ,  of course ,  i s  both i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  I know w e  tend,  
when we’re f l y i n g ,  t o  wrap ourse lves  up i n  t h i s  cocoon of metal, but t h e r e  
are a l o t  of people involved, and they a l l  have a p a r t  t o  play.  
INTERDEPARTMENTAL RELATIONS o r  f l i g h t  a t t e n d a n t s ,  t h e  ground 
----------_. 
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TABLE 2.- PLANNING, PROBLEM-SOLVING, 
D E C I  SIONMAKING 
CONSIDERATION OF ALL ALTERNATIVES 
SETTING TASK PRIORITIES 
_.----------- 
COMMUNICATION OF PLANS 
ANTICIPATION OF SITUATION 
Under t h e  heading of Planning, 
Problem-Solving, Decisionmaking 
( t a b l e  2 )  w e  l i s t e d  4 poin ts .  The 
f i r s t  one above t h e  l i n e  is  t h e  
necess i ty  t o  consider  a l l  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
We need t r a i n i n g  i n  the  a b i l i t y  t o  
cons ider  a l l  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  t o  know t h e  
s i t u a t i o n ,  t o  respond t o  the  s i t u a -  
t i o n .  Secondly, w e  have t o  be a b l e  t o  
set t h e  t a s k  p r i o r i t i e s .  I t ' s  a 
func t ion  of t i m e ,  and of a b i l i t y  
wi th in  the  crew. 
Below t h e  l i n e ,  good communications of f u t u r e  a c t i o n s  and a n t i c i p a t e d  
a c t i o n s  are needed. It 's not  good enough i f  you, as  one crewmember, are 
aware of an  impending problem. 
it  and do t h e  r i g h t  t h ing  a t  t h e  r i g h t  t i m e ,  bu t  i t ' s  a l s o  necessary f o r  
everyone else t o  know t h a t  you ' re  going t o  do i t .  
You may know t h a t  you a re  q u i t e  happy t o  m e e t  
And l a s t l y ,  below t h e  l i n e ,  i s  t h e  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of o the r  in f luences  on 
the  s i t u a t i o n .  These inc lude  environmental  in f luences ,  poss ib ly  company 
in f luences ,  i n f luences  of passengers ,  in f luences  of cabin  crew on t h e  f l i g h t  
deck, and in f luences  of con t ro l .  A l l  i n  a l l ,  a genera l  awareness and 
a n t i c i p a t i o n .  
A t h i r d  heading i s  t h a t  of Leadership and Management ( t a b l e  3) .  Above 
the  l i n e ,  we th ink  i t ' s  necessary t o  develop an  apprec i a t ion  of new 
TABLE 3.- LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
APPRECIATION 0 F NEW R ESPONSI BI LIT I ES 
AWARENESS OF CREW'S TASKS 
ABILITY TO DELEGATE 
WILLINGNESS TO TEACH/SHARE 
ABILITY TO INSTILL CONFIDENCE 
---------_I--- 
PRO F ESSlO N A L ISM 
SELF-CONFIDENCE 
COMMAND PRESENCE - STYLE - INTEGRITY 
COMMUNICATION OF INTENT 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  changed responsi-  
b i l i t i e s .  I t ' s  necessary f o r  t h e  
l eade r  t o  be t o t a l l y  aware of everyone 
else's t a s k s ,  t o  have a complete 
p i c t u r e .  Equal ly ,  i t ' s  necessary f o r  
o the r  crewmembers t o  know what he o r  
she  can expect  of everyone else. 
We th ink  i t ' s  necessary f o r  t h e  
l eade r  t o  be a b l e  t o  de l ega te  - 
not  t o  o f f load  those  s m a l l ,  unnecessary 
t a s k s  - b u t  t o  de l ega te  wi th  t h e  
thought t h a t  t h e r e  is  some teaching t o  
be done. The crew w i l l  l e a r n  by use  
of t h e  resources ;  and i f  t h e y ' r e  
delegated e a r l y  i n  t h e  man's career 
and inc reas ing ly  de lega ted ,  t he  
p i c t u r e  w i l l  be  cons t an t ly  improved. 
Below t h e  l i n e ,  and it  should be acknowledged t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  some 
d i f f i c u l t y  i n  de f in ing  t h e  word, w e  pu t  profess iona l i sm.  
t h a t  self-confidence w a s  necessary.  
should have command presence.  Again, a d i f f i c u l t  word t o  de f ine ,  but  I t h i n k  
w e  a l l  know what i s  meant. The man should have s t y l e ,  he should have 
W e  went on t o  say 
We thought i t  necessary t h a t  a leader  
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. 
i n t e g r i t y .  Las t ly ,  t h e r e  should be a d i s t r i b u t i o n  of a c t i v i t i e s  t o  use  a l l  
a v a i l a b l e  resources  i n  t h e  b e s t  poss ib l e  way. 
Now, a l l  of t he  p o i n t s  mentioned do apply t o  both t r a n s i t i o n  and upgrade 
t r a i n i n g .  A t  t h e  same t i m e  w e  a p p r e c i a t e  t h a t  a l l  t hese  p o i n t s  are  learned  
throughout t h e  airman's  career and any pe r iod ic  reinforcement must be t o  the  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  b e n e f i t ,  whether i t  be by way of courses ,  information,  o r  word 
of mouth. It doesn ' t  matter how i t  comes, as long as  i t ' s  cons t an t ly  spread.  
We d i d n ' t  spend too much t i m e  dec id ing  how one w a s  t o  do t h i s .  There 
are a number of t o o l s  a v a i l a b l e .  There are classroom t o o l s ,  t h e  case  s tudy 
approach, t h e  r o l e  p lay ing  t h a t  has  a l r eady  been mentioned, exchange of 
s i t u a t i o n s  and d u t i e s  i n  s imula tors  o r  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n  s imula tors ,  but  
j u s t  s imulated condi t ions .  Obviously, u se  of t h e  s imula to r ,  LOFT t r a i n i n g ,  
a i r c r a f t  t r a i n i n g ,  and t h e r e  are  a number of o t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
We thought t h a t  t h e r e  should be more p r e b r i e f i n g  and debr i e f ing  by t h e  
ord inary  l i n e  crews. 
and a t  the  conclusion of t h e  f l i g h t  say ,  "Thank you very  much, goodbye.'' 
But very o f t e n  something happens dur ing  a f l i g h t  t h a t  i s  worth d i scuss ing  
and t h a t  should be d iscussed  r i g h t  then and the re .  
We a l l  know t h a t  i t ' s  easy  t o  walk aboard an a i r c r a f t ,  
Management courses  a r e - o f  va lue  and i n  t h i s  r e spec t  I th ink  t h a t  one 
should not  n e c e s s a r i l y  conf ine  such courses  t o  t h e  commanders, t o  t he  
cap ta ins ,  bu t  t h a t  the sooner one involves  c o p i l o t s  t h e  b e t t e r .  
I n  summary, t h e  f e e l i n g  of our  group w a s  t h a t  t h e  e x p e r t i s e  of p i l o t s  
and crews i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  an  ongoing matter,  and they should be encouraged t o  
accept  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  they  are i n  a profess ion  c a l l i n g  f o r  cqns tan t  l ea rn ing  
and cons tan t  improvement. 
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SELECTION AND I N I T I A L  TRAINING 
* Capt. Berton Beach 
Chairman, Group 4 
CAPT. FRINK ( In t roductory  comments): The t o p i c  of Group 4 w a s  
s e l e c t i o n  and i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g .  The chairman of Group 4 w a s  Bert Beach, of 
Eas te rn ,  and he w a s  a s s i s t e d  by Maurie White. 
CAPT. BEACH: By way of i n t roduc t ion ,  w e  f e l t  t h a t  t o  enable  t h e  
c l e a r  s epa ra t ion  of t he  i s s u e s  of resource  management from those  of otherwise 
wel l -qua l i f ied  airmen, w e  should treat t h e  s k i l l s  and t r a i n i n g  requi red  f o r  
resource  management as incremental ;  t h a t  i s ,  as no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  being ev ident  
i n  the  phys ica l  opera t ion  of t he  a i r p l a n e .  This  s ta tement  of t h e  approach is  
perhaps not  t h e  c l e a r e s t  w e  could develop, but  a t  least i t  had t h e  v i r t u e  of 
helping t o  focus t h e  t a s k  t h a t  w e  considered i n  t h i s  d i scuss ion .  
One of t h e  fundamental conclusions t h a t  w e  reached unanimously w a s  t h a t  
resource  management should be sought and f o s t e r e d  a t  every s t a g e  of 
evolu t ion  i n  t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  c a r e e r ,  inc luding  s e l e c t i o n  of t h e  candida te  air-  
man, from t h e  f i r s t  day h e ' s  on t h e  proper ty .  The in fe rence  of t h i s  
dec i s ion  i s  t h a t  given t h e  present  p a t t e r n  of f l igh t -deck  promotions, t h e  
candida te  should have s k i l l s  and q u a l i t i e s  t h a t  w i l l  enable  him t o  func t ion  
e f f e c t i v e l y  as a subord ina te  dur ing  t h e  long w a i t  f o r  cap ta incy ,  and t h a t ,  
upon ob ta in ing  command rank, he should e x h i b i t  a new balance of t h e s e  s k i l l s  
as requi red  by t h a t  job .  
These cons ide ra t ions  lead  t o  a d e f i n i t i o n  of t he  s k i l l s  requi red  f o r  
resource  management t h a t  might no t  have otherwise been introduced i n  t h e  
s e l e c t i o n  process .  They a l s o  impose a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  a i r l i n e  
management t o  he lp  maintain e a r l y  mot iva t ions  through t h e  long per iod of 
subord ina te  s t a t u s .  
It should be noted f u r t h e r  t h a t  t h e  d e l i n e a t i o n  of s k i l l s  and 
q u a l i t i e s  t h a t  should be looked f o r  i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  process  doesn ' t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  mean t h a t  w e  a l r eady  have t h e  cri teria and t h e  test procedures 
needed t o  i d e n t i f y  them. Poss ib ly  knowledge e x i s t s  regard ing  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of 
such information,  c r i t e r i a ,  o r  test procedures,  bu t  they weren ' t  immediately 
a t  hand i n  our working group, and t h e  consensus w a s  t h a t  e i t h e r  those  
procedures e x i s t  c u r r e n t l y  o r  could be developed. 
The provis ion  of r e source  management t r a i n i n g  dur ing  t h e  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g  
per iod w a s  d i scussed ,  and i t  w a s  agreed t h a t  such t r a i n i n g  must be provided 
i n  order  t o  enable  t h e  j u n i o r  airman t o  func t ion  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  support  of 
t h e  cap ta in .  It would have t h e  added b e n e f i t  of ensuring t h a t  h i s  i n d o c t r i -  
n a t i o n  t o  capta incy  w a s  c a r r i e d  out  as a n  ongoing, progress ive ,  evolu t ionary  
process ,  one t h a t  i s  more e a s i l y  d iges t ed  than t h e  kind of c r a s h  courses  w e  
s e e m  t o  be providing today. 
*Eastern Air l ines .  
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To ensure  t h a t  t h e  candida te  e i t h e r  a l r eady  has  resource  management 
s k i l l s  o r  can be t r a i n e d  i n  t h e s e  s k i l l s ,  c e r t a i n  q u a l i t i e s  over  and above 
t h e  obvious ones needed f o r  good airmanship should be looked f o r  and 
evaluated i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  process .  And w e  f e l t  some of t h e s e  th ings  should 
be as fo l lows .  
1. H e  should have e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  communication s k i l l .  
2 .  H e  should be a t e a m  p l aye r .  That is  t o  say,  he needs t o  be t o l e r a n t  
of defer red  g r a t i f i c a t i o n .  
3 .  H e  should be a good fol lower as w e l l  as a good l eade r .  
4 .  H e  should ope ra t e  coopera t ive ly  wi th in  t h e  system, t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  
t h e  a v i a t i o n  system, and he should have a s t rong  personal  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h a t  
system. 
5. H e  should have a s t a b l e  p e r s o n a l i t y .  
6 .  H e  should be f l e x i b l e ,  t h a t  is  t o  say ,  he needs t o  be adaptab le  t o  
changing condi t ions .  
7 .  H e  needs t o  have t h e  proper motivat ion t o  become an a i r l i n e  cap ta in .  
We got  a l i t t l e  hung up on what motivat ion means, but  w e ' l l  address  t h a t  
la ter .  
The cr i ter ia  and test procedures f o r  eva lua t ing  t h e  above s k i l l s  may 
a l ready  be a v a i l a b l e  i n  an  adaptab le  form from t h e  psychological  l i t e r a t u r e  
now ex tan t .  I f  n o t ,  programs ought t o  be conducted t o  develop them. The 
f i n a l  s e l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  candida te  should be done by Flying Operations as t h e  
u l t i m a t e  a r b i t e r  of t h e  man's s u i t a b i l i t y  as a p o t e n t i a l  a i r c r a f t  commander. 
Training f o r  resource  management should be s t a r t e d  as e a r l y  i n  t h e  
airman's  career as poss ib l e ,  i n  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g ,  obviously.  It should be 
c a r r i e d  on cont inuously through h i s  progress  toward being an a i r l i n e  c a p t a i n ,  
Training f o r  resource  management, even a t  t h e  subord ina te  level,  should 
inc lude  improved methods of providing expanded o r i e n t a t i o n  t r a i n i n g .  This  
would enable  t h e  new h i r e  t o  be aware of t h e  resources  a v a i l a b l e  t o  him, and 
t o  begin t o  t h i n k  e a r l y  i n  h i s  career as he would i f  he w e r e  a cap ta in ,  and 
could thereby provide t h e  c a p t a i n  wi th  informed suppor t .  
Because of t h e  cosmopolitan makeup of our  group w e  tended, i n  d i s -  
cuss ing  methods w e  thought would be a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t r a i n i n g ,  t o  be  very  
genera l ,  r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  each carrier may have s p e c i f i c  requirements .  We 
f e l t  t h a t  formal t r a i n i n g  on i n t e r p e r s o n a l  s k i l l s  and management s k i l l s  w a s  
an  abso lu te  requirement,  formal t r a i n i n g  being classroom t r a i n i n g ,  s l i d e  
t a p e  p re sen ta t ions ,  aud iov i sua l ,  TV, f i l m  - whatever f i t s  t h e  carrier's 
needs. 
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Train ing  i n  t h e  complete crew concept should be given e a r l y .  Complete 
crew concept being no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  l imi t ed  t o ,  bu t  inc luding  "What is your 
r o l e  i n  t h e  c r e w ? "  
r o l e ? "  The complete crew concept ,  w e  f e l t ,  meant j u s t  
t h a t  - what do you do, what is a v a i l a b l e  t o  you, and how do you use  i t .  
"What i s  your r o l e  i n  support  of t h e  o the r  person ' s  
"What do they do?" 
W e  f e l t  t h a t  e a r l y  i n  t h e  t r a i n i n g  program, perhaps i n  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g ,  
ful l -mission s imula t ion  o r  LOFT t r a i n i n g ,  i f  you p r e f e r ,  should be i n i t i a t e d ,  
beginning wi th  normal s i t u a t i o n s ,  and proceeding on t o  t h e  more d i f f i c u l t  
abnormal s i t u a t i o n s .  W e  a l s o  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  pub l i ca t ions  t h a t  f l i g h t  crews 
use  as gu ide l ines  f o r  ope ra t ions  should r e f l e c t  resource  management con- 
s i d e r a t i o n s .  Perhaps t h a t  might be a p r o j e c t  t h a t  NASA could undertake s ince  
w e  weren ' t  c e r t a i n  how w e  could rewrite t r a i n i n g  manuals and a i r c r a f t  
ope ra t ing  manuals t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  kinds of t h ings  w e  f e e l  were important i n  
t h a t  area. 
Procedures should be developed t o  eva lua te  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h i s  
kind of t r a i n i n g .  
c a p t a i n  as t o  how e f f e c t i v e l y  we're t r a i n i n g  t h e  i n i t i a l  crewman, and w r i t t e n  
r e p o r t s ,  t h a t  i s ,  l i n e  p i l o t ' s  r e p o r t s ,  on how w e l l  t h e  man is  performing i n  
h i s  j ob .  There w a s  a need f o r  e f f e c t i v e  superv is ion  by check-airmen from t h e  
carrier t o  watch t h e  i n i t i a l  t r a i n e e  and t o  r e p o r t  back any d e f i c i e n c i e s  they 
s a w  i n  t h e  th ings  w e  supposedly t r a i n e d  him t o  do. W e  a l s o  f e l t  t h a t  LOFT, 
used as an eva lua tor  during r ecu r ren t  t r a i n i n g ,  would g ive  us  a handle  on how 
w e l l  w e  had done our  job  i n  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g .  
They could inc lude  such th ings  as feedback from t h e  l i n e  
W e  a l s o  would a s k  t h e  s tudent  f o r  feedback immediately upon completion 
of t h e  t r a i n i n g  - what he thought of i t ,  what he f e l t  he had missed, an  
o v e r a l l  judgment of our a b i l i t y  t o  t r a in  him w e l l .  Addi t iona l  feedback 
should be obtained a f t e r  he has  completed t h e  probat ion.  It w a s  thought t h a t  
w e  might f i n d  a l i t t l e  more candor a f t e r  he w a s  a l r eady  assured of t h e  j o b  
than when he w a s  a t  our  mercy dur ing  our t r a i n i n g  program. 
W e  a l s o  f e l t ,  as I see t h e  o the r  groups d i d ,  t h a t  w e  need open 
communications between t h e  t r a i n e r s  and t h e  managers on t h e  one hand, and 
t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  p i l o t s ,  i n  our case, t h e  Air Line P i l o t s  
Associat ion,  on t h e  o the r  hand, t o  provide u s  wi th  a d d i t i o n a l  feedback. 
I n  summary, w e  f e l t  t h a t  resource  management s k i l l s  and p o t e n t i a l  should 
be i d e n t i f i e d  and considered i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  process .  
t h e  ind iv idua l  con t r ibu t ing  t o  resource  management s k i l l  have been 
de l inea ted ,  bu t  t h e  cr i ter ia  and procedures f o r  eva lua t ion  may need t o  be 
developed. 
throughout t h e  airman's  career s t a r t i n g  i n  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g .  
Ce r t a in  q u a l i t i e s  of 
Training and resource  management should be provided cont inuously 
A v a r i e t y  of p o s s i b l e  methods f o r  eva lua t ing  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of 
resource  management t r a i n i n g  can be u t i l i z e d ,  inc luding  poss ib l e  a c t i v i t y  by 
company management, feedback from t h e  p i l o t s '  s e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  e tc .  
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Some developments might r e q u i  
p r o j e c t s  perhaps f o r  NASA. W e  s p  
t r y i n g  t o  dec ide  what an a i r l i ne  c a p t a i n  is, s i n c e  that 's t h e  
t r a i n i n g  u l t i m a t e l y  t akes .  W e  had some d i f f e  ce of opinion 
a l eade r?  Is he t h e  commander? Is t h e r e  a d 
cap ta in  is might be a problem, and s i n c e  w e  cou ldn ' t  so lve  i t  t o  our  
unanimous s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  we f e l t  i t  might be a good p r o j e c t  f o r  NASA t o  under- 
t ake  t o  develop a d e f i n i t i o n .  Once w e  know t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n  f o r  s u r e ,  then  w e  
might be b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  address  t h e  t r a i n i n g  methods t o  make him one. 
W e  a l s o  thought t h a t  t o  i n i t i a t e  some t r a i n i n g  i n  resource  management, 
i t  might be poss ib l e  t o  t ake  an a i r  carrier's i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g  program and 
run  two groups through i t .  One would be put  through t h e  carrier 's  e x i s t i n g  
i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g  program, and t h e  o the r  through a program developed perhaps 
e n t i r e l y  by NASA o r  the  carrier 's  program modified by NASA t o  inc lude  t h e  
i n t e r p e r s o n a l  s k i l l s  emphasis, t h e  resource  management emphasis. A t  t h e  end 
of it w e  would t r y  t o  eva lua te  which produced t h e  b e t t e r  a v i a t o r .  
That,  i n  summary, is what w e  spent  t h e  last day and a ha l f  doing. 
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TRANSITION AND UPGRADE TRAINING 
Lawson mite* 
Chairman, Group 6 
CAPT. FRINK ( In t roductory  comments): Our l as t  r e p o r t  is  from 
Working Group 6 ,  which w a s  chaired by Lawson White, of IATA; he w a s  a s s i s t e d  
by George Cooper. Their  t op ic  w a s  t r a n s i t i o n  and upgrade t r a i n i n g .  
MR. WHITE: We too found i t  a problem t o  d e f i n e  what w e  meant by 
t r a n s i t i o n  and upgrade t r a i n i n g .  To our group, t r a n s i t i o n  t r a i n i n g  is  t h a t  
t r a i n i n g  given t o  a f l i g h t  crewmember i n  order  f o r  him o r  her  t o  be 
q u a l i f i e d  t o  ope ra t e  i n  t h e  same capac i ty  i n  a new a i r c r a f t  type.  
upgrade t r a i n i n g  w e  considered as t h e  t r a i n i n g  given t o  a f l i g h t  crewmember 
i n  order  f o r  her o r  him t o  ope ra t e  i n  a higher  capac i ty  i n  t h e  same a i r c r a f t  
t y p e ,  t h a t  i s ,  from f i r s t  o f f i c e r  t o  cap ta in  o r  even from second o f f i c e r  t o  
f i r s t  o f f i c e r .  
And 
I propose t o  read you a summary of our d i scuss ions .  For t r a n s i t i o n  
t r a i n i n g ,  t h e  working group concluded t h a t  t h e  resources  t o  be managed would 
vary according t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t  type,  t h e  crewing philosophy, t h e  type of 
ope ra t ions ,  etc.  Nevertheless ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of resource  management would 
remain t h e  same, t h a t  i s ,  using a l l  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  resources  t o  t h e  b e s t  
advantage. 
It w a s  agreed t h a t  resource  management t r a i n i n g ,  i f  it is  included i n  a 
t r a n s i t i o n  course ,  should c o n s i s t  s o l e l y  of i n s t r u c t i o n  on what resources  
were a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  crewmembers. The reason  w e  reached t h i s  dec i s ion  w a s  
because w e  d i d n ' t  know what had gone on i n  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g ,  and w e  d i d n ' t  
know what had gone on i n  r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g ,  and so w e  had t o  make some 
assumptions t h a t  t he  o the r  groups would t ake  c a r e  of t h a t .  W e  thought i t  
important t h a t  t h e  crewmembers a l r eady  had some t r a i n i n g ,  and w e  j u s t  had t o  
i d e n t i f y  f o r  them i n  t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  what w a s  d i f f e r e n t  on t h e  new a i r c r a f t  
type 
We a l s o  agreed t h a t  t h e  knowledge and s k i l l  i n  resource  management would 
be d i f f e r e n t  f o r  t h e  c a p t a i n  and t h e  o the r  crewmembers. The reason f o r  t h i s  
i s  because t h e  c a p t a i n  must have t h e  l e g a l  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  t h e  s a f e t y  of h i s  
a i r c r a f t ,  and he i s ,  the re fo re ,  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  t o t a l  opera t ion ,  in-  
c luding  proper  resource  management. The r o l e  f o r  t h e  o the r  crewmembers, and 
t h i s  inc ludes  cabin  crewmembers, would be t h a t  they are p a r t  of t h e  
c a p t a i n ' s  resources  and hence have r o l e s  t h a t  are d i f f e r e n t  and suppor t ive .  
Resource management t r a i n i n g  should,  t he re fo re ,  r e f l e c t  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  
r o l e s  f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  crewmembers. 
* 
IATA. 
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It w a s  agreed a l s o  t h a t  resource  management t r a i n i n g  should,  t he re fo re ,  
s tar t  wi th  t h e  i n i t i a l  h i r i n g ,  and cont inue through each crewmember's c a r e e r  
t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  requirements of t h e  r o l e s  t h a t  I have j u s t  ou t l i ned ,  namely, 
suppor t ive  and managerial .  
c a p t a i n  should be capable  of proper resource management. To do t h i s  he w a s  
r equ i r ed ,  f i r s t  of a l l ,  t o  show proper c r e d i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  o the r  crewmembers. 
This  i n f e r s  competence, imparting s k i l l  and knowledge as a p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  
a good resource  manager and, of course,  continued maintenance of t h i s  
p ro f i c i ency  . 
There w a s  a l s o  no doubt t h a t  each and every 
W e  next  turned our a t t e n t i o n  t o  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  s k i l l s  requi red  of a 
good resource  manager and w e  f i r s t  of a l l  ou t l i ned  t h e s e  ( f i g .  1) as s o c i a l  
and communication s k i l l s ,  l eade r sh ip  and management s k i l l s ,  p lanning,  
problem-solving and decisionmaking s k i l l s .  W e  expanded t h e  requirements t o  
some e x t e n t ,  a l though incompletely,  as fol lows:  
Under s o c i a l  and communication s k i l l s  ( f i g .  2 )  w e  f e l t  t h a t  t he  manager, 
i f  you w i l l ,  should have t r a i n i n g  i n  in t e rpe r sona l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and i n  t h e  
mechanics of communication and communication e r r o r s .  I n  f i g u r e  3 ,  manage- 
ment s k i l l s ,  you note ,  I dropped l eade r sh ip  from t h e  t i t l e  and I'll r e t u r n  
t o  t h a t .  H e  should have t r a i n i n g  i n  de l ega t ion  of a u t h o r i t y ;  e s t a b l i s h i n g  
p r i o r i t i e s ;  achieving proper crew coord ina t ion  and crew cooperat ion;  
a l l o c a t i n g  d u t i e s ;  d i s t r i b u t i n g  workload; recognizing stress; superv is ing  
assigned t a s k s ;  monitoring t a s k s ;  and, p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  i n  accept ing  h i s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  
With regard t o  planning s k i l l s  ( f i g .  4 )  he needed t r a i n i n g  f o r  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  awareness and s t ay ing  ahead of t h e  a i r c r a f t .  What w e  mean by t h a t  
seems s e l f  -evident .  
I n  problem-solving s k i l l s  ( f i g .  5) t r a i n i n g  should be provided i n  
problem recogn i t ion  and s o l u t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s .  
With r e s p e c t  t o  decisionmaking s k i l l s ,  w e  f e l t  t h e  t r a i n i n g  should be i n  
t h e  knowledge necessary t o  make t h e  dec i s ion ,  t r a i n i n g  f o r  t h e  self-confidence 
t o  make a dec i s ion ,  and t h e  courage t o  s tand  by o r  change t h a t  dec i s ion  as 
necessary.  
Now, wi th  respect t o  l eade r sh ip ,  t h i s  s k i l l  gave t h e  working group t h e  
most d i f f i c u l t y .  Af te r  a long exchange of views i n  which each member of t h e  
working group gave h i s  i dea  of what w e  meant by l eade r sh ip ,  w e  came t o  t h e  
conclusion t h a t  t h e  necessary s k i l l  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  would be provided i f  he had 
t h e  s k i l l s  i n  t h e  o the r  f i e l d s  I 've  j u s t  mentioned. I n  o the r  words, i f  w e  
covered proper ly  decisionmaking, problem-solving, and t h e  o the r  s k i l l s ,  he  
would have t h e  necessary l eade r sh ip  s k i l l .  
W e  then turned our a t t e n t i o n  t o  exac t ly  what upgrade t r a i n i n g  meant. 
F i r s t ,  when should t h i s  upgrade t r a i n i n g  be given? W e  concluded t h a t  by t h e  
t i m e  t h e  new c a p t a i n  t akes  h i s  f i r s t  t r i p  as c a p t a i n ,  he should have had 
t h a t  t r a i n i n g .  That may seem a s o r t  of motherhood and s i n s  s ta tement ,  but  
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t h e  s i t u a t i o n  is so complicated t h a t  w e  f e l t  t h a t  w e  had t o  Teave i t  t o  each 
ind iv idua l  a i r l i n e  as t o  when they gave t h a t  t r a i n i n g .  
With r e spec t  t o  t h e  method of conducting t h i s  t r a i n i n g ,  inc luding  who 
d id  i t ,  aga in  w e  f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  needed t o  be determined by t h e  a i r l i n e  con- 
cerned, because each a i r l i n e  has  d i f f e r e n t  resources  a v a i l a b l e .  The va r ious  
t r a i n i n g  techniques are w e l l .  known, bu t  they may be s u i t a b l e  t o  one group and 
not another .  And w e  f e l t  i t  was necessary f o r  t h e  a i r l i n e  i t s e l f  t o  dec ide  
i t s  method and who should do i t .  
We haven ' t  r e a l l y  i d e n t i f i e d  any s p e c i f i c  r e sea rch  t a s k  needed. It  w a s  
our group 's  f e e l i n g  t h a t  wi th  t h e  a i r l i n e s '  a c t i v i t y  i n  t h i s  regard and wi th  
NASA monitoring i t ,  t h e r e  may be some areas f o r  r e sea rch  t h a t  are s e l f -  
revea l ing .  But one poin t  w a s  made - t h a t  perhaps w e  should consider  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of a t i m e  and motion s tudy of cockpi t  t a s k s ,  and t h a t  t h i s  may 
help u s  i n  proper resource  management. 
With regard t o  t h e  second o f f i c e r  t o  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  upgrade course ,  w e  
d id  not  t h i n k  t h e r e  w a s  any d i f f e r e n c e  i n  s p e c i f i c  t r a i n i n g .  W e  f e l t  t h a t  
with t h e  t r a i n i n g  he received from i n i t i a l  h i r e  u n t i l  he became second 
o f f i c e r ,  p l u s  h i s  r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g ,  he would n o t  r e q u i r e  any a d d i t i o n a l  
t r a i n i n g  when he became a f i r s t  o f f i c e r  o the r  than i n  t h e  resources  a v a i l -  
a b l e  t o  him. . 
A f i n a l  comment - another  p r e r e q u i s i t e  of a l l  of t h i s  i s  t h a t  t h e  
check-airmen, t h e  people who are doing t h e  checking, obviously have t o  be 
t r a ined  as w e l l  i n  t h e  r o l e s  t h a t  t h e  second o f f i c e r ,  f i r s t  o f f i c e r ,  and 
cap ta in  are going t o  p lay .  It n e c e s s a r i l y  fol lows,  of course,  t h a t  a l l  of 
t h i s  has  go t  t o  be au thor ized  from t h e  top.  
CAPT. FRINK: Thank you very much. That i s  t h e  conclusion of t he  
formal r e p o r t s .  
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1. SOCIAL AND COMMUNICATIONS 
2. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
3. PLANNING 
4. PROBLEM-SOLVING 
5. DECISIONMAKING 
Figure 1.- S k i l l s  requi red  f o r  resource  management. 
e INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
0 MECHANlCS OF COMMUNICATION 
Figure 2.- Soc ia l  and communications s k i l l s .  
0 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 
e ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES 
e ACHIEVING CREW COORDINATION AND CREW COOPERATION 
e ALLOCATION OF DUTIES 
a DISTRIBUTION OF WORKLOAD 
e RECOGNITION OF COMPETENCY AND STRESS 
SUPERVISION OF ASSIGNED TASKS 
e MONITORING 
0 ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSJBILITY 
Figure 3 . -  Management skills. 
176 
SITUATION AWARENESS 
0 STAYING AHEAD OF THE AIRCRAFT 
Figure 4.- Planning s k i l l s .  
0 PROBLEM RECOGNITION 
0 SOLUTION STRATEGIES 
Figure 5.- Problem-solving s k i l l s .  
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PANEL DISCUSSION 
CAPT. CARROLL, United Air l ines:  One of t h e  comments t h a t  you made, 
Bob [Houston, Group 21 w a s  t h a t  w e  should be quest ioning t h e  adequacy of t h e  
resources  made a v a i l a b l e  by t h e  company. Do you have any recommendations o r  
any conclusions t h a t  evolved from your group d i s c u s s i o n s  as t o  how you might 
determine t h e  adequacy of t h e  resources  t h a t  are  c u r r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e ?  
DR. HOUSTON, American A i r l i n e s :  I don ' t  t h i n k  w e  have any 
recommendations, Ed. It  j u s t  came o u t  i n  our d i s c u s s i o n  t h a t  w e  do provide 
our crewmembers wi th  a n  awful l o t  of paperwork. Some of i t  might be 
redundant,  and some of i t  might n o t  be designed as  c l e a r l y  as  i t  might be. 
I f  w e  expect them t o  use  t h i s  as resource  material ,  then i t ' s  incumbent upon 
management t o  i n s u r e  t h a t  they have t h e  e s s e n t i a l  m a t e r i a l ,  t h a t  t h e  informa- 
t i o n  is r e a d i l y  r e t r i e v a b l e ,  is n o t  over ly  redundant,  and so  on - j u s t  kind 
of a caut ion  f o r  management. 
There w a s  a comment from one of t h e  speakers  about t h e  f l i g h t  papers 
t h a t  he t akes  with him from Dispatch, and proceeds t o  throw away. That w a s  
i n  j e s t ,  but  i f  w e  expect t h e  crewmembers t o  use  t h a t  p r i n t e d  material ,  then 
i t  behooves u s  t o  make s u r e  t h a t  i t ' s  r e a l l y  e f f e c t i v e l y  presented.  
CAPT. CARROLL: I ' d  l i k e  t o  suggest  t h a t  perhaps i t  i s  something 
t h a t  would f a l l  i n  a n  area f o r  John Lauber 's  people t o  pursue. That i f  t h e r e  
are d i f f e r e n c e s ,  and I ' m  aware of a few d i f f e r e n c e s ,  a t  any rate,  i n  t h e  
paperwork a c t i v i t y  - n o t  only i n  t h e  volume of t h e  paperwork t h a t ' s  in- 
volved, but t h e  a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  cockpi t  relative t o  paperwork. The 
procedures d i f f e r  between a i r l i n e s ,  and i t  may w e l l  be  t h a t  t h a t ' s  something 
t h a t  John and your people could pursue t o  improve t h e  e f f i c a c y  of some of t h e  
procedures t h a t  have t o  be followed; w e  might a l l  b e n e f i t  from a d d i t i o n  o r  
d e l e t i o n .  
l i k e  some feedback, i f  w e  could g e t  t h a t  s o r t  of t h i n g ,  as t o  whether w e ' r e  
encumbering our people more than w e  should,  o r  whether we're supplying them 
with t h e  r i g h t  material. 
A s  long as  your group d i d  n o t  have anything s p e c i f i c  i n  mind, I ' d  
DR. HOUSTON: The R u f f e l l  Smith s tudy  made some comments about t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  i n  reading t h e  approach p l a t e s  and t h e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  levels of 
i l l u m i n a t i o n ,  as w e l l  as t h e  l e g i b i l i t y  of approach p l a t e s  and a l l  t h e  o t h e r  
paperwork t h a t  w e  g i v e  t h e  crewmembers. I t 's  a mul t i face ted  problem. 
CAPT. FRINK, Pan Am: Paperwork is  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  p i e c e  of t h e  
workload. O f  course,  i n t e r e s t i n g l y  enough, t h e r e  i s  another  s i d e  t o  t h a t ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  t h e  long-range opera tors .  W e  f i n d  t h e r e ' s  a n  overload 
s i t u a t i o n  and a l s o  an  underload s i t u a t i o n .  W e  haven ' t  t a lked  about t h a t  here  
because it r e a l l y  i s n ' t  p e r t i n e n t  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  o p e r a t i o n ,  but  t h e r e  does 
come a t i m e  i n  a long, 8-12 hour opera t ion  a t  35,000 t o  39,000 f e e t ,  where a n  
underload does occur.  For t h i s  reason w e  a c t u a l l y  f i n d  a n  opera t ion  t h a t  i s  
less than t h e  b e s t ,  and i t  creates a l e v e l - f l i g h t  complacency, i f  you w i l l .  
I t 's a s u b j e c t  t h a t  t h o s e  of you who are involved i n  long-range opera t ion  
might want t o  d i s c u s s  some day. 
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I t ' s  an  i n t e r e s t i n g  phenomenon t h a t ,  i f  we  d i d n ' t  provide something 
r e l a t i v e l y  important f o r  t h a t  man t o  do procedura l ly  dur ing  t h a t  8-10 hours 
wi th  t h i s  l e v e l - f l i g h t  opera t ion ,  mistakes would be made more o f t e n  than i f  
w e  do provide some paperwork. 
I not iced  t h a t  two p resen ta t ions  made on t h e  sub jec t  of s e l e c t i o n  and 
i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g  had a number of similari t ies as w e l l  as some d i f f e r e n c e s ,  
and perhaps some of you would l i k e  t o  comment on those.  I not iced  t h a t  i n  
regard t o  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  process ,  they both ind ica t ed  t h a t  w e  are not  doing it 
w e l l  now, even those  a i r l i n e s  which have done a l o t  of research  on t h i s .  I 
th ink  i t  w a s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  even a t  United,  a company t h a t  has 
done a g r e a t  d e a l  of work on s e l e c t i o n  and has  done a l o t  of i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of 
t he  b e s t  methods and procedures t o  u s e  - fo rg ive  m e  i f  I quote you wrong, 
Ed - but  I be l i eve  t h a t  i t  w a s  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  bus iness  of resource  manage- 
ment r e a l l y  w a s  no t  looked i n t o  w e l l  as p a r t  of your s e l e c t i o n  process .  
Would you l i k e  t o  comment on t h a t ,  Ed? 
CAPT. CARROLL: I b e l i e v e  Bob made t h a t  comment i n  h i s  summary, s o  
I'll d e f e r  t o  Bob. 
CAPT. CRUMP, United: I t h i n k  i t ' s  t r u e ;  w e  looked r i g h t  p a s t  t h a t .  
W e  looked a t  some of t h e  th ings  t h a t  are p a r t  of resource  management; bu t  
a f t e r  s e v e r a l  years  of i n v e s t i g a t i o n  and looking a t  a l l  of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
aspects of s e l e c t i o n ,  w e  never zeroed i n  on t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  s u b j e c t  p e r  se. 
I th ink  we've go t  good people but  I t h i n k  w e  have them because of o the r  
reasons.  We've got  people who are going t o  be a b l e  t o  accommodate q u i t e  
we l l  t o  resource  management t r a i n i n g  because they are experienced and 
i n t e l l i g e n t .  We're going t o  come out  p r e t t y  w e l l  w i t h  our p re sen t  group, 
but  i f  we  g e t  i n t o  a per iod when our  candida tes  have lower q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  I 
th ink  w e  would f i n d  ou t  t h a t  w e  had a de f i c i ency  i n  our s e l e c t i o n  system. 
W e  w i l l  go back now wi th  what we've learned he re  and begin t o  modify t h e  
program t o  inc lude  an eva lua t ion  of resource  management c a p a b i l i t i e s  and 
p o t e n t i a l .  
CAPT. FRINK: I th ink  i t ' s  very  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  mention t h a t  r i g h t  
of f  t h e  b a t  we're focus ing  on i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g  whereas I ' m  s u r e  w e  a l l  came 
i n  he re  without  t h e  idea  of command t r a i n i n g  as p a r t  of t h i s .  I f  w e  go out  
of he re  wi th  nothing more, w e  know t h a t  what we  have learned  is  t h a t  
resource  management extends a l l  t h e  way from t h e  top t o  t h e  bottom of our  
a v i a t i o n  c a r e e r s ,  and w e  have a very  d e f i n i t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  c a r r y  on 
t r a i n i n g  r i g h t  from t h e  beginning. 
It 's i n t e r e s t i n g  a l s o  t o  no te  t h a t  w i th  t h e  l imi t ed  amount of t i m e  t h a t  
w e  have had, t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e  d i scuss ions  t h a t  have been s t imula ted  has  
been outs tanding .  
need f o r  t h i s  workshop i s  a l s o  i n t e r e s t i n g .  There have been some 
d i f f e r e n c e s  expressed t h i s  morning, and I hope t h a t  by your ques t ions  and 
comments on t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  w e  can explore  f u r t h e r  t h e  how of t r a i n i n g  f o r  
resource  management. 
The r ap id  rate a t  which w e  have reached consensus on t h e  
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Is t h e r e  anyone who would l i k e  t o  comment f u r t h e r  on t h a t ?  A r e  t h e r e  
any ques t ions  about some of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s ?  
in s t ance ,  t h a t  w e  might play back audio t a p e s  of acc iden t s  i n  order  t o  
demonstrate t h e  problem of l a c k  of proper communication i n  t h e  cockpi t  and 
i t s  con t r ibu t ions  t o  acc iden t s .  It occurred t o  m e  t h a t  t h i s  is a very  
s e n s i t i v e  th ing .  
of such tapes; t h a t  is, whether they  might be made gene ra l ly  a v a i l a b l e ?  
There w a s  a sugges t ion ,  f o r  
Bob, d id  your group have any d i scuss ion  on t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
DR. HOUSTON: This  is  a technique t h a t  i s  being used, and w e  r a i s e d  
t h a t  ques t ion .  B i l l  Traub, would you l i k e  t o  comment on t h a t  by any chance? 
CAPT. TRAUB, United A i r l i n e s :  I merely pointed out  t h a t  during 
our r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g  now, w e  r ep lay  t h e  S a l t  Lake Ci ty  acc ident  inc luding  
t h e  tapes t h a t  are a v a i l a b l e ,  communications wi th  ATC, and wi th  t h e  company. 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  t apes  and audio program, w e  show t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t he  
a i r p l a n e  dur ing  approximately t h e  las t  20 min of t h e  f l i g h t .  
gone over very  w e l l .  
I t h i n k  i t ' s  
CAPT. FRINK: I can a t t e s t  t o  t h a t .  I t h i n k  t h a t  we  owe United 
A i r l i n e s  a real debt  of g r a t i t u d e  f o r  making up t h a t  audiovisua l  program, and 
making i t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  indus t ry .  Every airman i n  our company has seen  
t h a t ,  wi th  a n  appropr i a t e  commentary t h a t  t h i s  could be you; i t ' s  been very 
e f f e c t i v e  and very w e l l  r ece ived .  
There 's  no ques t ion  i n  my mind whatever, and I ' m  s u r e  t h e  o t h e r s  he re  
w i l l  agree ,  t h a t  such programs are very  he lp fu l .  The problem is how do w e  
g e t  them? 
prepare  t h a t  kind of program. Perhaps t h i s  is something NASA o r  someone else 
could do f o r  us .  
Everyone i s n ' t  going t o  be q u i t e  as generous o r  q u i t e  as  a b l e  t o  
DR. HOUSTON: I don ' t  t h i n k  you mentioned t h e  f a c t  t h a t  you j u s t  
You don ' t  make any c r i t i c a l  comments, you don ' t  po in t  play t h e  t ape  back. 
f i n g e r s ,  you j u s t  l e t  t h e  crewmen l i s t e n  t o  t h i s  and make t h e i r  own 
judgment, and t h a t ' s  t h e  message. 
CAPT. TRAUB: There 's  no e d i t o r i a l  comment whatsoever; i t ' s  ex- 
tremely e f f e c t i v e .  
CAPT. FRINK: Tha t ' s  r i g h t ,  i t ' s  very  e f f e c t i v e .  This is pure ly  
and simply t h e  cockpi t  vo ice  recorder  being played back, wi th  some ove r r ide  
of t h e  tower t a p e s  and some v i s u a l s  t o  go along wi th  i t  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  
case. Very, very e f f e c t i v e  program. 
MAJOR BURGH, USAF: W e  don ' t  have t h e  vo ice  t a p e  c a p a b i l i t y ,  bu t  w e  
do do t h i s .  W e  have about four  d i f f e r e n t  anatomies of acc iden t s  t h a t  w e  go 
through p r imar i ly  f o r  crew coord ina t ion ,  checking a l t i t u d e s ,  checking 
d i f f e r e n t  t h ings ,  from acc iden t s  t h a t  have happened. And w e  b a s i c a l l y  go 
through t h e  screwup wi th  t h e  s l i d e s ,  then s t o p  and d i scuss .  This  h'as gone 
over very  w e l l ,  and it  b r ings  t h e  problems o u t .  W e  don ' t  know i f  i t  he lps  
much a f t e r  t h a t ,  bu t  i t  does b r ing  everybody's a t t e n t i o n  t o  i t .  
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CAPT. FRINK: That ' s  very  t r u e ,  I know most of t h e  a i r l i n e s  have an  
acc ident  r e p o r t  c a p a b i l i t y ,  and airmen eat t h a t  up. And it  is a form of 
management t r a i n i n g  - t h e r e ' s  no ques t ion  about i t  - resource  management. 
And you see t h e  l a c k  of u se  of t h a t  d rama t i ca l ly  i n  i ts  e f f e c t .  
CAPT. GILSTRAP, United A i r l i n e s :  I t h i n k  t h e r e  are some pre- 
cau t ions  t h a t  you have t o  t ake  which I th ink  w e  d i d .  W e  waited u n t i l  a l l  
t h i s  information w a s  pub l i c  knowledge anyway, so t h e r e ' s  no d ivulg ing  of any 
information t h a t  wouldn't overwise be a v a i l a b l e .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  t apes  and t h e  
p re sen ta t ion  only make pub l i c  knowledge more accu ra t e  by i t s  p resen ta t ion .  
Therefore ,  any crewmembers who see i t  are only looking a t  t h e  most accu ra t e  
p re sen ta t ion  of what r e a l l y  took p lace .  
previous information they might have heard,  obviously much more accu ra t e  
than newspaper accounts o r  anything.  
permanent b a s i s  of t h e  most accu ra t e  type of p re sen ta t ion  you can g e t  of w h a t  
took place a t  a d i s a s t e r .  A s  a r e s u l t ,  i t  becomes more accep tab le  f o r  crew 
consumption than it  would i f  i t  were i n  any way inflammatory, even though t h e  
na tu re  of i t  might be s l i g h t l y  so  because of what took p lace .  But, a t  least ,  
w e ' r e  doing i t  wi th  g r e a t ,  g r e a t  care f o r  accuracy, and I t h i n k  t h a t ' s  very  
important f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  of p i l o t s  as a group i n  t h e  profess ion .  
It 's much more accu ra t e  than 
Consequently, i t ' s  an updat ing on a 
CAPT. FRINK: I ag ree  wi th  you. A s  I mentioned before ,  t h a t  w a s  
very ,  very w e l l  done. Is  t h e r e  anyone else who would l i k e  t o  comment on 
anything else t o  any of t h e  o the r  members of our  panel  t h i s  a f te rnoon?  
CAPT. CRUMP: Our group w a s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  f ind ing  out  how our 
recommendation on t h i s  r e sea rch  p r o j e c t  t h a t  w e  ou t l i ned  w a s  received by 
o the r  groups. I f  you remember, w e  w e r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  having a n e u t r a l  
o rgan iza t ion ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  NASA, do t h i s  r e sea rch  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  s tandards  
f o r  resource  management, both i n  measuring t h e  level of a p p l i c a n t s  and a l s o  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l .  I wondered i f  t h e r e  is  any comment from anyone i n  any of t h e  
o the r  groups about how you received t h a t  idea?  W e  are wondering whether t h i s  
e n t i r e  group would subsc r ibe  t o  t h a t ,  would endorse i t .  I f  i t  d i d ,  I t h i n k  
t h e  recommendation would have more weight,  and t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a research  
program tak ing  p l ace  might be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  improved. 
CAPT. FRINK: Does anybody have any comment on t h a t ?  How do you 
f e e l  about NASA looking i n t o  t h i s ?  
CAPT. TRAUB: I t h i n k  you proposed, Bob, a j o i n t  Industry/NASA 
committee, r i g h t ?  
CAPT. CRUME': Tha t ' s  r i g h t .  
CAPT. TRAUB: I l i k e  t h a t  i dea .  
CAPT. FRINK: How would such a committee be s e l e c t e d ?  This  is  
something t h a t ,  b a s i c a l l y ,  two groups almost d i sagreed  on. One group w a s  
s p e c i f i c  on a group of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  they f e l t  ought t o  be looked f o r  
i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  process  as r e l a t e d  t o  resource  management, whereas t h e  o t h e r  
group says  w e  are i n  t h e  da rk  about t h a t ,  e f f e c t i v e l y ,  and s a i d  i t  ought t o  
be researched.  
181 
Do you t h i n k  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a need f o r  researching  t h i s ,  o r  do you f e e l  
conf ident  from what w e  have come up wi th ,  t h a t  you can go back t o  your air- 
l i n e  and, based on t h e  information t h a t  w e  have gleaned from t h e s e  few days,  
develop a b e t t e r  code f o r  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  process?  O r  do you f e e l  t h a t  i t  i s  
necessary f o r  NASA and o t h e r s  t o  g e t  i n t o  some re sea rch  on t h i s ?  
MR. WHITE: You' l l  remember, I s a i d  i n  t h e  r e p o r t  on our  working 
group d i scuss ion ,  t h a t  i t  goes r i g h t  back t o  s e l e c t i o n .  When w e  were d i s -  
cuss ing  s e l e c t i o n ,  w e  happened t o  have Bob Helmreich r i g h t  i n  wi th  us .  W e  
had a l r eady  l i s t e d  a l l  t h e s e  t r a i n i n g  requirements i n  communications and 
problem so lv ing  and so on and so f o r t h  t h a t  I mentioned, and w e  asked him i f  
i t  w a s  poss ib l e  t o  have any measurement f o r  s e l e c t i o n  under those  areas and 
he s a i d  yes.  So obviously some re sea rch  has been done. 
MR. COEN, FAA: I ' m  a l l  f o r  fol lowing up. That w a s  our  group 's  
recommendation, t h a t  w e  do put  NASA t o  work. 
programs here .  W e  see t h a t  some people are a l r eady  working on some programs, 
and some are no t  working on it .  Some have good programs, some have mediocre 
programs, but  t h e r e  is  no s tandard i n  t h e  indus t ry .  
And w e  came up wi th  many good 
I b e l i e v e  t h a t  wi th  some recommendations from somebody l i k e  NASA o r  an 
IndustryINASA committee t o  develop an indus t ry  s tandard ,  i t  would g ive  you 
people i n  t r a i n i n g  a bigger  s t i c k  t o  go back t o  your company and say ,  "This 
is what t h e  indus t ry  as a whole i s  doing." W e  o f t e n  hear t h a t  w e  c a n ' t  g e t  
t h e  money from top management, t h a t  w e  need some s t imulus  t o  apply t o  them. 
Following t h i s  workshop I t h i n k  most of t h e  people he re  w i l l  go back and do 
something. We'll s t i l l  wind up wi th  a good, b e t t e r ,  and b e s t ,  bu t  I th ink  
t h a t  by coming up wi th  a n  indus t ry  s tandard ,  w e  can a l l  a t  least  d e r i v e  a 
mark p r e t t y  high above t h e  middle. 
CAPT. FRINK: George, whi le  you ' re  t h e r e ,  I wanted t o  mention t h a t  
i t  has  been mentioned t o  m e  by a few people t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a danger,  a r i s k  
i n  coming up with,  what should I say ,  an  indus t ry  recommendation f o r  some- 
th ing  l i k e  t h i s ;  t h a t  t h i s  w i l l  be  l a t ched  onto by t h e  r egu la to ry  agencies ,  
and become a requirement i n  some form. A new r e g u l a t i o n  w i l l  come out  and 
in s t ead  of Appendix E and F, w e ' l l  have E ,  F, and 6. 
comment on t h a t ?  I s a i d ,  "No, i t  wouldn't happen," bu t  maybe I ' m  naive.  
Would you l i k e  t o  
MR. COEN: Tha t ' s  always a risk, A l .  I n c i d e n t a l l y ,  I t h i n k  one of 
t h e  th ings  t h a t  came ou t  here ,  t h a t  a l o t  of people  were not  aware o f ,  i s  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  w e  d id  go ahead and make a s p o t  change i n  t h a t  r e g u l a t i o n  j u s t  t o  
a l low LOFT t r a i n i n g ,  and w e  d id  t h i s  q u i t e  some t i m e  ago. I know t h e r e ' s  a 
l o t  of people  i n  t h i s  room who are not  aware of t h a t .  
r e f e r r e d  t o  exemptions, t h e  Northwest exemption, and Captain Beach, of course,  
hoped t o  g e t  an  exemption. So t h a t  w a s  a good r egu la t ion .  
t h ings  up, gave you t h r e e  choices  of ways t o  perform your p ro f i c i ency  
t r a i n i n g .  
Some of t he  papers 
It loosened 
But I d o n ' t  in tend  t o  go back and recoxmend t h a t  somebody come up wi th  a 
new r e g u l a t i o n  t o  make a s tandard ,  a l though w e  are ou t  a l r eady  wi th  a 
b u l l e t i n  t h a t  w e  s e n t  t o  our p r i n c i p a l  i n spec to r s ,  t e l l i n g  them t o  recommend 
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t o  t h e  company t h a t  they do come up wi th  some kind of resource  management 
t r a i n i n g  f o r  t h e  cap ta in ,  o r  command t r a i n i n g ,  c a l l  i t  what you w i l l .  We are 
a l r eady  on record as recommending t h a t ,  bu t  w e  d i d n ' t  go any f u r t h e r .  
Of course,  what NTSB does sometimes has  some of our people jump through 
a hoop. 
r egu la to ry  process  r e s u l t i n g .  
W e  t r y  t o  jump out  aga in  sometimes, bu t  I don ' t  r e a l l y  see any 
CAPT. FRINK: Actual ly ,  I t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  FAA does have an  obl iga-  
t i o n  t o  pay some a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h i s  s u b j e c t ;  I don ' t  t h i n k  i t ' s  anything they 
can ignore.  On t h e  o the r  hand, i f  w e  l e t  ourse lves  be de t e r r ed  i n  f e a r  of 
s p e c i f i c  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  I t h i n k  t h a t  w e ,  ou r se lves ,  are ignor ing  our 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
on our  hands. W e  have t o  f a c e  t h e  i s s u e  of a recognized need, and I t h i n k  
t h a t ' s  what w e  are  doing i n  t h i s  forum. 
and apply i t .  
I f  w e  have two b a t t l e s  on our hands, then w e  have two b a t t l e s  
I hope t h a t  w e  a l l  intend t o  go back 
I d o n ' t  want t o  need le s s ly  extend t h i s  d i scuss ion .  I f  those  of you who 
are he re  f e e l  t h a t  t h e  r e p o r t s  t h i s  morning can s tand  on t h e i r  own f e e t ,  and 
t h a t  they should be given t o  NASA f o r  a n a l y s i s  and f o r  review and f o r  
recommendations, w e  can c a r r y  on wi th  t h a t .  I know t h a t  John has some o the r  
matters he would l i k e  t o  g e t  t o ,  and I w i l l  t u r n  i t  back t o  him i f  t h e r e  are 
no o the r  comments. 
CAPT. JOHANNESSEN, Scandinavian A i r l i n e s :  W i l l  w e  g e t  t hese  
r e p o r t s  d i s t r i b u t e d ?  W i l l  you mul t ip ly  them and send them t o  us  a f te rwards?  
CAPT. FRINK: Y e s ,  t h i s  w i l l  be done. It w i l l  t ake  some t i m e  
because t h e r e ' s  a long e d i t i n g  process  t h a t  w i l l  have t o  be done and I would 
guess i t  would be a matter of t h r e e  o r  four  months before . . . .  
DR. LAUBER: Not t h a t  long,  but  i t ' s  going t o  t ake  a while .  
CAF'T. FRINK: But t h e r e  w i l l  be  a r e p o r t  ou t  from t h i s  meeting, 
yes.  
CAPT. TURLINGTON, Pan Am: One of my p o i n t s  is I j u s t  hope t h a t  
NASA s t a y s  involved i n  t h i s  t h ing .  I can imagine a l l  i nd iv idua l  a i r l i n e s  
r e t u r n i n g  t o  t h e i r  own bases  and embarking on t h e s e  programs on t h e i r  own, 
but  I can ' t  imagine t h a t  t h a t ' s  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  way t o  g e t  t h e  most ou t  of 
t h e  resources  t h a t  w e  have c o l l e c t i v e l y .  That ' s  t h e  b ig  d i f f e r e n c e  I ' v e  
seen today. I hope they  s t a y  i n  t h e  program. 
DR. LAUBER: That raises a ques t ion  t h a t  you brought up t h i s  
morning, A l ,  t h a t  I ' d  l i k e  t o  hear  some c l a r i f i c a t i o n  on. 
i nd ica t ed  something about  o t h e r  a i r l i n e s  who weren ' t  p re sen t .  
t o  expound on what you had i n  mind by t h a t ?  
A t  one po in t ,  you 
Would you care 
DR. BILLINGS, Ames Research Center:  You s a i d  very s p e c i f i c a l l y  
t h a t  you would - I wrote  i t  down - w i l l  be  ask ing  NASA f o r  something f o r  
o the r  carriers. 
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C U T .  FRINK: I t h i n k  i t ' s  obvious t h a t  my meaning t h e r e  w a s  I 
th ink  t h e r e ' s  a g r e a t  d e a l  of va lue  i n  t h i s ,  and i t ' s  a va lue  t h a t  extends t o  
a l l  t h e  indus t ry .  They a l l  could not  be he re  f o r  va r ious  reasons.  Some of 
them don ' t  have t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  send members of t h e i r  s t a f f  here ,  and some 
of them are not  r e a l l y  aware enough of t h e  importance of t h i s  t o  a t t end .  
Which doesn ' t  mean t h a t  i f  w e  do a n  e f f e c t i v e  j o b  of r epor t ing ,  t h a t  they 
won't develop an  i n t e r e s t .  And i f  w e  come ou t  wi th  some recommendations, i t  
w i l l  assist them i n  improving t h e i r  programs i n  response t o  NASA's guidance. 
So, yes ,  t h e r e  are many a i r l i n e s  t h a t  are no t  represented  he re  t h a t  w i l l  and 
should b e n e f i t  by t h e  proceedings.  
MR. DANAHER, NTSB: Fur ther  t o  t h a t ,  I would assume t h a t  copies  of 
t h e  proceedings w i l l  be a v a i l a b l e  and might sugges t ,  a t  t h e  r i s k  of t h e  
obvious,  t h a t  w e  t r y  t o  in su re  t h a t  a copy g e t s  t o  a l l  scheduled a i r  c a r r i e r s  
i n  t h e  U.S. and perhaps do something through IATA toward making them a v a i l -  
a b l e  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a i r l i n e s .  Is t h e r e  a plan? 
DR. LAUBER: Y e s .  The d e t a i l s  of t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  remain t o  be 
worked o u t ,  bu t  w e  c e r t a i n l y  would l i k e  t o  make it  as widely a v a i l a b l e  as  
poss ib l e .  We'll have t o  work wi th  you and IATA and o t h e r s  t o  determine how 
t o  go about doing t h a t .  
CAPT. FRINK: It appears  t o  m e  t h a t  w e  have a tendency a t  t h i s  
s t a g e  of t h e  game t o  say ,  "This is g r e a t ,  NASA has t o l d  us  what w e  ought t o  
do." I don ' t  t h i n k  t h a t ' s  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  conclusion.  
I know from conversa t ions  wi th  a t  least  t h r e e  of t h e  a i r l i n e s  t h a t  are 
represented  he re ,  t h a t  t h e r e  is  every i n t e n t i o n  of going back home and 
p u t t i n g  some s t a f f  work i n t o  t h i s  t o  see what w e  can come up wi th  ourse lves .  
I do th ink  that i t  would be h e l p f u l  t o  conduct our  i nd iv idua l  a i r l i n e  s taff  
work, and coord ina te  t h a t  work wi th  NASA, so t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  of t he  work 
and t h e  f ind ings  t h a t  w e  g e t  i nd iv idua l ly  can be made a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  rest 
of t h e  indus t ry .  I t h i n k  t h a t  i t  might be appropr i a t e  i f  someone would come 
up wi th  a suggest ion as t o  exac t ly  how t o  do t h a t ,  i f  t h a t  i s  a worthy 
method of doing th ings .  What do you th ink ,  John, do you th ink  t h e r e ' s  a way 
w e  can g e t  toge ther  and come up wi th  recommendations on t h i s ?  
DR. LAUBER: Y e s ,  I suspec t  t h a t ' s  poss ib l e .  We'll have t o  work 
out  t h e  mechanism by which w e  do so. 
CAPT. FRINK: Can you t e l l  m e  what you a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  r o l e  of NASA 
would be? George Coen mentioned t h a t  i f  w e  do every th ing  t h a t  everyone has  
suggested,  w e  would have given NASA enough work t o  do f o r  t h e  next  century ,  
and A 1  Chambers is worried.  What d id  you see as your r o l e  on a cont inuing 
b a s i s  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of resource  management? Al, would you l i k e  t o  answer 
t h a t ?  
DR. CHAMBERS, NASA: I t h i n k  t h a t  t o  some degree Char l i e  is  going 
t o  address  t h a t  s u b j e c t ,  a t  least i n  t e r m s  of t h e  i t e m s  t h a t  have been r a i s e d  
he re  i n  t h e  las t  few days.  But t h e r e  may be a couple  of areas i n  which I 
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t h i n k  w e  can provide some he lp  immediately. One i s  t o  cont inue  t o  be a 
f a c i l i t a t o r  f o r  a c t i v i t i e s  l i k e  t h i s  one, which w i l l  he lp  keep some momentum 
going toward r e a l l y  g e t t i n g  good programs i n s t i t u t e d .  
I th ink  t h e  o the r  may be one where w e  t r y  and sharpen t h e  t o o l s  t h a t  w e  
u se  t o  measure how e f f e c t i v e  a p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i v i t y  would be, be i t  a LOFT- 
t y p e  s imula t ion  o r  be i t  some aud iov i sua l  a i d s  o r  some o t h e r  type  of class- 
room a c t i v i t y ;  a l l  of u s  would l i k e  t o  have a b e t t e r  f e e l i n g  t h a t  t hose  
th ings  t h a t  w e  are doing are t r u l y  e f f e c t i v e .  And i t  may be t h a t  w e  can 
provide some i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of those  d i f f e r e n t  techniques 
which then you could use  wi th  more confidence i n  planning your own programs. 
I th ink  each a i r l i n e  w i l l ,  i n  t h e  end, probably i n s t i t u t e  a program t h a t  
is s p e c i f i c  t o  i t s  own needs, i t s  own type  of opera t ion .  I n  t h a t  ca se ,  NASA 
can perhaps b e s t  p l a y  a r o l e  i n  g iv ing  you some t o o l s  t o  work wi th .  
CAPT. FRINK: I tend t o  ag ree  wi th  t h a t .  W e  are  going t o  g e t  some 
he lp  i n  t h e  form of t h e s e  proceedings t h a t  w i l l  make a v a i l a b l e  t o  a l l  t h e  
a i r l i n e s  t h e  thoughts t h a t  have been expressed here.  We have been made aware 
of t h e  o u t s i d e  agencies  t h a t  are ready t o  assist i n  t h e  development of 
programs and i n  t h e  de te rmina t ion  of t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  of 
programs, and w e  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  u t i l i z e  t h a t  he lp .  
B u t  I th ink  t h e  message t h a t  w e  must grasp  a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a i r l i n e s  i s  
t h a t ,  b z s i c a l l y ,  i t  i s  our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  u s e  t h e  information t h a t  w e  have 
received i n  the  l a s t  few days ,  and t h a t  w e  w i l l  receive from NASA as a 
r e s u l t  of t h i s  meeting, and develop our  programs. And w e  w i l l  cont inue  t o  
communicate through ATA and IATA and t h e i r  committees as t o  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
of our va r ious  programs. 
CAPT. BEACH: Could I address  t h i s  t o  John. From t h i s  meeting 
t h e r e  w i l l  be prepared a d i g e s t  of a l l  t h a t  w e  have s a i d  and done. 
l i k e  t o  see s p e c i f i c  i t e m s  l i s t e d  t h e r e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  American A i r l i n e s  
t r a n s a c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  program, s o  t h a t  w e  might communicate among ourse lves  
without going up through NASA and back down on t h e  k inds  of t h i n g s  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h a t  are of i n t e r e s t  perhaps t o  my carr ier .  I t h i n k  they can 
perform a s e r v i c e  as a c l e a r i n g  house of in format ion  t o  be made a v a i l a b l e  t o  
u s ,  conveying o the r  p o i n t s  of view w e  may n o t  have considered. 
see t h a t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  when t h e  f i n a l  product comes o u t  of t h i s  meeting. 
I would 
I ’ d  l i k e  t o  
DR. LAUBER: Your use  of t h e  word c lear inghouse  i s  most appro- 
p r i a t e ;  t h a t ’ s  one of t h e  r o l e s  w e  see our se lves  p lay ing  and t h a t  i s  e x a c t l y  
t h e  i n t e n t ,  t o  make t h e s e  proceedings a source  book s o  t h a t  o t h e r s  can, f o r  
example, l e a r n  t h a t  J ack  Mansfield, of American, has  an  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  s k i l l s  
t r a i n i n g  program and go d i r e c t l y  t o  him. W e  don’ t  i n t end  t o  be i n  t h a t  pa th  
a t  a l l .  
C U T .  BEACH: Fu r the r ,  I t h i n k  i t  might be  of va lue ,  once w e  
examine our c u r r e n t  programs, t o  g e t  back tc; you on how w e  have changed i t .  
I n  t h a t  way w e  could see t h e  t r e n d s  t h a t  t h e  indus t ry  may be t ak ing ,  what w e  
f e l t  we go t  from t h i s  meeting t h a t  in f luenced  u s  t o  do i t  d i f f e r e n t l y  from 
now on. 
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CAPT. CARROLL: That s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  I th ink ,  came o u t  i n  our  working 
group d e l i b e r a t i o n s .  The po in t  i s  t h a t  a l though you are going t o  be a 
c l e a r i n g  house, John, f o r  c o l l a t i n g  a l l  t h i s  information and d ispens ing  i t  t o  
us ,  it shouldn ' t  end the re .  There should be some t imely o r  pe r iod ic  con tac t  
t h a t  you now make wi th  a l l  a i r l i n e s  and you would say,  "We gave you t h i s  
information,  w e  understood you had c e r t a i n  p lans  f o r  implementation. Please 
adv i se  u s  of t h e  progress  you have made o r  t h e  problems you have run  in to , "  
and you would aga in  d isseminate  t h a t  information. 
i t .  
Tha t ' s  how w e  discussed 
Otherwise, w e  would g e t  t o  t h e  poin t  where w e  sa t  and jawboned forever  
about t h i s  and nothing f u r t h e r  would be done because of t h e  pressures  w e  are  
under,  t h e  economic cons ide ra t ions  w e  are confronted wi th ,  o r  t h e  work load.  
I ' d  l i k e  t o  see a cont inuing  r e f l e c t i o n  of clearing-house opera t ion .  
CAPT. FRINK: That ' s  exac t ly  r i g h t .  This  is  what I meant when I 
asked you, John, about your ongoing in t en t ion .  This is  t h e  s o r t  of t h ing  w e  
have t o  have. 
DR. LAUBER: One of t h e  ques t ions  (on t h e  ques t ionna i r e )  has t o  do 
wi th  whether a d d i t i o n a l  workshops of t h i s  kind might be an  appropr i a t e  th ing .  
Of course,  t h a t  is one way of doing it r a t h e r  than  u s  going out  t o  t h e  
c a r r i e r s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t o  b r ing  t h e  c a r r i e r s  i n  as a group on some r e c u r r e n t  
b a s i s  t o  p e r i o d i c a l l y  review progress  and new problems, new developments, and 
what ever .  
One of t h e  th ings  we'd l i k e  some feedback on is  how t o  accomplish t h a t .  
The workshop approach is only one p o s s i b l e  way; t h e r e  are many o t h e r  t h ings  
t h a t  might be poss ib l e ,  and your sugges t ions  on how we  might b e s t  do t h a t  
would be apprec ia ted .  
CAPT. CARROLL: That ' s  a lways  good and I t h i n k  I ' m  i n  favor  of 
cont inuing  a v e h i c l e  of t h i s  type.  But no t  everyone can a v a i l  themselves of 
t h i s ,  and w e  don ' t  want t o  keep i t  i n  one small group. We want t o  extend i t  
t o  o t h e r s ,  both f o r  t h e i r  advantage and f o r  feedback. 
CAPT. FRINK: I th ink  t h a t  workshops l i k e  t h i s  are outs tanding  t o  
s t i m u l a t e  t h e  kind of i n t e r e s t  w e  have had i n  t h e  l as t  few days.  Now i t  
behooves us  t o  go back and start  g e t t i n g  programs i n t o  being. Then w e  w i l l  
p e r i o d i c a l l y  be i n  con tac t  w i th  you and work wi th  you, and determine what of 
United 's  work, Pan Am's work, American's work, has  been e f f e c t i v e ,  and what 
they have done. We'll be  i n  touch wi th  you i n  a year .  And i f  w e  don ' t  g e t  
i n  touch w i t h  you d i r e c t l y  as ind iv idua l  airl ines,  then  a ques t ionna i r e  
should be s e n t  by you ask ing  what w e  have done and how e f f e c t i v e  i t  has  been. 
The response t o  t h a t  ques t ionna i r e  from a l l  t h e  a i r l i n e s  would be he lp fu l .  
I f u l l y  ag ree  t h a t  t h e r e  is a tendemy f o r  a l l  of u s ,  r ega rd le s s  of our 
good i n t e n t i o n s ,  t o  go back and g e t  locked up i n  our  problems. I t ' s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  pu t  some of t h e s e  th ings  i n t o  p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  manner i n  which w e  
intend t o  do so,  and some spur s  t o  t h a t  would be he lp fu l .  Also, I ' m  s u r e  
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everyone here  ag rees  t h a t  we  c a n ' t  a f f o r d  t o  waste e f f o r t s ,  w e  c a n ' t  a f f o r d  
t o  go t h e  wrong way, w e  c a n ' t  a f f o r d  t o  go i n t o  methods- that  are not  
e f f e c t i v e .  
I intend t o  s tudy a l l  of t h i s  material, and t h e r e ' s  going t o  be some 
t h a t  t h e  e x p e r t i s e  i n  t h i s  room has agreed would be a good way t o  go. That ' s  
probably t h e  way w e ' l l  s tart ,  wi th  t h e  s o l i d ,  s a f e ,  agreed-upon b e s t  methods, 
but  then I want t o  f i n d  out  what o t h e r  people are doing and what is  e f f e c t i v e .  
Sometimes t h a t ' s  hard t o  measure. A s  American A i r l i n e s  ind ica t ed ,  t h e r e  is 
no way t h a t  they can d i r e c t l y  measure t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e i r  i n t e r -  
personal  s k i l l s  programs. $ut w e  are agreed t h a t  such programs are good, and 
t h a t  w e  should l e t  each a i r l i n e  develop i t  i n  i ts  own way. 
C U T .  CRUMP: I j u s t  want t o  po in t  ou t  t h a t  t h e r e  are  not  very many 
a v i a t i o n  psychologis t s  i n  t h i s  country;  t h a t ' s  an  area of e x p e r t i s e  i n  my 
experience t h a t  i s  r e a l l y  lacking.  The gentlemen t h a t  were here ,  both Bob 
Helmreich and L e e  Bolman, were not  a v i a t i o n  psychologis t s ;  they w e r e  people 
who work i n  a s soc ia t ed  f i e l d s .  But t h e r e  i s  probably as much e x p e r t i s e  
wi th in  NASA i n  t h i s  area as t h e r e  is  i n  t h e  rest of t h e  country combined, 
and I t h i n k  w e  should focus on t h a t .  We're t a l k i n g  about each of u s  
developing our programs. I know how hard i t  i s  t o  f i n d  people i n  t h a t  f i e l d  
who are t r u l y  expe r t ,  t o  g ive  you t h e  kind of information t h a t  you need t o  
measure the  program t h a t  you ' re  developing. 
We can measure i t  aga ins t  our e x p e r t i s e  and a g a i n s t  what o the r  people 
are  doing,  but  i n  some cases ,  i t ' s  t h e  b l ind  leading  t h e  b l ind .  I would 
c e r t a i n l y  hope t h a t  NASA would cons ider  doing some bas i c  r e sea rch  i n  t h i s  
whole area of resource  management. Maybe I ' m  harping on t h a t  same old  th ing  
aga in ,  bu t  w e  don ' t  have a l o t  of choice  when i t  comes t o  looking f o r  people 
who can g ive  us  t h e  kind of exper t  he lp  w e  need. I th ink  w e  should do what 
w e  can t o  urge  t h e  NASA organiza t ion  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h i s  way, as w e l l  as 
be a c l e a r i n g  house and t h e  o the r  t h ings  w e  have asked them t o  do. 
MR. COEN: I guess t h e  ques t ion  is how much t i m e  and manpower can 
NASA put  i n t o  something l i k e  t h i s  w i t h i n  t h e i r  budgetary and manpower 
r e s t r a i n t s  without  some s o r t  of a c h a r t e r  from indus t ry .  Somebody is  going 
t o  have t o  mandate t h i s .  I don ' t  t h i n k  they can j u s t  go along.  
CAPT. FRINK: I agree ,  i t ' s  something w e  are going t o  have t o  t a l k  
about .  
A l ,  do you have anything t o  say about t h a t ?  
There may be a way of doing t h a t ;  I don ' t  know exac t ly  what i t  is. 
DR. CHAMBERS: I ' d  r a t h e r  l eave  t h a t  t o  you and George. I t 's  a very 
s e r i o u s  problem. I guess i t ' s  t h e  reason why w e  are he re  t r y i n g  t o  l i s t e n ,  
t o  understand what i t  is  t h a t  you t h i n k  is most important ,  because t h e r e  are 
l o t s  of t h ings  t o  work on. They need t o  be  p r i o r i t i z e d  i n  some way, some 
s o r t  of message be passed on t o  NASA as t o  t h e  ones t h a t  are most urgent .  
I ' m  t a l k i n g  about  NASA i n  i ts  formal sense .  Headquarters should be t o l d  t h a t  
t h e s e  are i s s u e s  t h a t  t h e  indus t ry  and t h a t  our  sister agencies  f e e l  are 
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important i s s u e s ,  and t h a t  they would l i k e  t o  have NASA take  a look  a t  them. 
But c e r t a i n l y  you should he lp  u s  g e t  t h e  support  t h a t  w e  need t o ,  i n  t u r n ,  
support  you people. 
CAPT. FRINK: I w a s  going t o  c a l l  on George Cooper i n  j u s t  a moment 
anyway because I wanted, be fo re  w e  terminated our d i scuss ion  t h i s  a f te rnoon,  
t o  a s k  George how he f e e l s  about t h e  way t h i n g s  have gone. George r e a l l y  is  
t h e  mentor of t h i s  meeting. We have him t o  thank f o r  t h e  f ac t  t h a t  w e  are 
he re  a t  a l l ,  and I want t o  know whether you are  s a t i s f i e d  wi th  your e f f o r t s ,  
George? 
MR. COOPER, 6. E .  Cooper Associates:  W e l l ,  " s a t i s f a c t i o n "  doesn ' t  
express  my f e e l i n g s  adequate ly  because from what I have observed t h i s  has  
gone way beyond my g r e a t e s t  expec ta t ions .  A s  a matter of f a c t ,  w e  are 
dea l ing  i n  an area t h a t ' s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  g e t  a hold on, and i f  i t  hadn ' t  been 
f o r  t he  d i r e c t  input  t h a t  w e  rece ived  from a number of you people i n  t h e  
indus t ry ,  encouraging us  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ,  why I doubt t h a t  I would have had 
t h e  audac i ty  t o  propose t h a t  we do it .  
so lve  your own problems and, of course,  doing whatever w e  can g ives  us  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  as w e l l .  
It 's a s i t u a t i o n  of he lp ing  you t o  
CAPT. FRINK: Did you have a ques t ion?  
MR. COOPER: I d i d n ' t  have a ques t ion ;  I had a statement wi th  
r e s p e c t  t o  how t o  g e t  t h e  support  f o r  what you want NASA t o  do. It j u s t  s o  
happens t h a t  r i g h t  now t h e r e ' s  a meeting going on a t  Goddard of t h e  
Aeronautical  Research Council of NASA. This  year  they have r e i n s t i t u t e d  many 
of t h e  r e sea rch  technology advisory  committees and subcommittees on an  ad hoc 
b a s i s ,  t o  t rea t  t h i s  very  s u b j e c t  of what should NASA be doing. There's  been 
a l o t  of e f f o r t  pu t  i n t o  i t .  
One way t o  g e t  your inpu t  i n t o  t h e  system, i f  you have s p e c i f i c  recom- 
mendations, is  through people l i k e  J .  D.  Smith, of United, who i s  Chairman 
of t h e  Committee on Operating Systems and Safe ty .  T h a t ' s  one way. Of 
course ,  t h e r e  are  o t h e r  ways, I wouldn't l eave  i t  j u s t  t o  t h a t .  
CAPT. FRINK: I ' m  going t o  j u s t  sum t h i s  up i n  a couple of words, 
and say  t h a t  i n  t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  o r  four  days w e  have learned  a l o t .  W e  have 
a l s o  learned  what w e  d o n ' t  know, and what w e  haven ' t  done, and I t h i n k  t h a t  
t h a t ' s  almost as important as t h e  s p e c i f i c s  t h a t  w e  have l ea rned .  
g o t t e n  a s tar t ,  and w e  know where we have t o  go. 
We've 
The t a s k  t h a t  is l e f t  t o  u s  r i g h t  now is  an extremely important one. 
W e  i d e n t i f y  an  area i n  need of t r a i n i n g ,  as we have so  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d  
t h i s  one,  and w e  have i d e n t i f i e d  how important i t  i s  t o  t h e  s a f e t y  of our 
ope ra t ions .  W e  have i d e n t i f i e d  t h a t  t h e  need f o r  t r a i n i n g  goes r i g h t  from 
s e l e c t i o n ,  through t h e  upgrade t r a i n i n g  and r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g ,  and 
throughout t h e  a i rman ' s  career. I t ' s  a new f a c t o r  i n  f l i g h t  ope ra t ions ,  and 
i t ' s  one t h a t ,  now t h a t  w e  know i t ,  imposes upon u s  a very  s e r i o u s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
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The d e t a i l s  t h a t  w e  have received he re  are important.  I ' m  s u r e  w e  are 
a l l  going t o  s tudy  them c a r e f u l l y ,  and t h a t  w e  are going t o  do something 
about i t .  Now, what w e  have t o  do is t o  r e so lve  t o  fo l low up and see t h a t  
something is  done, so  t h a t  t h i s  l a c k  i s  resolved.  With t h a t ,  I ' m  going t o  
a s k  John t o  come up and te rmina te  t h e  proceedings.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
* John K. Lauber 
Thank you, A . And l i k e  t o  thank you and a l l  of t h e  working group 
chairmen f o r  aoing an outs tanding  job .  We gave you a very  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k ,  
knowingly, but I ind ica t ed ,  too,  t h a t  w e  picked our working group chairmen 
wi th  a g r e a t  d e a l  of care, and i t  q u i t e  obviously pa id  o f f .  I t h i n k  a l l  of 
you d i d  an  outs tanding  j o b  wi th  what w a s  r e a l l y  a very  d i f f i c u l t  assignment. 
A s  A 1  and many o t h e r s  around m e  know, a l o t  of u s  had some r e s e r v a t i o n s  about 
how w e l l  t h a t  p rocess  would work. My impression of i t  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  is  t h a t  
you people found it u s e f u l ,  and C h a r l i e  B i l l i n g s  i s  about t o  t e l l  you w e  
found it  equa l ly  u s e f u l .  
of some of t h e  r e sea rch  i s sues  and p r i o r i t i e s  t h a t  have come up i n  t h i s  
workshop, and then w e ' l l  c l o s e  t h e  proceedings. 
I ' d  l i k e  t o  have Char l i e  b r i e f l y  summarize our view 
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SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP 
* Charles  E. B i l l i n g s ,  M.D. 
Thank you, John. There have been a g r e a t  many comments made he re  i n  
what I f e e l  is  probably t h e  s t r o n g e s t  s i n g l e  set of p re sen ta t ions  wi th  t h e  
fewest weak s p o t s  t h a t  I have ever  encountered i n  t h e  25 yea r s  i n  which I ' v e  
been going t o  va r ious  conferences.  The q u a l i t y  of t h e  p re sen ta t ions  has  been 
superb and, obviously,  t h e  amount of work t h a t  many of you put  i n t o  them i s  
ex t raord inary .  
John has  given m e  a t a s k  t h a t  seems as impossible  as summarizing the  
I ' m  no t  going t o  subsume t h e  world. world i n  30 minutes.  
t h ings  have s t r u c k  m e  over t h e  last  3 days t h a t  I 'd  l i k e  t o  cha t  about.  Some 
of them have been a l luded  t o  t h i s  a f te rnoon i n  t h e  d i scuss ion  j u s t  completed. 
But a number of 
,The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  keynote speakers ,  Bob Helmreich, Lee  Bolman, 
and Mike Garvey worked v i r t u a l l y  independently of each o the r .  
them, i n  t r y i n g  t o  g e t  t h e i r  hands around t h i s  t h ing  as they understood i t ,  
given t h a t  they  d id  have c e r t a i n  background and b r i e f i n g  materials i n  
common, found i t  necessary t o  set up a kind of two-way mat r ix  t o  t r y  t o  
conceptua l ize  t h e  problem. Bob, who ta lked  f i r s t ,  ta lked  about " ins t ru-  
menta l i ty"  o r  "goal o r i e n t a t i o n "  and s o r t  of suggested,  without  a c t u a l l y  
drawing us  an x-y g r i d ,  t h a t  t h a t  w a s  kind of or thogonal  w i th  ' 'expresSivity.l '  
"Group o r i e n t a t i o n , "  I be l i eve ,  was h i s  phrase f o r  t h a t .  
Y e t  a l l  of 
L e e  Bolman a c t u a l l y  drew us a l i t t l e  two-by-two diagram i n  which, on h i s  
x-axis,  i f  you w i l l ,  he  put  "advocacy," and then almost equated i t  t o  "goal 
o r i e n t a t i o n . "  H i s  y-axis w a s  "inquiry." 
And then  Mike yes te rday  ta lked  about "production" which he pu t  on h i s  
x-axis.  That w a s  clear enough. Then he s o r t  of ca tegor ized  t h e  rest of t h e  
world as "people," and put  "people" on h i s  y-axis. I don ' t  know whether 
t h e r e ' s  any s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a l l  t h r e e  of t hese  gentlemen, 
having had t r a i n i n g  i n  psychology and i n  experimental  methodology, chose as 
t h e i r  independent a x i s  t h e  p roduc t iv i ty  o r  product ion element and put people 
on t h e  dependent a x i s .  I w a s  a l i t t l e  b i t  amused by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h a t  w a s  
t h e  way i t  w a s  drawn. I w a s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  none of t h e  
speakers  i n  t h e s e  t h r e e  days have ta lked  a l o t  about  t h e  p roduc t iv i ty  
element. I ' m  going t o  come back t o  t h a t  i n  a second. 
One of t h e  th ings  t h a t  I t h i n k  w e  ought t o  cons ider  is  t h a t  I don ' t  want 
t o ,  and I hope t h a t  you won't,  g e t  hung up on t h e  methodology, t h e  9-1, 1-9 
business .  
but  i t ' s  nothing more than t h a t .  I wondered.whether t h e  e x p r e s s i v i t y  o r  
i nqu i ry  o r  people  element of t h e s e  t h r e e  very  e f f e c t i v e  people who have given 
t h i s  a l o t  of thought w a s  t h e  same element. A r e  t h e s e  t h e  same f a c t o r ?  
It may be t h e  g r e a t e s t  conceptua l iz ing  device  s i n c e  s l i c e d  bread, 
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The x-axis appears  t o  be i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ,  and I t h i n k  w e  can s a f e l y  
equate  advocacy with product iv i ty .  But I ' m  n o t  q u i t e  s u r e  about t h e  
o r d i n a t e ,  whether those  o t h e r  t h r e e  are t h e  same th ing .  If they a r e  
d i f f e r e n t ,  I ' m  no t  s u r e  whether t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  are semantic o r  real ,  and 
I ' m  no t  s u r e  i f  i t  makes any d i f f e r e n c e  e i t h e r ,  because each of t h e s e  i s  only 
a techrrique f o r  t r y i n g  t o  g e t  your hands around a concept t h a t  is  anything 
but easy,  as  John and h i s  co-workers have found i n  t h e  l a s t  s e v e r a l  months. 
A s  I s a i d ,  we've heard a l o t  of t a l k  i n  t h e  group meetings and elsewhere 
about t h e  s o c i a l  s k i l l s ,  communications s k i l l s ,  e t c . ,  and much less about 
production. And I wonder whether t h i s  i s  simply because w e  do ge t  t h e  j o b  
done p r e t t y  w e l l .  We g e t  t h e  j o b  done extremely w e l l  under most circum- 
s t a n c e s ,  but  t h e r e  a r e  s t i l l  enough b i t s  and p ieces  of crumpled aluminum 
f l o a t i n g  around t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  w e  don ' t  g e t  i t  done q u i t e  w e l l  enough. And 
w e  s t i l l  g e t  enough ASRS r e p o r t s  of acc idents  t h a t  d i d n ' t  happen because of 
chance a lone  t o  make us  f e e l  a l i t t l e  b i t  queasy about  being comfortable 
with how well we're doing. 
One member of t h i s  group, n o t  present  here  a t  t h e  moment, argued t h a t  
procedures represent  our only e f f e c t i v e  approach t o  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  s i d e  of 
t h i s  box. H e  argued t h a t  w e  c a n ' t  expect t o  change p e r s o n a l i t i e s ,  w e  c a n ' t  
r e a l l y  modify a g r e a t  d e a l  t h e  way i n  which people t h i n k ,  and t h a t ,  there- 
f o r e ,  we have g o t  t o  do i t  wi th  procedures.  I t  occurred t o  m e ,  i n  thinking 
about i t ,  t h a t  I don ' t  know what propor t ion  of t h e  t o t a l  anomalies t h a t  occur 
i n  a i r  carr ier  opera t ions  are those  f o r  which we a l ready  have procedures,  
e i t h e r  i m p l i c i t  o r  e x p l i c i t ,  and what propor t ion  of t h i n g s  t h a t  occur i n  l i n e  
opera t ions  are  t r u l y  unforeseen anomalies.  I say unforeseen advisedly 
because i f  i t  had been foreseen  somebody would have w r i t t e n  a procedure € o r  
t h e  th ing .  I t  probably i s n ' t  indexed i n  t h e  f l i g h t  manual, but  somebody has  
w r i t t e n  a procedure j u s t  t h e  same, because w e  have a tendency t o  opera te  t h e  
system t h i s  way. The FAA writes r u l e s ,  w e  write r u l e s ,  everybody writes 
r u l e s .  
I n  Bolman's c o n s t r u c t ,  i t ' s  of primary importance t o  provide people wi th  
t o o l s  t h a t  he lp  them recognize when t h e r e ' s  a d i f f e r e n c e  between espoused 
theory and theory i n  use:  t o  he lp  them recognize and act  on what I ' d  l i k e  t o  
c a l l  d i s c o r d ,  and t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  d iscord  wi th  more information.  This busi-  
ness  of being a b l e  t o  recognize d iscord  c e r t a i n l y  r e q u i r e s  s o c i a l  s k i l l s  
because w e  have g o t  t o  create an  environment i n  which any crew member o r  any 
resource,  whether i t ' s  on t h e  ground o r  i n  t h e  a i r ,  i s  used e f f e c t i v e l y .  
C e r t a i n l y ,  ASRS has  taught  u s  t h a t  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l l e r s  under c e r t a i n  
circumstances are t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  recognizers  of d i scord  t h a t  w e  have. 
J u s t  as you people,  i f  you re ta in  a proper ly  s u s p i c i o u s  mind, can be 
e x c e l l e n t  recognizers  of d i scord  i n  t h e  ATC system. 
Yes, you've g o t  t o  have s o c i a l  s k i l l s  t o  create t h e  environment i n  which 
anybody who n o t i c e s  d iscord  can and i s  expected t o  announce i t s  presence.  
But t h e r e  may be many ways t o  create t h a t  kind of a n  environment. No one 
approach t o  t h i s  business  i s  going t o  work i n  a l l  carr iers ,  because w e  have 
seen t h e  very pronounced d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  management s t y l e  and a l l o c a b l e  
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resources .  We've heard about some r a t h e r  d i s t i n c t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  a l l o c a b l e  
resources  f o r  t h i s  kind of job  between some of t h e  European and some of our 
U.S. carriers. 
But of equal  importance, no one approach w i l l  work f o r  a l l  cap 
a l l  crewmembers because they are ind iv idua l ly  d i f f e r e n t .  Probably t h e r e  are 
many more d i f f e r e n c e s  among t h e s e  people  whom you have h i r ed  and who are 
working out  t h e r e  than t h e r e  are among a i r  carriers. 
th ink  t h e r e  is c e r t a i n l y  a consensus on t h i s ,  is  t o  assist aircrewmembers 
t o  recognize t h a t  d i scordant  s i t u a t i o n s  can e x i s t ,  t o  assist them t o  create 
an  environment t h a t  maximizes the  l i ke l ihood  t h a t  they  w i l l  be recognized, 
and t o  assist them t o  create an  approach t h a t  w i l l  permit them t o  diagnose 
such d i sco rd ,  t o  f i n d  t h e  reasons why every th ing  doesn ' t  q u i t e  add up. 
The goa l  here ,  and I 
That b r ings  up a number of i n t e r e s t i n g  problems, both i n  t r a i n i n g  and on 
t h e  l i n e .  One of them, which has  been a l luded  t o  t h i s  a f te rnoon,  is  t h a t  i t  
is d i f f i c u l t  f o r  an  ind iv idua l  ( p a i n f u l ,  even) t o  recognize t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between what he th inks  he is  and what he a c t u a l l y  i s .  Between, if you w i l l ,  
espoused theory and theory i n  use.  
One of t h e  beau t i e s  of LOFT is t h a t  t h e  cap ta in  and t h e  crew g e t  t o  d i g  
t h e i r  own hole .  But I suspec t  t h a t  when we have g o t t e n  i n t o  t h i s  f a r  
enough, one of t h e  most s e r i o u s  problems wi th  LOFT, f o r  those  people whose 
resources  f o r  dea l ing  wi th  those  kinds of ho le s  are  marginal ,  is  going t o  be 
helping them ou t  of t h e  ho le ,  he lp ing  them t o  recognize why they  f e l l  i n  t he  
ho le  i n  t h e  f i r s t  place, and he lp ing  them t o  f i l l  i n  t h e  hole .  And a l l  t h r e e  
of those have got  t o  be done. This ,  t o  m e ,  p l aces  a very  cons iderable  burden 
on t h e  LOFT i n s t r u c t o r s  and on t h e i r  t r a i n i n g .  
should c a l l  them i n s t r u c t o r s ,  observers ,  o r  maybe counse lors ,  bu t  I th ink  
t h e r e  are going t o  be some people,  when we've evaluated enough people,  t h a t  
w e  are going t o  end up counsel ing,  r a t h e r  than t r a i n i n g  o r  observing.  
I don ' t  know whether w e  
I t h i n k  t h e  LOFT observer  o r  i n s t r u c t o r  o r  counselor  o r  whatever you 
want t o  c a l l  him has got  t o  be a b l e  t o  recognize  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between a 
crewmember who f a l l s  i n  a h o l e  because of a p ro f i c i ency  problem, and one who 
f a l l s  i n  a hole  because of a psychological  problem. Remember, we're no t  
aiming a t  t h e  top  5 percent  of our  a i r l i ne .  
them, you don ' t  know any way t o  he lp  them, and they  don ' t  need t h e  he lp .  
"If i t  a i n ' t  broke, don ' t  f i x  it.'' We're t a l k i n g  about t h e  bottom 15 o r  20 
percent .  It is  important t o  recognize t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between a psychological  
problem and a prof ic iency  problem because t h e  t rea tment  of t h e  two may be 
very  d i f f e r e n t .  Trea t ing  t h e  ozle w i t h  th ings  t h a t  work b e s t  f o r  t h e  o the r  
may do more harm than good. That ,  I th ink ,  i s  a p o t e n t i a l  problem i n  t h i s  
area. 
W e  don ' t  know any way t o  he lp  
Another one. I suggested t h a t  I don ' t  t h i n  one approach is  going 
t o  work f o r  everyone. The North Cent ra l  p i l o t s  i t  very  p l a i n  t h a t  they  
wanted p r e s c r i p t i o n s .  They were upse t  about  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  more p r e s c r i p t i v e  
material wasn't  presented i n  t h a t  very  e x c e l l e n t  approach t o  t h i s  problem. 
Well, p r e s c r i p t i o n s  may he lp ,  bu t  one of t h e  th ings  you l e a r n  i n  medicine is 
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t h a t  a l l  drugs have s i d e  e f f e c t s ,  t h a t  you never g e t  something f o r  nothing,  
and t h a t  nothing i s  going t o  work f o r  everybody. And t h e r e i n  l i e s  a very  
d i s t i n c t  danger i n  t h e  area of p r e s c r i p t i v e  remedies. 
I th ink  i t  b r ings  up aga in  t h e  importance of i n s t r u c t o r s  w i th  f l e x i -  
b i l i t y ,  i n s t r u c t o r s  who have not  been taken through a cookbook kind of 
course  i n  how t o  teach resource  management, but  i n s t r u c t o r s  who understand 
what they are t a l k i n g  about ,  and t h a t  t h e r e  is more than one way of dea l ing  
with i t .  
I don ' t  t h ink  i t ' s  going t o  be enormously d i f f i c u l t  t o  e l l u c i d a t e  t h e  
goa ls  of resource  management t r a i n i n g .  I t h i n k  t h a t  can be done. A g r e a t  
d e a l  of i t  has been done a t  t h i s  conference,  and i t  w i l l  be f a r  easier as a 
r e s u l t  of t h i s  conference.  W e  may even be a b l e  t o  s t anda rd ize  t h e  goa ls  
somewhere down t h e  l i n e .  
The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  resource  management t r a i n i n g  i s ,  I th ink ,  
abundantly c l e a r .  The reason I t h i n k  so,  as does John and t h e  rest of u s ,  
i s  because you people have t o l d  us .  You s t a r t e d  t e l l i n g  us  i n  1974 i n  our 
i n i t i a l  p i l o t  in te rv iews ,  t o  which John r e f e r r e d .  W e  d i d n ' t  understand by 
any means a l l  of what you were t e l l i n g  us ,  and I ' m  no t  s u r e  w e  understand a l l  
of what you w e r e  t e l l i n g  us  now. But t h e s e  ideas ,  what you have seen 
embodied i n  t h i s  conference,  what John, George, Maurie, and P a t  R u f f e l l  
Smith put  toge ther  f o r  t h i s ,  came s t r a i g h t  from you people.  I f  i t ' s  r i g h t ,  
i t ' s  r i g h t  because you t o l d  us  i n  an  e f f e c t i v e  way, and i f  i t ' s  wrong, i t ' s  
your f a u l t  too.  
So I th ink  w e  can handle t h e  goa l s  and t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  resource  
And i t ' s  going t o  be d i f f i c u l t  because we've 
management t r a i n i n g ,  bu t  then  w e  g e t  t o  t h e  methodology and t h a t ' s  going t o  
be very  much more d i f f i c u l t .  
go t  t o  r'ind approaches t h a t  can be so ld  t o  managements t h a t  have got  t o  buy 
t h e  concept and then  buy t h e  package. 
comes t o  buying s t u f f .  You know f a r  b e t t e r  than w e  do what 's  going t o  s e l l  
t o  your managers. 
And managements are funny when i t  
A s  I ind ica t ed ,  t h e r e ' s  an  enormous d i f f e r e n c e  i n  management and crew 
s t y l e s  a c r o s s  carriers and even wi th in  carriers. There are those  carriers 
t h a t  have been involved i n  mergers involving q u i t e  d i s s i m i l a r  crew s t y l e s .  
There are very pronounced d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  s t y l e s  w i th in  a i r  crew groups,  and 
I th ink  i t ' s  t r u e  wi th in  domici les  as w e l l  w i t h i n  carriers. 
Maybe what works f o r  one kind of group i s  no t  going t o  work f o r  
another  kind of group, and maybe t h e  person who tries t o  f i g u r e  i t  ou t  
b e t t e r  have enough f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  recognize t h a t  i n  advance. 
going t o  pose some i n t e r e s t i n g  problems f o r  carriers i n  t h e  process  of 
merging over t h e  next  couple  of years .  
I t h i n k  t h a t ' s  
Carriers are going t o  have d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  resources  t h a t  can be 
devoted t o  t h e  programs, and I t h i n k  t h a t  while  some c a n ' t  buy a l l  of i t ,  
they may be  a b l e  t o  buy 80 percent  of i t  f o r  a c o s t  of 50 percent  of i t .  
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Tha t ' s  one of t h e  areas where I do t h i n k  more r e sea rch  is needed, bu t  I ' m  no t  
s u r e  i t ' s  t h e  kind of r e sea rch  t h a t  NASA can do. 
s t ance  t h a t  ha l f  a loa f  i s  a p r e t t y  b i g  p i ece  of bread. 
be d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  percept ion  of t h e  t r a i n i n g  department by f l i g h t  
personnel ,  d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  are going t o  in f luence  what t h e  t r a i n i n g  depart-  
ment can o f f e r  i n  t h i s  area and g e t  away with.  
It may w e l l  be  i n  t h i s  in- 
There are going t o  
There ' s  another  problem, I th ink .  I t ' s  easy t o  become cap t iva t ed  by 
s o c i a l  and i n t e r p e r s o n a l  i s s u e s .  There 's  a l i t t l e  b i t  of t h e  p s y c h i a t r i s t  
i n  a l l  of us .  
nega t ive ,  about whether you can change pe r sona l i ty .  Trieve suggested t o  m e  
t h i s  morning t h a t  t h a t  probably is  a moot p o i n t ,  t h a t  i t  probably doesn ' t  
make a l o t  of d i f f e r e n c e  whether you can change pe r sona l i ty .  But one th ing  
w e  do know, and you people know i t  very  w e l l  indeed because i t ' s  one of t h e  
th ings  you do f o r  a l i v i n g ,  you can change behavior .  You can change behavior 
by making i t  very p l easan t  t o  behave one way and very  unpleasant  t o  behave i n  
another  way. Incen t ives ,  p o s i t i v e  and negat ive  incen t ives .  
We've heard ques t ions  he re ,  gene ra l ly  answered i n  t h e  
Now, i f  you can change behavior ,  and i f  t h e  d e s i r a b l e  o r  t h e  des i r ed  
modes of behavior can be taught ,  and I don ' t  t h ink  t h e r e ' s  any ques t ion  t h a t  
they can be taught ,  then t h a t  becomes t h e  goal  of t h i s  kind of t r a i n i n g  f o r  
those  persons whose behavior i s  substandard.  
Tra in ing  must t ake  i n t o  account t h e  worst  ca se ,  and resource  management 
t r a i n i n g  is  r e a l l y  no except ion.  And y e t  t r a i n i n g  has  go t  t o  t ake  t h e  worst 
case i n t o  account without  becoming completely deadly f o r  b e t t e r  people.  
seems t o  m e  t h a t  i f  resource  management i s  going t o  be of he lp  t o  a crew 
somewhere i n  a bad s i t u a t i o n ,  t h a t  t h e  kind of crew t h a t  is most going t o  
need t h a t  he lp  i s  going t o  be t h e  kind t h a t  incorpora tes  a r e l a t i v e l y  in- 
experienced cap ta in  who may not  be too s u r e  of himself as a manger and a new 
f i r s t  o f f i c e r  and a second o f f i c e r  who are e i t h e r  weak o r  new o r  o ld  and 
in f i rm o r  something of t h a t  s o r t ,  because t h a t ' s  j u s t  t h e  way i t  seems t o  
happen. And i t ' s  those  people  who are most going t o  need t h e  s k i l l s  and, 
t he re fo re ,  those  people whom you must reach  most e f f e c t i v e l y .  
t o  f i g u r e  out  a way t o  do t h a t  without  boring everybody else t o  death.  
It 
And you've got  
I t h i n k  these  scena r ios  need t o  be designed wi th  t h i s  i n  mind. This  is 
one of t h e  th ings  t h a t  worr ies  m e  about  s tandard ized  scenar ios .  I th ink  i t ' s  
e n t i r e l y  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  s imula tor  i n s t r u c t o r  should have some op t ions  wi th  
r e spec t  t o  cons t ruc t ing  scena r ios  such t h a t  people can go through t r ibu -  
l a t i o n s  and succeed r a t h e r  than  simply f a i l .  Captain Beach t a lked  about  t h i s  
w i th  regard  t o  graded scenar ios .  Perhaps we  should be  a b l e  t o  do a c e r t a i n  
amount of ad hoc grading on t h e  s p o t  - I ' m  no t  su re .  
ope ra t ing  permi ts  do n o t  permit u s  t o  do t h a t  kind of th ing .  I 've got  some 
problems wi th  t h a t .  
i n t o  account i nd iv idua l  l i m i t a t i o n s  and c a p a b i l i t i e s .  I th ink  t h a t  t o  t i e  
t h e i r  hands may be an  unwise th ing ,  a l though I can q u i t e  understand t h e  
reason why those  r e g u l a t i o n s  were w r i t t e n .  But I t h i n k  w e  may need t o  do 
some p lay ing  around wi th  t h a t .  
I know t h e  c u r r e n t  
We're paying f l i g h t  i n s t r u c t o r s  t o  i n s t r u c t  and t ake  
And then I th ink  we've got  one o t h e r  problem t o  th ink  about .  I th ink  
somewhere o u t  t h e r e  i n  t h a t  world t h a t  you people i n h a b i t ,  t h e r e  are going 
t o  be a few p i l o t s  who can make i t  as long as w e  keep making them do t h e  
jumping-through-the-hoop r o u t i n e  every s i x  months, bu t  who a r e n ' t  going t o  
make it  i f  w e  in t roduce  t h i s  t r a i n i n g .  I th ink  you've got  some guys who can 
f l y  t h e  a i r p l a n e ,  who can f l y  emergency procedures,  who can pass  t h e  
s tandard PC, bu t  who may not  have t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  take  on t h i s  kind of a 
caper .  What are you going t o  do wi th  them? You b e t t e r  know before  you ge t  
t o  them. I don ' t  know t h e  answer t o  t h a t  one. I don ' t  t h ink  t h a t ' s  a 
researchable  i s sue .  But somebody b e t t e r  do a l i t t l e  pragmatic th inking  about 
i t ,  and I t h i n k  i t  would be h ighly  d e s i r a b l e  t o  t h i n k  about i t  before  t h e  guy 
shows up on your doors tep ,  and says ,  "I j u s t  busted t h i s  th ing ,  what are you 
going t o  do now?" 
There are a number of researchable  i s s u e s  i n  t h i s  area. Whether they 
a l l  need t o  be researched o r  n o t  is another  ques t ion .  You people brought 
most of them up. Val ida t ion .  W e  kept  hear ing about v a l i d a t i o n ,  and t h i s  
morning i n  two very e f f e c t i v e  p re sen ta t ions  dea l ing  wi th  what I had thought 
w a s  a t o t a l l y  unmanageable can of worms, you managed t o  d ispose ,  i n  r e a l l y  
q u i t e  e l egan t  prose ,  of t h e  s e l e c t i o n  aspect of a l l  of t h i s .  W e  need 
c r i t e r i a .  It  w a s  pointed out  very  c l e a r l y  today, bu t  t h e  b e s t  way of coming 
up wi th  them i s  another  i s s u e .  
Tra in ing ,  another  researchable  i s s u e .  How do w e  eva lua te  t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
what we're doing? 
s u f f i c i e n t  major acc iden t  experience wi th in  an a i r  carrier so  t h a t  I can 
dec ide  whether I ' v e  been doing b e t t e r  f o r  t h a t  15 yea r s  than t h e  previous 15 
years .  
way e i t h e r ,  because they don ' t  have any acc iden t s .  
some way. W e  c o l l e c t  an  i n o r d i n a t e  amount of d a t a ,  and I j u s t  have t h e  
f e e l i n g ,  as w a s  t h e  case wi th  t h e  Apollo program when people s t a r t e d  looking 
a t  a l l  t h e  b i t s  and p i eces  of te lemet ry  they had gathered,  t h a t  t h e r e  may be 
some b i t s  and p ieces  of d a t a  t h a t  t e l l  u s  th ings  about how people perform on 
our a i r l i n e s .  And so I posed t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  v a l i d a t i o n  might be 
poss ib l e  us ing  d a t a  c u r r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e ,  i f  we w e r e  j u s t  a l i t t l e  more 
ingenious about how w e  used it. 
I a m  s t i l l  l o a t h  t o  w a i t  15  yea r s  t o  accumulate 
And then you g e t  an  a i r l i n e  l i k e  Qantas where you c a n ' t  do i t  t h a t  
But t h e r e ' s  got  t o  be 
We've got  t o  eva lua te  t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h i s  t r a i n i n g  while  i t ' s  being 
given. We've got  t o  eva lua te  t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h i s  t r a i n i n g  on those  who have 
j u s t  had i t ,  and we've got  t o  eva lua te  t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h i s  t r a i n i n g  long 
a f t e r  i t  has been given. 
I th ink  we  ought t o  pay some a t t e n t i o n  t o  whether LOFT is  a method of 
t r a i n i n g  o r  a method of eva lua t ion ,  o r  both.  I th ink  we've heard about LOFT 
as an  eva lua t ion  method, we've heard about LOFT as  a t r a i n i n g  method, 
everything bu t  LOFT as a s e l e c t i o n  method - nobody has  mentioned t h a t .  I ' m  
r e a l l y  somewhat su rp r i sed  nobody d i d ,  because t h e r e  are c e r t a i n  th ings  t h a t  
are common t o  f l i g h t  a c r o s s  a v a r i e t y  of d i f f e r e n t  kinds of a i r p l a n e s .  A s  a 
matter of f a c t ,  Bob, a m  I n o t  c o r r e c t  t h a t  you people  have been us ing  simu- 
l a t i o n  dur ing  your s e l e c t i o n  process? 
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CAPT. CRUMP: W e  a l s o  have, i n s t ead  of a PC, used t h e  LOFT program 
during t h e  probat ionary year .  
DR. BILLINGS: That would scare me.  Methodology, aga in .  A number 
I f  we've heard nothing else w e  have heard you people loud and 
of areas t h a t  may o r  may not  need formal r e sea rch  but  which c e r t a i n l y  need 
coord ina t ion ,  
clear wi th  respect t o  t h a t .  What works b e s t  f o r  whom and why. 
Regarding t h e  r e l a t i o n  of t h e  s e l e c t i o n  cr i ter ia  t o  t h e  t r a i n i n g  
methods: is  i t  j u s t  poss ib l e  t h a t  t h e r e  are some kinds of people who are  
s e l e c t e d  by t h e  a i r  carriers f o r  whom LOFT i s  not  perhaps t h e  most e f f e c t i v e ?  
And the  o t h e r  i s sue :  LOFT wi th  a f u l l  crew is  enormously expensive. Does 
i t  have t o  be a f u l l  crew? Again, I can understand why t h e  FAA r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  
bu t  somebody's go t  t o  grab t h a t  by the  horns,  too.  
expensive i f  w e  d i d n ' t  have t o  have a f u l l  crew. Is i t  conceivable  t h a t  w e  
don ' t ?  
LOFT would be a l o t  less 
I d o n ' t  t h ink  anyone knows a t  t h e  p re sen t  moment. 
The i s s u e  of s imula t ion  realism and s imula tor  acceptance w a s  brought up 
here .  I d o n ' t  doubt t h a t  t h e r e ' s  any ques t ion  t h a t  f o r  c e r t a i n  crews, those 
same crews who always know t h a t  they are d r i v i n g  a s imula tor  as  opposed t o  
g e t t i n g  wrapped up i n  t h e  th ing ,  t h i s  kind of t r a i n i n g  technique may have 
some s e r i o u s  shortcomings because i t  j u s t  i s n ' t  an  a i rplane f o r  those  guys. 
How do w e  g e t  around t h a t ?  
We p r e s e n t l y  s t i l l  check p i l o t s ,  no t  crews r e a l l y .  Is t h e r e  perhaps a 
way of r e i n f o r c i n g  t h e  va lue  of resource  management t r a i n i n g  and t h e  resource  
management approach by making crew i n t e g r a t i o n  a s p e c i f i c  c r i t e r i o n  i n  
checks? Now, I r e a l i z e  t h a t  crew coord ina t ion  i s  one of t h e  i t e m s  t h a t  is  
eva lua ted ,  bu t  I ' m  t a l k i n g  about a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  pe r -  
formance is  s p e c i f i c a l l y  evaluated i n  terms of how e f f e c t i v e l y  t h e  crew 
helped him. I wonder i f  perhaps t h a t  might do something t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  
va lue  of t h i s  t r a i n i n g ?  
A r e  w e  t r a i n i n g  command s k i l l s  o r  are w e  t r a i n i n g  s o c i a l  s k i l l s ?  Tha t ' s  
an i s s u e  about which t h e r e ' s  been cons iderable  looseness  i n  our  th inking  and 
i n  some of t h e  s ta tements  here .  I th ink  i t ' s  important  t h a t  we f i g u r e  out  
which i t  i s  because i f  we're t r a i n i n g  command s k i l l s ,  t h a t ,  I th ink ,  
c e r t a i n l y  mil i ta tes  t h a t  w e  p l ace  t h e  t r a i n i n g  somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y  i n  t h e  
career progress ion ,  and probably t h a t  i t  have a conten t  somewhat d i f f e r e n t  
from t h e  placement and t h e  conten t  i f  we're t r a i n i n g  e s s e n t i a l l y  s o c i a l  and 
communications s k i l l s .  
And f i n a l l y  w e  g e t  back t o  what I t h i n k  is t h e  most expensive and 
perhaps t h e  most c r i t i ca l  i s s u e ,  which i s  why I w a s  most i n t e r e s t e d  i n  these  
p re sen ta t ions  t h a t  i nd ica t ed  t h a t  i t  w a s  being taken i n  hand f i r s t ,  t h e  
t r a i n i n g  of i n s t r u c t o r s .  What do w e  t r a i n  them i n ?  How do w e  t r a i n  them? 
How much t r a i n i n g  do w e  g ive  them? How o f t e n  do w e  r e i n f o r c e  i t ?  And i f  
y o u ' l l  f o r g i v e  m e  f o r  being a f l i g h t  surgeon f o r  a minute, how c l i n i c a l  is  
t h a t  t r a i n i n g  going t o  be? 
counse lors  as w e l l  as i n s t r u c t o r s ,  bu t  I would a s k  you whether t h e r e  may be 
There 's  a c o s t  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  making these  guys 
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a l a r g e r  c o s t  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  no t  g iv ing  them a thorough understanding of 
t he  dynamics of t h e  t r a i n i n g  process  as  i t  w i l l  be  when we g e t  heavi ly  i n t o  
resource  management t r a i n i n g .  
There have been a number of ques t ions  asked he re  about audiovisua l  
methodology, feedback, computer a s s i s t e d  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  f i lms  and videp f o r  
o r i e n t a t i o n  and t h a t  s o r t  of t h ing .  I th ink  t h a t ' s  got  t o  be looked i n t o  
and I t h i n k  one of t h e  o the r  t h ings  t h a t  somebody is  going t o  have t o  look 
i n t o  i s  s e l l i n g  methods, because I t h i n k  sooner o r  later we're going t o  come 
up a g a i n s t  some tough customers when w e  t r y  t o  s e l l  t h i s  concept.  
I haven ' t  answered any of t h e  r e sea rch  i s s u e s  he re  and I d i d n ' t  in tend  
t o .  We're not  being very p r e s c r i p t i v e  e i t h e r ,  because t h e r e ' s  no magic i n  
any of what w e  presented here .  I ' m  s u r e  Lee ,  Bob, and Mike would be t h e  
f i rs t  t o  say so .  Whatever g e t s  t h e  job  done, whatever g ives  you a cons t ruc t  
t h a t  you can wrap yourself  around and assimilate,  i s  probably an e f f e c t i v e  
concept f o r  g e t t i n g  i n t o  t h i s  area. 
Now, wi th  regard t o  NASA's r o l e s ,  I have s a i d  t o  my col league  s i t t i n g  
over here  on my r i g h t  looking very  s e r i o u s  a t  t h i s  po in t ,  t h a t  w e  have 
go t t en  more mileage out  of resource  management wi th  less re sea rch  than any 
o the r  p r o j e c t  NASA has ever  done. Tha t ' s  no t  perhaps t o t a l l y  f a i r  because 
George and Maurie and P a t  R u f f e l l  Smith have, i n  f a c t ,  done some research .  
Miles Murphy has been working wi th  John looking a t  t h e  NASA ASRS d a t a .  W e  
have done r e sea rch  of a type ,  but  it c e r t a i n l y  is  a f a r  p i ece  from t h e  kind 
of r e sea rch  t h a t  NASA is o r d i n a r i l y  accused of doing. Nor, wi th  l imi t ed  
resources ,  are w e  capable  of devot ing a l l  of our  resources  t o  r e sea rch ,  and 
a l a r g e  p a r t  of our  resources  t o  f a c i l i t a t i o n ,  and a c t i n g  as a c a t a l y s t ,  as 
w e  hope w e  have done i n  t h i s  conference.  
W e  have t o  be very  c a r e f u l  about t h i s  because people have a way of 
asking us  i n  some of t h e s e  areas f o r  recommendations, and when w e  g ive  
recommendations based on consensus i n s t e a d  of d a t a ,  we're on very,  very  s o f t  
t u r f .  
people as you come and cha t  w i th  u s  and a s k  us  about t h ings ,  th ings  about 
which w e  do not  have d a t a .  
hollow recommendations. 
I t ' s  a problem t h a t  is going t o  l ead  t o  some f r u s t r a t i o n  f o r  you 
Recommendations without  r e sea rch  can be p r e t t y  
It i s  not  impossible ,  however, f o r  coordinated programs i n  which you do 
t h e  r e sea rch ,  and w e  t r y  t o  he lp  des ign  i t ,  and eva lua te  i t  and i n t e r p r e t  i t .  
It i s  no t  a t  a l l  impossible  t h a t  some of t h e  programs t h a t  you are a l r eady  
doing o r  planning,  i f  planned o r  done j u s t  a l i t t l e  b i t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  would 
r e s u l t  i n  a b e t t e r  y i e l d  of d a t a  which could be u s e f u l  n o t  only t o  you bu t  
t o  o the r  people .  And w e  have some people who know q u i t e  a l o t  about  experi-  
mental  des ign  and are r e a l l y  q u i t e  capable  of l i v i n g  wi th in  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
of t he  real world. 
So I t h i n k  one of t h e  reasons  f o r  coc rd ina t ion  is  t o  t r y  t o  g e t  maximum 
use  out  of t h e  d a t a  t h a t  you and you and you may be c o l l e c t i n g  i f  you dec ide  
t o  s t i c k  your f o o t  i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  swimming pool .  That is  probably a 
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b e t t e r  reason f o r  coord ina t ion  than any o t h e r .  I t h i n k  t h a t  may w e l l  
r ep resen t  i n  t h i s  area t h e  major rvice t h a t  NASA ea erform i n  t h e  long 
run ,  t h a t  of helping t o  act  as a n t r a l  po in t  f o r  i 
helping you t o  maximize t h e  e f f e c  eness  of t h e  exp 
W e  are doing t h i s  i n  a d i f f e r e n t  area of t r a i n i n g  a t  the  p re sen t  moment, 
thanks t o  A 1  and h i s  co l leagues  on t h e  ATA t r a i n i n g  committee. W e  are t r y i n g  
t o  he lp  a carrier do a p i ece  of r e sea rch  t h a t  i t  wants, t h a t  w e  want, and 
t h a t  a l l  of u s  f e e l  should be done, t o  eva lua te  t h e  d a t a ,  t o  i n t e r p r e t  them. 
I t h i n k  t h a t  perhaps has.some real promise i n  t h i s  area of resource  manage- 
ment, where a number of d i f f e r e n t  approaches may be found t o  be about  
equa l ly  e f f e c t i v e .  I t h i n k  t h a t  r e a l l y  is  about  what I th ink  I ' v e  been 
hear ing he re  t h e  last t h r e e  days.  
Once aga in ,  w e  are enormously g r a t e f u l  t o  a l l  of you f o r  t h e  t i m e ,  
because you a l l  had o t h e r  t h ings  t o  do, f o r  your a t t e n t i o n  and f o r  your 
input  which has  been enormously h e l p f u l  t o  us .  
d e a l  he re  and I ' m  g r a t e f u l  f o r  t h a t .  
I have learned a very g r e a t  
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CLOSING REMARKS 
Capt. A. A. Frink" 
Before John c l o s e s  t h e  proceedings,  which is next  on h i s  l i s t ,  I 
b e l i e v e ,  I want on behalf  of a l l  of t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of i ndus t ry  he re ,  t o  
thank you - A l ,  John, Char l i e ,  George, Maurie, T r i eve  - and a l l  t h e  rest 
of t h e  NASA group t h a t  has  t ack led  a very ,  very  d i f f i c u l t  problem i n  a way 
t h a t  i s  no t  t h e  usua l  way, as Char l i e  i nd ica t ed ,  t h a t  they l i k e  t o  do th ings .  
But they%ave done us  a tremendous s e r v i c e  and I t h i n k  t h a t  on behalf  of t h e  
indus t ry  w e  should g ive  them a very  rous ing  v o t e  of thanks. 
I a l s o  want t o  say  t h a t  one of them could no t  be he re ,  P a t  R u f f e l l  
Smith, who con t r ibu ted  heav i ly  t o  t h e  development of t h i s  program. P a t  is  
s e r i o u s l y  ill and w e  c e r t a i n l y  want t o  inc lude  P a t  i n  our thoughts.  
DR. LAUBER: Thank you, A l .  There are a g r e a t  number of people 
who made i n p u t s ,  a l o t  of va luab le  i n p u t s ,  i n t o  t h i s  program, about which I 
t h i n k  w e  heard some reasonably good and p o s i t i v e  feedback on. A l l  of t he  
speakers w e r e  super .  The working group chairmen d i d  superb ly ,  and A 1  Fr ink ,  
as  t h e  indus t ry  chairman, as you have j u s t  seen, gave an  e x c e l l e n t  per -  
formance i n  t h a t  capac i ty .  Louise Cooper and M i r i a m  White d i d  a superb j o b  
too  wi th  t h e  wives' program and w e  should a p p r e c i a t e  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  i n  t h a t  
regard .  
A l o t  of NASA people have put a l o t  of e f f o r t  i n t o  t h i s ,  as A 1  j u s t  
s a i d .  A l l  of t h e  NASA a s s i s t a n t s  w e r e  n o t  j u s t  a s s i s t a n t s  dur ing  t h e  3 
days of t h i s  workshop; r a t h e r ,  they have been involved very  c l o s e l y  wi th  t h e  
program f o r  a long per iod  of t i m e ,  and have made s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
For example, I n o t i c e  that  i n  the working group r e p o r t s  t h i s  morning, Miles 
Murphy's breakdown of t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of s k i l l s  and behaviors  involved w a s  
used q u i t e  f r equen t ly .  
t h a t  a l o t  of people have done. 
And t h a t ' s  an  i n d i c a t i o n  of j u s t  one of t h e  t h i n g s  
Tr ieve  Tanner w a s  r e spons ib l e  i n  l a r g e  p a r t  f o r  g e t t i n g  Lee  Bolman and 
Bob Helmreich on t h e  program and coord ina t ing  w i t h  them. 
very  p o s i t i v e  comments about those  papers and I t h i n k  t h a t  i n  l a r g e  p a r t  t h e  
success  of t hose  w a s  because of Trieve's working w i t h  them. And, of course ,  
Maurie and George - A 1  w a s  n o t  exaggera t ing  when he s a i d  George is  t r u l y  
t h e  mentor of t h i s  workshop, t r u l y  i n  a l l  senses of t h e  word. And, of 
course ,  P a t  R u f f e l l  Smith, who, as Al j u s t  i nd ica t ed ,  w a s  unable t o  be wi th  
us  because of s e r i o u s  i l l n e s s .  
I ' v e  heard some 
George had a c a b l e  t h i s  morning from England say ing ,  "Best wishes f o r  a 
happy and product ive  workshop.'' 
r e l a y  t o  P a t  t h a t  w e  have, i n  f a c t ,  had a happy and product ive  workshop. 
I ' m  s u r e  i f  any of you want t o  convey t h a t  message t o  P a t ,  i t  would be  
g r e a t l y  apprec ia ted .  
I t h i n k  a l l  of u s  are going t o  be a b l e  t o  
*Pan American World Airways. 
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One f i n a l  cha l lenge  before  w e  c lose .  My d i s s e r t a t i o n  advisor  r a r e l y  
s a i d  anything t h a t  I agreed wi th ,  but  one of t h e  th ings  t h a t  he d i d  say w a s  
t h a t  an idea ,  i f  good, is probably no t  very new, and i f  i t ' s  new, i t ' s  
probably not  very good. I s a i d  i t  t h e  o the r  way around, bu t  t h e  concept is  
t h e  same. Len Holdstock handed m e  a paper earlier today which he s a i d  you 
might f i n d  i n t e r e s t i n g .  I t ' s  t i t l e d  "Crew Management, a Captain 's  
Viewpoint." It goes on t o  say t h a t  an  accepted t ru ism i s  t h a t  management 
and l eade r sh ip  go hand i n  hand. I t ' s  been so i n  some of our outs tanding  
crews, good crews, and only some f a i r  ones. Although i t  may never have been 
so s t a t e d ,  t h i s  v a r i a t i o n  i n  crews i s  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  q u a l i t i e s  of 
l eade r sh ip  d isp layed  by t h e  cap ta in .  Leadership t h a t  produces success  i s  
r e f l e c t e d  by t h e  crew t o  t h e  passengers  and n o t  only enhances t h e  image of 
t h e  crew but  a l s o  more s t rong ly  t h a t  of t h e  a i r l i n e  t h e  passengers  have 
s e l e c t e d  t o  use.  
And i t  goes on t o  t a l k  about some of t he  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  expected from 
a good c a p t a i n ,  inc luding  cons ide ra t ion  t o  each ind iv idua l  crewmember as a 
mature p ro fes s iona l ,  honest ,  j u s t  and f a i r  t rea tment ,  l o y a l t y ,  t o  be kept  
o r i en ted  and i n  t h e  loop when dec i s ions  may involve  an  emergency, a n  s o  on 
and s o  f o r t h .  Sound l i k e  f a m i l i a r  words. The paper t h a t  Len gave t o  m e  w a s  
a l i t t l e  b i t  yellowed and f rayed .  He s a i d  he found i t  i n  t h e  bottom of a 
drawer,  and probably i t  w a s  on t h e  order  of 10 yea r s  o ld .  And I w a s  j u s t  
wondering i f ,  when w e  m e e t  i n  1989, we're going t o  be t a l k i n g  about t h e  same 
concepts o r  i f  w e  w i l l  have made some progress .  That ,  of course,  i s  t h e  
cha l lenge  t h a t  A1 made t o  a l l  of us .  
Thank you a l l  very  much. The proceedings are c losed .  
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INITIAL UPGRADING, PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
The step from Copilot to Captai? can certainly be 
described as one of the most significant achievements 
in the professional life of a civil aviation pilot. 
Not only the greater demands but also the emotional 
state associated with the Initial Upgrading give the 
training course for future Captains a meaning, which 
in the individual phases can have even a detrimental 
effect on the performance of the course participant. 
The aim of this paper is on the one hand to describe 
the course structure and on the other hand to go into 
the various related problems, such as method, failure 
rate, complaints, efficient preparation for the up- 
grading, etc.: In the third part, some envisaged 
future programme changes will be briefly described. 
TRAINING OBJECTIVES 
The training objectives are established in accordance 
with the Standards of Performance, which clearly 
define the flying capabilities, knowledge and 
personality of a Captain. 
COURSE STRUCTURE 
The Initial Up,grading is divided into two main parts, 
namely the so-called Captain's Course (CC) and 
Upgrading (UP). The CC falls within the responsibilities 
of the' Training Department, whereas the UP, lies in the 
hands of Line Operations. 
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operation and only then, after this introduction phase, 
the actual training as Pic take place. 
The basic features of the individual phases from CC 
and UP are described as follows: 
CAPTAINS COURSE --------------- 
Theory "Flight Procedures" 
(1 day / 6 hours) 
Simulator (pre-f light) 
(5 days / approx. 9 hours 
s t i c k  t ime ) 
Explanation of flight 
procedures, mainly with 
regard to T/O, APP with 
abnormal configuration, 
CAT 11, 
Familiarisation the 
left seat and the ulting 
new duties. Discussion 
with abnormal configurations. 
Simulator (post-f light) The objective of these 3 
( 3  days / approx. 10 hours days is to give the future 
crew t irne ) Captain the opportunity to 
fly the DC-9 in conditions 
which cannot, or at least 
not realistLCally, be achieved 
in the a/c (e.g. hydraulic 
failure, electrical failure, 
etc.). 
Here the emphasis is on the 
systematic work organisation, 
clear and precise actions and. 
consistent supervision of the 
assisting pilot; in short, in 
the sphere of flight manage- 
ment in. its broadest sense. 
Performance throughout the last eight days (whenever 
possible under the same flight instructor) determines 
the CC qualification. In this qualification, in 
addition to performance, the progress must also be 
assessed. Apart from the .final result, which is of 
course of vital significance, it must be seen - how this 
was achieved. 
Should the final qualification be "Not Qualified", the 
UP cannot-be started. 
After the pure flying part, the so-called Captain's 
Theory Course now begins. The first phase of this 
course lasts 5 days (approx. 34 hours) and the following 
subjects are dealt with: 
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- Organisation SWISSAIR; 
Orientation Finance & Partnerships; 
Orientation Product Planning & Marketing; 
Orientation Branch Offi’ces Abroad, Customer Service 
and the Pic, Problems of the Station Manager abroad; 
Noise Abatement Zurich Airport. 
- Organisation and work.distribution within Flight 
Operations; 
Operations Planning; 
Flight Area Manager Europe; 
Technical & Maintenance Department, Orientation . 
and Inspection Maintenance Control; 
Station Zurich, Orientation and Inspection. 
- Movement Control, Inspection, Cooperation with 
the Pic; 
Dispatch Zurich; Crew Planning and Control, 
Organisation, Problems, Cooperation; 
Medical Department: 
Catering Service, Orientation and Inspection. 
- The Work of the Cabin Crews; 
Position and Responsibility of the Pic, Cooperation 
with the Pic; 
ATC, Orientation and Inspection, Discussion; 
Security, Orientation and Discussion. 
- The Fears of the Passenger; 
The good Public Address; 
Speech Training. 
Following this first part of the Theory Course, the 
actual training in line operation begins. Under the 
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guidance of the Route Instructor, that which has been 
learned in flight and theoretical training is put into 
practice. At the same time, the new elements of 
operational problems must be assimilated. 
Route Training is divided into three phases: Instruction, 
Consolidation and Proficiency, with a total duration of 
120 - 150 hours. The objective of the three phases is 
selfexplanatory. After 70 hour;s, the Route Instructor 
no longer sits in the RH seat, the Captain-to-be works 
with the Copilot in a normal working capacity. 
In the last part'of the UP comes the second phase of 
the Theory Course. This lasts three days and usually 
takes place in the seclusion of the Training Centre for 
Swissair Management. The course deals mainly with the 
subjects "The Pic as boss" and "The conduct of the Pic 
in specific situations". 
is therefore laid on the managerial duties of the Pic. 
The emphasis in this course 
Upon successful completion of the Route Training comes 
the appointment as Captain. 
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INITIAL UPGRADING, PART I 1  
This part is limited to the various problem areas 
related to the structure and implementation of the 
Captain's Courses. 
ARE THE DEMANDS TOO HIGH ? 
Again and again the whole course, or certain phases of 
the programme, are thought to be unrealistic or generally 
too difficult, whereby the frequently cited "problem free 
line operation" is used as criterion. Taken point by 
point this may be the case. However, bearing in mind 
* the training objective, which should not consist purely 
of assimilating knowledge and skills but should consider 
, the training of correct.behaviour, we must so devise our 
programmes that this behaviour or conduct can be taught, 
practised and examined. 'Apart from the purely specialist 
training, the course must be planned so as to make 
possible the development of those personal qualities 
which enable the Captain to'carry out his duties calmly 
and decisively. 
The Initial Upgrading programme valid at present can be 
considered integrated and well balanced as regards both 
degree of difficulty and duration. Not without satis- 
faction, perhaps even with a certain feeling of relief, 
we discover that our opinion is confirmed by the majority 
of course participants. 
TOO MUCH STRESS ? 
Many Captains-to-be.enter into a conflict of rales, 
especially at the start of their training, resulting in 
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psychic difficulties. The aspirant gets into a 
situation in the course where mental powers of resist- 
ance are required of him. With 
these powers, so much energy is 
flying is concerned, a frequent 
is noted. 
the mobilisation of 
burned up that, where 
drop in performance 
Stress situations in CC are basically unavoidable, 
although varying in extent from person to person. The 
mastering of the various situations of rou.tine flying 
demands also later a certain resistance, which simply 
belongs to the pilot's profession. 
We do not attempt to artificially produce any stress 
anywhere. We know that the task faced by a Pic aspir- 
ant holds sufficient stress situations in itself. We 
can do without vexations, tricks or special effects, 
TOO MANY TESTS, TOO LITTLE TRAINING ? 
This accusation, which always crops up, is probably as 
old as flight training itself. In the CC it applies 
to the fact that certain knowledge and skills are 
expected of the aspirant, e.g. aer0dynamic.basi.c 
knowledge or the ability to fly a normal VMC circuit. 
These requirements, however, are usually too little 
defined and are therefore for the participants not 
clearly recognisable, 
possibilities for improvement, which we want to realise 
as soon as possible. 
In this area there are still 
All that which is "new ground" for the future Captains 
is taught during the course and can also be practised. 
A CC without mistakes is Utopia, apart from the fact 
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that in a learning process mistakes are necessary, even 
desirable. 
The limits set for the required performance, instruction 
and exmination will always remain somewhat indistinct, 
particularly in the CC, for it cannot be ignored that 
the CC also has a last say in the selection. Copilots 
who have had more than sufficient opportunity to prepare 
themselves for this duty, yet who are unable to cope 
with the demands made upon them, have obviously not 
developed sufficiently enough the qualities necessary. 
Seen purely statistically, there will always be such 
isolated cases and it would therefore be wrong to 
completely eliminate the filter effect of such an 
"initiation". If the CC were to contain absolutely 
no examination means anymore, one would have to reckon 
with unsuitable captains being appointed occasionally, 
despite the high quality of the selection methods and 
the basic training. 
FAILURE RATES 
The failure rate in the past was relatively high, 
between 17 % and 35 % yearly, whereas from 1976 onwards 
the failure rate has remained at approximately 15 %. 
The degree of difficulty of a course - and thereby 
one's own chance of success - is often measured by the 
failure rate. To point out that every aspect should be 
taken into consideration does not have much effect. As 
high failure rates can have .really undesirable 
psychological consequences on performance abilities 
and because they are unpleasant, not just for those 
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directly concerned but also for Swissair (for human 
and economical reasons), it was important to probe 
into the deeper lying reasons for these failures. 
Were the stress and performance demands too high? 
An investigation into the mat.ter xevealed that most 
failure cases involved two special areas: the partic- 
ipant either could not cope with the stress resulting 
from his duties or he lacked the mental fLexibility 
necessary to carry out the various tasks. 
HOW CAN ONE PREPARE ONESELF ? 
To prepare himself, a person has to know exactly what 
is expected of him, i.e. the learning objectives must 
be 'determined as clearly as possible. 
those areas which always present difficulties should 
be known, so that preparation can be optimi-sed by 
means of objective measures. 
Furthermore, 
For the past three years, all Captains-to-be have been 
informed some time prior to beginning the course as to 
course structure, learning Objectives and suggestions 
as to effective preparation. The content of this 
informative day programme will presently be examined 
with regard to its suitability and the experiences of 
the last three years will be evaluated. Finally, from 
time to time we shall indicate to our line Captains 
how-essential it is for the best possible intensive 
and initiative cooperation in the cockpit to motivate 
Copilots, by means of continual educational work, 
towards self education. Copilots should already think 
as Captains before they do a Captain's Course and the 
Captains should make this possible for them. A Copilot 
should prepare himself with each flight for his career 
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as Captain. Should he have too little support in this 
respect he could, during a longer period of time as 
Copilot, be in danger of deterioration as far as his 
level of performance is concerned. . 
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INITIAL UPGRADING, PART I 1 1  
The training towards becoming a Captain, who bears the 
responsibility for the passengers entrusted to him, for 
the crew, for the aircraft and, last but not least, 
also for the reputation of his company, cannot consist, 
even in the future, only of supplying knowledge and 
skills but rather the education towards and appropriation 
of behaviour and attitudes. The training of the Captain 
as manager will be intensified, the personality training 
must be brought somewhat more into the foreground. 
A l s o  cognitions in the wider field of so-called "human 
factors" must be increased and must enter into our 
programmes more systematically. Finally, the constantly 
changing environment, with its varying kinds of reper- 
cussions on the r41e and demands of a Captain will be 
observed carefully s o  that any important changes can be 
recognised and brought into the train'ing programme in 
time. 
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TRAINING -. ECONOP?IC AND SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 
by 
Capta in  R. E. Norman, Jr. 
Chairman, P i l o t  T r a i n i n g  Committee 
A i r  Line F i l o t s  Assoc ia t ion  
Continued development of f l i g h t  s i m u l a t o r s  and v i s u a l  sys tems i s  a key 
f a c t o r  i n  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  many s a f e t y  problems and t o  t h e  economic h e a l t h  
of t h e  a i r  ca r r i e r  i n d u s t r y .  The use  of f l i g h t  simula'tors has  made i t  
p o s s i b l e  t o  a t t a i n  a near-zero t r a i n i n g  a c c i d e n t  ra te  i n  t h e  p a s t  s e v e r a l  
years compared t o  the  h igh  l o s s  of l i v e s  and a i r c r a f t  du r ing  e a r l i e r  y e a r s  
of t h e  j e t  age  when most t r a i n i n g  was accomplished i n  a i r c r a f t .  However, 
r e c e n t  a i r c r a f t  a c c i d e n t s  have occurred  du r ing  i n c r e a s e d  p i l o t  t r a i n i n g  i n  
t h e  a i r c r a f t  due t o  t h e  expansion of t he  n m b e r  of p i l o t s  and t h e  l a c k  of  
a q a i l a b l e  s imula to r  time, which h i g h l i g h t s  t h e  c u r r e n t  v a l u e  of s imula to r  
t r a i n i n g .  F l i g h t  s i m u l a t o r s  can  provide  v a l u a b l e  and r e a l i s t i c  t r a i n i n g  
f o r  p i l o t s  t o  cope wi th  o r  avoid  t h e  c i rcumstances  t h a t  c o n t i n u e  t o  cause  
a c c i d e n t s  i n  a i r l i n e  ope ra t ions .  The consequences of any f a t a l  a c c i d e n t ,  
i n  t h e s e  t imes,  can  r e s u l t  i n  a n  economic d i s a s t e r  f o r  any a i r  ca r r i e r .  The 
f a c t  t h a t  many a i r  ca r r i e r s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  s i n u l a t o r  and a i r c r a f t  
manufac turers ,  a re  expending c o n s i d e r a b l e  funds on new v i s u a l  s i m u l a t o r s  
and t r a i n i n g  s t u d i e s  v e r i f i e s  ou r  obse rva t ion  t h a t :  S a f e t y  and economic 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  can complement one ano the r  and s a t i s f y  t h e  a i r  c a r r i e r  
o p e r a t i o n a l  requirements  and e n s u r e  t h e i r  economic s u r v i v a l .  
-- 
Fuel  s av ings  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  use  of s i m u l a t o r s  a r e  a l s o  s i z n i f i c a n t .  
F i r  exaz:ple, i t  i s  e s t ;  ,,mated t h a t  preser,: z i r c r a f t  p r o f i c i e c c y  checks f g r  ?zr t  
121 ca r r i e r s  w i l l  s ave  more than  100 m i l l i o n  g a l l o n s  of f u e l  a n w a l l y  
through t h e  use  of f l i g h t  s i m u l a t o r s .  For a l l  t ypes  of t r a i n i n g ,  i t  has  
been e s t i m a t e d l /  t h a t  more than  3-90 m i l l i o n  g a l l o n s  of f u e l  a r e  saved 
each  year .  Along w i t h  t h e  b e n e f i t s  of f u e l  s a v i n g s ,  o t h e r  expenses  
a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  a i r c r a f t  o p e r a t i o n  a re  reduced. These i n c l u d e  a i r c r a f t  
maintenance and d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  a i r p o r t  charges ,  and a i r c r a f t  and personnel  
schedul ing  expenses.  A i r c r a f t  should  be kep t  on t h e  l i n e  producing 
revenue, no t  f l y i n g  around with a n  empty cab in .  
We estimate t h a t  more than  100 v i s u a l  a t tachments  have been purchased by 
t h e  i n d u s t r y  i n  the  pas t  t h r e e  years .  Advancements i n  d i g i t a l  computers 
make i t  t e c h n i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  t o  perform a l l  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  i n  v i s u a l  
f l i g h t  s imula to r s .  Development of t h e  Computer-Generated-Image (CGI) 
v i s u a l  systems has  made i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  provide  a n  a c c e p t a b l e  and h igh ly  
r e l i a b l e  v i s u a l  s cene  €or  takeoff  and l and ing  maneuvers. I n  our  
e s t i m a t i o n ,  t h e  goa l  of t o t a l  s i m u l a t i o n  i s  well w i t h i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  
c a p a b i l i t y  which e x i s t s  today. With a l l  oE t h i s  computer technology and 
hardware a v a i l a b l e ,  why then are  w e  w a i t i n g  f o r  s i m u l a t o r s  t o  become a 
t o t a l  s u b s t i t u t e  €or  a i r c r a f t  t r a i n i n g ?  
- 1/ 
American Air lLnes,  Av ia t ion  Magazine, January 1979, page 31 - 3 3 -  
" F l i g h t  S imula to r s  Impact on U.S. Air l ines" ,  by D e  C. K i l l i a n ,  
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The answer is  s€mple. 
w i th  t h e  r ap id  t e c h n i c a l  advancements which have occurred  i n  s i m u l a t o r  
technology over  t h e  p a s t  s e v e r a l  y e a r s ,  and o n l y  r e c e n t l y  have t h e  human 
f a c t o r  aspects of des ign  and u s e  i n  approved t r a i n i n g  programs been 
cons idered  i n  s i m u l a t o r  des ign .  
Cr i te r ia  for s i m u l a t o r  approva l  have no t  k e p t  up 
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The ALPA P i l o t  T r a i n i n g  Committee's i n t e r e s t  i n  f l i g h t  s i m u l a t o r s  and 
approval  procedures ex tends  back many yea r s .  During t h i s  t i m e ,  t h e  
Committee has recommended on many occas ions  t h a t :  
(1) Indus t ry  and government proceed w i t h  a comprehensive e v a l u a t i o n  
of e x i s t i n g  t r a i n i n g  methods and c r i t e r i a  used f o r  t h e  d e s i g n ,  
approval  and use  of f l i g h t  s i m u l a t o r s .  
(2)  Technica l  c r i t e r i a  should  be developed f o r  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  of a 
f l i g h t  s imula to r .  The g o a l  of t h i s  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p rocess  would 
be a s i m u l a t o r  wi th  performance r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  a i r p l a n e ' s  
aerodynamic responses  and handl ing  q u a l i t i e s  under s t a t e d  
atmospheric c o n d i t i o n s .  With t h e  ach ievenen t  of t h i s  g o a l ,  f l i g h t  
s i m u l a t o r s  could be u t i l i z e d  i n  l i e u  of t h e  a i rp lane  f o r  formal  
t r a i n i n g  and checking maneuvers. 
Research and development funds a v a i l a b l e  i n  1970 f o r  f l i g h t  s i m u l a t i o n  
s t u d i e s  were not used because of oppos i t i on  by a few ?eop le  i n  government 
and indus t ry .  
f o r  approval  of t o t a l  s i n u l a t i o n  must  now be so lved  p r i a a r i l y  by a i r  
c a r r i g r s ,  p i l o t s  and sirnulator manufacturers.  Government approva l  of t o t a l  
s i m u l a t i o n  must be based on "hard d a t a "  r a t h e r  t nan  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  judgment 
methods t h a t  have proved t o  be inadequate  i n  t h e  past .  The r e c e n t  F M  
approval  of s imula to r s  f o r  t he  l and ing  manuever by two a i r  carriers has  
shown t h e  va lue  of good d a t a  and is ano the r  s t e p  toward t o t a l  s imu la t ion .  
-
The problems a €  developing  human f a c t o r s  and t e c h n i c a l  d a t a  
Development of. a i r p l a n e  per€ormance d a t a  f o r  programming s i m u l a t o r s ,  
especial ly  f o r  o l d e r  a i r p l a n e s ,  will r e q u i r e  some f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  w i t h  
ins t rumented  a i r p l a n e s .  Areas where more a i rc raf t  d a t a  i s  needed inc lude  
t h e  i n f l u e n c e s  of ground e f f e c t  on performance and hand l ing ,  f l a r e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  s topp ing  and d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  f o r c e s  and rates on 
contaminated runways, and e f f e c t s  of wind and p r e c i p i t a t i o n  on a i r c r a f t  
performance. Reduction of € l i g h t  test d a t a  t o  computer programs depends on  
more q u a l i t y  in fa rma t ion  t o  e l i m i n a t e  unknown f a c t o r s  t h a t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  
complex i n t e r r e l a t e d  aerodynamic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of jet  a i r c r a f t .  
HUMAN FACTORS 
Human f a c t o r s  a n a l y s i s  i n  t h e  computer programming of €Light  s i m u l a t o r s  may 
prove t o  be t h e  most d i € f i c u l t  p a r t  of t o t a l  s imu la t ion .  Developments i n  
human Fac to r s  a n a l y s i s  a l so  have a p o t e n t i a l  t o  produce the greatest Long- 
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term b e n e f i t s  i n  t h e  d e s i g n  of t r a i n i n g  programs, o p e r a t i n g  p h i l o s o p h i e s  
and economic e f f i c i e n c y  i n  t r a i n i n g  programs. 
Some of t h e  impor tan t  human f a c t o r s  areas t h a t  must be  c o n s i d e r  
development of- t o t a l  s i m u l a t i o n  inc lude :  
( 4 )  
Analys is  of t h e  v i s u a l  cues necessa ry  f 
l and  an a i r p l a n e  under normal and adve r  
methods of t r a i n i n g  may be needed t o  overcome some of t h e  
l i m i t a t i o n s  of v i s u a l  systems. 
The e f f e c t s  and n e c e s s i t y  f o r  s i m u l a t o r  motion du r ing  v a r i o u s  
f l i g h t  maneuvers and i n  pa r t i cu la r  f o r  landings .  
Methods of programming and development of t r a i n i n g  e x e r c i s e s  f o r  
the c i rcumstances  t h a t  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  cause  a c c i d e n t s  such as 
tu rbu lence ,  wind s h e a r ,  low v i s i b i l i t y  approaches ,  v i s u a l  
i l l u s i o r s ,  e tc .  
The coord ina ted  crew concepts  of o p e r a t i n g  a i r c r a f t  w i t h  more 
emphasis on t h e  rea l  world problems of a i r l i n e  ope ra t ion .  A 
c a r e f u l  and thorough a n a l y s i s  of a i r  c a r r i e r  a c c i d e n t s  over  t h e  
p a s t  s e v e r a l  years w i l l  r e v e a l  t h o s e  areas where improvement i s  
r equ i r ed  i n  provid ing  a i r c r e w s  w i t h  a .sound b a s i s  € o r  
c o o r d i n a t i n g  t h e i r  f l i g h t  deck a c t i v i t i e s .  
Reevalua t ion  of check-orientsd c c n t r o l l i n g  r e g u l a t i o n s  t o  p e r m i t  
more t r a i n i n g  emphasis on methods of handl ing  o r  avo id ing  t h e  
c i rcumstances  t h a t  cause  a c c i d e n t s .  
Ear ly  and easy s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  above problems would appear t o  be 
d i f f i c u l t ;  however, w e  b e l i e v e  r e s e a r c h  a l r e a d y  completed and p r o j e c t s  i n  
p rogres s  can provide  much of t h e  necessary  informat ion .  
renewed s p i r i t  of coope ra t ion  and a s e n s e  of urgency w i t h i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  i n  
the development o €  s a f e t y  and t r a i n i n g  programs. We have a c t i v e l y  
p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  and reviewed a number of i n d u s t r y  p r o j e c t s  t h a t  have o r  
w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of p i l o t  t r a in i r . g  programs and 
f l i g h t  s i m u l a t o r  approval  processes .  Some of t h e  p r o j e c t s  most important 
t o  t raLning are : 
We d e t e c t  a 
S a f e t y  awareness programs. 
Low v i s i b i l i t y  approach s t u d i e s .  
Human f a c t o r s  s t u d i e s .  
Renewed i n t e r e s t  i n  v i s u a l  i l l u s i o n s .  
S imula t ion  s t u d i e s  of wind shea r .  
O p e r a t i o n a l l y  o r i e n t e d  p r o f i c i e n c y  t r a i n i n g  programs. 
FAA exemption t o  r e q u a l i f y  p i l o t s  i n  f l i g h t  s imula to r s .  
FAA approval  of s i m u l a t o r s  f o r  t a k e o f f s  and Landings i n  v i s u a l  
s imu La t o r s . 
s t e n t  e f f o r t s  by p i l o t s  and a i r  carriers t o  r e v i s e  and 
e c o n t r o l l i n g  r e g u l a t i o n s .  
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Disseminat ion of t imely  and u s e f u l  in format ion  from t h e  above and other 
s t u d i e s  i s  a recognized problem. P u b l i c a t i o n  of t h e  r e s u l t s  of  low 
v i s i b i l i t y  s imula to r  s t u d i e s  h a s  long been de layed  because of o p p o s i t i o n  to  
t h e  probable  conclusions.  Informat ion  from wind s h e a r  a c c i d e n t s  is  f i n a l l y  
being developed f o r  i n c l u s i o n  i n  t r a l n i n g  programs. Other problems of  
instrument  f a i l u r e s ,  t u rbu lence  encounters  and unusual  weather  c o n d i t i o n s  
du r ing  approaches are  being cons idered  by some carriers f o r  i n c l u s i o n  i n  
t r a i n i n g  programs. S ince  many oE t h e s e  t r a i n i n g  exercises are  not  
adap tab le  t o  checking,  t h e r e  is cont roversy  over  t h e  v a l u e  as w e l l  as the 
methods of provid ing  r e a l i s t i c  s imula to r  t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e s e  areas. 
Programming a t r a i n i n g  e x e r c i s e  t h a t  may r e s u l t  i n  l o s s  of c o n t r o l  i s  one 
method where 3 p i l o t  can  l e a r n  t o  recognize  and p o s s i b l y  avo id  a n  impending 
d i s a s t e r .  "Negative t r a i n i n g "  is t h e  u s u a l  comment from those  who oppose 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of human f a c t o r s  i n  t r a i n i n g  and they  seldom have 
c o n s t r u c t i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  proposa ls .  
We are  convinced t h a t  new methods of t r a i n i n g  w i l l  evolve  from human 
f a c t o r s  s t u d i e s  completed and a l r e a d y  i n  progress .  One a i r  carr ier  has  been 
g ran ted  a waiver t o  conduct a n  " o p e r a t i o n a l l y  o r i e n t e d "  p r o f i c i e n c y  
t r a i n i n g  prograa r a t h e r  than us ing  t h e  Appendix F requirements .  Shor t  
segment r ea l  world s i t u a t i o n s  are programmed wi th  r e a l i s t i c  abnormal and 
emergency s i t u a t i o n s  i n s e r t e d  f o r  t h e  crew t o  s o l v e  i n  real  time. P i l o t s  
a re  e n t h u s i a s t i c  about  t h i s  l i ne -o r i en ted  crew concept  of t r a i n i n g .  The 
t r end  of r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g  and checking w i l l  d e f i n i t e l y  fo l low a s imilar  
concept.  We b e l i e v e  l i ne -o r i en ted  crew coord ina ted  concepts  w i l l  
even tua l ly  be adopted by most of t h e  indus t ry .  Attachment 1 provides  a 
b r i e f  o u t l i n e  of w h a t  we th ink  would be a l a r g e  s t e p  forward i n  r e c u r r e n t  
crew t r a i n i n g  programs. 
FUTURE TREND 
The f u t u r e  of p i l o t  t r a i n i n g  programs depends on the adop t ion  of new 
ph i losoph ies  and t h e  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e  of an  a i r  carrier 's  t r a i n i n g  and 
t e c h n i c a l  s t a f f .  With t h e  newer developments i n  s i m u l a t o r s  and v i s u a l  
systems,  w e  are not r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  u s u a l  "b ig  a i r l i n e "  s t a f f  of many 
eng inee r s  and t echn ic i ans .  Simulator  manufacturers  can  provide  r e l a t i v e l y  
w e l l  developed and r e l i a b l e  machines t h a t  can  be main ta ined  by a minimum 
t e c h n i c a l  s t a f f .  The important  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  is  t h e  long-range economic 
advantage p lus  the  fac t  t h a t  v i s u a l  s i m u l a t o r s  provide  t h e  on ly  l o g i c a l  
method O E  accomplishing t r a i n i n g  e x e r c i s e s  i n  t h e  areas t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l l y  
have caused a c c i d e n t s  . 
Since  c e r t a i n  a i r  car r ie rs  ( o t h e r s  are expected ' t o  follow) have rece ived  
approval  of t h e t r  s imula to r s  f o r  t h e  l and ing  maneuver and a d d i t i o n a l  use  oE 
approved s l m u l a t o r s  w i L L  be made as  w e  approach t o t a l  s i m u l a t i o n ,  s i m u l a t o r  
time is becoming very valuable .  Better planning f o r  t h e  u s e  O E  s imula to r  
time will be r equ i r ed  s i n c e  t h e r e  is a s h o r t a g e  of approved s imula to r s .  
Various p i l o t  groups have i n d i c a t e d  cons ide rab le  i n t e r e s t  i n  f l i g h t  
s l m u l a t l o n ,  v i s u a l  s y s t e m s  and human € a c t o r s  s t u d i e s .  We recommend t h a t  
a l l  p i l o t  groups p a r t l c i p a t e  w i t h  t h e i r  companies i n  the  development of 
more product tve  t r a t n i n g  programs. Whe the r - i t  be r e v i s e d  r e c u r r e n t  
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training,  new simulators or a t o t a l  simulation program, weibel ieve p i l o t  
interest  and support will be welcomed by most a i r  carr iers .  
training funds must be used i n  a productive manner so that  the  ultimate 
goal of safety  and e f f i c i e n c y  in everyday l i n e  operations can be achieved. 
In these times, 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
In 1 9 7 4 ,  a survey  of ou r  most exper ienced  s a f e t y  and t r a i n i n g  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n d i c a t e d  overwhelming agreement on t h e  n e c e s s i t y  t o  r e v i s e  
r equ i r ed  r e c u r r e n t  proEiciency t r a i n i n g  and checking. Recurren t  t r a i n i n g  
was proposed on a n  annual  b a s i s  f o r  a l l  p i l o t s  a s  a f u e l  s a v i n g  measure and 
as a s o l u t i o n  t o  s e v e r a l  s a f e t y  problems. During t h e  i n t e r v e n i n g  two 
y e a r s ,  a d d i t i o n a l  in format ion  has  developed t h a t  s u p p o r t s  t h e  need t o  
cons ide r  improved r e c u r r e n t  a i r  crew t r a i n i n g .  A i r  carriers,  p i l o t s  and 
o t h e r s  have recommended t h a t  r e c u r r e n t  and o t h e r  programs be r e v i s e d  t o  
r e f l e c t  a l i n e - o r i e n t e d  and crew coord ina ted  concept of t r a i n i n g .  
We propose t h e  fo l lowing  b r i e f l y  s t a t e d  o u t l i n e  as a n  improved method of 
conducting r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g  f o r  f l i g h t  deck a i r  crews: 
Recurrent p i l o t  t r a i n i n g  should be conducted on a n  annual  b a s i s  
in an approved f l i g h t  s imula to r .  
F l i g h t  s i m u l a t o r  t r a i n i n g  should  i n c l u d e  a review of ins t rument  
approaches and s e l e c t e d  abnormal and emergency procedures.  
The t r a i n i n g  w i l l  be designed t o  rea l i s t ic  line o p e r a t i o n a l  
concepts  w i t h  emphasis on crew coord ina t ion .  
T r a i n l n g  may inc lude  s e l e c t e d  weather,  wind shear, t u rbu lence  and 
unusual approach c o n d i t i o n s  o r  o t h e r  c i rcumstances  t h a t  are 
l i k e l y  t o  cause  a c c i d e n t s .  
Annual, t r a i n i n g  f o r  f l i g h t  deck crew members should  i n c l u d e  ' 
a p p r o p r i a t e  review of a i r c r a f t  systems, a i r c r a f t  performance and 
emergency procedures ,  i nc lud ing  d i t c h i n g  i E  over water. 
Annual t r a i n i n g  f o r  f l i g h t  deck crew should  i n c l u d e  a review of 
r e c e n t  o r  r e c u r r i n g  problems f o r  t h e  a i r c r a f t  type  and a d d i t i o n s  o r  
r e v i s i o n s  t o  t h e  nav iga t ion  and ins t rument  equipment o r  a i r  
t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  procedures.  
We estimate t h a t  t h e  above procedure would r e q u i r e  approximate ly  s i x  hours 
of ground t r a i n i n g  and f o u r  hours  of f l i g h t  s i m u l a t o r  t r a i n i n g .  
Seve ra l  s i m u l a t o r  sequences are recommended and would be r e v i s e d  and 
approved on a n  annual  bas i s .  
The preceding  b r i e f l y  s t a t e d  o u t l i n e  provides  more t r a i n i n g  f o r  a i r  crews 
than is now requ i r ed  by t h e  r egu la t ions .  
than t h e  p r e s e n t  s t e r e o t y p e d  check requirements.  T r a i n i n g  equipment would 
be b e t t e r  u t i l i z e d  and schedu l ing  of f l i g h t  crews for t r a i n i n g  would be 
simpLL€ied and more e € E i c i e n t .  
The t r a i n i n g  would be more u s e f u l  
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CALCUIATTD 2 I S K  Ori BLIND ASSUMPTION? * 
b Y  
Gerard M .  Bruggink 
Bureau of Accident I n v e s t i g a t i o n  
National Transpor ta t ion  Safe ty  Board 
;lashington, D .C . 20594 
I n  May, 1952,  t he  U . S .  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Airport  Commission, 
cha i red  by James I i .  D o o l i t t l e ,  def ined c a l c u l a t e d  risk as  "A 
w i l l i ngness  t o  embark d e l i b e r a t e l y  on a course  of  a c t i o n  w h i c h  
o f f e r s  prospec t ive  rewards outweighing its est imated dangers". 
There can be no doubt t h a t  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  reflected the a t t i -  
tude  of  p i l o t s  l i k e  D o o l i t t l e  who con t r ibu ted  so much t o  t h e  
development of a v i a t i o n  i n t o  a publ ic  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  system. 
Iiowever, when we 1001~ a t  some of t h e  acc iden t s  i n  r ecen t  y e a r s  
it appears t h a t  t h e  a r t  of r i sk- tak ing  is slowly becoming a l o s t  
a r t .  That is the only conclusion one can  draw f r o m  mishaps t h a t  
could have been prevented by using only a modest degree of skep- 
t i c i s m  i n  es t imat ing  t h e  danger of a p a r t i c u l a r  course  of a c t i o n  
o r  i n a c t i o n .  
Our a f f l i c t i o n  could be the i r o n i c  consequence of  opera t ing  
i n  a system t h a t  achieved a hiqh degree of r e l i a b i l i t y  by re- 
ducing dependence on ind iv idua l  decision-making - including r i s k  
assessment - through a p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of managerial c o n t r o l s ,  reg- 
u l a t i o n s ,  and computer i npu t s .  Actual ly ,  i n  the process  of e l i m i -  
nat ing some of the  t r a d i t i o n a l  human f a c t o r s  problems w e  may have 
c rea t ed  a new one: t h e  i n a b i l i t y  t o  sense  when "the systems'" 
p r o t e c t i v e  mantle no longer  covers u s .  The s a f e t y  pub l i ca t ion  of 
a major U . S .  c a r r i e r  i d e n t i f i e d  a s i m i l a r  problem when it re- 
ferred t o  ('a highly s t r u c t u r e d  ope ra t iona l  environment which in -  
vi tes  follow-the-leader complacency and discourages depar ture  
from rou t ine . "  Ye can go one step f u r t h e r  and make t h e  b lunt  ob- 
s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  w e  ope ra t e  i n  a c l ima te  t h a t  is more conducive t o  
the development of b l i n d  f a i th  than  r i s k  awareness. 
THE ACCIDENT HECORD 
Elements of inadequate r i s k  percept ion  can be found i n  
almost every acc ident  and a t  a l l  levels of the a v i a t i o n  indus t ry .  
Unfortunately,  t h a t  s t a g e - s e t t i n g  aspec t  of an acc ident  sequence 
is seldom discussed i n  unambiguous t e r m s  i n  acc i3ent  reports 
because t h e  underlying reasons may be too e l u s i v e  or too emhar- 
r a s s i n g  f o r  a n a l y t i c a l  t rea tment .  T h i s  f r u s t r a t i n g  l i m i t a t i o n  
* Presented a t  t h e  O r i e n t A i r l i n e s  Assoc ia t ion  F l ight  Safe ty  
Seminar, Manila, 9-11 May, 1979.  
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of  our acc ident  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  is e loquent ly  summarized i n  t he  
in t roduc t ion  t o  a NASA s tudy * deal ing  w i t h  human f a c t o r s  i n  a i r -  
c r a f t  opera t ions .  
of the error mechansim involving wel l - t ra ined  p ro fes s iona l s  a t  
c r i t i c a l  p o i n t s  i n  f l i g h t  t h e  au thors  s t a t e :  "Neither do w e  under- 
s tand ,  except i n  i s o l a t e d  cases ,  the  f a c t o r s  which may be respon- 
sible for ( the c r e w ' s )  f a i l u r e  t o  recognize and r e a c t  t o  presumably 
c l e a r  warnings, o r  t o  in t e rvene  under circumstances which seem t o  
c l e a r l y  r e q u i r e  such in t e rven t ion" .  
by b r i e f l y  reviewing the  risk-management a spec t s  of some recen t  
acc iden t s .  The headings of t h e s e  summaries refer t o  the  segment 
of a v i a t i o n  commonly a s soc ia t ed  w i t h  the  i d e n t i f i e d  risks. This 
t reatment  of these acc iden t s  is used f o r  acc ident  prevent ion pur-  
poses only; t h e r e  is no i n t e n t  t o  imply c u l p a b i l i t y  or t o  ques t ion  
the o f f i c i a l  cause determinat ion of these acc iden t s .  
A f t e r  r e f e r r i n g  t o  our l a c k  of  understanding 
The u n i v e r s a l i t y  of  t h i s  problem can best be i l l u s t r a t e d  
Operator 
About four  y e a r s  ago, a j e t  t r a n s p o r t  c o l l i d e d  w i t h  r i s i n q  
t e r r a i n  a s  t h e  a i r c r a f t  descended below safe a l t i t u d e  due t o  the 
crew's incorrect i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the i r  p o s i t i o n  r \ r i t h  reqard t o  t he  
a i r p o r t .  There w e r e  no su rv ivo r s .  The i n v e s t i g a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  
a t t r i b u t e d  the  premature descent  t o  "dependence on Doppler and 
weather r ada r  systems on board the a i r c r a f t  which l e f t  room f o r  
mis in t e rp re t a t iono1 .  
of f - s tandard  cockpit instrumentat ion.  The Doppler computer in -  
d i c a t o r  and t h e  computer system w e r e  no t  of t h e  same make. 
a r e s u l t ,  only the 100-miles i n d i c a t i o n  on t h e  distance-to-go 
p resen ta t ion  was correct; 
i n d i c a t o r  d i s k s  w e r e  "more o r  less a r b i t r a r y " .  The opera t ions  
manual had the  following remark under the i l l u s t r a t i o n  of t h e  com- 
puter  i n d i c a t o r :  "Distance-to-go not  Active". The i n v e s t i g a t i v e  
a u t h o r i t y  was of  the opinion t h a t  it would have been more appro- 
p r i a t e  t o  mask t h i s  i n d i c a t o r  "so  t h a t  t h e  chances of  c r e w  m i s -  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  would have been completely eliminated'l.  That the 
c r e w  relied on the distance-to-go counter  was s t rong ly  suggested 
by t h e i r  reports of being "one three zero  m i l e s  out" and *'one 
four m i l e s  ou t" .  The  a i r c r a f t  s t r u c k  a mountain 40 m i l e s  f r o m  the 
a i r p o r t ,  a t  4300 f t  m s l .  
range markings d i f f e red  f r o m  t hose  used i n  t h e  o p e r a t o r ' s  o t h e r  
a i r c r a f t .  T h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  was not  explained i n  t h e  opera t ions  
manual. 
have received misleading information i f  they  were using t h e  t e r r a i n  
mapping f e a t u r e s  of the weather radar t o  cross check t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  
T h i s  was t h e  only a i r c r a f t  i n  the  o p e r a t o r ' s  f leet  with 
A s  
t h e  p o s i t i o n s  of t h e  t e n  and one m i l e s  
The weather r ada r  system vas  a l s o  off-s tandard i n  t h a t  the  
The i n v e s t i g a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  concluded t h a t  the c r e w  could 
* NASA TMX-62,472. 
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w i t h  regard t o  t h e  a i r p o r t  ( loca ted  near  a c o a s t l i n e ) .  
What does these case have t o  do wi th  r i s k  awareness? The 
answer t o  t h i s  ques t ion  is governed by our understand 
of t h e  fundamental concepts i n  acc ident  prevent ion:  always t r y  
t o  make it e a s i e r  f o r  the o t h e r  person - and ourse lves  - not  t o  
make an  e r r o r .  T h i s  r e q u i r e s  imagination and awareness of what 
goes on on t h e  dark  s i d e  of  human behavior .  We a r e  c r e a t u r e s  of 
h a b i t  with a b u i l t - i n  tendency t o  r e l y  on what seems t o  conform 
with pas t  experience.  Therefore, t h e  assumption t h a t  a caut ionary  
note  about a non-standard p iece  of  equipment w i l l  p r o t e c t  a c r e w  
from reve r t ing  t o  ingrained h a b i t s  i n  a high workload s i t u a t i o n  
must  be viewed wi th  susp ic ion .  
A i r  T r a f f i c  Control 
I n  November, 1975, t w o  wide-bodied je ts  were on the same 
je t  r o u t e  and approaching each o t h e r  head-on, a t  n igh t ,  a t  a 
c los ing  speed of  863 knots;  one was maintaining f l i g h t  l e v e l  350, 
the  o t h e r  was climbing through FL 350 t o  FL 370. The radar  con- 
t r o l l e r ,  who had full da ta  blocks a v a i l a b l e ,  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  L? poten- 
t i a l  c o n f l i c t  existed but expected t h a t  t h e  climbing a i r c r a f t  
would reach  FL 370 before  passing t h e  o t h e r  f l i g h t .  According t o  
the  o f f i c i a l  acc ident  r epor t  he "assumed t h a t ,  by keeping an eye 
on the  s i t u a t i o n ,  he would be a b l e  t o  t a k e  t imely s t e p s  i f  t h e  
a n t i c i p a t e d  sepa ra t ion  a i d  not  mate r i a l i ze" .  
When t h i s  c o n t r o l l e r  relied on automation technology r a t h e r  
than on p o s i t i v e  steps t o  i n s u r e  separa t ion ,  t h e  s a f e t y  of the 306 
persons aboard the  two f l i g h t s  was governed s o l e l y  by h i s  con- 
t i n u i n g  awareness of t h e  developments on his  radar  scope. T h i s  
presumed safeguard f a i l e d  when he allowed secondary d u t i e s  t o  i n -  
terfere with h i s  observa t ion  of  the  c l e a r l y  displayed c o n f l i c t .  
13 last-second warning from another c o n t r o l l e r ,  t h e  a l e r t n e s s  
of t h e  c a p t a i n  of t h e  climbing a i r c r a f t ,  and h i s  viqorous evasive 
maneuver kept t h e  a i r c r a f t  separated by no more thdn  100 feet .  
-__-- 
This  c a s e  is  a c l a s s i c  i l l u s t r a t i o g  nf one of t h e  c a r d i n a l  
s i n s  i n  a v i a t i o n :  U N C R I T I C A L  A C C E P T A X E  O F  U N J U S T I F I A B L E  AS- 
S U I W T I O N S .  
avoided by a s l i g h t  exercise of t he  imagination i n  t h e  form of a 
quest ion:  "iiJhat a r e  t h e  consequences if my assumption is fa l se?"  
T h i s  is the type  of assumption t h a t  can e a s i l y  be 
Manufacturer and Administration 
I n  l a t e  1974, t h e  c r e w  of a je t  t r a n s p o r t  i n i t i a t e d  a take-  
off  w i th  the  leading  edge (LE) f l a p s  r e t r a c t e d  because the pneu- 
matic system which ope ra t e s  them had not  been turned on. The 
a i r c r a f t  became a i rbo rne  i n  a p a r t i a l l y  s t a l l e d  cond i t ion  and 
settled back t o  t h e  ground, beyond the runway. There was a post-  
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c r a s h  f i re ;  6 7 6  of  the occupants survived.  
Two yea r s  e a r l i e r ,  another  opera tor  of t h e  same type  a i r -  
c r a f t  experienced an  inc iden t  involving a take-off with t h e  LE 
f l a p s  p a r t i a l l y  r e t r a c t e d .  Real iz ing t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h i s  
i nc iden t  as  a p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  cause,  the opera tor  a l e r t e d  the  
manufacturer and t h e  c e r t i f i c a t i n g  a u t h o r i t y .  
t h e  manufacturer t h e  opera tor  modified h i s  own a i r c r a f t  by in-  
c luding t h e  LE f l a p  pos t ion  i n  t he  take-off  conf igu ra t ion  a u r a l  
warning system. N o  f u r t h e r  a c t i o n  was taken because the cer t i f i -  
c a t i n g  a u t h o r i t y  and manufacturer considered the  occurrence an 
i s o l a t e d  inc iden t  t h a t  could have been prevented by adherence t o  
e x i s t i n g  cockpi t  procedures. 
In conjunct ion wi th  
It should be noted t h a t ,  a t  t h e  t i m e ,  t he  i n c o r r e c t  posi-  
t i on ing  of the  LE f l a p s  was ind ica ted  by t h e  absence of a green 
l i q h t .  T h e  adquacy of a warning system t h a t  relies on  the ab- 
sence of a s t imulus  needs no comment wi th in  the  contex t  of t h i s  
seminar. Nhat should be stressed is the  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  ex i s t ence  
of t he  modif icat ion,  proposed and adopted by t h e  opera tor  who ex- 
perienced the  f i rs t  repor ted  inc iden t ,  was not o f f i c i a l l y  mentioned 
t o  o the r  ope ra to r s  of  t h e  same type a i r c r a f t .  Furthermore, follow- 
ing  t h a t  i nc iden t  there occurred e i g h t  known, s i m i l a r  i n c i d e n t s  
w h i c h ,  for one reason o r  another ,  never reached t h e  c e r t i f i c a t i n g  
a u t h o r i t y  o r  t h e  manufacturer u n t i l  af ter  t h e  acc ident ,  two y e a r s  
l a t e r .  
To sum it up, t h i s  acc ident  is a demonstration o f :  
1. Unimaginative r i s k  assessment compounded by 
2 .  The inadequacy of  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i nc iden t  
r epor t ing  system, 
C r e w  
About f i v e  y e a r s  ago, a j e t  t r a n s p o r t  s t r u c k  mountainous 
t e r r a i n  while the  c r e w  was executing a letdown procedure as p a r t  
of  t he  NDB approach t o  a s e a l e v e l  a i r p o r t ,  loca ted  on an i s l a n d .  
The acc ident  occurred a t  n ight ;  all occupants d i ed .  
The i n v e s t i g a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  determined t h a t  t he  c r e w  s t a r t e d  
the letdown when one of  the ADF needles i n  the cockpi t  swung 
w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r  remained s teady;  based on a r econs t ruc t ion  of the 
f l i g h t  t r a c k ,  t h i s  needle swing occurred while the f l i g h t  was s t i l l  
about 30 m i l e s  from t h e  NDB ( loca ted  on the  a i r p o r t ) .  The c r e w  
repor ted  t h a t  they w e r e  over the s t a t i o n  and c learance  f o r  letdown 
was given.  Due t o  t h e  displacement of the descent  p a t t e r n ,  the 
letdown was made over the mountainous i s l a n d  in s t ead  of over open 
water.  The a i r c r a f t  f l e w  i n t o  r i s i n g  t e r r a i n  a t  3000 f t  m s l .  
Although t h e  acc ident  r e p o r t  does not  provide enough in-  
formation t o  eva lua te  t he  c r e w ' s  response t o  the  s i n g l e  A D F  needle 
swing, it appears t h a t  t h i s  acc ident  was caused by the acceptance 
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of  doubtful  pos i t i on  information. 
s i t u a t i o n  s h o u l d  have made it obvious t h a t  a letdown s t a r t e d  
before reaching the s t a t i o n  c a r r i e d  an unacceptable r i s k ,  the 
crew s h o u l d  a t  l e a s t  have waited for v e r i f i c a t i o n  from the second 
A D F .  Furthcrmorc, an opera t iny  VOR w a s  loca ted  6 m i l e s  from t h e  
s t a t i o n .  There a r e  no ind ica t ions  t h a t  the crew made an attempt 
t o  u s e  t h i s  add i t iona l  navaid. 
Since the topoqraphy of t h e  
T h i s  controlled-flight-into-terrain accident  was one of 
three, i n  t h c  same year ,  t h a t  destroyed three j e t  t r anspor t s  Find 
k i l l e d  390 persons on mountain s lopes i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of 
d e s t i n a t i o n  airporl:s. Gne would  expect t h a t  descents  and i n i t i a l  
approachcs t h a t  1 eave no marqin whatsocvcr f o r  navigat ional  o r  
procedural e r r o r s  would be cha rac t e r i zed  by the crew's readiness  
t o  r e a c t  p ro t ec t ive ly  t o  t h e  f i rs t  doubt about their  pos i t i on  
i n  t i m e  and space.  
DISCUSS I O N  
The r ep resen ta t ive  examples i n  each of thc four  cdtegorics 
shou ld  be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  support  t h e  premise t h d t  our r i sk- tak ing  
behavior, occas iona l ly ,  shows s e r i o u s  f laws.  Those who a r e  not 
y e t  convinced of t h i s  should t a k e  a hard and o b j e c t i v e  look a t  
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  accident  experience,  including some of a v i a t i o n ' s  
worst d i s a s t e r s  so f a r .  
T h i s  apparent weakness i n  t h e  recogni t ion  and handling of  
r i s k s  probably f i n d s  i t s  o r i g i n  i n  a misunderstanding about t h e  
role of t r u s t  i n  any t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  system. N o  s o c i e t y  can have 
mobi l i ty  without a c e r t a i n  level of t r u s t ,  t h a t  is, the con- 
v i c t i o n  t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  person o r  t h ing  will perform ils promised. 
T h i s  t r u s t  m u s t  have a sound foundation; it cdnnot be equated w i t h  
hope o r  b l ind  f a i t h .  There is no such th ing  as t r u s t i n g  t h a t  a 
badly-worn t i r e  w i l l  s u s t a i n  another 1000 m i l e s  of high-speed 
dr iv ing;  t h i s  is not a ca l cu la t ed  r i s k  b u t  one of t h e  lowest forms 
of gambling. 
Although there a r e  some notor ious exceptions,  proven high- 
r i s k  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  genera l ly  t r e a t e d  w i t h  t h e  respcct they de- 
serve a t  t h e  ind iv idua l  a s  w e l l  as  t h e  admin i s t r a t ive  and cor-  
porate  leve l .  For ins tance ,  no p i l o t  i n  h i s  r i q h t  mind would a t -  
tempt  an approach i n t o  F,ai Tak, w i t h  weather a t  minimums, un less  
he has complete t r u s t  i n  h i s  a i r c r a f t ,  h i s  instruments,  t h e  
navaids, h i s  own competence, and h i s  crew. A s  long a s  t h i s  t r u s t  
is not contaminated by se l f - serv ing  cons idera t ions  we are deal ing  
with an acceptable  ca l cu la t ed  r i s k .  
I3etween the d e s i r a b l e  and undesirable  extremes of decis ion-  
making - ca lcu la t ed  r i sk  and b l ind  assumption- I. ic?s a t r a n s i t i o n  
zone i n  which o u r  proximity t o  e i t h e r  extreme is governed by t h e  
q u a l i t y  of o u r  t r u s t .  Nith regard to t h i s  i n t m g i b l e  index of 
t he  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  success  of our endeavors it should be noted 
t h a t  there is nothing abso lu te  about i t ;  t r u s t  can only be measured 
i n  t e r m s  of its j u s t i f i a b i l i t y .  To p u t  it d i f f e r e n t l y ,  nobody 
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can g i v e  one hundred percent  assurance t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  f l i g h t  
w i l l  be acc ident - f ree .  
s a f e t y .  Such a conscious attempt t o  j u s t i f y  ou r  t r u s t  d i f f e r e n -  
t i a t e s  the c a l c u l a t e d  r i s k  from the mindless assumption. 
We can only bend t h e  od's i n  favor of 
Some of the  f a c t o r s  t h a t  predispose towards t h e  t ak ing  of 
r i s k s  t h a t  have no b a s i s  i n  t r u s t  hdVe f a m i l i a r  names: 
- Economicdl o r  r epu ta t iona l  cons idera t ions  
- T h e  pressure  of schedules  o r  duty time l i m i t a t i o n s  
- Faticjue, he it self- induced,  system-induced, or 
t h e  r e s u l t  o f uncont r o l l  ab1 e c i rcums t ances 
- Xcluctance t o  d i v e r t ,  o r  t o  qo-around, for a var i c t :  
of reasqns 
- A cockpi t  atmosphere t h a t  discourages un- 
sol ic i ted expression o f  d o u b t  o r  concern 
These f a c t o r s  have been i d e n t i f i e d  repea ted ly  i n  acc ident  
r e p o r t s .  However, the p e r t i n e n t  f i nd ings  never seem t o  have reached 
those  f o r  whom t h e  h e l l  t o l l s  next ,  Apparently, there is a small 
number of persons,  i n  a l l  segments of a v i a t i o n ,  who remain b l i ss -  
f u l l y  ignorant  of t h e  risk they  take ,  o r  impose on o t h e r s ,  because 
they believe t h a t  y e a r s  of uneventful routi.ne operati-ons do away 
with the  need t o  l i s t e n  t o  woeful ta les .  T h i s  f a l s e  sense of 
s e c u r i t y  is t h e  b igges t  o b s t a c l e  i n  our  a t tempts  t o  e x p l o i t  what 
is bad i n  a v i a t i o n  t o  make what is good about it better. 
CONCLUSION 
Occasionally,  one hears  tallc about a v i a t i o n ' s  " inc red ib l e  
s a f e t y  record."  The r e a l l y  i n c r e d i b l e  p a r t  about it is t h a t  we 
ge t  away w i t h  so  much uncalled-for r i s k t a k i n g .  The few acc idents  
t h a t  s t i l l  occur suggest  t h a t  most of t h e m  involve an under&- 
veloped, or temporar i ly  i n a c t i v e ,  t r i g g e r i n g  mechanism for t h e  
t imely percept ion  of  risk a t  t h e  ind iv idua l ,  managerial, o r  regu- 
l a t o r y  l e v e l .  
One has  t o  conclude t h a t  t h e  haze of  i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y  through 
which too  many approach a c a r e e r  i n  a v i a t i o n  can best be d i s -  
persed by d iscuss ing  the f a c t s  of l i f e  - and dea th  - i n  a v i a t i o n  
i n  unadul terated t e r m s .  That means we need a merciless com- 
munications system t h a t  deprives every p r i n c i p a l  i n  o u r  de- 
cep t ive ly  s a f e  environment of the  excuse t o  proceed on b l ind  as- 
sumptions, 
About 300 hundred yea r s  ago, when h i s  t roops  were about t o  
cross a river, Cromwell t o l d  them: "Trust the Lord but  keep your 
powder dry.'* I n  a v i a t i o n  we need a s i m i l a r  message a f t e r  each 
take-off c learance :  "Trust the  system b u t  keep your opt ions  open." 
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The  r a r e  occurrence of s e r ious  emergencies i n  jet t r anspor t  
opera t ions  - combined wi th  the  p reva i l i ng  t r end  t o  g l o s s  over ,  o r  
ignore,  the unpleasant - makes it d i f f i c u l t  t o  broach t h i s  sub jec t  
without being considered an a l a rmis t .  The sheer volume of techno- 
l o g i c a l  i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  covered i n  the  emergency s e c t i o n  of our  
handbooks discourages any doubt about our  preparedness.  We may 
even derive a sense  of s e c u r i t y  from these  catalogued responses i n  
our f l igh tbag ,  without r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  some emergencies don ' t  follow 
the p r in t ed  scenar io  and may not leave  t i m e  t o  consu l t  t h e  book o r  
a checklist .  Worst of a l l ,  there is  no way t o  p red ic t  how the sud- 
den demands of a l i f e - s i z e  emergency may c r i p p l e  the certificated 
and renowned a b i l i t y  of our  cockpi t  team t o  master advers i ty .  
c r a f t  by f l i g h t  c r e w s  who managed t o  br ing  a disabled a i r c r a f t  i n  
f o r  a successfu l  emergency landing a t  an a i r p o r t .  Since one cannot 
argue w i t h  success ,  it is not  customary t o  ques t ion  t h e  dec is ions  
of a c r e w  who made it d e s p i t e  avoidable de lays  i n  landing an a i r -  
c r a f t  whose a i rwor th iness  could not  be guaranteed 73y anybody. A s  
a r e s u l t ,  the th inness  of the s t r i n g  t h a t  may have held th ings  to-  
ge ther  u n t i l  a s a f e  landing could be made is seldom the sub jec t  of 
open d iscuss ion .  
confidence,  a review of some of  the uncomfortable knowledge s to red  
i n  a v i a t i o n ' s  c l o s e t  should s u f f i c e .  Actual ly ,  t h i s  paper pretends 
t o  be no more than  an i n v i t a t i o n  f o r  i n t rospec t ion  intended t o  
s t imu la t e  the development of p ro tec t ive  i n s t i n c t s  i n  those  who rec- 
ognize the br i t t l e  e l e m g n t s  i n  our a v i a t i o n  system, 
To provide some semblance of o rde r  i n  an  otherwise un- 
wieldy sub jec t ,  the decisionmaking process  and t h e  manner i n  which 
it may be a f f ec t ed  by the urgency of an emergency s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  
be discussed first. T h i s  w i l l  be followed by some suggest ions 
dea l ing  wi th  the prevent ion of emergency s i t u a t i o n s .  F ina l ly ,  a 
Over the yea r s  w e  have seen some spec tacu la r  1tsaves18 of  a i r -  
To t he  ex ten t  t h a t  an  excuse is needed t o  ra t t le  our self- 
The v i e w s  expressed by the w r i t e r  do not  necessa r i ly  
reflect those  of the National Transpor ta t ion  Sa fe ty  Board 
* 
Presented at the Flight Safety Foundation's Corporate Aviation 
Safety Seminar, April 1978. 
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con t rove r s i a l  sub jec t  w i l l  be t r e a t e d :  the op t ion  t o  sacrifice 
the  a i r c r a f t  i n  a surv ivable ,  o f f - a i r p o r t  crash-landing. 
DECISIONMAKING 
Although w e  may not always be consciously aware of  it, 
decision-making i m p l i e s  having a choice.  The manner i n  which w e  
perceive a choice,  o r  an opt ion ,  is governed by t h e  q u a l i t y  of  
t he  information a t  our  d i sposa l  and the q u a l i t y  of  our i n t e rp re -  
t a t i o n  the reo f .  
p ress ion  t h a t  t h i s  is a r a t h e r  o rde r ly  process of  weighing the 
pros and cons of a v a i l a b l e  opt ions  and then  deciding on t h e  a c t i o n  
t h a t  best s u i t s  our purposes. 
T h e  problem w i t h  some emergencies is t h a t  they do not  a l -  
low the  luxury of a by-the-book decisionmaking process .  
a v a i l a b l e  information may be incomplete o r  misleading. The phase 
of ope ra t ion  where the unusual occurs  may leave  enough t i m e  on ly  
fo r  an immediate r eac t ion ,  a response t h a t  is governed more by 
what m i g h t  be c a l l e d  a sixth sense developed through t r a i n i n g  and 
experience,  than  by the process of reasoning. 
Most textbooks on human behavior give t h e  i m -  
The 
Take-Off Emerqencies 
T h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  p a r t  of emergencies r equ i r ing  an immediate 
and i r r e v e r s i b l e  dec i s ion  is t h a t  they a r e  o f t e n  handled better 
than those t h a t  leave  t i m e  f o r  apprehension and changes i n  p lans .  
The go-no-go dec i s ion  during t h e  takeoff  r o l l  is a case  i n  poin t .  
Most of t h e  reasoning inputs  a r e  cranked i n t o  the go-no-go formu- 
l a  well before  t akeof f .  T h i s  t akes  i n t o  account s u c h  i t e m s  a s  
runway length ,  condi t ion  of runway and overrun, na tu re  of t e r r a i n  
o r  obs t ac l e s  beyond a i r p o r t  boundary, t h e  a i r c r a f t ' s  stopping ca- 
p a b i l i t y ,  and v i s i b i l i t y  cond i t ions .  T h e  p r i n c i p a l  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
the  na tu re  of the emergency and the  crew's instantaneous eva lua t ion  
of i t s  ser iousness .  Consid$ring t h e  c r i t i c a l i t y  of the t i m e  element 
and t h e  problems i n  assess ing  some emergencies, the  immediate no-go 
dec i s ion  of a c r e w  w h o  senses  reasonable doubt about the a i r c r a f t ' s  
a b i l i t y  t o  become - and remain - a i rborne  has t o  be accepted and 
respected, r ega rd le s s  of the  outcome. 
c i s i o n  t o  keep an a i r c r a f t  on the ground i n  quest ionable  circum- 
s tances  seems sound pol icy.  I n  March 1968, a B-727 was t o t a l l y  
destroyed when the c r e w  continued a n ight  takeoff  r o l l  d e s p i t e  a 
takeoff  warning horn t h a t  s t a r t e d  t o  sound a f e w  seconds after the 
t h r u s t  levers w e r e  advanced. The  c r e w  assumed they would be a b l e  
t o  i d e n t i f y  and c o r r e c t  the  condi t ion  t h a t  caused t h e  warning s i g -  
n a l .  The a i r c r a f t  was r o t a t e d  a t  V r  and l i f t e d  o f f .  Immediately 
t h e r e a f t e r  t he  s t i ckshake r  was ac t iva t ed .  Concern about t h i s  a b i l -  
i t y  t o  keep the a i r p l a n e  i n  the a i r ,  and t o  c l e a r  a nearby freeway, 
prompted the c a p t a i n  t o  put the a i r c r a f t  back on t h e  ground. 
undiscovered, unsafe condi t ion  t h a t  t r i gge red  the warning horn was 
A conserva t ive  approach i n  making the e a r l i e s t  poss ib l e  de- 
The 
a 20 f l a p  s e t t i n g .  
I n  October 1977 the c r e w  of a s t r e t c h e d  DC-8 success fu l ly  
discontinued the takeoff  j u s t  before l i f t - o f f  when they heard a 
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loud noise  and the a i r c r a f t  s t a r t e d  t o  l i s t .  Actually,  a d i s i n -  
t eg ra t ing  w h e e l  r i m  had c u t  a l a r g e  hole  i n  an i n t e g r a l  f u e l  tank 
and the s p i l l i n g ,  f u e l  was ign i ted  immediately. An a l e r t  f i re  de- 
partment managed t o  con t ro l  the f i r e  bu t  not  u n t i l  it had caused 
s u b s t a n t i a l  damage. 
events  had allowed the  a i r c r a f t  t o  become a i rbo rne  w i t h  a f i re  i n  
a w h e e l w e l l  and the  wing roo t ,  some i n t e r e s t i n g  ques t ions  can be 
r a i sed :  
Assuming t h a t  a s l i g h t  change i n  the timing of the c r i t i c a l  
- What immediate ind ica t ions  would the c r e w  have had 
about the t r u e  na ture  of the  problem? 
- How could they have assessed the urgency of the 
s i t u a t i o n  based on information a v a i l a b l e  i n  the 
cockpi t  ? 
events  have given them a f a l s e  sense of s ecu r i ty?  
ed t o  observe and r epor t  unusual occurrences in -  
volving a i r c r a f t  s t r u c t u r e s  o r  systems t h a t  a r e  
beyond the purview of the f l i g h t  deck crew? 
- How long would it have taken the wing t o  fo ld  
a f t e r  being weakened by the  f ire,  o r ,  how long 
before  an explosion i n  the wing would have ended 
the f l i g h t ?  
- Could the  d i sab l ing  of alarm systems by f i re  o r  o the r  
- To what ex ten t  i s  the cabin  c r e w  t ra i f ied and pos i t ion-  
These ques t ions  dea l  only w i t h  the t echn ica l  aspec ts  of  the 
information a c r e w  needs t o  make i n t e l l i g e n t  dec i s ions .  O t h e r  
a spec t s  of our information-processing c a p a b i l i t y  i n  an emergency 
s i t u a t i o n  a r e  o f t e n  so complex t h a t  their  inf luence  can only be 
surmised. For example: 
- The manner i n  which w e  s o r t  o u t  and f i t p r io r i t i ze"  
mul t ip l e  s t i m u l i  i n  a stress environment. 
- The manner i n  which t r a i n i n g  and experience condi t ion  
our percept ion  and reflexes. 
- T h e  absence of a f ami l i a r  feedback loop so t h a t  w e  can 
no longer  judge the e f f ec t iveness  of our  ac t ions .  The 
feedback may a l s o  be misleading. 
- T h e  manner i n  w h i c h  subsurface psychological and - 
phys io logica l  stresses - inc luding  f a t i g u e  - may 
degrade cockpi t  d i s c i p l i n e  and the performance 
c a p a b i l i t y  of i nd iv idua l  c r e w  m e m b e r s .  
A B-707 acc ident  t h a t  occurred several yea r s  ago i l l u s -  
t r a t e s  how e a s i l y  the rou t ine  response t o  a Ifistandard" emergency 
can be d i s rup ted  by well-meaning but  uncoordinated c r e w  m e m b e r s .  
L e s s  than a minute a f t e r  takeoff ,  a d i s i n t e g r a t i n g  compressor disc 
i n  t h e  N o .  2 engine severed the main f u e l  l i n e  t o  tha t  engine. 
c r e w  f e l t  and h e a d a  combined shock and bang and saw the N o .  2 
engine instruments  running down. 
t h r u s t  lever back and pul led  the landing gear  horn cance l  s w i t c h ,  
w h i l e  t h e  first o f f i c e r  pressed the  f i re  bell  cance l  but ton.  
A check cap ta in  occupying the forward jumpseat reported 
a t  t h i s  t i m e  t h a t  there w a s  a se r ious  f i re  i n  the N o .  2 engine 
and suggested an immediate landing. Although the N o .  2 engine 
f i r e  shut-off handle w a s  i l lumina ted ,  and t h e  cap ta in  had ordered 
The 
The f l i g h t  engineer moved the 
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"Engine F i r e  D r i l l " ,  the No. 2 shut-off  han 
s t i l l  needed t o  be done. A s  
feeding the  f i re  a t  a 
a f t e r  the landing.  Du 
t o  the  nea res t  runway the bur 
a i r c r a f t ,  bu t  the f i r e  i n  the 
the  wing persisted. 
an  explosion i n  the le f t  wing. Five occupants w e r e  unable t o  es- 
cape i n  t i m e  from the burning a i r c r a f t .  
H e r e  is another c l i f fhange r .  An inges ted  seagu l l  d i sab led  
the  No. 4 engine of a B-747 immediately a f t e r  l i f t - o f f  f o r  a long 
f e r r y  f l i g h t .  The cap ta in  c a l l e d  gear-up bu t  h i s  command was not 
heard by the f irst  o f f i c e r  who s t a r t e d  a s s i s t i n g  the f l l g h t  englneer 
i n  securing the  engine. 
v e r t i c a l  s epa ra t ion  from bui ld ings  i n  the  takeoff  path,  w h i l e  
climbing a t  V2 + 2 0 .  
ed. A t  about 1100 feet  the 5-minute l i m i t a t i o n  on takeoff  t h r u s t  
was reached and t h r u s t  was reduced. A t  t h i s  t i m e  it became i m -  
poss ib l e  t o  c l i m b  o r  acce le ra t e  beyond V2+ 20 and the cap ta in  order-  
ed the immediate dumping of f u e l .  
and the f l a p s  w e r e  r e t r a c t e d  i n  s t ages .  I t  was not u n t i l  a f t e r  the  
s i t u a t i o n  l o s t  i t s  c r i t i c a l i t y  t h a t  the first o f f i c e r  discovered 
t h a t  the  gear  was s t i l l  down. 
These l a s t  two inc iden t s  highlight a un iversa l  shortcoming 
i n  emergency t r a i n i n g :  our i n a b i l i t y  t o  dup l i ca t e  the unmitigated 
stress of a r e a l  o r  imagined t h r e a t  t o  su rv iva l  and i t s  po ten t i a l  
effect on ind iv idua l  and team behavior.  One of the best safeguards 
under these condi t ions  is the cap ta in ' s  f i r m  and immediate exercise 
of command au tho r i ty  and the e n t i r e  c r e w ' s  s tr ict ,  methodical com- 
p l i ance  w i t h  pe r t inen t  procedures. The enforced o rde r l ines s  of the 
i n i t i a l  r eac t ion  t o  an emergency may be the most important f ac to r  
i n  channeling the  ad rena l in  flow i n  the cockpi t  i n t o  the desired 
d i r ec t ion .  
because of confusion about what t 
Shor t ly  a f t e r  a success fu l  
The cap ta in  concentrated on maintaining 
A t  a height of 800 feet " f l aps  5" was select- 
Performance gradual ly  increased 
I n f l i q h t  Emerqencies 
By their  very na ture ,  i n f l i g h t  emergencies tend t o  allow 
more t i m e  f o r  ana lys i s  and co r rec t ive  ac t ion .  I n  November 1.977, 
the  c r e w  of a B-707 experienced a nosedown runaway s t a b i l i z e r  t r i m ,  
and o the r  unusual i nd ica t ions ,  w h i l e  a t  FL 390. A t  the same t i m e ,  
one of the cab in  c r e w  reported flooding of the forward t o i l e t .  
(The  washbasin had overflowed due t o  a de fec t ive  fauce t . )  Water 
had entered the e l e c t r i c a l  bay and affected e l e c t r i c a l  equipment. 
I n  t h i s  case ,  a r e a d i l y  d i sce rnab le  cause/effect  rela- 
combined w i t h  the  moder e rate of  the t r i m  dev ia t ion  
Inc iden t s  involving smoke o r  f i re  should be treated with 
ay s t a b i l i z e r  d r i l l  w a s  completed and the f l i g h t  continued 
and the high a l t i t u d e ,  created no er ious  problems 
the h ighes t  resp from their  very beginning. I n  July 1973, the 
c r e w  of a 4-engi je t  t r anspor t  asked the approach c o n t r o l l e r  f o r  
an emergency des t s i n c e  they **a problem of f i r e  on board." 
The f l i g h t  had c l a n t i c  c ros s ing  and had 
U t e s  a f t e r  t h e  emergency 
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was dec lared ,  smoke i n  t h e  cockpi t  made t h e  s i t u a t i o n  so i n t o l e r -  
ab le  t h a t  t h e  cap ta in  decided t o  make a f o r c  landing.  H e  had t o  
open the  s l i d i n g  cockp i t  window t o  maintain ound re ference ,  The 
a i r c r a f t  was s k i l l f u l l y  landed i n  open farm land,  about 3 m i l e s  
from the d e s t i n a t i o n  runway. Unfortunately,  by t h a t  t i m e  most of 
the cabin  occupants had a l ready  been incapac i t a t ed  by t h e  i n f l i g h t  
smoke and w e r e  unable t o  leave  t h e  i n t a c t  fuse lage  which was subse- 
quent ly  destroyed i n  t h e  ground f i re .  
T h e  probable cause of t h i s  acc ident  was a f i re  i n  one of t h e  
a f t  t o i l e t s .  The i g n i t i o n  mechanism could not  be pinpointed; it 
may have been an e l e c t r i c a l  problem o r  ca re l e s sness  i n  the form of 
a discarded c i g a r e t t e .  Whatever went wrong, it took only about 10 
m i n u t e s  t o  c r e a t e  t o x i c  condi t ions  throughout t h e  fuse lage  and t o  
convince t h e  cap ta in  t h a t  t h e  only reasonable  dec i s ion  under t h e  
circumstances was an immediate c ra sh  landing.  
I n  November 1973, the c r e w  of a cargo j e t  ca r ry ing  hazard- 
ous ma te r i a l s  l o s t  con t ro l  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  while a t tempting t o  
make an emergency landing a t  a major a i r p o r t .  About 35 minutes 
ea r l i e - r  the  f l i g h t  had reported an accumulation of smoke i n  t h e  
e l e c t r i c a l  bay and had s t a r t e d  emergency d r i l l s  f o r  an e l e c t r i c a l  
problem. Actual ly ,  improperly packaged chemicals i n  the cargo 
probably s t a r t e d  leaking  and reac ted  spontaneously with the pack- 
aging ma te r i a l .  T h i s  c r ea t ed  a continuous and uncont ro l lab le  source 
of smoke which permeated the cockpi t .  There w e r e  no ind ica t ions  
t h a t  the c r e w  was aware of t h e  amount and type  of hazardous mater i -  
a l s  on board. 
c o n t r o l l e r  volunteered t o  the  c r e w  information t h a t  they w e r e  
passing a m i l i t a r y  a i r  base.  A t  t h a t  t i m e  t h e  f l i g h t  was about 
45 m i l e s  from t h e  a i r p o r t  where the c r e w  planned t o  t ake  t h e  a i r -  
c r a f t  and where company maintenance f a c i l i t i e s  w e r e  ava i l ab le .  
According t o  t h e  acc ident  r epor t ,  had an e l e c t r i c a l  problem i n  t h e  
e l e c t r i c a l  bay indeed been t h e  source  of  t h e  smoke, as suspected 
by t h e  c r e w ,  t h e  l o g i c a l  dec i s ion  from a l o g i s t i c s  viewpoint w a s  
t o  land t h e  a i r c r a f t  a t  t h e  nea res t  a i r p o r t  wi th  company f a c i l i -  
t i e s .  However, while sympathizing with t h i s  c r e w ' s  b a f f l i n g  
predicament, w e  should not  h e s i t a t e  t o  put s e l fp re se rva t ion  i n  
its proper perspec t ive  by drawing t h i s  conclusion: when t h e  o r i g i n  
of smoke o r  f i r e  is unknown, and when c h e c k l i s t  ac t ions  f a i l  t o  
i d e n t i f y  and c o r r e c t  t h e  problem, land a s  soon as poss ib l e  o r  b r ing  
t h e  a i r c r a f t  down t o  a l e v e l  from which an immediate emergency 
landing o r  d i t ch ing  can be made. I f  t h i s  sounds l ike  grim advice,  
consider  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  reflected i n  these  two i s o l a t e d  mishaps. 
lead quickly t o  a c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n .  I n  D e c e m b e r  1974, t h e  c r e w  
o f  a j e t  t r anspor t  was unable t o  r ega in  c o n t r o l  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  
a f t e r  s t a l l i n g  it a t  about 24,000 feet as a r e s u l t  of a t tempts  t o  
reduce an abnormally high a i r speed  and r a t e  of  c l i m b .  The c r e w  
a t t r i b u t e d  t h e  high readings t o  t h e  a i rcraf t ' s  l i g h t  weight and 
weather cond i t ions ,  Actual ly ,  t h e  f l i g h t  w a s  climbing through 
fo recas t  i c i n g  condi t ions  and t h e  p i t o t  heads became blocked by 
i c ing ,  because t h e  c r e w  had neglected t o  t u r n  on the p i t o t  hea t e r  
switches.  
About 20 minutes before  the f l i g h t ' s  abrupt  end, a t r a f f i c  
Mis in t e rp re t a t ion  of unusual instrument ind ica t ions  can 
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There w e r e  no ind ica t ions  t h a t  any of the c r e w  m e m b e r s  
suspected the t r u e  na ture  of the problem and t h e r e  was no apparent  
attempt t o  revert t o  a t t i t u d e  f ly ing .  This is a d i s t u r b i n g  d i s -  
covery s i n c e  one expects  t h a t  every p i 1  t t o  rec- 
ognize,  and cope with,  problems i n  t h e  
i s  one of  the many p ieces  of 
t h e  subconscious, ready 
c i a t i o n .  There is anoth 
p i l o t ' s  bag of tricks." There is no s t a n  
should go i n t o  t h i s  bag. The s i z e  and 
probably governed a s  much by what w e  "soak up" from our  own ex- 
per iences ,  and those  of  o t h e r s ,  a s  by formal 
t o  reduce the margin between success  and f a i l u r e  t o  ze ro ,  I n  
January 1969, a DC-8 w a s  flown i n t o  the water during an instrument 
approach w h i l e  the c a p t a i n  and the f l i g h t  engineer w e r e  a sce r t a in -  
ing the  p o s i t i o n  of the landing gear  following the f a i l u r e  of  the 
gear  i n d i c a t o r  l i g h t s .  I n  D e c e m b e r  1972, a s i m i l a r ,  " f i f t y -cen t "  
d i s t r a c t i o n  i n  the cockpi t  l ed  t o  the first f a t a l  wide-bodied jet 
acc ident .  
t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  rooms w i t h  warning devices w e  run the r i s k  of 
d u l l i n g  the s e n s i t i v i t y  of our  i n t e r n a l  warning systems t o  the 
poin t  where w e  a r e  becoming victims of our own c leverness .  
I n  some modes of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  s e r i o u s  thoughts is given 
t o  using technology i n  such a manner t h a t  even the most i r r e spons i -  
ble cannot h u r t  themselves. A s i d e  from the  ques t ion  whether any 
s o c i e t y  can a f fo rd  the price of a foolproof t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  system, 
the  na ture  of a v i a t i o n  is such t h a t  it w i l l  probably be the  l a s t  
t o  f a l l  victim t o  the  utopian idea t h a t  you can design ind iv idua l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  completely ou t  of our  freedom of  mobi l i ty .  There- 
fo re ,  t r u e  s a f e t y  i n  a v i a t i o n  cont inues t o  r e q u i r e  an opera t ing  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  and conscience.  
I t  does not  r e q u i r e  an emergency of mo proport ions 
It appears t h a t  i n  the process of c l u t t e r i n g  cockpi t s  and 
PREVENTING EMERGENCIES 
It is not  unusual f o r  an emergency t o  s t a r t  w i t h  our f a i l -  
ure  t o  l i s t e n  t o  an a i r c r a f t  which is t r y i n g  t o  t e l l  us  i t - h a s  
a problem. These s e l f - i n f l i c t e d  emergencies o f t e n  s t a r t  wi th  the  
placebo: "Groundcheck OK" o r  "Carried over." I n  August 1977, the 
N o .  1 engine of  a four-engine t r a n s p o r t  went i n t o  f u l l  reverse a t  
FL 300. Ten days before  t h i s  j o l t i n g  inc iden t ,  the N o .  1 engine 
reverse opera t ing  l i g h t  s t a r t e d  a c t i n g  up. Maintenance personnel 
could not  f i nd  anything wrong w i t h  it. During t h e  ta'keoff on the 
day of  the inc iden t  the reverse l i g h t  i l luminated again,  then  went 
o u t  0 
aga ins t  unpleasant s u r p r i s e s  from a system problem t h a t  stymies 
maintenance, have it i s o l a t e d ;  i f  the system is e s s e n t i a l  t o  f l i g h t ,  
don ' t  accept  
ment l ist ( M  e same category.  Consider t h e  predic- 
ament of t h e  without electrical power s h o r t l y  
a f t e r  a n igh t  takeoff  i n t o  i e n t  condi t ions .  The a i r c r a f t  
had been operated for 4 2  hours w i t h  the N o .  3 genera tor  inopera t ive  
The l e s son  is obvious: i f  you want t o  p r o t e c t  yourself  
s w i t h  regard t o  the i n t e n t  of the  minimum equip- 
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(pe rmis s ib l e  by MEL). Shor t ly  a f t e r  l i f t - o f f ,  a f i re  warning i n  
t h e  N o .  1 engine forced t h e  c r e w  t o  s h u t  down t h a t  engine. ( N o  
evidence of an i n f l i g h t  f i r e  was found i n  t h e  wreckage.) Shor t ly  
a f t e r  shutdown of t h e  N o .  1 engine, a l l  power from the remaining 
( N o .  2 )  generator  was l o s t .  The standby e l e c t r i c a l  system was not  
ac t iva t ed  or f a i l e d  t o  func t ion .  The c r e w  l o s t  a l l  a t t i t u d e  ref- 
erence and an accident  was unavoidable. 
A s  a r e s u l t  of t h i s  acc ident  t h e  MEL was revised and an in-  
dependent, standby a t t i t u d e  i n d i c a t o r  became mandatory f o r  a l l  t u r -  
b o j e t  a i r c r a f t .  Some innocuous quest ions:  D o  you have t o  do any- 
th ing  t o  keep t h i s  l a s t - r e s o r t  instrument opera t ing  and i l lumina t -  
ed i n  case  of t o t a l  loss of e l e c t r i c a l  power i n  your a i r c r a f t ?  
How long w i l l  it ope ra t e  on i t s  own power? 
might be w e l l  t o  po in t  ou t  t h a t  for a f l i g h t  c r e w  t h e r e  is no such 
t h i n g  a s  a f a l s e  warning; every warning has t o  be taken s e r i o u s l y .  
I n  March, 1977 t h e  c r e w  of  a 4-engine t r a n s p o r t  experienced simul- 
taneous f i re  warnings on t h e  N o .  2 and 3 engines a t  FL 330. The 
f i r e  dri l ls  f o r  both engines w e r e  completed and t h e  f l i g h t  was 
continued success fu l ly  on two engines.  I t  was l a t e r  determined 
t h a t  both warnings w e r e  f a l s e .  A s ea l ing  washer w a s  missing from 
a connector i n  t h e  N o .  2 system. Crossed w i r e s  on a r e l a y  u n i t  
caused a sympathetic warning i n  t h e  N o .  3 system. What i s  a c r e w  
t o  do who has a s i m i l a r  experience a f t e r  takeoff  a t  max gross ,  o r  
i n  t h e  middle  of  a P a c i f i c  c ross ing?  How many persons and a i r c r a f t  
have been l o s t  - i n  a l l  forms of  f l y i n g  - because of f a l s e  warnings? 
The s o l u t i o n  of t h i s  problem is i n  the hands of des igners  and main- 
tenance personnel.  
t o  do w i t h  what w e  l e a r n  f r o m  the t r i b u l a t i o n s  of our col leagues.  
Some examples: 
While on t h e  s u b j e c t  of warning l i g h t s  and s igna l? ,  it 
The  prevent ion of emergencies - and acc idents  - has a l o t  
- The N o .  3 engine of a B-747 s t a l l e d  and flamed o u t  
when t h e  a i r c r a f t  encountered the jet wake of another 
B-747 a t  FL 300. 
i n t eg ra t ed  36 seconds after t h e  c r e w  s t a r t e d  ex- 
perimenting with t h e  au to thro t t le / speed  c o n t r o l  
system f o r  no o t h e r  reason than  their  own c u r i o s i t y .  
The a i r c r a f t  w a s  a t  FL 390. Fragments of t h e  N o .  3 
engine penetrated the fuse lage ,  t h e  N o .  2 engine 
nace l l e ,  and the  r i g h t  wing. During t h e  t o t a l  cab in  
decompression, a passenger was forced o u t  of a cab in  
window t h a t  had been broken by an engine fragment. 
- A wide-bodied j e t  s t r u c k  approach l i g h t  supporting 
s t r u c t u r e  af ter  l i f t - o f f  a t  the very end of t h e  
runway. The a i r c r a f t  w a s  damaged s u b s t a n t i a l l y ;  3 of the 
4 hydraul ic  systems became inopera t ive .  The l a t e  
l i f t - o f f  w a s  assoc ia ted  w i t h  the use of i n c o r r e c t  
takeoff  re ference  speeds. There had been a change 
i n  depar ture  runway, which required a f l a p  s e t t i n g  
of 20° i n s t ead  of  100; however, the speed bugs w e r e  
l e f t  a t  t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  s e t t i n g s ,  
- The fan assembly of t h e  N o .  3 engine of  a DC-10 d i s -  
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- Shor t ly  a f t e r  a n ight  t akeof f ,  and w h i l e  en t e r ing  
an ove rcas t ,  the c r e w  of an L-1011 experienced a 
severe nose-up tendency t h a t  could not  be relieved 
by using a l l  a v a i l a b l e  e l e c t r i c a l  t r i m .  Although 
t h e  yoke was held a g a i n s t  the forward s top ,  the 
p i t ch  passed through about 22  degrees and the a i r -  
speed went down t o  140 knots .  By s k i l l f u l  manip- 
u l a t i o n  of  power and f l a p s  t h e  c r e w  was a b l e  t o  
c o n t r o l  the f l i g h t  pa th  and make an ILS approach, 
followed by a successfu l  landing.  
It  was l a t e r  determined t h a t  f a i l u r e  of  a bear ing assembly 
i n  one of  the e l eva to r  drive systems resulted i n  jamming 
of the  l e f t  e l eva to r  i n  the  U P  p o s i t i o n .  
THE F I N A L  O P T I O N  
One of t h e  most ignored t ruisms i n  a v i a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  
a b i l i t y  t o  f l y  an a i r c r a f t  has t o  be complemented by the a b i l i t y  
t o  c ra sh  it competently, should the  need a r i s e .  Equally ignored 
is  t h e  l o g i c  t h a t  a l l  p i l o t s  must possess  a working knowledge of 
c ra sh  dynamics although only a f r a c t i o n  of one percent  of each gen- 
e r a t i o n  of t r a n s p o r t  p i l o t s  f aces  a s i t u a t i o n  where the a i r c r a f t  
ceases  t o  be a f l y i n g  machine. That does no t  mean t h a t  our outlook 
should be one of  morbid preoccupation w i t h  what might  happen. A s -  
s t a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  preparedness i n  t h i s  regard involves only an honest 
attempt t o  grasp  the underlying concepts and s t o r i n g  them - ou t  of  
s i g h t  but  w i th in  reach - i n  our bag of tricks. 
experience has provided one comforting i n s i g h t :  the modern jet  
a i r c r a f t ' s  impressive a b i l i t y  t o  p r o t e c t  i t s  occupants even during 
severe c ra sh  dece le ra t ions .  I t  is  not unusual t o  see an a i r c r a f t  
s l i d e  t o  s t o p  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  rough t e r r a i n ,  during a landing o r  
takeoff  mishap, without extensive t raumatic  effects on t h e  occu- 
pants .  The obvious conclusion is t h a t  a p i l o t  who has some under- 
s tanding of the minimum requirements f o r  an o f f - a i r p o r t  emergency 
landing s i t e  is  i n  a much better pos i t i on  t o  in su re  t h e  success  o f  
a c r a s h  landing,  
Ter ra in  Se lec t ion  
The l eng th  of  a f i e l d  t h a t  w i l l  accommodate a jet t r a n s p o r t  
depends on t h e  condi t ion  of the s o i l .  The smoke-filled B-707 tha t  
was success fu l ly  crash-landed by a p i l o t  who had t o  look o u t  of a 
s ide  window s l i d  1800 feet on dry,  hard farmland. S o f t e r  t e r r a i n ,  
such a s  a c o r n f i e l d ,  would probably reduce t h i s  d i s t ance .  About 
2000 t o  2500 feet of open t e r r a i n  should be adequate f o r  most 
t r a n s p o r t s  a t  t y p i c a l  landing speeds. However, it must be remember- 
ed t h a t  t h i s  is ground d i s t ance .  I f  t h e  approach has t o  be made 
over an obs t ruc ted  a rea ,  a considerable  larger f i e l d  is d e s i r a b l e  
t o  compensate for judgment errors, e s p e c i a l l y  when no power is 
a v a i l a b l e .  Every e f f o r t  should be made t o  prevent the  a i r c r a f t  
from s t r i k i n g  s o l i d  obs t ac l e s  before  the touchdown poin t  is reached. 
If con tac t  w i t h  s e r i o u s  obs t ac l e s  is unavoidable, due t o  t h e  l i m i t s  
of a v a i l a b l e  space, it is best t o  have such con tac t s  occur a t  t h e  
low speed assoc ia ted  w i t h  the end of a ground sl ide.  
Despite a l l  i t s  negat ive connotat ions,  world-wide acc ident  
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T h e  f i e l d  does not  have t o  have the q u a l i t i e s  of  a WW IX 
gras s  s t r i p .  I t  can be gen t ly  r o l l i n g ,  crossed by fences and s m a l l  
di tches,  and covered w i t h  crops and s m a l l  trees. But it should 
not  have d e s t r u c t i v e  obs t ac l e s  l i k e  l a r g e  trees, s o l i d  s t r u c t u r e s ,  
boulders ,  rav ines ,  and powerlines i n  t h e  intended path. Since t h e  
a i r c r a f t  may s w e r v e  a s  it slows down, l a t e r a l  space i n  the second 
h a l f  of the f i e ld  i s  more important t han  i n  the first h a l f .  
followed. Therefore,  a w a t e r  landing can  be a good a l t e r n a t i v e  
when the only o the r  choice  is obviously unsu i t ab le  t e r r a i n .  The  
p r inc ipa l  cons idera t ions  f o r  a d i t ch ing  are: w a t e r  temperature and 
su r face  condi t ions ,  proximity t o  land,  access  t o  water-survival 
equipment, and the t i m e  ava i l ab le  t o  prepare the occupants. 
sist of nothing more than  a brief oppor tuni ty  t o  nudge t h e  a i r c r a f t  
i n t o  the l e a s t  undes i rab le  d i r e c t i o n .  For ins tance ,  when a takeoff  
o r  go-around has  t o  be rejected, the p i l o t  should at tempt  t o  use 
the  remaining con t ro l  over the a i r c r a f t  t o  achieve the most favor- 
ab le  c ra sh  heading. Knowledge of condi t ions  and obs t ac l e s  beyond 
the  runway is v i t a l  i n  t h i s  regard .  A f e w  degrees of change i n  
heading may make a l l  the  d i f f e rence  i n  the outcome of such an 
emergency. 
Jet a i r c r a f t  d i t c h  w e l l  when f l i g h t  manual i n s t r u c t i o n s  are 
During ground-level emergencies t e r r a i n  s e l e c t i o n  may con- 
&proach and Landinq 
T h e  d e s t r u c t i v e  energy tha t  is brought t o  bear on the 
s t r u c t u r a l  i n t e g r i t y  of an  a i r c r a f t  i s  governed by the abruptness  
of the s topping  process  which, i n  tu rn ,  i s  propor t iona l  to stopping 
d i s t ance  and ve loc i ty  squared. Since w e  a r e  concerned with ground- 
speed only,  wind d i r e c t i o n  and v e l o c i t y  can become c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r s .  
An a i r c r a f t  landed w i t h  a t a i lwind  of 20 knots  a t  an ind ica ted  a i r -  
speed of 130 knots has almost t w i c e  a s  much d e s t r u c t i v e  energy a s  
an  a i r c r a f t  landed i n t o  a 20-knot headwind; assuming i d e n t i c a l  
r a t e s  of dece le ra t ion  i n  both cases ,  a t a i lw ind  landing would ex- 
tend ground travel by a f a c t o r  of  nea r ly  two. However, wind direc- 
t i o n  and ve loc i ty  become decisive f a c t o r s  on ly  when t i m e  and cir- 
cumstances pose no ove r r id ing  cons idera t ions .  A con t ro l l ed  touch- 
down i n  less - than- idea l  t e r r a i n  is p re fe rab le  t o  the chance of 
l o s ing  con t ro l  i n  an  a t tempt  t o  reach an  a i r p o r t .  
of f l a p s ,  i f  ava i l ab le ,  s i n c e  they lower the touchdown speed. The 
best pos i t i on  of  a r e t r a c t a b l e  landing gear  i s  sub jec t  t o  ques t ion ,  
except i n  case  of a d i t ch ing  when it de f in i t e ly ' shou ld  be retracted. 
The advice t o  crash-land w i t h  the  gear extended i n  o f f - a i r p o r t  
landings should be weighed agaimst its poss ib l e  consequences, as  
shown by a c t u a l  acc ident  experience i n  one j e t  t r anspor t .  The 
sub jec t  f l i g h t  manual recommends t h a t  the landing gear  be extended 
f o r  crash landings s i n c e  it absorbs cons iderable  energy. It goes 
on t o  say t h a t ,  even if the gear  is c a r r i e d  away, the i n t e g r i t y  
of  t h e  fuel-containing po r t ion  of  the wings w i l l  not  be af fec ted .  
ex tens ive  post-crash f i r e  when an extended landing gear  was sheared 
o f f  i n  a d i t ch  i n  the runway overrun area .  
The proper a i r c r a f t  conf igura t ion  always includes the use 
One aborted takeoff i n  t h i s  model a i r c r a f t  r e su l t ed  i n  an 
The f u e l  s p i l l a g e  w a s  
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a t t r i b u t e d  t o  d i s rup t ion  of an i n t e g r a l  f u e l  tank  when the main 
landing gear  support ing s t r u c t u r e  was t o r n  away. 
forces  on the main fuse lage  and the occupants w e r e  minor. 
A s imi l a r  a i r c r a f t  made an extremely ha 
down on f l a t  t e r r a i n  during an attempted go 
condi t ions .  Almost a l l  occupants sus t a ined  r m  of  deceler- 
a t i v e  i n j u r i e s ;  14 of them w e r e  immobilized 
by rescue  personnel.  The  f a c t  t h a t  there 
and no ca t a s t roph ic  post-crash f i r e  - can 
t h e  r e t r a c t e d  pos i t i on  of t h e  landing gear  
The l a t t e r  mishap provides some i n t e r e s t i n g  i n s i g h t  i n  the 
p re fe r r ed  manner of  touchdown i n  a con t ro l l ed  crash-landing. For 
obvious reasons,  the v e r t i c a l  speed is  reduced t o  zero immediately 
upon ground con tac t  i f  a gear-up landing i s  made. Except f o r  com- 
press ion  and deformation of the fuse lage  bottom, there w i l l  be no 
cushioning effect. This means t h a t  the  p i l o t  should at tempt  t o  
maintain enough c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  t o  reduce the r a t e  of s i n k  t o  
p r a c t i c a l l y  zero a t  touchdown. If he reaches the selected touch- 
down area  a t  excessive forward speed, and f i e l d  l eng th  i s  c r i t i c a l ,  
he should consider  forc ing  the a i r c r a f t  onto the ground despi te  
the higher-than-normal speed. T h i s  advice does not apply t o  
d i t ch ings  which should always be executed a t  t h e  lowest poss ib l e  
speed, bu t  without s t a l l i n g .  
manuals is the manner i n  w h i c h  t he  c r e w  can reduce the  g r e a t e s t  
hazard of an otherwise surv ivable  accident :  a post-crash f ire.  
The ser iousness  of f u e l  s p i l l a g e  depends on the quan t i ty  in-  
volved and the loca t ion .  I n  the  case  of wing-mounted engines 
there is a p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  one o r  more engines w i l l  be t o r n  away 
even during a w e l l  executed gear-up landing on s u i t a b l e  t e r r a i n .  
I f  the na ture  of t h e  obs t ac l e s  makes major wing damage unavoidable, 
it is p re fe rab le  t o  have t h i s  occur symmetrically and simultaneous- 
l y ,  t h a t  is, equal s ec t ions  of outboard wing panels  should be 
severed a t  the same t i m e .  T h i s  he lps  t o  maintain the  desired i m -  
pac t  heading and keeps the fuse lage  from s l i d i n g  sideways i n t o  
obs t ac l e s .  
s a f e t y  advantage over  the m o r e  v o l a t i l e  B-type f u e l s .  T h i s  app l i e s  
t o  i n f l i g h t  i nc iden t s  ( inc luding  l i gh tn ing  strikes) a s  w e l l  a s  
ground mishaps. T h i s  advantage is l o s t  when impact condi t ions  
cause spraying (mis t ing)  of f u e l .  
i g n i t i o n  sources ,  is the immediate shutdown of a l l  engines a s  soon 
as it is apparent t h a t  they  can no longer prevent a ground mishap 
o r  con t r ibu te  t o  con t ro l  over the s topping process .  This s tep 
should be taken any t i m e  t h e  a i r c r a f t ' s  expected ground t r a j e c t o r y  
w i l l  involve o the r  t han  runway sur face .  The t i m e  between shutdown 
and the damage process may be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  cool  t h e  hot  s ec t ion  
tu rb ine  engines below the i g n i t i o n  po in t  of  s p i l l e d  flammables. 
rthermore, t h i s  a c t i o n  precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y  of continued 
engine ope ra t ion  when fuse lage  damage d i s r u p t s  con t ro l  from the 
cockpi t  
The impact 
A commonly overlooked f a c t o r  i n  the  emergency sec t ion  of f l i g h t  
S t a t i s t i c a l l y ,  J e t - A  type  f u e l s  (kerosene) seem t o  have a 
The most obvious and bene f i c i a l  step toward the  reduct ion  of 
Another source of i g n i t i o n  is t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  system. However, 
is system should not be deac t iva ted  u n t i l  its services a r e  no 
longer  needed f o r  a i r c r a f t  con t ro l ,  inst rumentat ion,  and o the r  
v i t a l  func t ions  
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A s  soon a s  t i m e  permits a f t e r  a s i g n i f i c a n t  inc ident ,  cab in  
c r e w  and passengers should get  a message from t h e  cockpi t  a s su r ing  
t h e m  t h a t  t h e  f l i g h t  c r e w  is a t  l e a s t  aware of whatever unusual 
event occurred. Following t h a t  announcement, the  cabin  c r e w  should 
be kep t  informed of any development t ha t  may r equ i r e  an  unscheduled 
o r  emergency landing.  T h i s  add i t iona l  knowledge give's the  cab in  
c r e w  the oppor tuni ty  t o  plan,  coord ina te ,  and implement passenger 
prepara t ion  i n  a t imely and effective manner. 
c r a sh  su rv iva l :  a dece le ra t ion  process  t h a t  helps in su re  impact 
su rv iva l  by leaving  the  occupiable po r t ion  of the fuse lage  a s  much 
a s  poss ib l e  i n t a c t .  The second requirement, t imely evacuation, 
f a l l s  beyond the  scope of t h i s  paper. 
T h i s  d i scuss ion  touched only  on the first requirement f o r  
CONCLUSIONS 
The need t o  be reminded of our v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  emergency 
s i t u a t i o n s  has a p a r a l l e l  i n  our need t o  s u f f e r  booster  shots  t o  
maintain immunity aga ins t  c e r t a i n  d iseases .  Unfortunately,  too  
o f t e n  w e  expect t o  maintain hmuni ty  by keeping t r a c k  only of . 
those emergencies t h a t  r e s u l t e d  i n  widely-publicized acc idents .  
These a r e  j u s t  the v i s i b l e  t i p  of an iceberg  of l ea rn ing  experi-  
ences i n  the form of numerous d a i l y  inc iden t s  t h a t  occur without 
ill effects.  I n  most ca ses  it is the  to l e rance  b u i l t  i n t o  the 
system, o r  the competence of an a l e r t  c r e w ,  t h a t  t akes  the s t i n g  
ou t  of p o t e n t i a l  t h r e a t s .  I n  some cases  it i s  the  random timing 
of the event t h a t  makes it harmless. However, p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  cases  
demonstrate the f a l l i b i l i t y  o r  ingenui ty  of the human element 
throughout the  av ia t ion  sysFem. 
mistakes of o the r s  s ince  w e  won't l i v e  long enouqh t o  make t h e m  
a p i l o t  t h i s  means t h a t  he derives more personal s ecu r i ty ' f rom a 
pub l i ca t ion  t h a t  exposes h i m  t o  the  imperfect ions i n  h i s  opera t iona l  
environment than from one t h a t  te l ls  h i m  how t o  inves t  h i s  money. 
Some of the outs tanding s a f e t y  pub l i ca t ions  t ha t  use t h i s  concept 
a r e :  " B r i t i s h  Airways A i r  Sa fe ty  R e v i e w "  and PanAmerican's "Cross- 
check. '* 
p i l o t s  t o  jump the customary hoops a s  p a r t  o f  their  r ecu r r ing  cer- 
t i f i c a t i o n  process,  w e  should encourage the programming of r e a l -  
world o rdea l s  i n t o  t h e m .  A one-time, unant ic ipa ted  exposure t o  
inc iden t s  such a s  an  iced-up P i t o t - s t a t i c  system, o r  t o t a l  loss  of 
e l e c t r i c a l  power, would make a p i l o t  more responsive t o  ac tua l  
problems i n  these a reas .  T h i s  type  of t r a i n i n g  promotes enl ighten-  
ed decision-making i n  unusual s i t u a t i o n s  without downplaying the 
c o n s t r a i n t s  of s tandard opera t ing  procedures.  
By g iv ing  emergency awareness t he  level of rea l i sm and 
r e s p e c t a b i l i t y  it demands, w e  a l s o  encourage the world-wide shar ing  
of  experiences t h a t  should form the basis of our  preparedness f o r  
uncommon chal lenges.  
The overused expression t h a t  w e ' d  better l e a r n  from the 
a l l  ourse lves  is s t i l l a s  va l id  as  the first t i m e  it was used. For 
I n  add i t ion  t o  using our l i f e l ike  s imula tors  t o  prepare 
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The key t o  t h e  silccess of t h i s  NASA/Industrg lu'orkishcp on Rescurre  ifanagement 
on t5e F l i g h t  Deck is t h e  m a l l  working groups th::t a i1  conference p a r t i c i -  
pants  h a i ~  heen essigned to. Each of t h e  i n v i t e d  p r e s e n t z t i s n s  was s z l e c t s i  
t o  provide you with some t o o l s  t o  work v i th - -  i 4ea  concepts and approhcilp:;. 
It is t h e  applfc-c'iion of t h e s e  t o o l s ,  thrnugh tho d i s c u s s i o n s  and da l ibcra-  
t i o n s  of t h e  wgrking groups, which w i l l  produce new ideas ,  new concepts aiid 
new approaches as w e l l  as i d e n t i f y  c u r r e n t  approaches vhich should be eont in-  
ued o r  expanded. Because o f  t he  c e n t r a l  importance of t h e  working group con- 
c e p t ,  we have given c a r e f u l  coi is iderat ion t o  developing workable, product ive 
o b j e c t i v e s  and approaches f o r  t h e s e  working groups, and t o  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r e  a d  
composition. The ia format ion  below was assembled t o  assist the  working group 
chairmen, t h e  NASA A s s i s t a n t  and t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  members of t h e  working g roxps  
i n  organiz ing  t h e i r  a t  t ack  on t h e i r  ass igned problem. 
OB J E  CT I V C z  
The o b j e c t i v e  of each working group is t o  genera te  a r e p o r t  conta in ing  t h e  
foll.owing information: 
1 .  What are t h e  s p e c i f i c  resource  management s k i l l s ,  behavior and 
p r o f i c i e n c i e s  which should be developed i n  f l i g h t  deck crewmembers? 
2. A t  which p o i n t  i n  an airman's career is it most a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  
i n c o r p o r a t e  resource  management t r a i n i n g ?  
3 .  What are t h e  most a p p r o p r i a t e  techniques f o r  conducting t h i s  
t r a iriing ? 
The fol lowing d i s c u s s i o n  is intended t o  amplify each of t h e s e  objec t ives .  
The o b j e c t i v e  regarding s p e c i f i c  s k i l l s ,  behavior  and p r o f i c i e n c i e s  i s  c e n t r a l  
t o  t h e  whole concept of resource  management t r a i n i n g .  The u l t i m a t e  success  
of any t r a i n i n g  program i s  l a r g e l y  dependent upon t h e  development of d e t z i l e d ,  
p r e c i s e  spec i f i caz io i i s  descr ib ing  t h e  des i red  ecd product.  Furthermore, these 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  w i l l ,  i n  l a r g e  p a r t ,  determine t5e content  and s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  
t r a i n i n g  program, and w i l l  a l s o  form t h e  basis f o r  spec i fy ing  c r i t e r i a  which 
can be used i n  a s s e s s i n g  a i r n a n  performance. 
Some p o s s i b i l i t i e s  have been suggested i n  t h e  formal presenta t ions .  Exanples 
inc.l.ude: ( I )  The Captain must i n s u r e  p o s i t i v e  d e l e g a t i o n  of var ious  d u t i e s  
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  dur ing  a l l  f l i g h t  opera t ions ;  ( 2 )  A l l  crewmml~ers must 
immediately inform t h e i r  f e l l o w  crewmembers of any s i g n i f  i c m t  ques t ion  o r  
doubt about t h e  conten t  o r  meaning of c learances ,  i n s t r u c t i o n s  o r  o t h e r  in- 
formation r e l e v a n t  t o  tho, conduct of the f l i g h t ;  ( 3 )  The Captain Rust es tab-  
l i s h  clear and open l i n e s  of communication between a l l  f l i g h t  deck 
crewmembers. These are g i s e n  h e r e  as examples only-- i t  is up t o  t h e  indi;ridu- 
a1 working groups t o  determine whether t!iese are a p p r o p r i a t e  t r a i n i n g  objcc- 
t ives ,  and t o  develop o t h e r s  as necessary.  
I n  some ways, t h e  ques t ion  about t h e  most a p p r o p r i a t e  phase of an  airman's 
c a r e e r  i n  which to  g i v e  resource  management t r a i n i n g  nay be misleading, be- 
cause i t  impl ies  t h a t  rescurce  management t r a i n i n g  Piould be given a t  o n l y  orie 
po in t .  It seems f a r  more l i k e l y  t h a t  elements of resource  management traintr . ;  
might be incorpora ted  i n t o  e x i s t i n g  phases cf aircrew t r a i n i n g .  I n  c t h c r  
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words, r a t h e r  than def  i n i n 2  a r?sou 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s  as working groups rrmy res 
e f f e c t  t h a t  elcrrents of scsource manag 
r e n t  Lra in in  
F i n a l l y ,  f o r  ea 
d i s c u s s  ions  t h e  
t h e  s imula tor ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
resource  management t r a i n i n  
b l e  t o  v a r i o u s  eleinents of 
c o n s i d e r  which eleinents of t h i s  t r a i n i n g  d g h t  b e  conducted i n  classrooms, 
s m a l l  group d i s c u s s i o n s ,  as p a r t  of an audio-visual  t r a i n i u g  package, o r  
through o t h e r  approaches,  inc luding  t h i n g s  l i k e  S a f e t y  Awareness programs, 
and F l i g h t  Operat ions and S a f e t y  publ ica t ions .  
There are two o t h e r  cons idera t ions  t o  keep i n  mind when consider ing t h e  "How" 
of resource  management t r a i n i n g :  Economics and Regulat ions.  With regard t o  
t h e  former, you are i n  t h e  unique p o s i t i o n  o f  being a b l e  t o  assess t h e  poten- 
t i a l  economic impact of your recommendations, and w e  need not  say more. With 
r e g a r d  t o  the l a t t e r ,  b7e do have r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from FAA F l i g h t  Standards 
p r e s e n t  who are i n  a unique p o s i t i o n  t o  d i s c u s s  c u r r e n t  and f u t u r e  regula tory  
cons idera t ions .  P lease  ca l l  upon t h e  FAA people f o r  h e l p  and guidance on t h i s  
matter. 
PROCEDURES 
Each working group h a s  an assigned chairman from t h e  tndus t ry ,  and a NASA As-  
s i s t a n t  who w i l l  sEme m u l t i p l e  func t ions ,  inc luding  h o s t ,  resource  person, 
t e c h n i c a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  advisor ,  and recording s e c r e t a r y .  Operating pr3- 
cedures  have been l e f t  t o  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  of t h e  working group chairmen. 
Working group assignments w e r e  made by NASA on t h e  b a s i s  of several con- 
s i d e r a t i o n s .  P l e a s e  n o t e  t h a t  e l though w e  have assigned one of t h r e e  s p e c i f i c  
areas ( S e l e c t i o n  and I n i t i a l  Tra in ing ,  T r a n s i t i o n  arid Upgrade Tra in ing ,  and 
Recurrent  Tra in ing  and Line Operat ions)  t o  each 1lorkin.g Group, we do no t  ire311 
t o  s t r i c t l y  l i m i t  t h e  scope af any one group's d i s c u s s i o n  t o  t h e  assigned 
area. I n s t e a d ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  assigned area t o  be an i n d i c a t i o n  of the primary 
area of cons idera t ion .  If you wish t o  make recommendations i n  any o t h e r  
areas, you c e r t a i n l y  may do so a f te r  a th  ugh development of t h e  primary 
ts, along with meeting room 
g Group Assignment Sheet  e your r e g i s t r a t i o n  
o t  have ind iv idua  i n g  group as- 
r y  chairman, and 
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c o n s i s t  of t h r e e  two-person tea:' one KASA person, and one of the th ree  nnn- 
i i idus t ry  speakers.  The rton-:iAS:;. team nembers a r e  Drs. Eolm:in and Helmreicit, 
arid Mr. Garvey. The XASA r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r e  D r s .  B i l l i n g s  and Tanner, and 
Wr. Elurphy. These teams w i l l  c i r c u l a t e  among t h e  working g o u p s ,  and s h s u i d  
be  cousidered as resources  a v a i l a b l e  t o  assist yoclr d e l i b e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e i r  
p a r t i c u l a r  areas of e x p e r t i s e .  ??gain, it is up t o  ach Fkrking grolrp t o  
determine how it wants t o  make u s e  of these "mobile" resources.  
You should a l s o  cons ider  each of t h e  indus t ry  speakers as being 2 v a i l a b l e  t o  
assist  on any given problem. Althcugh these  speakers  hzve been assigned to 
s p e c i f i c  working groups, t h e  working group chairmen w i l l  t emporar i ly  r e i e a s e  
t.hese i n d i v i d u a l s  upon r eques t  from another  group. 
Also no te  t h a t  we have o t h e r  resources  a-Jailable should you need them: FAR 
P a r t  61 and 121; t h e  A i r m e 3 ' s  Information Kanual; some ASRS r e p o r t s ,  and 
s e l e c t e d  a i r c r a f t  acc iden t  r epor t s .  Your NASA A s s i s t a n t  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  lo- 
cate t h i s  material should you d e s i r e  i t .  
WORKTNG GROUP REPORT FORIUT 
It is t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of your NASA Ass i s t an t  t o  he lp  the  Chairman draEt t h e  
Working Group Report which w i l l  be submitted t o  t h e  gene ra l  assembly. To e=- 
s u r e  a uniform format,  we ask t h a t  t h e s e  r e p o r t s  fo l low the  format silggested 
e below. 
Ea.ch r e p o r t  should c o n s i s t  of t h r e e  major s e c t i o n s :  (1) a n  In t roduc t ion ;  ( 2 )  
Recommendations; and (3)  a Summary. The I n t r o d u c t i o n  should c o n s i s t  of a 
maximum of two pages which should desc r ibe  gene ra l  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  npproach 
t aken  t o  t h e  ass igned  i s s u e  by t h e  working group, and o t h e r  material of a gen- 
eral in t roduc to ry  na ture .  
The Recommendations s e c t i o n  is t h e  h e a r t  of t h e  r e p o r t .  This s e c t i o n  should 
b e  q u i t e  s p e c i f i c .  Each recommendation should c o n s i s t  of at least two, and i n  
some cases, t h r e e ,  p a r t s :  (1) Tra in ing  Objec t ives ;  ( 2 )  Tra in ing  Approach; and, 
i f  app ropr i a t e ,  (3 )  Research I s sues .  The Tra in ing  Objec t ives  should be s t a t e d  
i n  s p e c i f i c  terms, and t h e  Tra in ing  Approach should cons ide r  t h e  dua l  i s s u e s  
of How t o  t r a i n  t o  t h e  s t a t e d  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and When i n  an airman's career t h i s  
t r a i n i n g  should be conducted (or  i n t o  which e x i s t i n g  t r a i n i n g  program o r  phase 
t h e  recommended t r a i n i n g  should be incorpora ted) .  
Whenever t h e r e  are Research I s s u e s  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  connection with any spec iF ic  
recoamendation, t h e s e  should be  s t a t e d ,  along wi th  some s ta tement  about t he  
relative p r i o r i t y  of each r e sea rch  i ssue .  
The Summary s e c t i o n  should be l i m i t e d  t o  a maximum of two pages, and should 
a t t empt  t o  summarize t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  group's d i scuss ion .  Any major areas 
of disagreement,  minor i ty  opinions and o t h e r  similar informat ion  should b e  
placed here.  
Renember t h a t  each r e p o r t  must be succ inc t .  We r e a l i z e  t h a t ,  i n  some cases, 
t h i s  is going t o  prec lude  f u l l  d i scuss ion  of t h e  i s sues .  There w i l l  be an op- 
p o r t u n i t y  t o  amplify and c l a r i f y  t h e s e  p o i n t s  during t h e  pane l  d i sc- i ss ion  and 
g e n e r a l  d i scuss ion  Thursday afternoon. Furthermore, an oppor tuni ty  to  f u r t h e r  
develop these  i s s u e s  w i l l  be given during the p repa ra t ion  of t h e  Workshop 
Procedings.  A D r a f t  of t h e  Proceedings w i l l  b e  c i r c u l a t e d  t o  t h e  Working 
Group Chairmen who w i l l  be a b l e  to e d i t ,  modify, expand o r  d e l e t e  s e c t i o n s  of 
t h e  Norking Group r e p o r t s .  
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